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
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✓ CARLYLE ✓

A HISTORY OF GREECE BY GEORGE GROTE

VOLUME XII

EVERY
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GUIDE



IN THY
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HISTORY OF GREECE

PART II

HISTORICAL GREECE

(Continued)

CHAPTER XCII

ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER

A YEAR and some months had sufficed for Alexander to make a first display of his energy and military skill, destined for achievements yet greater ; and to crush the growing aspirations for freedom among Greeks on the south, as well as among Thracians on the north, of Macedonia. The ensuing winter was employed in completing his preparations ; so that early in the spring of 334 B.C. his army destined for the conquest of Asia was mustered between Pella and Amphipolis, while his fleet was at hand to lend support.

The whole of Alexander's remaining life—from his crossing the Hellespont in March or April 334 B.C. to his death at Babylon in June 323 B.C., eleven years and two or three months—was passed in Asia, amidst unceasing military operations, and ever-multiplied conquests. He never lived to revisit Macedonia ; but his achievements were on so transcendent a scale, his acquisitions of territory so unmeasured, and his thirst for further aggrandisement still so insatiate, that Macedonia sinks into insignificance in the list of his possessions. Much more do the Grecian cities dwindle into outlying appendages of a newly-grown Oriental empire. During all these eleven years, the history of Greece is almost a blank, except here and there a few scattered events. It is only at the death of Alexander that the Grecian cities again awaken into active movement.

The Asiatic conquests of Alexander do not belong directly and literally to the province of an historian of Greece. They were achieved by armies of which the general, the principal

officers, and most part of the soldiers, were Macedonian. The Greeks who served with him were only auxiliaries, along with the Thracians and Pæonians. Though more numerous than all the other auxiliaries, they did not constitute, like the Ten Thousand Greeks in the army of the younger Cyrus, the force on which he mainly relied for victory. His chief-secretary, Eumenês, of Kardia, was a Greek, and probably most of the civil and intellectual functions connected with the service were also performed by Greeks. Many Greeks also served in the army of Persia against him, and composed indeed a larger proportion of the real force (disregarding mere numbers) in the army of Darius than in that of Alexander. Hence the expedition becomes indirectly incorporated with the stream of Grecian history by the powerful auxiliary agency of Greeks on both sides—and still more, by its connexion with previous projects, dreams, and legends long antecedent to the aggrandisement of Macedon—as well as by the character which Alexander thought fit to assume. To take revenge on Persia for the invasion of Greece by Xerxês, and to liberate the Asiatic Greeks, had been the scheme of the Spartan Agesilaus, and of the Pheræan Jason; with hopes grounded on the memorable expedition and safe return of the Ten Thousand. It had been recommended by the rhetor Isokratês, first to the combined force of Greece, while yet Grecian cities were free, under the joint headship of Athens and Sparta—next, to Philip of Macedon as the chief of united Greece, when his victorious arms had extorted a recognition of headship, setting aside both Athens and Sparta. The enterprising ambition of Philip was well pleased to be nominated chief of Greece for the execution of this project. From him it passed to his yet more ambitious son.

Though really a scheme of Macedonian appetite and for Macedonian aggrandisement, the expedition against Asia thus becomes thrust into the series of Grecian events, under the Pan-Hellenic pretence of retaliation for the long-past insults of Xerxês. I call it a *pretence*, because it had ceased to be a real Hellenic feeling, and served now two different purposes; first, to ennoble the undertaking in the eyes of Alexander himself, whose mind was very accessible to religious and legendary sentiment, and who willingly identified himself with Agamemnon or Achilles, immortalised as executors of the collective vengeance of Greece for Asiatic insult—next, to assist in keeping the Greeks quiet during his absence. He was himself aware that the real sympathies of the Greeks were rather adverse than favourable to his success.

Asiatic Campaigns of Alexander 3

Apart from this body of extinct sentiment, ostentatiously re-kindled for Alexander's purposes, the position of the Greeks in reference to his Asiatic conquests was very much the same as that of the German contingents, especially those of the Confederation of the Rhine, who served in the grand army with which the Emperor Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812. They had no public interest in the victory of the invader, which could end only by reducing them to still greater prostration. They were likely to adhere to their leader as long as his power continued unimpaired, but no longer. Yet Napoleon thought himself entitled to reckon upon them as if they had been Frenchmen, and to denounce the Germans in the service of Russia as traitors who had forfeited the allegiance which they owed to him. We find him drawing the same pointed distinction between the Russian and the German prisoners taken, as Alexander made between Asiatic and Grecian prisoners. These Grecian prisoners the Macedonian prince reproached as guilty of treason against the proclaimed statute of collective Hellas, whereby he had been declared general and the Persian king a public enemy.¹

Hellas, as a political aggregate, has now ceased to exist,

¹ Arrian, i. 16, 10; i. 29, 9, about the Grecian prisoners taken at the victory of the Granikus—*ὅσους δὲ αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους ἔλαβε, τούτους δὲ δῆσας ἐν πέδαις, εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀπέπεμψεν ἐργάζεσθαι, ὅτι παρὰ τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, Ἕλληνες ὄντες, ἐναντία τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὲρ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐμάχοντο.* Also iii. 23, 15, about the Grecian soldiers serving with the Persians, and made prisoners in Hyrkania—*Ἀδικεῖν γὰρ μεγάλα* (said Alexander) *τοὺς στρατευομένους ἐναντία τῇ Ἑλλάδι: παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροις παρὰ τὰ δόγματα τῶν Ἑλλήνων.*

Toward the end of October 1812, near Moscow, General Winzingerode, a German officer in the Russian service,—with his aide-de-camp a native Russian, Narishkin,—became prisoner of the French. He was brought to Napoleon—"At the sight of that German general, all the secret resentments of Napoleon took fire. 'Who are you (he exclaimed)? a man without country! When I was at war with the Austrians, I found you in their ranks. Austria has become my ally, and you have entered into the Russian service. You have been one of the warmest instigators of the present war. Nevertheless, you are a native of the Confederation of the Rhine: *you are my subject.* You are not an ordinary enemy: you are a rebel: I have a right to bring you to trial. *Gens d'armes*, seize this man!' Then addressing the aide-de-camp of Winzingerode, Napoleon said, 'As for you, Count Narishkin, I have nothing to reproach you with: you are a Russian, you are doing your duty.'" (Ségur's Account of the Campaign in Russia, book ix. ch. vi. p. 132.)

These threats against Winzingerode were not realised, because he was liberated by the Cossacks during his passage into France: but the language of Napoleon expresses just the same sentiment as that of Alexander towards the captive Greeks.

except in so far as Alexander employs the name for his own purposes. Its component members are annexed as appendages, doubtless of considerable value, to the Macedonian kingdom. Fourteen years before Alexander's accession, Demosthenês, while instigating the Athenians to uphold Olynthus against Philip, had told them¹—"The Macedonian power, considered as an appendage, is of no mean value ; but by itself, it is weak and full of embarrassments." Inverting the position of the parties, these words represent exactly what Greece herself had become, in reference to Macedonia and Persia, at the time of Alexander's accession. Had the Persians played their game with tolerable prudence and vigour, his success would have been measured by the degree to which he could appropriate Grecian force to himself, and withhold it from his enemy.

Alexander's memorable and illustrious manifestations, on which we are now entering, are those, not of the ruler or politician, but of the general and the soldier. In this character his appearance forms a sort of historical epoch. It is not merely in soldierlike qualities—in the most forward and even adventurous bravery—in indefatigable personal activity, and in endurance as to hardship and fatigue,—that he stands pre-eminent ; though these qualities alone, when found in a king, act so powerfully on those under his command, that they suffice to produce great achievements, even when combined with generalship not surpassing the average of his age. But in generalship, Alexander was yet more above the level of his contemporaries. His strategic combinations, his employment of different descriptions of force conspiring towards one end, his long-sighted plans for the prosecution of campaigns, his constant foresight and resource against new difficulties, together with rapidity of movement even in the worst country—all on a scale of prodigious magnitude—are without parallel in ancient history. They carry the art of systematic and scientific warfare to a degree of efficiency, such as even successors trained in his school were unable to keep up unimpaired.

We must recollect however that Alexander found the Macedonian military system built up by Philip, and had only to apply and enlarge it. As transmitted to him, it embodied the accumulated result and matured fruit of a series of successive improvements, applied by Grecian tacticians to the primitive

¹ Demosth. Olynth. ii. p. 22. "Ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ δύναμις καὶ ἀρχὴ ἐν μὲν προσθήκης μέρει ἐστὶ τις οὐ μικρά, ὅσον ὑπὲρ ἑξέ ποθ' ὑμῖν ἐπὶ Τιμοθέου πρὸς Ὀλυνθίους . . . αὕτη δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἀσθενὴς καὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ μεσστή.

Hellenic arrangements. During the sixty years before the accession of Alexander, the art of war had been conspicuously progressive—to the sad detriment of Grecian political freedom. “Everything around us (says Demosthenês addressing the people of Athens in 342 B.C.) has been in advance for some years past—nothing is like what it was formerly—but nowhere is the alteration and enlargement more conspicuous than in the affairs of war. Formerly, the Lacedæmonians as well as other Greeks did nothing more than invade each other’s territory, during the four or five summer months, with their native force of citizen hoplites: in winter they stayed at home. But now we see Philip in constant action, winter as well as summer, attacking all around him, not merely with Macedonian hoplites, but with cavalry, light infantry, bowmen, foreigners of all descriptions, and siege batteries.”¹

I have in several preceding chapters dwelt upon this progressive change in the character of Grecian soldiery. At Athens, and in most other parts of Greece, the burghers had become averse to hard and active military service. The use of arms had passed mainly to professional soldiers, who, without any feeling of citizenship, served wherever good pay was offered, and became immensely multiplied, to the detriment and danger of Grecian society.² Many of these mercenaries were lightly armed—peltasts served in combination with the hoplites.³ Iphikratês greatly improved and partly re-armed the peltasts; whom he employed conjointly with hoplites so effectively as to astonish his contemporaries.⁴ His innovation

¹ Demosth. Philipp. iii. pp. 123, 124: compare Olynth. ii. p. 22. I give here the substance of what is said by the orator, not strictly adhering to his words.

² Isokratês, in several of his discourses, notes the gradual increase of these mercenaries—men without regular means of subsistence, or fixed residence, or civic obligations. Or. iv. (Panegyric), s. 195; Or. v. (Philippus), s. 112-142; Or. viii. (De Pace), s. 31-56.

³ Xenoph. Magist. Equit. ix. 4. *Οἶδα δ' ἐγὼ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ ἱππικὸν ἀρξάμενον εὐδοκίμειν, ἐπεὶ ξένους ἱππίας προσέλαβον· καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι πανταχοῦ τὰ ξενικὰ ὁρῶ εὐδοκίμουνα.*

Compare Demosth. Philippic. i. p. 46; Xenoph. Hellenic. iv. 4, 14; Isokratês, Orat. vii. (Areopagit.), s. 93.

⁴ For an explanation of the improved arming of peltasts introduced by Iphikratês, see vol. ix. chap. lxxv. of this History. Respecting these improvements, the statements both of Diodorus (xv. 44) and of Nepos are obscure. MM. Rüstow and Köchly (in their valuable work, *Geschichte des Griechischen Kriegswesens*, Aarau, 1852, B. ii. p. 164) have interpreted the statements in a sense to which I cannot subscribe. They think that Iphikratês altered not only the arming of peltasts, but also that of hoplites; a supposition, which I see nothing to justify.

was further developed by the great military genius of Epaminondas ; who not only made infantry and cavalry, light-armed and heavy-armed, conspire to one scheme of operations, but also completely altered the received principles of battle-manceuvring, by concentrating an irresistible force of attack on one point of the enemy's line, and keeping the rest of his own line more on the defensive. Besides these important improvements, realised by generals in actual practice, intelligent officers like Xenophon embodied the results of their military experience in valuable published criticisms.¹ Such were the lessons which the Macedonian Philip learnt and applied to the enslavement of those Greeks, especially of the Thebans, from whom they were derived. In his youth, as a hostage at Thebes, he had probably conversed with Epaminondas, and must certainly have become familiar with the Theban military arrangements. He had every motive, not merely from ambition of conquest, but even from the necessities of defence, to turn them to account ; and he brought to the task military genius and aptitude of the highest order. In arms, in evolutions, in engines, in regimenting, in war-office arrangements, he introduced important novelties ; bequeathing to his successors the Macedonian military system, which, with improvements by his son, lasted until the conquest of the country by Rome, near two centuries afterwards.

The military force of Macedonia, in the times anterior to Philip, appears to have consisted, like that of Thessaly, in a well-armed and well-mounted cavalry, formed from the substantial proprietors of the country—and in a numerous assemblage of peltasts or light infantry (somewhat analogous to the Thessalian Penestæ) : these latter were the rural population, shepherds or cultivators, who tended sheep and cattle, or tilled the earth, among the spacious mountains and valleys of Upper Macedonia. The Grecian towns near the coast, and the few Macedonian towns in the interior, had citizen-hoplites better

¹ Besides the many scattered remarks in the *Anabasis*, the *Cyropædia* is full of discussion and criticism on military phenomena. It is remarkable to what an extent Xenophon had present to his mind all the exigencies of war, and the different ways of meeting them. See as an example, *Cyropæd.* vi. 2 ; ii. 1.

The work on sieges, by Æneas (*Poliorketika*), is certainly anterior to the military improvements of Philip of Macedon ; probably about the beginning of his reign. See the preface to it by Rüstow and Köchly, p. 8, in their edition of *Die Griechischen Kriegsschriftsteller*, Leips. 1853. In this work, allusion is made to several others, now lost, by the same author—*Παρασκευαστική βίβλος*, *Ποριστική βίβλος*, *Στρατοπεδευτική*, &c.

armed : but foot service was not in honour among the natives, and the Macedonian infantry in their general character were hardly more than a rabble. At the period of Philip's accession, they were armed with nothing better than rusty swords and wicker shields, noway sufficient to make head against the inroads of their Thracian and Illyrian neighbours ; before whom they were constantly compelled to flee for refuge up to the mountains.¹ Their condition was that of poor herdsmen, half-naked or covered only with hides, and eating from wooden platters ; not much different from that of the population of Upper Macedonia three centuries before, when first visited by Perdikkas the ancestor of the Macedonian kings, and when the wife of the native prince baked bread with her own hands.² On the other hand, though the Macedonian infantry was thus indifferent, the cavalry of the country was excellent, both in the Peloponnesian war, and in the war carried on by Sparta against Olynthus more than twenty years afterwards.³ These horsemen, like the Thessalians, charged in compact order, carrying as their principal weapon of offence, not javelins to be hurled, but the short thrusting-pike for close combat.

Thus defective was the military organisation which Philip found. Under his auspices it was cast altogether anew. The poor and hardy Landwehr of Macedonia, constantly on the defensive against predatory neighbours, formed an excellent material for soldiers, and proved not intractable to the innovations of a warlike prince. They were placed under constant training in the regular rank and file of heavy infantry : they were moreover brought to adopt a new description of arm, not only in itself very difficult to manage, but also comparatively

¹ See the striking speech addressed by Alexander to the discontented Macedonian soldiers, a few months before his death, at Opis or Susa (Arrian, vii. 9).

... Φίλιππος γὰρ παραλαβὼν ὑμᾶς πλανήτας καὶ ἀπόρους, ἐν διφθέραις τοὺς πολλοὺς νέμοντας ἀνὰ τὰ ὄρη πρόβατα κατὰ ὀλίγα, καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων κακῶς μαχομένους Ἰλλυριοῖς τε καὶ Τριβαλλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὁμόροις Θραξί, χλαμύδας μὲν ὑμῖν ἀντὶ τῶν διφθερῶν φορεῖν ἔδωκε, κατήγαγε δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὄρων ἐς τὰ πεδία, ἀξιομάχους καταστήσας τοῖς προσχώροις τῶν βαρβάρων, ὥς μὴ χωρίων ἔτι ὀχυρότητι πιστεύοντας μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀρετῇ σώζεσθαι . . .

In the version of the same speech given by Curtius (x. 10, 23), we find, "Modo sub Philippo seminudis, amicula ex purpurâ sordent, aurum et argentum oculi ferre non possunt : lignea enim vasa desiderant, et ex cratibus scuta rubiginemque gladiatorum," &c.

Compare the description given by Thucydides, iv. 124, of the army of Brasidas and Perdikkas, where the Macedonian foot are described as ἄλλος ὄμιλος τῶν βαρβάρων πολὺς.

² Herodot. viii. 137.

³ Thucyd. ii. 100 ; Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 40-42.

useless to the soldier when fighting single-handed, and only available by a body of men in close order, trained to move or stand together. The new weapon, of which we first hear the name in the army of Philip, was the sarissa—the Macedonian pike or lance. The sarissa was used both by the infantry of his phalanx, and by particular regiments of his cavalry; in both cases it was long, though that of the phalanx was much the longer of the two. The regiments of cavalry called Sarissophori or Lancers were a sort of light-horse, carrying a long lance, and distinguished from the heavier cavalry intended for the shock of hand combat, who carried the xyston or short pike. The sarissa of this cavalry may have been fourteen feet in length, as long as the Cossack pike now is; that of the infantry in phalanx was not less than twenty-one feet long. This dimension is so prodigious and so unwieldy, that we should hardly believe it, if it did not come attested by the distinct assertion of an historian like Polybius.

The extraordinary reach of the sarissa or pike constituted the prominent attribute and force of the Macedonian phalanx. The phalangites were drawn up in files generally of sixteen deep, each called a Lochus; with an interval of three feet between each two soldiers from front to rear. In front stood the lochage, a man of superior strength, and of tried military experience. The second and third men in the file, as well as the rearmost man who brought up the whole, were also picked soldiers, receiving larger pay than the rest. Now the sarissa, when in horizontal position, was held with both hands (distinguished in this respect from the pike of the Grecian hoplite, which occupied only one hand, the other being required for the shield), and so held that it projected fifteen feet before the body of the pikeman; while the hinder portion of six feet was so weighted as to make the pressure convenient in such division. Hence, the sarissa of the man standing second in the file, projected twelve feet beyond the front rank; that of the third man, nine feet; those of the fourth and fifth ranks respectively six feet and three feet. There was thus presented a quintuple series of pikes by each file to meet an advancing enemy. Of these five, the three first would be decidedly of greater projection, and even the fourth of not less projection, than the pikes of Grecian hoplites coming up as enemies to the charge. The ranks behind the fifth, while serving to sustain and press onward the front, did not carry the sarissa in a horizontal position, but slanted it over the shoulders of those before them, so as to break the force of any darts or arrows

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which might be shot over head from the rear ranks of the enemy.¹

The phalangite (soldier of the phalanx) was further provided with a short sword, a circular shield of rather more than two feet in diameter, a breast-piece, leggings, and a kausia or broad-brimmed hat—the head-covering common in the Macedonian army. But the long pikes were in truth the main weapons of defence as well as of offence. They were destined to contend against the charge of Grecian hoplites with the one-handed pike and heavy shield; especially against the most formidable manifestation of that force, the deep Theban column organised by Epaminondas. This was what Philip had to deal with, at his accession, as the irresistible infantry of Greece, bearing down everything before it by thrust of pike and propulsion of shield. He provided the means of vanquishing it, by training his poor Macedonian infantry to the systematic use of the long two-handed pike. The Theban column, charging a phalanx so armed, found themselves unable to break into the array of protended pikes, or to come to push of shield. We are told that at the battle of Chæroneia, the front rank Theban soldiers, the chosen men of the city, all perished on the ground; and this is not wonderful, when we conceive them as rushing, by their own courage as well as by the pressure upon them from behind, upon a wall of pikes double the length of their own. We must look at Philip's phalanx with reference to the enemies before him, not with reference to the later Roman organisation, which Polybius brings into comparison. It answered perfectly the purposes of Philip, who wanted it mainly to stand the shock in front, thus overpowering Grecian hoplites in their own mode of attack. Now Polybius informs us, that the phalanx was never once beaten, in front and on ground suitable for it; and wherever the ground was fit for hoplites, it was also fit for the phalanx. The inconveniences of Philip's array, and of the long pikes, arose from the incapacity of the phalanx to change its front or keep its order on unequal ground; but such inconveniences were hardly less felt by Grecian hoplites.²

The Macedonian phalanx, denominated the *Pezetæri*³ or

¹ Respecting the length of the pike of the Macedonian phalanx, see Appendix to this Chapter.

² The impression of admiration, and even terror, with which the Roman general Paulus Emilius was seized, on first seeing the Macedonian phalanx in battle array at Pydna—has been recorded by Polybius (Polybius, *Fragm.* xxix. 6, 11; *Livy*, xlv. 40).

³ Harpokration and Photius, v. *Πεζέταιροι*, *Demosth.* *Olynth.* ii. p. 23; *Arrian*, iv. 23, 1. *τῶν πεζεταίων καλουμένων τὰς τάξεις*, and ii. 23, 2, &c.

Foot Companions of the King, comprised the general body of native infantry, as distinguished from special *corps d'armée*. The largest division of it which we find mentioned under Alexander, and which appears under the command of a general of division, is called a Taxis. How many of these Taxeis there were in all, we do not know; the original Asiatic army of Alexander (apart from what he left at home) included six of them, coinciding apparently with the provincial allotments of the country: Orestæ, Lynkestæ, Elimiotæ, Tymphæi, &c.¹ The writers on tactics give us a systematic scale of distribution (ascending from the lowest unit, the Lochus of sixteen men, by successive multiples of two, up to the quadruple phalanx of 16,384 men) as pervading the Macedonian army. Among these divisions, that which stands out as most fundamental and constant, is the Syntagma, which contained sixteen Lochi. Forming thus a square of sixteen men in front and depth, or 256 men, it was at the same time a distinct aggregate or permanent battalion, having attached to it five supernumeraries, an ensign, a rear-man, a trumpeter, a herald, and an attendant or orderly.² Two of these Syntagmas composed a body of 512 men, called a Pentakosiarchy, which in Philip's time is said to have been the ordinary regiment, acting together under a separate command; but several of these were doubled by Alexander when he reorganised his army at Susa,³ so as to form regiments of 1024 men, each under his Chiliarch,

Since we know from Demosthenês that the *pezetæri* date from the time of Philip, it is probable that the passage of Anaximenês (as cited by Harpokration and Photius) which refers them to Alexander, has ascribed to the son what really belongs to the father. The term *ἐταῖροι*, in reference to the kings of Macedonia, first appears in Plutarch, Pelopidas, 27, in reference to Ptolemy, before the time of Philip: see Otto Abel, *Makedonien vor König Philip*, p. 129 (the passage of Ælian referred to by him seems of little moment). The term Companions or Comrades had under Philip a meaning purely military, designating foreigners as well as Macedonians serving in his army: see Theopompus, *Fragm.* 249. The term, originally applied only to a select few, was by degrees extended to the corps generally.

¹ Arrian, i. 14, 3. iii. 16, 19; Diodor. xvii. 57. Compare the note of Schmieder on the above passage of Arrian; also Droysen, *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*, pp. 95, 96, and the elaborate note of Müttel on Curtius, v. 2, 3, p. 400.

The passage of Arrian (his description of Alexander's army arrayed at the Granikus) is confused, and seems erroneous in some words of the text; yet it may be held to justify the supposition of six taxeis of *pezetæri* in Alexander's phalanx on that day. There seem also to be six taxeis at Arbêla (iii. 11, 16).

² Arrian, *Tactic.* c. 10; Ælian, *Tactic.* c. 9.

³ Curtius, v. 2, 3.

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and each comprising four Syntagmas. All this systematic distribution of the Macedonian military force when at home, appears to have been arranged by the genius of Philip. On actual foreign service, no numerical precision could be observed; a regiment or a division could not always contain the same fixed number of men. But as to the array, a depth of sixteen, for the files of the phalangites, appears to have been regarded as important and characteristic,¹ perhaps essential to impart a feeling of confidence to the troops. It was a depth much greater than was common with Grecian hoplites, and never surpassed by any Greeks except the Thebans.

But the phalanx, though an essential item, was yet only one among many, in the varied military organisation introduced by Philip. It was neither intended, nor fit, to act alone; being clumsy in changing front to protect itself either in flank or rear, and unable to adapt itself to uneven ground. There was another description of infantry organised by Philip called the Hypaspists—shield-bearers or Guards;² originally few in number, and employed for personal defence of the prince—but afterwards enlarged into several distinct *corps d'armée*. These Hypaspists or Guards were light infantry of the line;³ they were hoplites, keeping regular array and intended for close combat, but more lightly armed, and more fit for diversities of circumstance and position than the phalanx. They seem to have fought with the one-handed pike and shield, like the Greeks; and not to have carried the two-handed phalangite pike or sarissa. They occupied a sort of intermediate place between the heavy infantry of the phalanx properly so called—and the peltasts and light troops generally. Alexander in his later campaigns had them distributed into Chiliarchies (how the distribution stood earlier, we have no distinct information), at least three in number, and probably more.⁴ We find them employed by him in forward and aggressive movements; first his light troops and cavalry begin the attack; next the hypaspists

¹ This is to be seen in the arrangements made by Alexander a short time before his death, when he incorporated Macedonian and Persian soldiers in the same lochos; the normal depth of sixteen was retained; all the front ranks or privileged men being Macedonians. The Macedonians were much hurt at seeing their native regimental array shared with Asiatics (Arrian, vii. 11, 5; vii. 23, 4-8).

² The proper meaning of *ὑπασπισταί*, as guards or personal attendants on the prince, appears in Arrian, i. 5, 3; vii. 8, 6.

Neoptolemus, as *ἀρχιὑπασπιστής* to Alexander, carried the shield and lance of the latter on formal occasions (Plutarch, Eumenēs, 1).

³ Arrian, ii. 4, 3, 4; ii. 20, 5.

⁴ Arrian, iv. 30, 11; v. 23, 11.

come to follow it up ; lastly, the phalanx is brought up to support them. The hypaspists are used also for assault of walled places, and for rapid night marches.¹ What was the total number of them we do not know.²

Besides the phalanx, and the hypaspists or Guards, the Macedonian army, as employed by Philip and Alexander, included a numerous assemblage of desultory or irregular troops, partly native Macedonians, partly foreigners, Thracians, Pæonians, &c. They were of different descriptions ; peltasts, darters, and bowmen. The best of them appear to have been the Agriænes, a Pæonian tribe expert in the use of the javelin. All of them were kept in vigorous movement by Alexander, on the flanks and in front of his heavy infantry, or intermingled with his cavalry,—as well as for pursuit after the enemy was defeated.

Lastly, the cavalry in Alexander's army was also admirable—at least equal, and seemingly even superior in efficiency, to his best infantry.³ I have already mentioned that cavalry was the choice native force of Macedonia, long before the reign of Philip ; by whom it had been extended and improved.⁴ The heavy cavalry, wholly or chiefly composed of native Macedonians, was known by the denomination of the Companions. There was besides a new and lighter variety of cavalry, apparently introduced by Philip, and called the Sarissophori, or Lancers, used like Cossacks for advanced posts or scouring the country. The sarissa which they carried was probably much shorter than that of the phalanx ; but it was long, if compared with the xyston or thrusting-pike used by the heavy cavalry for the shock of close combat. Arrian, in describing the army of Alexander at Arbëla, enumerates eight distinct squadrons of this heavy cavalry—or cavalry of the Companions ; but the total number included in the Macedonian army at

¹ Arrian, ii. 20, 5 ; ii. 23, 6 ; iii. 18, 8.

² Droysen and Schmiedel give the number of hypaspists in Alexander's army at Issus, as 6000. That this opinion rests on no sufficient evidence, has been shown by Müttel (ad Curtium, v. 2, 3, p. 399). But that the number of hypaspists left by Philip at his death was 6000 seems not improbable.

³ See Arrian, v. 14, 1 ; v. 16, 4 ; Curtius, vi. 9, 22. "Equitatui, optimæ exercitûs parti," &c.

⁴ We are told that Philip, after his expedition against the Scythians about three years before his death, exacted and sent into Macedonia 20,000 chosen mares, in order to improve the breed of Macedonian horses. The regal haras were in the neighbourhood of Pella (Justin, ix. 2 ; Strabo, xvi. p. 752, in which passage of Strabo, the details apply to the haras of Seleukus Nikator at Apameia, not to that of Philip at Pella).

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Alexander's accession, is not known. Among the squadrons, several at least (if not all) were named after particular towns or districts of the country—Bottiaea, Amphipolis, Apollonia, Anthemus, &c.;¹ there was one or more, distinguished as the Royal Squadron—the Agêma or leading body of cavalry—at the head of which Alexander generally charged, himself among the foremost of the actual combatants.²

The distribution of the cavalry into squadrons was that which Alexander found at his accession; but he altered it, when he remodelled the arrangements of his army (in 330 B.C.) at Susa, so as to subdivide the squadron into two Lochi, and to establish the Lochus for the elementary division of cavalry, as it had always been of infantry.³ His reforms went thus to cut down the primary body of cavalry from the squadron to the half-squadron or Lochus, while they tended to bring the infantry together into larger bodies—from cohorts of 500 each to cohorts of 1000 men each.

Among the Hypaspists or Guards, also, we find an Agêma or chosen cohort which was called upon oftener than the rest to begin the fight. A still more select corps were, the Body-Guards; a small company of tried and confidential men, individually known to Alexander, always attached to his person, and acting as adjutants or as commanders for special service. These Body-Guards appear to have been chosen persons promoted out of the Royal Youths or Pages; an institution first established by Philip, and evincing the pains taken by him to bring the leading Macedonians into military organisation as well as into dependence on his own person. The Royal Youths, sons of the chief persons throughout Macedonia, were taken by Philip into service, and kept in permanent residence around him for purposes of domestic attendance and companionship. They maintained perpetual

¹ Arrian, i. 2, 8, 9 (where we also find mentioned *τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑνωθεν Μακεδονίας ἱππέας*); i. 12, 12; ii. 9, 6; iii. 11, 12.

About the *ἱππεῖς σαρισσοφόροι*, see i. 13, 1.

It is possible that there may have been sixteen squadrons of heavy cavalry, and eight squadrons of the Sarissophori,—each squadron from 180 to 250 men—as Rüstow and Köchly conceive (p. 243). But there is no sufficient evidence to prove it; nor can I think it safe to assume, as they do, that Alexander carried over with him to Asia *just half* of the Macedonian entire force.

² Arrian, iii. 11, 11; iii. 13, 1; iii. 18, 8. In the first of these passages, we have *ἱλαὶ βασιλικάι* in the plural (iii. 11, 12). It seems too that the different *ἱλαὶ* alternated with each other in the foremost position, or *ἡγεμονία*, for particular days (Arrian, i. 14, 9).

³ Arrian, iii. 16, 19.

guard of his palace, alternating among themselves the hours of daily and nightly watch: they received his horse from the grooms, assisted him to mount, and accompanied him if he went to the chase: they introduced persons who came to solicit interviews, and admitted his mistresses by night through a special door. They enjoyed the privilege of sitting down to dinner with him, as well as that of never being flogged except by his special order.¹ The precise number of the company we do not know; but it must have been not small, since fifty of these youths were brought out from Macedonia at once by Amyntas to join Alexander, and to be added to the company at Babylon.² At the same time the mortality among them was probably considerable; since, in accompanying Alexander, they endured even more than the prodigious fatigues which he imposed upon himself.³ The training in this corps was a preparation first for becoming Body-Guards of Alexander,—next, for appointment to the great and important military commands. Accordingly, it had been the first stage of ad-

¹ Arrian, iv. 13, 1. Ἐκ Φιλίππου ἦν ἡδὴ καθεστηκός, τῶν ἐν τέλει Μακεδόνων τοὺς παῖδας, ὅσοι ἐς ἡλικίαν ἐμειρακίσαντο, καταλέγεσθαι ἐς θεραπείαν τοῦ βασιλέως. Τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἑλλην διαίταν τοῦ σώματος διακονεῖσθαι βασιλεῖ, καὶ κοιμώμενον φυλάσσειν, τοῦτοιοι ἐπετέτραπτο· καὶ ὅποτε ἐξελαύνοι βασιλεὺς, τοὺς ἵππους παρὰ τῶν ἵπποκόμων δεχόμενοι ἐκείνοι προσήγον, καὶ ἀνέβαλον οὗτοι βασιλέα τὸν Περσικὸν τρόπον, καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ θήρᾳ φιλοτιμίας βασιλεῖ κοινῶν ᾔσαν, &c.

Curtius, viii. 6, 1. "Mos erat principibus Macedonum adultos liberos regibus tradere, ad munia haud multum servilibus ministeriis abhorrentia. Excubabant servatis noctium vicibus proximi foribus ejus ædis, in quâ rex acquiescebat. Per hos pellices introducebantur, alio aditu quam quem armati obsidebant. Iidem acceptos ab agasonibus equos, quum rex ascensus esset, admovebant; comitabanturque et venantem, et in præliis, omnibus artibus studiorum liberalium exculti. Præcipuus honor habebatur, quod licebat sedentibus vesci cum rege. Castigandi eos verberibus nullius potestas præter ipsum erat. Hæc cohors velut seminarium ducum præfectorumque apud Macedonas fuit: hinc habuere posteri reges, quorum stirpibus post multas ætates Romani opes ademerunt." Compare Curtius, v. 6, 42; and Ælian, V. H. xiv. 49.

This information is interesting, as an illustration of Macedonian manners and customs, which are very little known to us. In the last hours of the Macedonian monarchy, after the defeat at Pydna (168 B.C.), the *pueri regii* followed the defeated king Perseus to the sanctuary at Samothrace, and never quitted him until the moment when he surrendered himself to the Romans (Livy, xlv. 5).

As an illustration of the scourging, applied as a punishment to these young Macedonians of rank, see the case of Dekamnichus, handed over by king Archelaus to Euripidês, to be flogged (Aristotle, Polit. v. 8, 13).

² Curtius, v. 6, 42; Diodor. xvii. 65.

³ We read this about the youthful Philippos, brother of Lysimachus (Curtius, viii. 2, 36).

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vancement to most of the Diadochi, or great officers of Alexander, who after his death carved kingdoms for themselves out of his conquests.

It was thus that the native Macedonian force was enlarged and diversified by Philip, including at his death:—1. The phalanx, Foot-companions, or general mass of heavy infantry, drilled to the use of the long two-handed pike or sarissa—2. The Hypaspists, or lighter-armed corps of foot-guards—3. The Companions, or heavy cavalry, the ancient indigenous force consisting of the more opulent or substantial Macedonians—4. The lighter cavalry, lancers, or Sarissophori. With these were joined foreign auxiliaries of great value. The Thessalians, whom Philip had partly subjugated and partly gained over, furnished him with a body of heavy cavalry not inferior to the native Macedonian. From various parts of Greece he derived hoplites, volunteers taken into his pay, armed with the full-sized shield and one-handed pike. From the warlike tribes of Thracians, Pæonians, Illyrians, &c., whom he had subdued around him, he levied contingents of light troops of various descriptions, peltasts, bowmen, darters, &c., all excellent in their way, and eminently serviceable to his combinations, in conjunction with the heavier masses. Lastly, Philip had completed his military arrangements by organising what may be called an effective siege-train for sieges as well as for battles; a stock of projectile and battering machines, superior to anything at that time extant. We find this artillery used by Alexander in the very first year of his reign, in his campaign against the Illyrians.¹ Even in his most distant Indian marches, he either carried it with him, or had the means of constructing new engines for the occasion. There was no part of his military equipment more essential to his conquests. The victorious sieges of Alexander are among his most memorable exploits.

To all this large, multifarious and systematised array of actual force, are to be added the civil establishments, the dépôts, magazines of arms, provision for remounts, drill officers and adjutants, &c., indispensable for maintaining it in constant training and efficiency. At the time of Philip's accession, Pella was an unimportant place;² at his death, it was not only strong as a fortification and place of deposit for regal treasure, but also the permanent centre, war-office, and training quarters, of the greatest military force then known. The military registers

¹ Arrian, i. 6, 17.

² Demosthenes, *De Coronâ*, p. 247.

as well as the traditions of Macedonian discipline were preserved there until the fall of the monarchy.¹ Philip had employed his life in organising this powerful instrument of dominion. His revenues, large as they were, both from mines and from tributary conquests, had been exhausted in the work, so that he had left at his decease a debt of 500 talents. But his son Alexander found the instrument ready-made, with excellent officers, and trained veterans for the front ranks of his phalanx.²

This scientific organisation of military force, on a large scale and with all the varieties of arming and equipment made to co-operate for one end, is the great fact of Macedonian history. Nothing of the same kind and magnitude had ever before been seen. The Macedonians, like Epirots and Ætolians, had no other aptitude or marking quality except those of soldiership. Their rude and scattered tribes manifest no definite political institutions and little sentiment of national brotherhood; their union was mainly that of occasional fellowship in arms under the king as chief. Philip the son of Amyntas was the first to organise this military union into a system permanently and efficaciously operative, achieving by means of it conquests such as to create in the Macedonians a common pride of superiority in arms, which served as substitute for political institutions or nationality. Such pride was still further exalted by the really superhuman career of Alexander. The Macedonian kingdom was nothing but a well-combined military machine, illustrating the irresistible superiority of the rudest men, trained in arms and conducted by an able general, not merely over undisciplined multitudes, but also over free, courageous, and disciplined citizenship, with highly gifted intelligence.

During the winter of 335-334 B.C., after the destruction of Thebes and the return of Alexander from Greece to Pella, his final preparations were made for the Asiatic expedition. The Macedonian army, with the auxiliary contingents destined for this enterprise, were brought together early in the spring. Antipater, one of the oldest and ablest officers of Philip, was appointed to act as viceroy of Macedonia during the king's

¹ Livy, xlii. 51; xliv. 46, also the comparison in Strabo, xvi. p. 752, between the military establishments of Seleukus Nikator at Apameia in Syria, and those of Philip at Pella in Macedonia.

² Justin, xi. 6. About the debt of 500 talents left by Philip, see the words of Alexander, Arrian, vii. 9, 10. Diodorus affirms (xvi. 8) that Philip's annual return from the gold mines was 1000 talents; a total not much to be trusted.

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absence. A military force, stated at 12,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry,¹ was left with him to keep down the cities of Greece, to resist aggressions from the Persian fleet, and to repress discontents at home. Such discontents were likely to be instigated by leading Macedonians or pretenders to the throne, especially as Alexander had no direct heir: and we are told that Antipater and Parmenio advised postponement of the expedition until the young king could leave behind him an heir of his own lineage.² Alexander overruled these representations, yet he did not disdain to lessen the perils at home by putting to death such men as he principally feared or mistrusted, especially the kinsmen of Philip's last wife Kleopatra.³ Of the dependent tribes around, the most energetic chiefs accompanied his army into Asia, either by their own preference or at his requisition. After these precautions, the tranquillity of Macedonia was entrusted to the prudence and fidelity of Antipater, which were still further ensured by the fact that three of his sons accompanied the king's army and person.⁴ Though unpopular in his deportment,⁵ Antipater discharged the duties of his very responsible position with zeal and ability; notwithstanding the dangerous enmity of Olympias, against whom he sent many

¹ Diodor. xvii. 17.

² Diodor. xvii. 16.

³ Justin, xi. 5. "Proficiscens ad Persicum bellum, omnes novercæ suæ cognatos, quos Philippus in excelsiorem dignitatis locum provehens imperiis præfecerat, interfecit. Sed nec suis, qui apti regno videbantur, pepercit; ne qua materia seditionis procul se agente in Macedoniâ remaneret." Compare also xii. 6, where the Pausanias mentioned as having been put to death by Alexander is *not* the assassin of Philip. Pausanias was a common Macedonian name (see Diodor. xvi. 93).

I see no reason for distrusting the general fact here asserted by Justin. We know from Arrian (who mentioned the fact incidentally in his work *τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον*, though he says nothing about it in his account of the expedition of Alexander—see Photius, Cod. 92, p. 220) that Alexander put to death, in the early period of his reign, his first cousin and brother-in-law Amyntas. Much less would he scruple to kill the friends or relatives of Kleopatra. Neither Alexander nor Antipater would account such proceeding anything else than a reasonable measure of prudential policy. By the Macedonian common law, when a man was found guilty of treason, all his relatives were condemned to die along with him (Curtius, vi. 11, 20).

Plutarch (De Fortunâ Alex. Magn. p. 342) has a general allusion to these precautionary executions ordered by Alexander. Fortune (he says) imposed upon Alexander *δεινὴν πρὸς ἄνδρας ὁμοφύλους καὶ συγγενεῖς διὰ φόνου καὶ σιδήρου καὶ πυρὸς ἀνάγκην ἀμύνης, ἀτερπέστατον τέλος ἔχουσαν*.

⁴ Kassander commanded a corps of Thracians and Pæonians: Iollas and Philippus were attached to the king's person (Arrian, vii. 27, 2; Justin, xii. 14; Diodor. xvii. 17).

⁵ Justin, xvi. i. 14. "Antipatrum—amariorem semper ministrum regni, quam ipsos reges, fuisse," &c.

complaints to Alexander when in Asia, while she on her side wrote frequent but unavailing letters with a view to ruin him in the esteem of her son. After a long period of unabated confidence, Alexander began during the last years of his life to dislike and mistrust Antipater. He always treated Olympias with the greatest respect; trying however to restrain her from meddling with political affairs, and complaining sometimes of her imperious exigencies and violence.¹

The army intended for Asia, having been assembled at Pella, was conducted by Alexander himself first to Amphipolis, where it crossed the Strymon; next along the road near the coast to the river Nestus and to the towns of Abdëra and Maroneia; then through Thrace across the rivers Hebrus and Melas; lastly, through the Thracian Chersonese to Sestos. Here it was met by his fleet, consisting of 160 triremes, with a number of trading vessels besides,² made up in large proportions from contingents furnished by Athens and Grecian cities.³ The passage of the whole army—infantry, cavalry, and machines, on ships, across the strait from Sestos in Europe to Abydos in Asia—was superintended by Parmenio, and accomplished without either difficulty or resistance. But Alexander himself, separating from the army at Sestos, went down to Elæus at the southern extremity of the Chersonese. Here stood the chapel and sacred precinct of the hero Protesilaus, who was slain by Hektor; having been the first Greek (according to the legend of the Trojan war) who touched the shore of Troy. Alexander, whose imagination was then full of Homeric reminiscences, offered sacrifice to the hero, praying that his own disembarkation might terminate more auspiciously.

He then sailed across in the admiral's trireme, steering with his own hand, to the landing-place near Ilium called the Harbour of the Achæans. At mid-channel of the strait, he sacrificed a bull, with libations out of a golden goblet, to Poseidon and the Nereids. Himself too in full armour, he was the first (like Protesilaus) to tread the Asiatic shore; but he found no enemy

¹ Plutarch, *Alexand.* 25-39; *Arrian*, vii. 12, 12. He was wont to say, that his mother exacted from him a heavy house-rent for his domicile of ten months.

Kleopatra also (sister of Alexander and daughter of Olympias) exercised considerable influence in the government. Dionysius, despot of the Pontic Herakleia, maintained himself against opposition in his government, during Alexander's life, mainly by paying assiduous court to her (*Memnon*, *Heracl.* c. 4, ap. *Photium*, *Cod.* 224).

² *Arrian*, i. 11, 9.

³ The Athenians furnished twenty ships of war, *Diodor.* xvii. 22.

like Hektor to meet him. From hence, mounting the hill on which Ilium was placed, he sacrificed to the patron-goddess Athênê; and deposited in her temple his own panoply, taking in exchange some of the arms said to have been worn by the heroes in the Trojan war, which he caused to be carried by guards along with him in his subsequent battles. Among other real or supposed monuments of this interesting legend, the Ilians showed to him the residence of Priam with its altar of Zeus Herkeios, where that unhappy old king was alleged to have been slain by Neoptolemus. Numbering Neoptolemus among his ancestors, Alexander felt himself to be the object of Priam's yet unappeased wrath; and accordingly offered sacrifice to him at the same altar, for the purpose of expiation and reconciliation. On the tomb and monumental column of Achilles, father of Neoptolemus, he not only placed a decorative garland, but also went through the customary ceremony of anointing himself with oil and running naked up to it: exclaiming how much he envied the lot of Achilles, who had been blest during life with a faithful friend, and after death with a great poet to celebrate his exploits. Lastly, to commemorate his crossing, Alexander erected permanent altars in honour of Zeus, Athênê, and Hêraklês; both on the point of Europe which his army had quitted, and on that of Asia where it had landed.¹

The proceedings of Alexander, on the ever-memorable site of Ilium, are interesting as they reveal one side of his imposing character—the vein of legendary sympathy and religious

¹ Arrian, i. 11; Plutarch, Alexand. 15; Justin, xi. 5. The ceremony of running up to the column of Achilles still subsisted in the time of Plutarch—ἀλειψάμενος λίπα καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἐπαίρων συναναδραμὼν γυμνός, ὥσπερ ἔθος ἔστιν, &c. The words here seem to imply that this monumental column was placed on an eminence, and that it was used as a goal for runners to run up to in matches at the festivals. Philostratus, five centuries after Alexander, conveys a vivid picture of the numerous legendary and religious associations connected with the plain of Troy and with the tomb of Protesilaus at Elæus, and of the many rites and ceremonies performed there even in his time (Philostrat. Heroica, xix. 14, 15, p. 742, ed. Olearius—δρόμοις δ' ἐβρύθμισμένοις συνηλάζον, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν Ἀχιλλέα, &c., and the pages preceding and following).

Dikæarchus (Fragm. 19. ed. Didot. ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 603) had treated in a special work about the sacrifices offered to Athênê at Ilium (Περὶ τῆς ἐν Ἰλίῳ θυσίας) by Alexander, and by many others before him; by Xerxes (Herodot. vii. 43), who offered up 1000 oxen—by Mindarus (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 4, &c.). In describing the proceedings of Alexander at Ilium, Dikæarchus appears to have dwelt much on the warm sympathy which that prince exhibited for the affection between Achilles and Patroklos: which sympathy Dikæarchus illustrated by characterising Alexander as φιλόπαις ἐκμανῶς, and by recounting his public admiration for the eunuch Bagôas: compare Curtius, x. i. 25—about Bagôas.

sentiment wherein alone consisted his analogy with the Greeks. The young Macedonian prince had nothing of that sense of correlative right and obligation which characterised the free Greeks of the city community. But he was in many points a reproduction of the heroic Greeks,¹ his warlike ancestors in legend, Achilles and Neoptolemus, and others of that Æakid race, unparalleled in the attributes of force—a man of violent impulse in all directions, sometimes generous, often vindictive—ardent in his individual affections both of love and hatred, but devoured especially by an inextinguishable pugnacity, appetite for conquest, and thirst for establishing at all cost his superiority of force over others—"Jura negat sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis"—taking pride, not simply in victorious generalship and direction of the arms of soldiers, but also in the personal forwardness of an Homeric chief, the foremost to encounter both danger and hardship. To dispositions resembling those of Achilles, Alexander indeed added one attribute of a far higher order. As a general, he surpassed his age in provident and even long-sighted combinations. With all his exuberant courage and sanguine temper, nothing was ever omitted in the way of systematic military precaution. Thus much he borrowed, though with many improvements of his own, from Grecian intelligence as applied to soldiership. But the character and dispositions, which he took with him to Asia, had the features, both striking and repulsive, of Achilles, rather than those of Agesilaus or Epaminondas.

The army, when reviewed on the Asiatic shore after its crossing, presented a total of 30,000 infantry, and 4500 cavalry, thus distributed:—

INFANTRY.

Macedonian phalanx and hypaspists	12,000
Allies	7,000
Mercenaries	5,000
<hr/>	
Under the command of Parmenio	24,000
Odryssians, Triballi (both Thracians), and Illyrians . . .	5,000
Agriænes and archers	1,000
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Total infantry 30,000

¹ Plutarch, *Fort. Al. M.* ii. p. 334. Βριθὺς δπλατοπάλας, δάϊος ἀντιπάλαις—ταύτην ἔχων τέχνην προγονικὴν ἀπ' Αἰακιδῶν, &c.

Ἄλκην μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκεν Ὀλύμπιος Αἰακίδῃσι,
Νοῦν δ' Ἀμυνθαονίδαῖς, πλοῦτον δ' ἔπορ' Ἀτρείδῃσιν.
(Hesiod. *Fragment.* 223, ed. Marktscheffel.)

Like Achilles, Alexander was distinguished for swiftness of foot (Plutarch, *Fort. Al. M.* i. p. 331).

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CAVALRY.

Macedonian heavy—under Philotas son of Parmenio . . .	1,500
Thessalian (also heavy)—under Kallas	1,500
Miscellaneous Grecian—under Erigyius	600
Thracian and Pæonian (light)—under Kassander . . .	900

Total cavalry 4,500

Such seems the most trustworthy enumeration of Alexander's first invading army. There were however other accounts, the highest of which stated as much as 43,000 infantry with 4000 cavalry.¹ Besides these troops, also, there must have been an effective train of projectile machines and engines, for battles and sieges, which we shall soon find in operation. As to money, the military chest of Alexander, exhausted in part by profuse donatives to his Macedonian officers,² was as poorly furnished as that of Napoleon Buonaparte on first entering Italy for his brilliant campaign of 1796. According to Aristobulus, he had with him only seventy talents; according to another authority, no more than the means of maintaining his army for thirty days. Nor had he even been able to bring together his auxiliaries, or complete the outfit of his army, without incurring a debt of 800 talents, in addition to that of 500 talents contracted by his father Philip.³ Though Plutarch⁴ wonders at the smallness of the force with which Alexander

¹ Diodor. xvii. 17. Plutarch (Alexand. 15) says that the highest numbers which he had read of, were,—43,000 infantry with 5000 cavalry: the lowest numbers, 30,000 infantry with 4000 cavalry (assuming the correction of Sintenis, τετρακισχιλίους in place of πεντακισχιλίους, to be well founded, as it probably is—compare Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327).

According to Plutarch (Fort. Al. M. p. 327), both Ptolemy and Aristobulus stated the number of infantry to be 30,000; but Ptolemy gave the cavalry as 5000, Aristobulus, as only 4000. Nevertheless Arrian—who professes to follow mainly Ptolemy and Aristobulus whenever they agree—states the number of infantry as “not much more than 30,000; the cavalry as more than 5000” (Ex. Al. i. 11, 4). Anaximenes alleged 43,000 infantry, with 5500 cavalry. Kallisthenes (ap. Polybium, xii. 19) stated 40,000 infantry, with 4500 cavalry. Justin (xi. 6) gives 32,000 infantry, with 4500 cavalry.

My statement in the text follows Diodorus, who stands distinguished, by recounting not merely the total, but the component items besides. In regard to the total of infantry, he agrees with Ptolemy and Aristobulus: as to cavalry, his statement is a mean between the two.

² Plutarch, Alexand. 15.

³ Arrian, vii. 9, 10—the speech which he puts in the mouth of Alexander himself—and Curtius, x. 2, 24.

Onesikritus stated that Alexander owed at this time a debt of 200 talents (Plutarch, Alex. 15).

⁴ Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327; Justin, xi. 6.

contemplated the execution of such great projects, yet the fact is, that in infantry he was far above any force which the Persians had to oppose him;¹ not to speak of comparative discipline and organisation, surpassing even that of the Grecian mercenaries, who formed the only good infantry in the Persian service; while his cavalry, though inferior as to number, was superior in quality and in the shock of close combat.

Most of the officers exercising important command in Alexander's army were native Macedonians. His intimate personal friend Hephæstion, as well as his body-guards Leonnatus and Lysimachus, were natives of Pella: Ptolemy the son of Lagus, and Pithon, were Eordians from Upper Macedonia; Kraterus and Perdikkas, from the district of Upper Macedonia called Orestis;² Antipater with his son Kassander, Kleitus son of Drôpidês, Parmenio with his two sons Philôtas and Nikanor, Seleukus, Kœnus, Amyntas, Philippus (these two last names were borne by more than one person), Antigonus, Neoptolemus,³ Meleager, Peukestês, &c., all these seem to have been native Macedonians. All or most of them had been trained to war under Philip, in whose service Parmenio and Antipater, especially, had occupied a high rank.

Of the many Greeks in Alexander's service, we hear of few in important station. Medius, a Thessalian from Larissa, was among his familiar companions; but the ablest and most distinguished of all was Eumenês, a native of Kardia in the Thracian Chersonese. Eumenês, combining an excellent Grecian education with bodily activity and enterprise, had attracted when a young man the notice of Philip, and had been appointed as his secretary. After discharging these duties for seven years until the death of Philip, he was continued by Alexander in the post of chief secretary during the whole of that king's life.⁴ He conducted most of Alexander's correspondence, and the daily record of his proceedings, which was kept under the name of the Royal Ephemeridês. But though his special duties were thus of a civil character, he was not less eminent as an officer in the field. Occasionally entrusted with

¹ Arrian, i. 13, 4.

² Arrian, vi. 28, 6; Arrian, Indica, 18; Justin, xv. 3-4. Porphyry (Fragin ap. Syncellum, Frag. Histor. Græc. vol. iii. p. 695-698) speaks of Lysimachus as a Thessalian from Kranon; but this must be a mistake: compare Justin, xv. 3.

³ Neoptolemus belonged, like Alexander himself, to the Æakid gens (Arrian, ii. 27, 9).

⁴ Plutarch, Eumenês, c. 1; Cornelius Nepos, Eumen. c. 1.

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high military command, he received from Alexander signal recompenses and tokens of esteem. In spite of these great qualities—or perhaps in consequence of them—he was the object of marked jealousy and dislike¹ on the part of the Macedonians,—from Hephæstion the friend, and Neoptolemus the chief armour-bearer, of Alexander, down to the principal soldiers of the phalanx. Neoptolemus despised Eumenês as an unwarlike penman. The contemptuous pride with which Macedonians had now come to look down on Greeks, is a notable characteristic of the victorious army of Alexander, as well as a new feature in history; retorting the ancient Hellenic sentiment, in which Demosthenês, a few years before, had indulged towards the Macedonians.²

Though Alexander had been allowed to land in Asia unopposed, an army was already assembled under the Persian satraps within a few days' march of Abydos. Since the reconquest of Egypt and Phenicia, about eight or nine years before, by the Persian king Ochus, the power of that empire had been restored to a point equal to any anterior epoch since the repulse of Xerxês from Greece. The Persian successes in Egypt had been achieved mainly by the arms of Greek mercenaries, under the conduct and through the craft of the Rhodian general Mentor; who, being seconded by the preponderant influence of the eunuch Bagôas, confidential minister of Ochus, obtained not only ample presents, but also the appointment of military commander on the Hellespont and the Asiatic seaboard.³ He procured the recall of his brother Memnon, who with his brother-in-law Artabazus had been obliged to leave Asia from unsuccessful revolt against the Persians, and had found shelter with Philip.⁴ He further subdued, by force or by fraud, various Greek and Asiatic chieftains on the Asiatic coast; among them, the distinguished Hermeias, friend of Aristotle, and master of the

¹ Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, Eum. 2, 3, 8, 10.

² Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 119, respecting Philip—οὐ μόνον οὐχ Ἕλληνας ὄντας, οὐδὲ προσήκοντος οὐδὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ βαρβάρου ἐντεῦθεν ὄνεν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ὀλέθρου Μακεδόνας, ὅθεν οὐδ' ἀνδραποδὸν σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἦν πρότερον πρᾶσθαι.

Compare this with the exclamations of the Macedonian soldiers (called Argyraspides) against their distinguished chief Eumenês, calling him *Χερβονησίτης ὀλέθρος* (Plutarch, Eumenês, 18).

³ See, in reference to these incidents, vol. xi. chap. xc.

⁴ Diodor. xvi. 52; Curtius, vi. 4, 25; vi. 5, 2. Curtius mentions also Manapis, another Persian exile, who had fled from Ochus to Philip.

strong post of Atarneus.¹ These successes of Mentor seem to have occurred about 343 B.C. He, and his brother Memnon after him, upheld vigorously the authority of the Persian king in the regions near the Hellespont. It was probably by them that troops were sent across the strait both to rescue the besieged town of Perinthus from Philip, and to act against that prince in other parts of Thrace;² that an Asiatic chief, who was intriguing to facilitate Philip's intended invasion of Asia, was seized and sent prisoner to the Persian court; and that envoys from Athens, soliciting aid against Philip, were forwarded to the same place.³

Ochus, though successful in regaining the full extent of Persian dominion, was a sanguinary tyrant, who shed by wholesale the blood of his family and courtiers. About the year 338 B.C., he died poisoned by the eunuch Bagôas, who placed upon the throne Arses, one of the king's sons, killing all the rest. After two years, however, Bagôas conceived mistrust of Arses, and put him to death also, together with all his children: thus leaving no direct descendant of the regal family alive. He then exalted to the throne one of his friends named Darius Codomannus (descended from one of the brothers of Artaxerxês Mnemon), who had acquired glory, in a recent war against the Kadusians, by killing in single combat a formidable champion of the enemy's army. Presently, however, Bagôas attempted to poison Darius also; but the latter, detecting the snare, forced him to drink the deadly draught himself.⁴ In spite of such murders and change in the line of succession, which Alexander afterwards reproached to Darius,⁵ the authority of Darius seems to have been recognised, without any material opposition, throughout all the Persian empire.

Succeeding to the throne in the early part of B.C. 336, when Philip was organising the projected invasion of Persia, and when the first Macedonian division under Parmenio and Attalus was already making war in Asia—Darius prepared

¹ Diodor. xvi. 52. About the strength of the fortress of Atarneus, see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 11; Diodor. xiii. 65. It had been held in defiance of the Persians, even before the time of Hermeias—Isokratês. Compare also Isokratês, Or. iv. (Panegy.) s. 167.

² Letter of Alexander, addressed to Darius after the battle of Issus, apud Arrian, ii. 14, 7. Other troops sent by the Persians into Thrace (besides those despatched to the relief of Perinthus), are here alluded to.

³ Demosthenês, Philippic. iv. pp. 139, 140; Epistola Philippi apud Demosthen. p. 160.

⁴ Diodor. xvii. 5; Justin, x. 3; Curtius, x. 5, 22.

⁵ Arrian, ii. 14, 10.

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measures of defence at home, and tried to encourage anti-Macedonian movements in Greece.¹ On the assassination of Philip by Pausanias, the Persian king publicly proclaimed himself (probably untruly) as having instigated the deed, and alluded in contemptuous terms to the youthful Alexander.² Conceiving the danger from Macedonia to be past, he imprudently slackened his efforts and withheld his supplies during the first months of Alexander's reign, when the latter might have been seriously embarrassed in Greece and in Europe by the effective employment of Persian ships and money. But the recent successes of Alexander in Thrace, Illyria, and Bœotia, satisfied Darius that the danger was not past, so that he resumed his preparations for defence. The Phœnician fleet was ordered to be equipped; the satraps in Phrygia and Lydia got together a considerable force, consisting in part of Grecian mercenaries; while Memnon, on the seaboard, was furnished with the means of taking 5000 of these mercenaries under his separate command.³

We cannot trace with any exactness the course of these events, during the nineteen months between Alexander's accession and his landing in Asia (August 336 B.C. to March or April 334 B.C.). We learn generally that Memnon was active and even aggressive on the north-eastern coast of the Ægean. Marching northward from his own territory (the region of Assus or Atarneus skirting the Gulf of Adramyttium⁴) across the range of Mount Ida, he came suddenly upon the town of Kyzikus on the Propontis. He failed, however, though only by a little, in his attempt to surprise it, and was forced to content himself with a rich booty from the district around.⁵ The Macedonian generals Parmenio and Kallas had crossed into Asia with bodies of troops. Parmenio, acting in Æolis, took Gryniun, but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege of Pitanê; while Kallas, in the Troad, was attacked, defeated, and compelled to retire to Rhœteium.⁶

We thus see that during the season preceding the landing of Alexander, the Persians were in considerable force, and Memnon both active and successful even against the Macedonian generals, on the region north-east of the Ægean. This

¹ Diodor. xvii. 7.

² Arrian, ii. 14, 11.

³ Diodor. xvii. 7.

⁴ Diodor. xvii. 7: compare Arrian, i. 17, 9. ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν Μέμνονος ἔπεμψεν—which doubtless means this region, conquered by Mentor from Hermæias of Atarneus.

⁵ Diodor. xvii. 7; Polyænus, v. 34, 5.

⁶ Diodor. xvii. 7. We read also of military operations near Magnesia, between Parmenio and Memnon (Polyænus, v. 34, 4).

may help to explain that fatal imprudence, whereby the Persians permitted Alexander to carry over without opposition his grand army into Asia, in the spring of 334 B.C. They possessed ample means of guarding the Hellespont, had they chosen to bring up their fleet, which, comprising as it did the force of the Phenician towns, was decidedly superior to any naval armament at the disposal of Alexander. The Persian fleet actually came into the Ægean a few weeks afterwards. Now Alexander's designs, preparations, and even intended time of march, must have been well known not merely to Memnon, but to the Persian satraps in Asia Minor, who had got together troops to oppose him. These satraps unfortunately supposed themselves to be a match for him in the field, disregarding the pronounced opinion of Memnon to the contrary, and even overruling his prudent advice by mistrustful and calumnious imputations.

At the time of Alexander's landing, a powerful Persian force was already assembled near Zeleia in the Hellespontine Phrygia, under command of Arsitês the Phrygian satrap, supported by several other leading Persians—Spithridatês (satrap of Lydia and Ionia), Pharnakês, Atizyês, Mithridatês, Rheomithrês, Niphatês, Petinês, &c. Forty of these men were of high rank (denominated kinsmen of Darius), and distinguished for personal valour. The greater number of the army consisted of cavalry, including Medes, Baktrians, Hyrkanians, Kappadokians, Paphlagonians, &c.¹ In cavalry they greatly outnumbered Alexander; but their infantry was much inferior in number,² composed however, in large proportion, of Grecian mercenaries. The Persian total is given by Arrian as 20,000 cavalry, and nearly 20,000 mercenary foot; by Diodorus as 10,000 cavalry, and 100,000 infantry; by Justin even at 600,000. The numbers of Arrian are the more credible; in those of Diodorus, the total of infantry is certainly much above the truth—that of cavalry probably below it.

Memnon, who was present with his sons and with his own division, earnestly dissuaded the Persian leaders from hazarding a battle. Reminding them that the Macedonians were not only much superior in infantry, but also encouraged by the leadership of Alexander—he enforced the necessity of employing their numerous cavalry to destroy the forage and provisions, and if necessary, even towns themselves—in order to render any considerable advance of the invading force

¹ Diodor. xvii. 18, 19; Arrian, i. 12, 14; i. 16, 5.

² Arrian, i. 12, 16; i. 13, 4.

impracticable. While keeping strictly on the defensive in Asia, he recommended that aggressive war should be carried into Macedonia; that the fleet should be brought up, a powerful land-force put aboard, and strenuous efforts made, not only to attack the vulnerable points of Alexander at home, but also to encourage active hostility against him from the Greeks and other neighbours.¹

Had this plan been energetically executed by Persian arms and money, we can hardly doubt that Antipater in Macedonia would speedily have found himself pressed by serious dangers and embarrassments, and that Alexander would have been forced to come back and protect his own dominions; perhaps prevented by the Persian fleet from bringing back his whole army. At any rate, his schemes of Asiatic invasion must for the time have been suspended. But he was rescued from this dilemma by the ignorance, pride, and pecuniary interests of the Persian leaders. Unable to appreciate Alexander's military superiority, and conscious at the same time of their own personal bravery, they repudiated the proposition of retreat as dishonourable, insinuating that Memnon desired to prolong the war in order to exalt his own importance in the eyes of Darius. This sentiment of military dignity was further strengthened by the fact, that the Persian military leaders, deriving all their revenues from the land, would have been impoverished by destroying the landed produce. Arsitês, in whose territory the army stood, and upon whom the scheme would first take effect, haughtily announced that he would not permit a single house in it to be burnt.² Occupying the same satrapy as

¹ Compare the policy recommended by Memnon, as set forth in Arrian (i. 12, 16), and in Diodorus (xvii. 18). The superiority of Diodorus is here incontestable. He proclaims distinctly both the defensive and the offensive side of Memnon's policy; which, when taken together, form a scheme of operations no less effective than prudent. But Arrian omits all notice of the offensive policy, and mentions only the defensive—the retreat and destruction of the country; which, if adopted alone, could hardly have been reckoned upon for success, in starving out Alexander, and might reasonably be called in question by the Persian generals. Moreover, we should form but a poor idea of Memnon's ability, if in this emergency he neglected to avail himself of the irresistible Persian fleet.

I notice the rather thin point of superiority of Diodorus, because recent critics have manifested a tendency to place too exclusive a confidence in Arrian, and to discredit almost all allegations respecting Alexander except such as Arrian either certifies or countenances. Arrian is a very valuable historian; he has the merit of giving us plain narrative without rhetoric, which contrasts favourably both with Diodorus and with Curtius; but he must not be set up as the only trustworthy witness.

² Arrian, i. 12, 18.

Pharnabazus had possessed sixty years before, he felt that he would be reduced to the same straits as Pharnabazus under the pressure of Agesilaus—"of not being able to procure a dinner in his own country."¹ The proposition of Memnon was rejected, and it was resolved to await the arrival of Alexander on the banks of the river Granikus.

This unimportant stream, commemorated in the Iliad, and immortalised by its association with the name of Alexander, takes its rise from one of the heights of Mount Ida near Skêpsis,² and flows northward into the Propontis, which it reaches at a point somewhat east of the Greek town of Parium. It is of no great depth: near the point where the Persians encamped, it seems to have been fordable in many places; but its right bank was somewhat high and steep, thus offering obstruction to an enemy's attack. The Persians, marching forward from Zeleia, took up a position near the eastern side of the Granikus, where the last declivities of Mount Ida descend into the plain of Adrasteia, a Greek city situated between Priapus and Parium.³

Meanwhile Alexander marched onward towards this position, from Arisbê (where he had reviewed his army)—on the first day to Perkôtê, on the second to the river Praktius, on the third to Hermôtus; receiving on his way the spontaneous surrender of the town of Priapus. Aware that the enemy was not far distant, he threw out in advance a body of scouts under Amyntas, consisting of four squadrons of light cavalry and one of the heavy Macedonian (Companion) cavalry. From Hermôtus (the fourth day from Arisbê) he marched direct towards the Granikus, in careful order, with his main phalanx in double files, his cavalry on each wing, and the baggage in the rear. On approaching the river, he made his dispositions for immediate attack, though Parmenio advised waiting until the next morning. Knowing well, like Memnon on the other side, that the chances of a pitched battle were all against the Persians, he resolved to leave them no opportunity of decamping during the night.

In Alexander's array, the phalanx or heavy infantry formed the central body. The six Taxeis or divisions, of which it

¹ Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 1, 33.

² Strabo, xiii. p. 602. The rivers Skamander, Æsepus, and Granikus, all rise from the same height, called Kotylus. This comes from Demetrius, a native of Skêpsis.

³ Diodor. xvii. 18, 19. Οἱ βάρβαροι, τὴν ὑπάρειαν κατεληγμένοι, &c. "prima congressio in campis Adrastiis fuit." Justin, xi. 6; compare Strabo, xiii. pp. 587, 588.

consisted, were commanded (reckoning from right to left) by Perdikkas, Koenus, Amyntas son of Andromenês, Philippos, Meleager, and Kraterus.¹ Immediately on the right of the phalanx, were the hypaspistæ, or light infantry, under Nikanor son of Parmenio—then the light horse or lancers, the Pæonians, and the Apolloniate squadron of Companion-cavalry commanded by the Ilarch Sokratês, all under Amyntas son of Arrhibæus—lastly the full body of Companion-cavalry, the bowmen, and the Agrianian darters, all under Philôtas (son of Parmenio), whose division formed the extreme right.² The left flank of the phalanx was in like manner protected by three distinct divisions of cavalry or lighter troops—first, by the Thracians, under Agathon—next, by the cavalry of the allies, under Philippos son of Menelaus—lastly, by the Thesalian cavalry, under Kallas, whose division formed the extreme left. Alexander himself took the command of the right, giving that of the left to Parmenio; by right and left are meant the two halves of the army, each of them including three Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx with the cavalry on its flank—for there was no recognised centre under a distinct command. On the other side of the Granikus, the Persian cavalry lined the bank. The Medes and Baktrians were on their right, under Rheomithrês—the Paphlagonians and Hyrkanians in the centre, under Arsitês and Spithridatês—on the left were Memnon and Arsamenês, with their divisions.³ The Persian infantry, both Asiatic and Grecian, were kept back in reserve; the cavalry alone being relied upon to dispute the passage of the river.

In this array, both parties remained for some time, watching each other in anxious silence.⁴ There being no firing or smoke,

¹ Arrian, i. 14, 3. The text of Arrian is not clear. The name of Kraterus occurs twice. Various explanations are proposed. The words *ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς συμμάχου τάξεως* seem to prove that there were three *τάξεις* of the phalanx (Kraterus, Meleager, and Philippos) included in the left half of the army—and three others (Perdikkas, Koenus, and Amyntas) in the right half; while the words *ἐπὶ δέ, ἡ Κρατέρου τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου* appear wrongly inserted. There is no good reason for admitting two distinguished officers, each named Kraterus. The name of Philippos and his *τάξις* is repeated twice; once in counting from the right of the *τάξεις*,—once again in counting from the left.

² Plutarch states that Alexander struck into the river with thirteen squadrons (*ἵλαι*) of cavalry. Whether this total includes all then present in the field, or only the Companion-cavalry—we cannot determine (Plutarch, Alex. 16).

³ Diodor. xvii. 19.

⁴ Arrian, i. 14, 8. *Χρόνον μὲν δὴ ἀμφοτέρω τὰ στρατεύματα, ἐν ἄκρῳ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐφειστώτες, ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸ μέλλον ὀκνεῖν ἡσυχίαν ἔχον· καὶ σιγῇ ἦν πολλῇ ἐφ' ἐκατέρων.*

as with modern armies, all the details on each side were clearly visible to the other; so that the Persians easily recognised Alexander himself on the Macedonian right from the splendour of his armour and military costume, as well as from the respectful demeanour of those around him. Their principal leaders accordingly thronged to their own left, which they reinforced with the main strength of their cavalry, in order to oppose him personally. Presently he addressed a few words of encouragement to the troops, and gave the order for advance. He directed the first attack to be made by the squadron of Companion-cavalry whose turn it was on that day to take the lead—the squadron of Apollonia, of which Sokratēs was captain—commanded on this day by Ptolemæus son of Philippus) supported by the light horse or Lancers, the Pæonian darters (infantry), and one division of regularly armed infantry, seemingly hypaspistæ.¹ He then himself entered the river, at the head of the right half of the army, cavalry and infantry, which advanced under sound of trumpets and with the usual war-shouts. As the occasional depths of water prevented a straightforward march with one uniform line, the Macedonians slanted their course suitably to the fordable spaces; keeping their front extended so as to approach the opposite bank as much as possible in line, and not in separate columns with flanks exposed to the Persian cavalry.² Not merely the right under Alexander, but also the left under Parmenio, advanced and crossed in the same movement and under the like precautions.

The foremost detachment under Ptolemy and Amyntas, on reaching the opposite bank, encountered a strenuous resistance, concentrated as it was here upon one point. They found Memnon and his sons with the best of the Persian cavalry immediately in their front; some on the summit of the bank,

¹ Arrian, i. 14, 9. τοὺς προδρόμους ἰππέας mean the same cavalry as those who are called (in i. 14, 2) σαρισφόρους ἰππέας, under Amyntas son of Arrhibæus.

² Arrian, i. 14, 10. Αὐτὸς δὲ (Alexander) ἄγων τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας . . . ἐμβαίνει ἐς τὸν πόρον, λοξὴν αἰὲ παρτείνων τὴν τάξιν, ἥ παρῆλκε τὸ βεῦμα, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἐκβαίνοντι αὐτῷ οἱ Πέρσαι κατὰ κέρας προσπίπτοιεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτός, ὡς ἀνυστόν, τῇ φάλαγγι προσμύξῃ αὐτοῖς.

Apparently, this passage λοξὴν αἰὲ παρτείνων τὴν τάξιν, ἥ παρῆλκε τὸ βεῦμα is to be interpreted by the phrase which follows, describing the purpose to be accomplished.

I cannot think that the words imply a movement *en echelon*, as Rüstow and Köchly contend (Geschichte des Griechischen Kriegswesens, p. 271)—nor a crossing of the river *against* the stream, to break the force of the current, as is the opinion of others.

from whence they hurled down their javelins—others down at the water's edge, so as to come to closer quarters. The Macedonians tried every effort to make good their landing, and push their way by main force through the Persian horse, but in vain. Having both lower ground and insecure footing, they could make no impression, but were thrust back with some loss, and retired upon the main body which Alexander was now bringing across. On his approaching the shore, the same struggle was renewed around his person with increased fervour on both sides. He was himself among the foremost, and all near him were animated by his example. The horsemen on both sides became jammed together, and the contest was one of physical force and pressure by man and horse; but the Macedonians had a great advantage in being accustomed to the use of the strong close-fighting pike, while the Persian weapon was the missile javelin. At length the resistance was surmounted, and Alexander, with those around him, gradually thrusting back the defenders, made good their way up the high bank to the level ground. At other points the resistance was not equally vigorous. The left and centre of the Macedonians, crossing at the same time on all practicable spaces along the whole line, overpowered the Persians stationed on the slope, and got up to the level ground with comparative facility.¹ Indeed no cavalry could possibly stand on the bank to offer opposition to the phalanx with its array of long pikes, wherever this could reach the ascent in any continuous front. The easy crossing of the Macedonians at other points helped to constrain those Persians, who were contending with Alexander himself on the slope, to recede to the level ground above.

Here again, as at the water's edge, Alexander was foremost in personal conflict. His pike having been broken, he turned to a soldier near him—Aretis, one of the horseguards who generally aided him in mounting his horse—and asked for another. But this man, having broken his pike also, showed

¹ Arrian, i. 15, 5. *Καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν (Alexander himself) ξυνειστήκει μάχη καρτερὰ, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλαι ἐπ' ἄλλαις τῶν τάξεων τοῖς Μακεδόσι διέβαινον οὐ χαλεπῶς ἤδη.*

These words deserve attention, because they show how incomplete Arrian's description of the battle had before been. Dwelling almost exclusively upon the personal presence and achievements of Alexander, he had said little even about the right half of the army, and nothing at all about the left half of it under Parmenio. We discover from these words that *all* the *τάξεις* of the phalanx (not only the three in Alexander's half, but also the three in Parmenio's half) passed the river nearly at the same time, and for the most part with little or no resistance.

the fragment to Alexander, requesting him to ask some one else; upon which the Corinthian Demaratus, one of the Companion-cavalry close at hand, gave him his weapon instead. Thus armed anew, Alexander spurred his horse forward against Mithridatês (son-in-law of Darius), who was bringing up a column of cavalry to attack him, but was himself considerably in advance of it. Alexander thrust his pike into the face of Mithridatês, and laid him prostrate on the ground: he then turned to another of the Persian leaders, Rhœsakês, who struck him a blow on the head with his scimitar, knocked off a portion of his helmet, but did not penetrate beyond. Alexander avenged this blow by thrusting Rhœsakês through the body with his pike.¹ Meanwhile a third Persian leader, Spithridatês, was actually close behind Alexander, with hand and scimitar uplifted to cut him down. At this critical moment, Kleitus son of Dropidês—one of the ancient officers of Philip, high in the Macedonian service—struck with full force at the uplifted arm of Spithridatês and severed it from the body, thus preserving Alexander's life. Other leading Persians, kinsmen of Spithridatês, rushed desperately on Alexander, who received many blows on his armour, and was in much danger. But the efforts of his companions near were redoubled, both to defend his person and to second his adventurous daring. It was on that point that the Persian cavalry was first broken. On the left of the Macedonian line, the Thessalian cavalry also fought with vigour and success;² and the light-armed foot, intermingled with Alexander's cavalry generally, did great damage to the enemy. The rout of the Persian cavalry, once begun, speedily became general. They fled in all directions, pursued by the Macedonians.

But Alexander and his officers soon checked this ardour of pursuit, calling back their cavalry to complete his victory. The Persian infantry, Asiatics as well as Greeks, had remained without movement or orders, looking on the cavalry battle which had just disastrously terminated. To them Alexander immediately turned his attention.³ He brought up his phalanx and hypaspistæ to attack them in front, while his cavalry assailed on all sides their unprotected flanks and rear; he

¹ Arrian, i. 15, 6-12; Diodor. xvi. 20; Plutarch, Alex. 16. These authors differ in the details. I follow Arrian.

² Diodor. xvii. 21.

³ Arrian, i. 16, 1. Plutarch says that the infantry, on seeing the cavalry routed, demanded to capitulate on terms with Alexander; but this seems hardly probable.

himself charged with the cavalry, and had a horse killed under him. His infantry alone was more numerous than they, so that against such odds the result could hardly be doubtful. The greater part of these mercenaries, after a valiant resistance, were cut to pieces on the field. We are told that none escaped, except 2000 made prisoners, and some who remained concealed in the field among the dead bodies.¹

In this complete and signal defeat, the loss of the Persian cavalry was not very serious in mere number—for only 1000 of them were slain. But the slaughter of the leading Persians, who had exposed themselves with extreme bravery in the personal conflict against Alexander, was terrible. There were slain not only Mithridatês, Rhœsakês, and Spithridatês, whose names have been already mentioned,—but also Pharnakês, brother-in-law of Darius, Mithrobarzanês satrap of Kappadokia, Atizyês, Niphatês, Petinês, and others; all Persians of rank and consequence. Arsitês, the satrap of Phrygia, whose rashness had mainly caused the rejection of Memnon's advice, escaped from the field, but died shortly afterwards by his own hand, from anguish and humiliation.² The Persian or Perso-Grecian infantry, though probably more of them individually escaped than is implied in Arrian's account, was as a body irretrievably ruined. No force was either left in the field, or could be afterwards re-assembled in Asia Minor.

The loss on the side of Alexander is said to have been very small. Twenty-five of the Companion-cavalry, belonging to the division under Ptolemy and Amyntas, were slain in the first unsuccessful attempt to pass the river. Of the other cavalry, sixty in all were slain; of the infantry, thirty. This is given to us as the entire loss on the side of Alexander.³ It is only the number of killed; that of the wounded is not stated; but assuming it to be ten times the number of killed, the total of both together will be 1265.⁴ If this be correct, the resistance of the Persian cavalry, except near that point where Alexander himself and the Persian chiefs came into conflict, cannot have been either serious or long protracted. But when we add further the contest with the infantry, the smallness of the total

¹ Arrian, i. 16, 4; Diodor. xvii. 21. Diodorus says that on the part of the Persians more than 10,000 foot were killed, with 2000 cavalry; and that more than 20,000 men were made prisoners.

² Arrian, i. 16, 5, 6.

³ Arrian, i. 16, 7, 8.

⁴ Arrian, in describing another battle, considers that the proportion of twelve to one, between wounded and killed, is above what could have been expected (v. 24, 8). Rüstow and Köchly (p. 273) state that in modern battles, the ordinary proportion of wounded to killed is from 8 : 1 to 10 : 1.

assigned for Macedonian killed and wounded will appear still more surprising. The total of the Persian infantry is stated at nearly 20,000, most part of them Greek mercenaries. Of these only 2000 were made prisoners; nearly all the rest (according to Arrian) were slain. Now the Greek mercenaries were well armed, and not likely to let themselves be slain with impunity; moreover Plutarch expressly affirms that they resisted with desperate valour, and that most of the Macedonian loss was incurred in the conflict against them. It is not easy therefore to comprehend how the total number of slain can be brought within the statement of Arrian.¹

After the victory, Alexander manifested the greatest solicitude for his wounded soldiers, whom he visited and consoled in person. Of the twenty-five Companions slain, he caused brazen statues, by Lysippus, to be erected at Dium in Macedonia, where they were still standing in the time of Arrian. To the surviving relatives of all the slain he also granted immunity from taxation and from personal service. The dead bodies were honourably buried, those of the enemy as well as of his own soldiers. The two thousand Greeks in the Persian service who had become his prisoners, were put in chains, and transported to Macedonia there to work as slaves; to which treatment Alexander condemned them on the ground that they had taken arms on behalf of the foreigner against Greece, in contravention of the general vote passed by the synod at Corinth. At the same time, he sent to Athens three hundred panoplies selected from the spoil, to be dedicated to Athênê in the acropolis with this inscription—"Alexander son of Philip, and the Greeks except the Lacedæmonians (*present these offerings*), out of the spoils of the foreigners inhabiting Asia."² Though the vote to which Alexander appealed represented no existing Grecian aspiration, and granted only a sanction which could not be safely refused, yet he found satisfaction in clothing his own self-aggrandising impulse under the name of a supposed Pan-Hellenic purpose: which was at the same time useful as strengthening his hold upon the Greeks, who were the only persons competent, either as officers or soldiers, to uphold the Persian empire against him. His conquests were the extinction

¹ Arrian, I. 16, 8; Plutarch, Alexand. 16. Aristobulus (apud Plutarch, *l. c.*) said that there were slain among the companions of Alexander (τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον) thirty-four persons, of whom nine were infantry. This coincides with Arrian's statement about the twenty-five companions of the cavalry, slain.

² Arrian, I. 16, 10, 11.

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of genuine Hellenism, though they diffused an exterior varnish of it, and especially the Greek language, over much of the Oriental world. True Grecian interests lay more on the side of Darius than of Alexander.

The battle of the Granikus, brought on by Arsitês and the other satraps contrary to the advice of Memnon, was moreover so unskilfully fought by them, that the gallantry of their infantry, the most formidable corps of Greeks that had ever been in the Persian service, was rendered of little use. The battle, properly speaking, was fought only by the Persian cavalry;¹ the infantry was left to be surrounded and destroyed afterwards.

No victory could be more decisive or terror-striking than that of Alexander. There remained no force in the field to oppose him. The impression made by so great a public catastrophe was enhanced by two accompanying circumstances; first, by the number of Persian grandees who perished, realising almost the wailings of Atossa, Xerxês, and the Chorus, in the *Persæ* of Æschylus,² after the battle of Salamis—next, by the chivalrous and successful prowess of Alexander himself, who, emulating the Homeric Achilles, not only rushed foremost into the *mêlée*, but killed two of these grandees with his own hand. Such exploits, impressive even when we read of them now, must at the moment when they occurred have acted most powerfully upon the imagination of contemporaries.

Several of the neighbouring Mysian mountaineers, though mutinous subjects towards Persia, came down to make submission to him, and were permitted to occupy their lands under the same tribute as they had paid before. The inhabitants of the neighbouring Grecian city of Zeleia, whose troops had served with the Persians, surrendered and obtained their pardon; Alexander admitting the plea that they had served only under constraint. He then sent Parmenio to attack Daskylum, the stronghold and chief residence of the satrap of Phrygia. Even this place was evacuated by the garrison and surrendered, doubtless with a considerable treasure therein. The whole satrapy of Phrygia thus fell into Alexander's power, and was appointed to be administered by Kallas for his behalf, levying the same amount of tribute as had been paid

¹ Arrian usually calls the battle of the Granikus an *ἰππομαχία* (i. 17, 10, and elsewhere).

The battle was fought in the Attic month Thargelion: probably the beginning of May (Plutarch, Camillus, 19).

² Æschylus, *Pers.* 950 *seqq.*

before.¹ He himself then marched, with his main force, in a southerly direction towards Sardis—the chief town of Lydia, and the main station of the Persians in Asia Minor. The citadel of Sardis—situated on a lofty and steep rock projecting from Mount Tmolus, fortified by a triple wall with an adequate garrison—was accounted impregnable, and at any rate could hardly have been taken by anything less than a long blockade,² which would have allowed time for the arrival of the fleet and the operations of Memnon. Yet such was the terror which now accompanied the Macedonian conqueror, that when he arrived within eight miles of Sardis, he met not only a deputation of the chief citizens, but also the Persian governor of the citadel, Mithrinês. The town, citadel, garrison, and treasure were delivered up to him without a blow. Fortunately for Alexander, there was not in Asia any Persian governors of courage and fidelity such as had been displayed by Maskamês and Bogês after the repulse of Xerxês from Greece.³ Alexander treated Mithrinês with courtesy and honour, granted freedom to the Sardians and to the other Lydians generally, with the use of their own Lydian laws. The betrayal of Sardis by Mithrinês was a signal good fortune to Alexander. On going up to the citadel, he contemplated with astonishment its prodigious strength; congratulating himself on so easy an acquisition, and giving directions to build there a temple of Olympian Zeus, on the spot where the old palace of the kings of Lydia had been situated. He named Pausanias governor of the citadel, with a garrison of Peloponnesians from Argos; Asander, satrap of the country; and Nikias, collector of tribute.⁴ The freedom granted to the Lydians, whatever it may have amounted to, did not exonerate them from paying the usual tribute.

From Sardis, he ordered Kallas, the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia—and Alexander son of Aëropus, who had been promoted in place of Kallas to the command of the Thessalian cavalry—to attack Atarneus and the district belonging to Memnon, on the Asiatic coast opposite Lesbos. Meanwhile he himself directed his march to Ephesus, which he reached on the fourth day. Both at Ephesus and at Miletus

¹ Arrian, i. 17, 1, 2.

² About the almost impregnable fortifications and position of Sardis, see Polybius, vii. 15–18; Herod. i. 84. It held out for nearly two years against Antiochus III. (B.C. 216), and was taken at last only by the extreme carelessness of the defenders; even then, the citadel was still held.

³ Herodot. vii. 106, 107.

⁴ Arrian, i. 17, 5–9; Diodor. xvii. 21.

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—the two principal strongholds of the Persians on the coast, as Sardis was in the interior—the sudden catastrophe at the Granikus had struck unspeakable terror. Hegesistratus, governor of the Persian garrison (Greek mercenaries) at Miletus, sent letters to Alexander offering to surrender the town on his approach ; while the garrison at Ephesus, with the Macedonian exile Amyntas, got on board two triremes in the harbor and fled. It appears that there had been recently a political revolution in the town, conducted by Syrphax and other leaders, who had established an oligarchical government. These men, banishing their political opponents, had committed depredations on the temple of Artemis, overthrown the statue of Philip of Macedon dedicated therein, and destroyed the sepulchre of Heropythus the liberator in the agora.¹ Some of the party, though abandoned by their garrison, were still trying to invoke aid from Memnon, who however was yet at a distance. Alexander entered the town without resistance, restored the exiles, established a democratical constitution, and directed that the tribute heretofore paid to the Persians should now be paid to the Ephesian Artemis. Syrphax and his family sought refuge in the temple, from whence they were dragged by the people and stoned to death. More of the same party would have been despatched, had not the popular vengeance been restrained by Alexander ; who displayed an honourable and prudent moderation²

Thus master of Ephesus, Alexander found himself in communication with his fleet, under the command of Nikanor ; and received propositions of surrender from the two neighbouring inland cities, Magnesia and Tralleis. To occupy these cities, he despatched Parmenio with 5000 foot (half of them Macedonians) and 200 of the Companion-cavalry ; while he at the same time sent Antimachus with an equal force in a northerly direction, to liberate the various cities of Æolic and Ionic Greeks. This officer was instructed to put down in each of them the ruling oligarchy, which acted with a mercenary garrison as an instrument of Persian supremacy—to place the government in the hands of the citizens—and to abolish all payment of tribute. He himself—after taking part in a solemn

¹ Arrian, i. 17, 12. Respecting these commotions at Ephesus, which had preceded the expedition of Alexander, we have no information : nor are we told who Heropythus was, or under what circumstances he had liberated Ephesus. It would have been interesting to know these facts, as illustrating the condition of the Asiatic Greeks previous to Alexander's invasion.

² Arrian, i. 17, 10-13.

festival and procession to the temple of Ephesian Artemis, with his whole army in battle-array—marched southward towards Miletus; his fleet under Nikanor proceeding thither by sea.¹ He expected probably to enter Miletus with as little resistance as Ephesus. But his hopes were disappointed: Hegesistratus, commander of the garrison in that town, though under the immediate terror of the defeat at the Granikus he had written to offer submission, had now altered his tone, and determined to hold out. The formidable Persian fleet,² four hundred sail of Phenician and Cyprian ships of war with well-trained seamen, was approaching.

This naval force, which a few weeks earlier would have prevented Alexander from crossing into Asia, now afforded the only hope of arresting the rapidity and ease of his conquests. What steps had been taken by the Persian officers since the defeat at the Granikus, we do not hear. Many of them had fled, along with Memnon, to Miletus;³ and they were probably disposed, under the present desperate circumstances, to accept the command of Memnon as their only hope of safety, though they had despised his counsel on the day of the battle. Whether the towns in Memnon's principality of Atarneus had attempted any resistance against the Macedonians, we do not know. His interests however were so closely identified with those of Persia, that he had sent up his wife and children as hostages, to induce Darius to entrust him with the supreme conduct of the war. Orders to this effect were presently sent down by that prince;⁴ but at the first arrival of the fleet, it seems not to have been under the command of Memnon, who was however probably on board.

It came too late to aid in the defence of Miletus. Three days before its arrival, Nikanor the Macedonian admiral, with his fleet of one hundred and sixty ships, had occupied the island of Ladê, which commanded the harbour of that city. Alexander found the outer portion of Miletus evacuated, and took it without resistance. He was making preparations to besiege the inner city, and had already transported 4000 troops across to the island of Ladê, when the powerful Persian fleet came in sight, but found itself excluded from Miletus, and obliged to take moorings under the neighbouring promontory of Mykalê. Unwilling to abandon without a battle the command of the sea, Parmenio advised Alexander to fight this fleet, offering himself to share the hazard aboard.

¹ Arrian, i. 18, 5, 6.

² Diodor. xvii. 22.

³ Arrian, i. 18, 10-13.

⁴ Diodor. xvii. 23.

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But Alexander disapproved the proposition, affirming that his fleet was inferior not less in skill than in numbers; that the high training of the Macedonians would tell for nothing on shipboard; and that a naval defeat would be the signal for insurrection in Greece. Besides debating such prudential reasons, Alexander and Parmenio also differed about the religious promise of the case. On the sea-shore, near the stern of the Macedonian ships, Parmenio had seen an eagle, which filled him with confidence that the ships would prove victorious. But Alexander contended that this interpretation was incorrect. Though the eagle doubtless promised to him victory, yet it had been seen on land—and therefore his victories would be on land: hence the result signified was, that he would overcome the Persian fleet, by means of land operations.¹ This part of the debate, between two practical military men of ability, is not the least interesting of the whole; illustrating as it does, not only the religious susceptibilities of the age, but also the pliancy of the interpretative process, lending itself equally well to inferences totally opposite. The difference between a sagacious and a dull-witted prophet, accommodating ambiguous omens to useful or mischievous conclusions, was one of very material importance in the ancient world.

Alexander now prepared vigorously to assault Miletus, repudiating with disdain an offer brought to him by a Milesian citizen named Glaukippus—that the city should be neutral and open to him as well as to the Persians. His fleet under Nikanor occupied the harbour, blocked up its narrow mouth against the Persians, and made threatening demonstrations from the water's edge; while he himself brought up his battering-engines against the walls, shook or overthrew them in several places, and then stormed the city. The Milesians, with the Grecian mercenary garrison, made a brave defence, but were overpowered by the impetuosity of the assault. A large number of them were slain, and there was no way of escape except by jumping into little boats, or swimming off upon the hollow of the shield. Even of these fugitives, most part were killed by the seamen of the Macedonian triremes; but a division of 300 Grecian mercenaries got on to an isolated rock near the mouth of the harbour, and there prepared to sell their lives dearly. Alexander, as soon as his soldiers were thoroughly masters of the city, went himself on shipboard to attack the mercenaries on the rock, taking with

¹ Arrian, i. 18, 9-15; i. 20, 2.

him ladders in order to effect a landing upon it. But when he saw that they were resolved on a desperate defence, he preferred admitting them to terms of capitulation, and received them into his own service.¹ To the surviving Milesian citizens he granted the condition of a free city, while he caused all the remaining prisoners to be sold as slaves.

The powerful Persian fleet, from the neighbouring promontory of Mykalê, was compelled to witness, without being able to prevent, the capture of Miletus, and was presently withdrawn to Halikarnassus. At the same time Alexander came to the resolution of disbanding his own fleet; which, while costing more than he could then afford, was nevertheless unfit to cope with the enemy in open sea. He calculated that by concentrating all his efforts on land operations, especially against the cities on the coast, he should exclude the Persian fleet from all effective hold on Asia Minor, and ensure that country to himself. He therefore paid off all the ships, retaining only a moderate squadron for the purpose of transport.²

Before this time, probably, the whole Asiatic coast northward of Miletus—including the Ionic and Æolic cities and the principality of Memnon—had either accepted willingly the dominion of Alexander, or had been reduced by his detachments. Accordingly he now directed his march southward from Miletus, towards Karia, and especially towards Halikarnassus, the principal city of that territory. On entering Karia, he was met by Ada, a member of the Karian princely family, who tendered to him her town of Alinda and her other possessions, adopting him as her son, and entreating his protection. Not many years earlier, under Mausôlus and Artemisia, the powerful princes of this family had been formidable to all the Grecian islands. It was the custom of Karia that brothers and sisters of the reigning family intermarried with each other: Mausôlus and his wife Artemisia were succeeded by Idrieus and his wife Ada, all four being brothers and sisters, sons and daughters of Hekatomnus. On the death of Idrieus, his widow Ada was expelled from Halikarnassus and other parts of Karia by her surviving

¹ Arrian, i. 19; Diodor. xvii. 22.

² Arrian, i. 20, 1-4; Diodor. xvii. 22. At the same time, the statement of Diodorus can hardly be correct (xvii. 24), that Alexander sent his battering engines from Miletus to Halikarnassus by sea. This would only have exposed them to be captured by the Persian fleet.

We shall see that Alexander reorganised his entire fleet during the ensuing year.

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brother Pixodarus ; though she still retained some strong towns, which proved a welcome addition to the conquests of Alexander. Pixodarus, on the contrary, who had given his daughter in marriage to a leading Persian named Orontobatês, warmly espoused the Persian cause, and made Halikarnassus a capital point of resistance against the invader.¹

But it was not by him alone that this city was defended. The Persian fleet had repaired thither from Miletus ; Memnon, now invested by Darius with supreme command on the Asiatic coast and the Ægean, was there in person. There was not only Orontobatês with many other Asiatics, but also a large garrison of mercenary Greeks, commanded by Ephialtês, a brave Athenian exile. The city, strong both by nature and by art, with a surrounding ditch forty-five feet broad and twenty-two feet deep,² had been still further strengthened under the prolonged superintendence of Memnon ;³ lastly, there were two citadels, a fortified harbour with its entrance fronting the south, abundant magazines of arms, and good provision of defensive engines. The siege of Halikarnassus was the most arduous enterprise which Alexander had yet undertaken. Instead of attacking it by land and sea at once, as at Miletus, he could make his approaches only from the land, while the defenders were powerfully aided from seaward by the Persian ships with their numerous crews.

His first efforts, directed against the gate on the north or north-east of the city, which led towards Mylasa, were interrupted by frequent sallies and discharges from the engines on the walls. After a few days thus spent without much avail, he passed with a large section of his army to the western side of the town, towards the outlying portion of the projecting tongue of land, on which Halikarnassus and Myndus (the latter farther westward) were situated. While making demonstrations on this side of Halikarnassus, he at the same time attempted a night attack on Myndus, but was obliged to retire after some hours of fruitless effort. He then confined himself to the siege of Halikarnassus. His soldiers, protected from missiles by moveable penthouses (called Tortoises), gradually filled up the wide and deep ditch round the town, so as to open a level road for his engines (rolling towers of wood) to come up close to the walls. The engines being brought up close, the work

¹ Arrian, i. 23, 11, 12 ; Diodor. xvii. 24 ; Strabo, xiv. p. 657.

² Arrian, i. 20, 13.

³ Arrian, i. 20, 5. *ξύμπαντα ταῦτα Μέμνων τε αὐτὸς παρὼν ἐκ πολλοῦ παρεσκευάκει, &c.*

of demolition was successfully prosecuted ; notwithstanding vigorous sallies from the garrison, repulsed, though not without loss and difficulty, by the Macedonians. Presently the shock of the battering-engines had overthrown two towers of the city-wall, together with two intermediate breadths of wall ; and a third tower was beginning to totter. The besieged were employed in erecting an inner wall of brick to cover the open space, and a wooden tower of the great height of 150 feet for the purpose of casting projectiles.¹ It appears that Alexander waited for the full demolition of the third tower, before he thought the breach wide enough to be stormed ; but an assault was prematurely brought on by two adventurous soldiers from the division of Perdikkas.² These men, elate with wine, rushed up singlehanded to attack the Mylasean gate, and slew the foremost of the defenders who came out to oppose them, until at length, reinforcements arriving successively on both sides, a general combat took place at a short distance from the wall. In the end, the Macedonians were victorious, and drove the besieged back into the city. Such was the confusion, that the city might then have been assaulted and taken, had measures been prepared for it beforehand. The third tower was speedily overthrown ; nevertheless, before this could be accomplished, the besieged had already completed their half-moon within, against which accordingly, on the next day, Alexander pushed forward his engines. In this advanced position, however, being as it were within the circle of the city-wall, the Macedonians were exposed to discharges not only from engines in their front, but also from the towers yet standing on each side of them. Moreover, at night, a fresh sally was made with so much impetuosity, that some of the covering wicker-work of the engines, and even the main woodwork of one of them, was burnt. It was not without difficulty that Philôtas and Hellanikus, the officers on guard, preserved the remainder ; nor were the besieged finally driven in, until Alexander himself appeared with reinforcements.³ Though his troops had been victors in these successive combats, yet he could not carry off his dead, who lay close to the walls, without soliciting a truce for burial. Such request usually counted as a confession of defeat : nevertheless Alexander solicited the truce, which

¹ Compare Arrian, i. 21, 7, 8 ; Diodor. xvii. 25, 26.

² Both Arrian (i. 21, 5) and Diodorus (xvii. 25) mention this proceeding of the two soldiers of Perdikkas, though Diodorus says that it occurred at night, which cannot well be true.

³ Arrian, i. 21, 7-12.

was granted by Memnon, in spite of the contrary opinion of Ephialtês.¹

After a few days of interval, for burying his dead and repairing the engines, Alexander recommenced attack upon the half-moon, under his own personal superintendence. Among the leaders within, a conviction gained ground that the place could not long hold out. Ephialtês especially, resolved not to survive the capture, and seeing that the only chance of preservation consisted in destroying the besieging engines, obtained permission from Memnon to put himself at the head of a last desperate sally.² He took immediately near him 2000 chosen troops, half to encounter the enemy, half with torches to burn the engines. At daybreak, all the gates being suddenly and simultaneously thrown open, sallying parties rushed out from each against the besiegers; the engines from within supporting them by multiplied discharges of missiles. Ephialtês with his division, marching straight against the Macedonians on guard at the main point of attack, assailed them impetuously, while his torch-bearers tried to set the engines on fire. Himself distinguished no less for personal strength than for valour, he occupied the front rank, and was so well seconded by the courage and good array of his soldiers charging in deep column, that for a time he gained advantage. Some of the engines were successfully fired, and the advanced guard of the Macedonian troops, consisting of young troops, gave way and fled. They were rallied partly by the efforts of Alexander, but still more by the older Macedonian soldiers, companions in all Philip's campaigns; who, standing exempt from night-watches,

¹ Diodor. xvii. 25.

² The last desperate struggle of the besieged, is, what stands described in i. 22 of Arrian, and in xvii. 26, 27 of Diodorus; though the two descriptions are very different. Arrian does not name Ephialtês at Halikarnassus. He follows the Macedonian authors, Ptolemy and Aristobulus; who probably dwelt only on Memnon and the Persians as their real enemies, treating the Greeks in general as a portion of the hostile force. On the other hand, Diodorus and Curtius appear to have followed, in great part, Grecian authors; in whose view, eminent Athenian exiles, like Ephialtês and Charidemus, counted for much more.

The fact here mentioned by Diodorus, that Ephialtês drove back the young Macedonian guard, and that the battle was restored only by the extraordinary efforts of the old guard—is one of much interest, which I see no reason for mistrusting, though Arrian says nothing about it. Curtius (v. 2; viii. 1) makes allusion to it on a subsequent occasion, naming Atharrias: the part of his work in which it ought to have been narrated is lost. On this, as on other occasions, Arrian slurs over the partial reverses, obstructions, and losses, of Alexander's career. His authorities probably did so before him.

were encamped more in the rear. These veterans, among whom one Atharrias was the most conspicuous, upbraiding the cowardice of their comrades,¹ cast themselves into their accustomed phalanx-array, and thus both withstood and repulsed the charge of the victorious enemy. Ephialtēs, foremost among the combatants, was slain, the rest were driven back to the city, and the burning engines were saved with some damage. During this same time, an obstinate conflict had also taken place at the gate called Tripylon, where the besieged had made another sally, over a narrow bridge thrown across the ditch. Here the Macedonians were under the command of Ptolemy (not the son of Lagus), one of the king's body-guards. He, with two or three other conspicuous officers, perished in the severe struggle which ensued, but the sallying party were at length repulsed and driven into the city.² The loss of the besieged was severe, in trying to get again within the walls, under vigorous pursuit from the Macedonians.

By this last unsuccessful effort, the defensive force of Halikarnassus was broken. Memnon and Orontobatēs, satisfied that no longer defence of the town was practicable, took advantage of the night to set fire to their wooden projectile engines and towers, as well as to their magazines of arms, with the houses near the exterior wall, while they carried away the troops, stores, and inhabitants, partly to the citadel called Salmakis—partly to the neighbouring islet called Arkonnesus—partly to the island of Kos.³ Though thus evacuating the town, however, they still kept good garrisons well provisioned in the two citadels belonging to it. The conflagration, stimulated by a strong wind, spread widely. It was only extinguished by the orders of Alexander, when he entered the town, and put to death all those whom he found with firebrands. He directed that the Halikarnassians found in the houses should be spared, but that the city itself should be demolished. He assigned the whole of Karia to Ada, as a principality, doubtless under condition of tribute. As the citadels still occupied by the enemy were strong enough to require a long siege, he did not think it necessary to remain in person for the purpose of

¹ Diodor. xvi. 27; Curtius, v. I, viii. 2. . . . οἱ γὰρ πρεσβύτατοι τῶν Μακεδόνων, διὰ μὲν τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀπολελυμένοι τῶν κινδύνων, συνεστρατευμένοι δὲ Φιλίππῳ τοῖς μὲν φυγομαχοῦσι νεωτέροις πικρῶς ὠνείδισαν τὴν ἀνανδρίαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ συναθροισθέντες καὶ συνασπίσαντες, ὑπέστησαν τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἤδη νενικηκέναι

² Arrian, i. 22, 5.

³ Arrian, i. 23, 3, 4; Diodor. xvii. 27.

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reducing them ; but surrounding them with a wall of blockade, he left Ptolemy and 3000 men to guard it.¹

Having concluded the siege of Halikarnassus, Alexander sent back his artillery to Tralles, ordering Parmenio, with a large portion of the cavalry, the allied infantry, and the baggage waggons, to Sardis.

The ensuing winter months he employed in the conquest of Lykia, Pamphylia, and Pisidia. All this southern coast of Asia Minor is mountainous ; the range of Mount Taurus descending nearly to the sea, so as to leave little or no intervening breadth of plain. In spite of great strength of situation, such was the terror of Alexander's arms, that all the Lykian towns—Hyparna, Telmissus, Pinara, Xanthus, Patara, and thirty others—submitted to him without a blow.² One alone among them, called Marmareis, resisted to desperation.³ On reaching the territory called Milyas, the Phrygian frontier of Lykia, Alexander received the surrender of the Greek maritime city, Phasêlis. He assisted the Phaselites in destroying a mountain fort erected and garrisoned against them by the neighbouring Pisidian mountaineers, and paid a public compliment to the sepulchre of their deceased townsman, the rhetorician Theodektês.⁴

After this brief halt at Phasêlis, Alexander directed his course to Pergê in Pamphylia. The ordinary mountain road, by which he sent most of his army, was so difficult as to require some leveling by Thracian light troops sent in advance for the purpose. But the king himself, with a select detachment, took a road more difficult still, called Klimax, under the mountains by the brink of the sea. When the wind blew from the south, this road was covered by such a depth of water as to be impracticable ; for some time before he reached the spot, the wind had blown strong from the south—but as he came near, the special providence of the gods (so he and his friends conceived it) brought on a change to the north, so that the sea receded and left an available passage, though his soldiers had the water up to their waists.⁵ From Pergê he marched on to Sidê, receiving on his way envoys from Aspendus, who offered to surrender their city, but deprecated the

¹ Arrian, i. 23, 11 ; Diodor. xvii. 7 ; Strabo, xiv. p. 657.

² Arrian, i. 24, 6-9.

³ Diodor. xvii. 28.

⁴ Arrian, i. 24, 11 ; Plutarch, Alexand. 17.

⁵ Arrian, i. 26, 4. οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἐξηγοῦντο, &c. Strabo, xiv. p. 666 ; Curtius, v. 3, 22.

Plutarch's words (Alexand. 17) must be taken to mean that Alexander did not boast so much of this special favour from the gods, as some of his panegyrists boasted for him.

entrance of a garrison ; which they were allowed to buy off by promising fifty talents in money, together with the horses which they were bringing up as tribute for the Persian king. Having left a garrison at Sidê, he advanced onward to a strong place called Syllium, defended by brave natives with a body of mercenaries to aid them. These men held out, and even repulsed a first assault ; which Alexander could not stay to repeat, being apprised that the Aspendians had refused to execute the conditions imposed, and had put their city in a state of defence. Returning rapidly, he constrained them to submission, and then marched back to Pergê ; from whence he directed his course towards the greater Phrygia,¹ through the difficult mountains, and almost indomitable population, of Pisidia.

After remaining in the Pisidian mountains long enough to reduce several towns or strong posts, Alexander proceeded northward into Phrygia, passing by the salt lake called Askanius to the steep and impregnable fortress of Kelænæ, garrisoned by 1000 Karians, and 100 mercenary Greeks. These men, having no hope of relief from the Persians, offered to deliver up the fortress, unless such relief should arrive before the sixtieth day.² Alexander accepted the propositions, remained ten days at Kelænæ, and left there Antigonus (afterwards the most powerful among his successors) as satrap of Phrygia, with 1500 men. He then marched northward to Gordium on the river Sangarius, where Parmenio was directed to meet him, and where his winter-campaign was concluded.³

APPENDIX

ON THE LENGTH OF THE MACEDONIAN SARISSA OR PIKE

The statements here given about the length of the sarissa carried by the phalangite, are taken from Polybius, whose description is on all points both clear and consistent with itself. "The sarissa (he says) is sixteen cubits long, according to the original theory ; and fourteen cubits, as adapted to actual practice"—τὸ δὲ τῶν σαρισῶν μέγεθος ἐστὶ, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν, ἑκαίδεκα πηχῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀρμογὴν τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, δεκατεσσάρων. Τούτων δὲ τοὺς

¹ Arrian, i. 27, 1-8.

² Curtius, iii. 1, 8.

³ Arrian, i. 29, 1-5.

τέσσαρας ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ μεταξὺ ταῖν χερσῶν διάστημα, καὶ τὸ κατόπιν σήκωμα τῆς προβολῆς (xviii. 12).

The difference here indicated by Polybius between the length in theory, and that in practice, may probably be understood to mean, that the phalangites, when in exercise, used pikes of the greater length; when on service, of the smaller: just as the Roman soldiers were trained in their exercises to use arms heavier than they employed against an enemy.

Of the later Tactic writers, Leo (Tact. vi. 39) and Constantine Porphyrogenitus, repeat the double measurement of the sarissa as given by Polybius. Arrian (Tact. c. 12) and Polyænus (ii. 29, 2) state its length at sixteen cubits—Ælian (Tact. c. 14) gives fourteen cubits. All these authors follow either Polybius, or some other authority concurrent with him. None of them contradict him, though none state the case so clearly as he does.

Messrs. Rüstow and Köchly (Gesch. des Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 238), authors of the best work that I know respecting ancient military matters, reject the authority of Polybius as it here stands. They maintain that the passage must be corrupt, and that Polybius must have meant to say that the sarissa was sixteen *feet* in length—not sixteen *cubits*. I cannot subscribe to their opinion, nor do I think that their criticism on Polybius is a just one.

First, they reason as if Polybius had said that the sarissa of actual service was *sixteen* cubits long. Computing the weight of such a weapon from the thickness required in the shaft, they pronounce that it would be unmanageable. But Polybius gives the actual length as only *fourteen* cubits: a very material difference. If we accept the hypothesis of these authors—that corruption of the text has made us read *cubits* where we ought to have read *feet*,—it will follow that the length of the sarissa, as given by Polybius, would be *fourteen feet*, not *sixteen feet*. Now this length is not sufficient to justify various passages in which its prodigious length is set forth.

Next, they impute to Polybius a contradiction in saying that the Roman soldier occupied a space of three feet, equal to that occupied by a Macedonian soldier—and yet that in the fight, he had two Macedonian soldiers and ten pikes, opposed to him (xviii. 13). But there is here no contradiction at all: for Polybius expressly says that the Roman, though occupying three feet when the legion was drawn up in order, required, when fighting, an expansion of the ranks and an increased interval to the extent of three feet behind him and on each side of him (χάλασμα καὶ διάστασιν ἀλλήλων ἔχειν δεήσει τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐλάχιστον τρεῖς πόδας κατ' ἐπιστάτην καὶ παραστάτην) in order to allow full play for his sword and shield. It is therefore perfectly true that each Roman soldier, when actually marching up to attack the phalanx, occupied as much ground as two phalangites, and had ten pikes to deal with.

Further, it is impossible to suppose that Polybius, in speaking of *cubits*, really meant *feet*: because (cap. 12) he speaks of *three feet* as the interval *between each rank* in the file, and these *three feet* are

clearly made equal to *two cubits*. His computation will not come right, if in place of *cubits* you substitute *feet*.

We must therefore take the assertion of Polybius as we find it; that the pike of the phalangite was fourteen cubits or twenty-one feet in length. Now Polybius had every means of being well informed on such a point. He was above thirty years of age at the time of the last war of the Romans against the Macedonian king Perseus, in which war he himself served. He was intimately acquainted with Scipio, the son of Paulus Emilius, who gained the battle of Pydna. Lastly, he had paid great attention to tactics, and had even written an express work on the subject.

It might indeed be imagined, that the statement of Polybius, though true as to his own time, was not true as to the time of Philip and Alexander. But there is nothing to countenance such a suspicion—which moreover is expressly disclaimed by Rüstow and Köchly.

Doubtless twenty-one feet is a prodigious length, unmanageable except by men properly trained, and inconvenient for all evolutions. But these are just the terms under which the pike of the phalangite is always spoken of. So Livy, xxxi. 39, "*Erant pleraque silvestria circa, incommoda phalangi maximè Macedonum; quæ, nisi ubi prælongis hastis velut vallum ante clypeos objecit (quod ut fiat, libero campo opus est) nullius admodum usus est.*" Compare also Livy, xlv. 40, 41, where, among other intimations of the immense length of the pike, we find, "*Si carptim aggrediendo, circumagere immobilem longitudine et gravitate hastam cogas, confusâ strue implicatur:*" also xxxiii. 8, 9.

Xenophon tells us that the Ten Thousand Greeks in their retreat had to fight their way across the territory of the Chalybes, who carried a pike *fifteen cubits* long, together with a short sword: he does not mention a shield, but they wore greaves and helmets (Anab. iv. 7, 15). This is a length greater than what Polybius ascribes to the pike of the Macedonian phalangite. The Mosynœki defended their citadel "with pikes so long and thick that a man could hardly carry them" (Anabas. v. 4, 25). In the Iliad, when the Trojans are pressing hard upon the Greek ships, and seeking to set them on fire, Ajax is described as planting himself upon the poop, and keeping off the assailants with a thrusting-pike of twenty-two cubits or thirty-three feet in length (*ξυστὸν ναύμαχον ἐν παλάμῃσιν—δυσκαιεικοσίπηχυ*, Iliad, xv. 678). The spear of Hektor is ten cubits, or eleven cubits, in length—intended to be hurled (Iliad, vi. 319; viii. 494)—the reading is not settled, whether *ἑγχοσ ἑχ'* ἐνδεκάπηχυ, or *ἑγχοσ ἑχεν* δεκάπηχυ.

The Swiss infantry, and the German Landsknechte, in the sixteenth century, were in many respects a reproduction of the Macedonian phalanx: close ranks, deep files, long pikes, and the three or four first ranks composed of the strongest and bravest men in the regiment—either officers, or picked soldiers receiving double pay. The length and impenetrable array of their pikes enabled them to resist the charge of the heavy cavalry or men at

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arms : they were irresistible in front, unless an enemy could find means to break in among the pikes, which was sometimes, though rarely, done. Their great confidence was in the length of the pike. Macciavelli says of them (*Ritratti dell' Alamagna*, Opere, t. iv. p. 159; and *Dell' Arte della Guerra*, p. 232-236), "Dicono tenere tale ordine, che non é possibile entrare tra loro, né accostarseli, quanto é la picca lunga. Sono ottime genti in campagna, à far giornata : ma per espugnare terre non vagliono, e poco nel difenderlo : ed universalmente, dove non possano tenere l'ordine loro della milizia, non vagliono."

CHAPTER XCIII

SECOND AND THIRD ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER— BATTLE OF ISSUS—SIEGE OF TYRE

It was about February or March 333 B.C., when Alexander reached Gordium ; where he appears to have halted for some time, giving to the troops who had been with him in Pisidia a repose doubtless needful. While at Gordium, he performed the memorable exploit familiarly known as the cutting of the Gordian knot. There was preserved in the citadel an ancient waggon of rude structure, said by the legend to have once belonged to the peasant Gordius and his son Midas—the primitive rustic kings of Phrygia, designated as such by the gods, and chosen by the people. The cord (composed of fibres from the bark of the cornel tree), attaching the yoke of this waggon to the pole, was so twisted and entangled as to form a knot of singular complexity, which no one had ever been able to untie. An oracle had pronounced, that to the person who should untie it the empire of Asia was destined. When Alexander went up to see this ancient relic, the surrounding multitude, Phrygian as well as Macedonian, were full of expectation that the conqueror of the Granikus and of Halikarnassus would overcome the difficulties of the knot and acquire the promised empire. But Alexander, on inspecting the knot, was as much perplexed as others had been before him, until at length, in a fit of impatience, he drew his sword and severed the cord in two. By every one this was accepted as a solution of the problem, thus making good his title to the empire of Asia ; a belief which the gods ratified by a storm of thunder and lightning during the ensuing night.¹

At Gordium, Alexander was visited by envoys from Athens,

¹ Arrian, ii. 3 ; Curtius, iii. 2, 17 ; Plutarch, Alex. 18 ; Justin, xi. 7.

entreating the liberation of the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, who were now at work chained in the Macedonian mines. But he refused this prayer until a more convenient season. Aware that the Greeks were held attached to him only by their fears, and that, if opportunity occurred, a large fraction of them would take part with the Persians, he did not think it prudent to relax his hold upon their conduct.¹

Such opportunity seemed now not unlikely to occur. Memnon, excluded from efficacious action on the continent since the loss of Halikarnassus, was employed among the islands of the Ægean (during the first half of 333 B.C.), with the purpose of carrying war into Greece and Macedonia. Invested with the most ample command, he had a large Phenician fleet and a considerable body of Grecian mercenaries, together with his nephew Pharnabazus and the Persian Autophradatês. Having acquired the important island of Chios, through the co-operation of a part of its inhabitants, he next landed on Lesbos, where four out of the five cities, either from fear or preference, declared in his favour; while Mitylênê, the greatest of the five, already occupied by a Macedonian garrison, stood out against him. Memnon accordingly disembarked his troops and commenced the blockade of the city both by sea and land, surrounding it with a double palisade wall from sea to sea. In the midst of this operation he died of sickness; but his nephew Pharnabazus, to whom he had consigned the command provisionally, until the pleasure of Darius could be known, prosecuted his measures vigorously, and brought the city to a capitulation. It was stipulated that the garrison introduced by Alexander should be dismissed; that the column, recording alliance with him, should be demolished; that the Mityleneans should become allies of Darius, upon the terms of the old convention called by the name of Antalkidas; and that the citizens in banishment should be recalled, with restitution of half their property. But Pharnabazus, as soon as admitted, violated the capitulation at once. He not only extorted contributions, but introduced a garrison under Lykomêdês, and established a returned exile named Diogenês as despot.² Such breach of faith was ill-calculated to assist the further extension of Persian influence in Greece.

Had the Persian fleet been equally active a year earlier, Alexander's army could never have landed in Asia. Nevertheless, the acquisitions of Chios and Lesbos, late as they were in coming, were highly important as promising future progress. Several of the Cycladês islands sent to tender their adhesion to

¹ Arrian, i. 29, 8.

² Arrian, ii. 1, 4-9.

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the Persian cause ; the fleet was expected in Eubœa, and the Spartans began to count upon aid for an anti-Macedonian movement.¹ But all these hopes were destroyed by the unexpected decease of Memnon.

It was not merely the superior ability of Memnon, but also his established reputation both with Greeks and Persians, which rendered his death a fatal blow to the interests of Darius. The Persians had with them other Greek officers—brave and able—probably some not unfit to execute the full Memnonian schemes. But none of them had gone through the same experience in the art of exercising command among Orientals—none of them had acquired the confidence of Darius to the same extent, so as to be invested with the real guidance of operations, and upheld against court-calumnies. Though Alexander had now become master of Asia Minor, yet the Persians had ample means, if effectively used, of defending all that yet remained, and even of seriously disturbing him at home. But with Memnon vanished the last chance of employing these means with wisdom or energy. The full value of his loss was better appreciated by the intelligent enemy whom he opposed, than by the feeble master whom he served. The death of Memnon, lessening the efficiency of the Persians at sea, allowed full leisure to re-organise the Macedonian fleet,² and to employ the undivided land-force for further inland conquest.³

If Alexander was a gainer in respect to his own operations by the death of this eminent Rhodian, he was yet more a gainer by the change of policy which that event induced Darius to adopt. The Persian king resolved to renounce the defensive schemes of Memnon, and to take the offensive against the Macedonians on land. His troops, already summoned from the various parts of the empire, had partially arrived, and were still coming in.⁴ Their numbers became greater and greater, amounting at length to a vast and multitudinous host, the total of which is given by some as 600,000 men—by others as 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry. The spectacle of this showy and imposing mass, in every variety of arms, costume, and language,

¹ Diodor. xvii. 29.

² Arrian, ii. 2, 6 ; Curtius, iii. 3, 19 ; iii. 4, 8. "Nondum enim Memnonem vitâ excessisse cognoverat (Alexander)—satis gnarus, cuncta in expedito fore, si nihil ab eo moveretur."

³ Diodor. xvi. 31.

⁴ Diodor. xvii. 30, 31. , Diodorus represents the Persian king as having *begun* to issue letters of convocation for the troops, *after* he heard the death of Memnon ; which cannot be true. The letters must have been sent out before.

filled the mind of Darius with confidence ; especially as there were among them between 20,000 and 30,000 Grecian mercenaries. The Persian courtiers, themselves elate and sanguine, stimulated and exaggerated the same feeling in the king himself, who became confirmed in his persuasion that his enemies could never resist him. From Sogdiana, Baktria, and India, the contingents had not yet had time to arrive ; but most of those between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian sea had come in—Persians, Medes, Armenians, Derbikes, Barkanians, Hyrkanians, Kardakes, &c. ; all of whom, mustered in the plains of Mesopotamia, are said to have been counted, like the troops of Xerxês in the plain of Doriskus, by piling off a space capable of containing exactly 10,000 men, and passing all the soldiers through it in succession.¹ Neither Darius himself, nor any of those around him, had ever before seen so overwhelming a manifestation of the Persian imperial force. To an Oriental eye, incapable of appreciating the real conditions of military preponderance,—accustomed only to the gross and visible computation of numbers and physical strength,—the king who marched forth at the head of such an army appeared like a god on earth, certain to trample down all before him—just as most Greeks had conceived respecting Xerxês,² and by stronger reason Xerxês respecting himself, a century and a half before. Because all this turned out a ruinous mistake, the description of the feeling, given in Curtius and Diodorus, is often mistrusted as baseless rhetoric. Yet it is in reality the self-suggested illusion of untaught men, as opposed to trained and scientific judgement.

But though such was the persuasion of Orientals, it found no response in the bosom of an intelligent Athenian. Among the Greeks now near Darius, was the Athenian exile Charidêmus ; who having incurred the implacable enmity of Alexander, had been forced to quit Athens after the Macedonian capture of Thebes, and had fled together with Ephialtês to the Persians. Darius, elate with the apparent omnipotence of his army under review, and hearing but one voice of devoted concurrence from the courtiers around him, asked the opinion of Charidêmus, in

¹ Curtius, iii. 2.

² Herodot. vii. 56—and the colloquy between Xerxês and Demaratus, vii. 103, 104—where the language put by Herodotus into the mouth of Xerxês is natural and instructive. On the other hand, the superior penetration of Cyrus the younger expresses supreme contempt for the military inefficiency of an Asiatic multitude—Xenophon, *Anab.* i. 7, 4. Compare the blunt language of the Arcadian Antiochus—Xen. *Hellen.* vii. i. 38 ; and *Cyropæd.* viii. 8, 20.

full expectation of receiving an affirmative reply. So completely were the hopes of Charidêmus bound up with the success of Darius, that he would not suppress his convictions, however unpalatable, at a moment when there was yet a possibility that they might prove useful. He replied (with the same frankness as Demaratus had once employed towards Xerxês), that the vast multitude now before him were unfit to cope with the comparatively small number of the invaders. He advised Darius to place no reliance on Asiatics, but to employ his immense treasures in subsidising an increased army of Grecian mercenaries. He tendered his own hearty services either to assist or to command. To Darius, what he said was alike surprising and offensive; in the Persian courtiers, it provoked intolerable wrath. Intoxicated as they all were with the spectacle of their immense muster, it seemed to them a combination of insult with absurdity, to pronounce Asiatics worthless as compared with Macedonians, and to teach the king that his empire could be defended by none but Greeks. They denounced Charidêmus as a traitor who wished to acquire the king's confidence in order to betray him to Alexander. Darius, himself stung with the reply, and still further exasperated by the clamours of his courtiers, seized with his own hands the girdle of Charidêmus, and consigned him to the guards for execution. "You will discover too late (exclaimed the Athenian) the truth of what I have said. My avenger will soon be upon you."¹

Filled as he now was with certain anticipations of success and glory, Darius resolved to assume in person the command of his army, and march down to overwhelm Alexander. From this moment, his land-army became the really important and aggressive force, with which he himself was to act. Herein we note his distinct abandonment of the plans of Memnon—the turning-point of his future fortune. He abandoned them, too, at the precise moment when they might have been most safely and completely executed. For at the time of the battle of the Granikus, when Memnon's counsel was originally given, the defensive part of it was not easy to act upon; since the Persians had no very strong or commanding position. But now, in the spring of 333 B.C., they had a line of defence as good as they could possibly desire; advantages, indeed, scarcely to be paralleled elsewhere. In the first place, there was the line of Mount Taurus, barring the entrance of Alexander into Kilikia; a line of defence (as will presently appear) nearly inexpugnable. Next, even if Alexander had succeeded in forcing this line and

¹ Curtius, iii. 2, 10-20; Diodor. xvii. 30.

mastering Kilikia, there would yet remain the narrow road between Mount Amanus and the sea, called the Amanian Gates, and the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria—and after that, the passes over Mount Amanus itself—all indispensable for Alexander to pass through, and capable of being held, with proper precautions, against the strongest force of attack. A better opportunity for executing the defensive part of Memnon's scheme could not present itself; and he himself must doubtless have reckoned that such advantages would not be thrown away.

The momentous change of policy, on the part of the Persian king, was manifested by the order which he sent to the fleet after receiving intelligence of the death of Memnon. Confirming the appointment of Pharnabazus (made provisionally by the dying Memnon) as admiral, he at the same time despatched Thymôdes (son of Mentor and nephew of Memnon) to bring away from the fleet the Grecian mercenaries who served aboard, to be incorporated with the main Persian army.¹ Here was a clear proof that the main stress of offensive operations was henceforward to be transferred from the sea to the land.

It is the more important to note such desertion of policy, on the part of Darius, as the critical turning-point in the Greco-Persian drama—because Arrian and the other historians leave it out of sight, and set before us little except secondary points in the case. Thus, for example, they condemn the imprudence of Darius, for coming to fight Alexander within the narrow space near Issus, instead of waiting for him on the spacious plains beyond Mount Amanus. Now, unquestionably, granting that a general battle was inevitable, this step augmented the chances in favour of the Macedonians. But it was a step upon which no material consequences turned; for the Persian army under Darius was hardly less unfit for a pitched battle in the open plain; as was afterwards proved at Arbela. The real imprudence—the neglect of the Memnonian warning—consisted in fighting the battle at all. Mountains and defiles were the real strength of the Persians, to be held as posts of defence against the invader. If Darius erred, it was not so much in relinquishing the open plain of Sochi, as in originally preferring that plain with a pitched battle, to the strong lines of defence offered by Taurus and Amanus.

The narrative of Arrian, except perhaps in what it affirms, is not only brief and incomplete, but even omits on various occasions to put in relief the really important and determining points.

¹ Arrian, ii. 2, 1; ii. 13, 3. Curtius, iii. 3, 1.

While halting at Gordium, Alexander was joined by those newly-married Macedonians whom he had sent home to winter, and who now came back with reinforcements to the number of 3000 infantry and 300 cavalry, together with 200 Thessalian cavalry, and 150 Eleians.¹ As soon as his troops had been sufficiently rested, he marched (probably about the latter half of May) towards Paphlagonia and Kappadokia. At Ankyra he was met by a deputation from the Paphlagonians, who submitted themselves to his discretion, only entreating that he would not conduct his army into their country. Accepting these terms, he placed them under the government of Kallas, his satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Advancing farther, he subdued the whole of Kappadokia, even to a considerable extent beyond the Halys, leaving therein Sabiktas as satrap.²

Having established security in his rear, Alexander marched southward towards Mount Taurus. He reached a post called the Camp of Cyrus, at the northern foot of that mountain, near the pass Tauri-pylæ, or Kilikian Gates, which forms the regular communication between Kappadokia on the north side, and Kilikia on the south, of this great chain. The long road ascending and descending was generally narrow, winding, and rugged, sometimes between two steep and high banks; and it included, near its southern termination, one spot particularly obstructed and difficult. From ancient times, down to the present, the main road from Asia Minor into Kilikia and Syria has run through this pass. During the Roman empire, it must doubtless have received many improvements, so as to render the traffic comparatively easier. Yet the description given of it by modern travellers represents it to be as difficult as any road ever traversed by an army.³ Seventy years before Alexander, it had been traversed by the younger Cyrus with the 10,000 Greeks, in his march up to attack his brother Artaxerxes; and Xenophon,⁴ who then went through it, pronounces it absolutely

¹ Arrian, i. 29, 6.

² Arrian, ii. 4, 2; Curtius, iii. 1, 22; Plutarch, Alex. 18.

³ Respecting this pass, see vol. ix. chap. lxix. of this History. There are now two passes over Taurus, from Erekli on the north side of the mountain—one the easternmost, descending upon Adana in Kilikia—the other, the westernmost, upon ? Ibrahim Pacha, the Turks and pass un-defended, so that Ibrahim defended themselves but without opposition. The Turkish pass, but Egyptians (Histoire de la Guerre d'Alexandre crossed the pass, but Egyptians, p. 243).
⁴ Xenoph. Anab. i.



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impracticable for an army, if opposed by any occupying force. So thoroughly persuaded was Cyrus himself of this fact, that he had prepared a fleet, in case he found the pass occupied, to land troops by sea in Kilikia in the rear of the defenders; and great indeed was his astonishment to discover that the habitual recklessness of Persian management had left the defile unguarded. The narrowest part, while hardly sufficient to contain four armed men abreast, was shut in by precipitous rock on each side.¹ Here, if anywhere, was the spot in which the defensive policy of Memnon might have been made sure. To Alexander, inferior as he was by sea, the resource employed by the younger Cyrus was not open.

Yet Arsamês, the Persian satrap commanding at Tarsus in Kilikia, having received seemingly from his master no instructions, or worse than none, acted as if ignorant of the existence of his enterprising enemy north of Mount Taurus. On the first approach of Alexander, the few Persian soldiers occupying the pass fled without striking a blow, being seemingly unprepared for any enemy more formidable than mountain-robbers. Alexander thus became master of this almost insuperable barrier without the loss of a man.² On the ensuing day he marched his whole army over it into Kilikia, and arriving in a few hours at Tarsus, found the town already evacuated by Arsamês.³

At Tarsus Alexander made a long halt; much longer than he intended. Either from excessive fatigue, or from bathing while hot in the chilly water of the river Kydnus, he was seized with a violent fever, which presently increased to so dangerous a pitch that his life was despaired of. Amidst the grief and alarm with which this misfortune filled the army, none of the physicians would venture to administer remedies, from fear of being held responsible for what threatened to be a fatal result.⁴ One alone among them, an Akarnanian named

¹ Curtius, iii. 4, II.

² Curtius, iii. 4, II. "Contemplatus locorum situm (Alexander), non alias dicitur magis admiratus esse felicitatem suam," &c.

See Plutarch, Demetrius, 47, where Agathoklês (son of Lysimachus) holds the line of Taurus against Demetrius Poliorkêtês.

³ Arrian, ii. 4, 3-8; Curtius, iii. 4. Curtius ascribes to Arsamês the intention of executing what had been recommended by Memnon before the battle of the Granikus—to desolate the country in order to check Alexander's advance. But this can hardly be the right interpretation of the proceeding. Arrian's account seems more reasonable.

⁴ When Hephæstion died of fever at Ekbatana, nine years afterwards, Alexander caused the physician who had attended him to be crucified (Plutarch, Alexand. 72; Arrian, vii. 14).

Philippus, long known and trusted by Alexander, engaged to cure him by a violent purgative draught. Alexander directed him to prepare it; but before the time for taking it arrived, he received a confidential letter from Parmenio, entreating him to beware of Philippus, who had been bribed by Darius to poison him. After reading the letter, he put it under his pillow. Presently came Philippus with the medicine, which Alexander accepted and swallowed without remark, at the same time giving Philippus the letter to read, and watching the expression of his countenance. The look, words, and gestures of the physician were such as completely to reassure him. Philippus, indignantly repudiating the calumny, repeated his full confidence in the medicine, and pledged himself to abide the result. At first it operated so violently as to make Alexander seemingly worse, and even to bring him to death's door; but after a certain interval, its healing effects became manifest. The fever was subdued, and Alexander was pronounced out of danger, to the delight of the whole army.¹ A reasonable time sufficed to restore him to his former health and vigour.

It was his first operation, after recovery, to send forward Parmenio, at the head of the Greeks, Thessalians, and Thracians, in his army, for the purpose of clearing the forward route and of securing the pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria.² This narrow road, bounded by the range of Mount Amanus on the east and by the sea on the west, had been once barred by a double cross-wall with gates for passage, marking the original boundaries of Kilikia and Syria. The Gates, about six days' march beyond Tarsus,³ were found guarded, but the guard fled with little resistance. At the same time, Alexander himself, conducting the Macedonian troops in a south-westerly direction from Tarsus, employed some time in mastering and regulating the towns of Anchialus and Soli, as well as the Kilikian mountaineers. Then, returning to Tarsus, and recommencing his forward march, he advanced with the

¹ This interesting anecdote is recounted, with more or less of rhetoric and amplification, in all the historians—Arrian, ii. 4; Diodor. xvii. 31; Plutarch, Alexand. 19; Curtius, iii. 5; Justin, xi. 8.

It is one mark of the difference produced in the character of Alexander, by superhuman successes continued for four years—to contrast the generous confidence which he here displayed towards Philippus, with his cruel pre-judgement and torture of Philôtas four years afterwards.

² Arrian, ii. 5, 1; Diodor. xvii. 32; Curtius, iii. 7, 6.

³ Cyrus the younger was five days in marching from Tarsus to Issus, and one day more from Issus to the Gates of Kilikia and Syria.—Xenoph. Anab. i. 4, 1; vol. ix. chap. lxix. of this History.

infantry and with his chosen squadron of cavalry, first to Magarsus near the mouth of the river Pyramus, next to Mallus; the general body of cavalry, under Philôtas, being sent by a more direct route across the Alëian plain. Mallus, sacred to the prophet Amphilochus as patron-hero, was said to be a colony from Argos; on both these grounds Alexander was disposed to treat it with peculiar respect. He offered solemn sacrifice to Amphilochus, exempting Mallus from tribute, and appeased some troublesome discord among the citizens.¹

It was at Mallus that he received his first distinct communication respecting Darius and the main Persian army; which was said to be encamped at Sochi in Syria, on the eastern side of Mount Amanus, about two days' march from the mountain pass now called Beylan. That pass, traversing the Amanian range, forms the continuance of the main road from Asia Minor into Syria, after having passed first over Taurus, and next through the difficult point of ground above specified (called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria), between Mount Amanus and the sea. Assembling his principal officers, Alexander communicated to them the position of Darius, now encamped in a spacious plain with prodigious superiority of numbers, especially of cavalry. Though the locality was thus rather favourable to the enemy, yet the Macedonians, full of hopes and courage, called upon Alexander to lead them forth-against him. Accordingly Alexander, well pleased with their alacrity, began his forward march on the following morning. He passed through Issus, where he left some sick and wounded under a moderate guard—then through the Gates of Kilikia and Syria. At the second day's march from those Gates, he reached the seaport Myriandrus, the first town of Syria or Phenicia.²

Here, having been detained in his camp one day by a dreadful storm, he received intelligence which altogether changed his plans. The Persian army had been marched away from Sochi, and was now in Kilikia, following in his rear. It had already got possession of Issus.

Darius had marched out of the interior his vast and miscellaneous host, stated at 600,000 men. His mother, his wife, his harem, his children, his personal attendants of every description, accompanied him, to witness what was anticipated as a certain triumph. All the apparatus of ostentation and luxury was provided in abundance, for the king and for his Persian grandees. The baggage was enormous: of gold and silver

¹ Arrian, ii. 5, 11.

² Arrian, ii. 6.

alone, we are told that there was enough to furnish load for 600 mules and 300 camels.¹ A temporary bridge being thrown over the Euphrates, five days were required to enable the whole army to cross.² Much of the treasure and baggage, however, was not allowed to follow the army to the vicinity of Mount Amanus, but was sent under a guard to Damascus in Syria.

At the head of such an overwhelming host, Darius was eager to bring on at once a general battle. It was not sufficient for him simply to keep back an enemy, whom, when once in presence, he calculated on crushing altogether. Accordingly, he had given no orders (as we have just seen) to defend the line of the Taurus; he had admitted Alexander unopposed into Kilikia, and he intended to let him enter in like manner through the remaining strong passes—first, the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, between Mount Amanus and the sea—next, the pass, now called Beylan, across Amanus itself. He both expected and wished that his enemy should come into the plain to fight, there to be trodden down by the countless horsemen of Persia.

But such anticipation was not at once realised. The movements of Alexander, hitherto so rapid and unremitting, seemed suspended. We have already noticed the dangerous fever which threatened his life, occasioning not only a long halt, but much uneasiness among the Macedonian army. All was doubtless reported to the Persians, with abundant exaggerations; and when Alexander, immediately after recovery, instead of marching forward towards them, turned away from them to subdue the western portion of Kilikia, this again was construed by Darius as an evidence of hesitation and fear. It is even asserted that Parmenio wished to await the attack of the Persians in Kilikia, and that Alexander at first consented to do so.³ At any rate, Darius, after a certain interval, contracted the persuasion, and was assured by his Asiatic councillors and courtiers, that the Macedonians, though audacious and triumphant against frontier satraps, now hung back intimidated by the approaching majesty and full muster of the empire, and that they would not stand to resist his attack. Under this impression Darius resolved upon an advance into Kilikia with all his army. Thymôdês indeed, and other intelligent Grecian advisers—together with the Macedonian exile Amyntas—deprecated his new resolution, entreating him to persevere in his original purpose. They pledged themselves that Alexander would come forth to attack him wherever he was, and that too,

¹ Curtius, iii. 3, 24.

² Curtius, iii. 7, 1.

³ Curtius, iii. 7, 8.

speedily. They dwelt on the imprudence of fighting in the narrow defiles of Kilikia, where his numbers, and especially his vast cavalry, would be useless. Their advice, however, was not only disregarded by Darius, but denounced by the Persian councillors as traitorous.¹ Even some of the Greeks in the camp shared, and transmitted in their letters to Athens, the blind confidence of the monarch. The order was forthwith given for the whole army to quit the plains of Syria and march across Mount Amanus into Kilikia.² To cross, by any pass, over such a range as that of Mount Amanus, with a numerous army, heavy baggage, and ostentatious train (including all the suite necessary for the regal family), must have been a work of no inconsiderable time; and the only two passes over this mountain were, both of them, narrow and easily defensible.³ Darius followed the northernmost of the two, which brought him into the rear of the enemy.

Thus at the same time that the Macedonians were marching southward to cross Mount Amanus by the southern pass, and attack Darius in the plain—Darius was coming over into Kilikia by the northern pass to drive them before him back into Macedonia.⁴ Reaching Issus, seemingly about two days after they had left it, he became master of their sick and wounded left in the town. With odious brutality, his grandees impelled him to inflict upon these poor men either death or amputation of hands and arms.⁵ He then marched forward—

¹ From Æschinês (cont. Ktesiphont. p. 552) it seems that Demosthenês, and the anti-Macedonian statesmen at Athens, received letters at this moment written in high spirits, intimating that Alexander was "caught and pinned up" in Kilikia. Demosthenês (if we may believe Æschinês) went about showing these letters, and boasting of the good news which was at hand. Josephus (Ant. Jud. xi. 8, 3) also reports the confident anticipations of Persian success, entertained by Sanballat at Samaria, as well as by all the Asiatics around.

² Arrian, ii. 6; Curtius, iii. 8, 2; Diodor. xvii. 32.

³ Cicero, Epist. ad Famil. xv. 4. See the instructive commentary of Mützell ad Curtium, iii. 8, pp. 103, 104. I have given, in an Appendix to this Volume, a Plan of the ground near Issus, together with some explanatory comments.

⁴ Plutarch (Alexand. 20) states this general fact correctly; but he is mistaken in saying that the two armies missed one another in the night, &c.

⁵ Arrian, ii. 7, 2; Curtius, iii. 8, 14. I have mentioned, a few pages back, that about a fortnight before, Alexander had sent Parmenio forward from Tarsus to secure the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, while he himself marched backward to Soli and Anchialus. He and Parmenio must have been separated at this time by a distance not less than eight days of ordinary march. If, during this interval, Darius had arrived at Issus, he would have been just between them, and would have cut them off one from

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along the same road by the shore of the Gulf which had already been followed by Alexander—and encamped on the banks of the river Pinarus.

The fugitives from Issus hastened to inform Alexander, whom they overtook at Myriandus. So astonished was he that he refused to believe the news until it had been confirmed by some officers whom he sent northward along the coast of the Gulf in a small galley, and to whom the vast Persian multitude on the shore was distinctly visible. Then, assembling the chief officers, he communicated to them the near approach of the enemy, expatiating on the favourable auspices under which a battle would now take place.¹ His address was hailed with acclamation by his hearers, who demanded only to be led against the enemy.²

His distance from the Persian position may have been about eighteen miles.³ By an evening march, after supper, he reached at midnight the narrow defile (between Mount Amanus and the sea) called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, through which he had marched two days before. Again master of that important position, he rested there the last portion of the night, and advanced forward at daybreak northward towards Darius. At first the breadth of practicable road was so confined as to admit only a narrow column of march, with the cavalry following the infantry; presently it widened, enabling Alexander to enlarge his front by bringing up successively the divisions of the phalanx. On approaching near to the river Pinarus (which flowed across the pass), he adopted his order of battle. On the extreme right he placed the hypaspists, or light division of hoplites; next (reckoning from right to left), five Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx, under Kœnus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Ptolemy, and Amyntas. Of these three last or left divisions, Kraterus had the general command; himself subject to the orders of Parmenio, who commanded the entire left half of the army. The breadth of plain between the mountains on the right, and the sea on the left, is said to have been not more

the other. It was Alexander's good luck that so grave an embarrassment did not occur.

¹ Arrian, ii. 7, 8.

² Arrian, ii. 7; Curtius, iii. 10; Diodor. xvii. 33.

³ Kallisthenês called the distance 100 stadia (ap. Polyb. xii. 19). This seems likely to be under the truth.

Polybius criticises severely the description given by Kallisthenês of the march of Alexander. Not having before us the words of Kallisthenês himself, we are hardly in a condition to appreciate the goodness of the criticism; which in some points is certainly overstrained.

than fourteen stadia, or somewhat more than one English mile and a half.¹ From fear of being outflanked by the superior numbers of the Persians, he gave strict orders to Parmenio to keep close to the sea. His Macedonian cavalry, the Companions, together with the Thessalians, were placed on his right flank; as were also the Agrianês, and the principal portion of the light infantry. The Peloponnesian and allied cavalry, with the Thracian and Kretan light infantry, were sent on the left flank to Parmenio.²

Darius, informed that Alexander was approaching, resolved to fight where he was encamped, behind the river Pinarus. He, however, threw across the river a force of 30,000 cavalry, and 20,000 infantry, to ensure the undisturbed formation of his main force behind the river.³ He composed his phalanx, or main line of battle, of 90,000 hoplites; 30,000 Greek hoplites in the centre, and 30,000 Asiatics armed as hoplites (called Kardakês), on each side of these Greeks. These men—not distributed into separate divisions, but grouped in one body or multitude⁴—filled the breadth between the mountains and the sea. On the mountains to his left, he placed a body of 20,000 men, intended to act against the right flank and rear of Alexander. But for the great numerical mass of his vast host,

¹ Kallisthenês ap. Polybius, xii. 17.

² Arrian, ii. 8, 4-13.

³ Compare Kallisthenês ap. Polyb. xii. 17; and Arrian, ii. 8, 8. Considering how narrow the space was, such numerous bodies as these 30,000 horse and 20,000 foot must have found little facility in moving. Kallisthenês did not notice them, as far as we can collect from Polybius.

⁴ Arrian, ii. 8, 9. Τοσούτους γὰρ ἐπὶ φάλαγγος ἀπλῆς ἐδέχετο τὸ χωρίον, ἵνα ἐτάσσοντο.

The depth of this single phalanx is not given, nor do we know the exact width of the ground which it occupied. Assuming a depth of sixteen, and one pace in breadth to each soldier, 4000 men would stand in the breadth of a stadium of 250 paces; and therefore 80,000 men in a breadth of twenty stadia (see the calculation of Rüstow and Köchly (p. 280) about the Macedonian line). Assuming a depth of twenty-six, 6500 men would stand in the breadth of the stadium, and therefore 90,000 in a total breadth of 14 stadia, which is that given by Kallisthenês. But there must have been intervals left, greater or less, we know not how many; the covering detachments, which had been thrown out before the river Pinarus, must have found some means of passing through to the rear, when recalled.

Mr. Kinneir states that the breadth between Mount Amanus and the sea varies between one mile and a half (English) and three miles. The fourteen stadia of Kallisthenês are equivalent to nearly one English mile and three-quarters.

Neither in ancient nor in modern times have Oriental armies ever been trained, by native officers, to regularity of march or array—see Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, ch. xxiii. vol. ii. p. 498; Volney, *Travels in Egypt and Syria*, vol. i. p. 124.

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he could find no room to act; accordingly they remained useless in the rear of his Greek and Asiatic hoplites; yet not formed into any body of reserve, or kept disposable for assisting in case of need. When his line was thoroughly formed, he recalled to the right bank of the Pinarus the 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry which he had sent across as a protecting force. A part of this cavalry were sent to his extreme left wing, but the mountain ground was found unsuitable for them to act, so that they were forced to cross to the right wing, where accordingly the great mass of the Persian cavalry became assembled. Darius himself in his chariot was in the centre of the line, behind the Grecian hoplites. In the front of his whole line ran the river or rivulet Pinarus; the banks of which, in many parts naturally steep, he obstructed in some places by embankments.¹

As soon as Alexander, by the retirement of the Persian covering detachment, was enabled to perceive the final dispositions of Darius, he made some alteration in his own, transferring his Thessalian cavalry by a rear movement from his right to his left wing, and bringing forward the lancer-cavalry or *sarisophori*, as well as the light infantry, *Pæonians* and archers, to the front of his right. The *Agrianians*, together with some cavalry and another body of archers, were detached from the general line to form an oblique front against the 20,000 Persians posted on the hill to outflank him. As these 20,000 men came near enough to threaten his flank, Alexander directed the *Agrianians* to attack them, and to drive them farther away on the hills. They manifested so little firmness, and gave way so easily, that he felt no dread of any serious aggressive movement from them. He therefore contented himself with holding back in reserve against them a body of 300 heavy cavalry; while he placed the *Agrianians* and the rest on the right of his main line, in order to make his front equal to that of his enemies.²

Having thus formed his array, after giving the troops a

¹ Arrian, ii. 10, 2. Kallisthenês appears to have reckoned the mercenaries composing the Persian phalanx at 30,000—and the cavalry at 30,000. He does not seem to have taken account of the *Kardakês*. Yet Polybius in his criticism tries to make out that there was not room for an array of even 60,000; while Arrian enumerates 90,000 hoplites, not including cavalry (Polyb. xii. 18).

² Arrian, ii. 9; Kallisthenês ap. Polyb. xii. 17. The slackness of this Persian corps on the flank, and the ease with which Alexander drove them back—a material point in reference to the battle—are noticed also by Curtius, iii. 9, 11.

certain halt after their march, he advanced at a very slow pace, anxious to maintain his own front even, and anticipating that the enemy might cross the Pinarus to meet him. But as they did not move, he continued his advance, preserving the uniformity of the front, until he arrived within bowshot, when he himself, at the head of his cavalry, hypaspists, and divisions of the phalanx on the right, accelerated his pace, crossed the river at a quick step, and fell upon the Kardakês or Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left. Unprepared for the suddenness and vehemence of this attack, these Kardakês scarcely resisted a moment, but gave way as soon as they came to close quarters, and fled, vigorously pressed by the Macedonian right. Darius, who was in his chariot in the centre, perceived that this untoward desertion exposed his person from the left flank. Seized with panic, he caused his chariot to be turned round, and fled with all speed among the foremost fugitives.¹ He kept to his chariot as long as the ground permitted, but quitted it on reaching some rugged ravines, and mounted on horseback to make sure of escape; in such terror that he cast away his bow, his shield, and his regal mantle. He does not seem to have given a single order, nor to have made the smallest effort to repair a first

¹ Arrian, ii. 11, 6. εὐθὺς, ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄρματος, σὺν τοῖς πρώτοις ἔφυγε, &c.

This simple statement of Arrian is far more credible than the highly wrought details given by Diodorus (xvii. 34) and Curtius (iii. 11, 9) about a direct charge of Alexander upon the chariot of Darius, and a murderous combat immediately round that chariot, in which the horses became wounded and unmanageable, so as to be on the point of overturning it. Charês even went so far as to affirm that Alexander had come into personal conflict with Darius, from whom he had received his wound in the thigh (Plutarch, Alex. 20). Plutarch had seen the letter addressed by Alexander to Antipater, simply intimating that he had received a slight wound in the thigh.

In respect to this point, as to so many others, Diodorus and Curtius have copied the same authority.

Kallisthenês (ap. Polyb. xii. 22) stated that Alexander had laid his plan of attack with a view to bear upon the person of Darius, which is not improbable (compare Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 22), and was in fact realised, since the first successful charge of the Macedonians came so near to Darius as to alarm him for the safety of his own person. To the question put by Polybius—How did Alexander know in what part of the army Darius was?—we may reply, that the chariot and person of Darius would doubtless be conspicuous: moreover, the Persian kings were habitually in the centre—and Cyrus the younger, at the battle of Kunaxa, directed the attack to be made exactly against the person of his brother Artaxerxês.

After the battle of Kunaxa, Artaxerxês assumed to himself the honour of having slain Cyrus with his own hand, and put to death those who had really done the deed, because they boasted of it (Plutarch, Artax. 16).

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misfortune. The flight of the king was the signal for all who observed it to flee also ; so that the vast host in the rear were quickly to be seen trampling one another down, in their efforts to get through the difficult ground out of the reach of the enemy. Darius was himself not merely the centre of union for all the miscellaneous contingents composing the army, but also the sole commander ; so that after his flight there was no one left to give any general order.

This great battle—we might rather say, that which ought to have been a great battle—was thus lost,—through the giving way of the Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left, and the immediate flight of Darius,—within a few minutes after its commencement. But the centre and right of the Persians, not yet apprised of these misfortunes, behaved with gallantry. When Alexander made his rapid dash forward with the right, under his own immediate command, the phalanx in his left centre (which was under Kraterus and Parmenio) either did not receive the same accelerating order, or found itself both retarded and disordered by greater steepness in the banks of the Pinarus. Here it was charged by the Grecian mercenaries, the best troops in the Persian service. The combat which took place was obstinate, and the Macedonian loss not inconsiderable ; the general of division, Ptolemy son of Seleukus, with 120 of the front-rank men or choice phalangites, being slain. But presently Alexander, having completed the rout on the enemies' left, brought back his victorious troops from the pursuit, attacked the Grecian mercenaries in flank, and gave decisive superiority to their enemies. These Grecian mercenaries were beaten and forced to retire. On finding that Darius himself had fled, they got away from the field as well as they could, yet seemingly in good order. There is even reason to suppose that a part of them forced their way up the mountains or through the Macedonian line, and made their escape southward.¹

Meanwhile on the Persian right, towards the sea, the heavy-armed Persian cavalry had shown much bravery. They were bold enough to cross the Pinarus² and vigorously to charge

¹ This is the supposition of Mr. Williams, and it appears to me probable, though Mr. Ainsworth calls it in question, in consequence of the difficulties of the ground southward of Myriandrus towards the sea. [See Mr. Ainsworth's *Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates*, *Journal of the Geograph. Society*, 1838, p. 194.] These Greeks, being merely fugitives with arms in their hands—with neither cavalry nor baggage—could make their way over very difficult ground.

² Arrian, ii. 11, 3 ; Curtius, iii. 11, 13. Kallisthenès stated the same

the Thessalians; with whom they maintained a close contest, until the news spread that Darius had disappeared, and that the left of the army was routed. They then turned their backs and fled, sustaining terrible damage from their enemies in the retreat. Of the Kardakês on the *right* flank of the Grecian hoplites in the Persian line, we hear nothing, nor of the Macedonian infantry opposed to them. Perhaps these Kardakês came little into action, since the cavalry on their part of the field were so severely engaged. At any rate they took part in the general flight of the Persians, as soon as Darius was known to have left the field.¹

The rout of the Persians being completed, Alexander began a vigorous pursuit. The destruction and slaughter of the fugitives were prodigious. Amidst so small a breadth of practicable ground, narrowed sometimes into a defile and broken by frequent watercourses, their vast numbers found no room, and trod one another down. As many perished in this way as by the sword of the conquerors; insomuch that Ptolemy (afterwards king of Egypt, the companion and historian of Alexander) recounts that he himself in the pursuit came to a ravine choked up with dead bodies, of which he made a bridge to pass over it.² The pursuit was continued as long as the light of a November day allowed; but the battle had not begun till a late hour. The camp of Darius was taken, together with his mother, his wife, his sister, his infant son, and two daughters. His chariot, his shield, and his bow also fell into the power of the conquerors; and a sum of 3000 talents in money was found, though much of the treasure had been sent to Damascus. The total loss of the Persians is said to have amounted to 10,000 horse and 100,000 foot; among the slain moreover were several eminent Persian grandees—Arsamês, Rheomithrês, and Atizyês, who had commanded at the Granikus—Sabakês, satrap of Egypt. Of the Macedonians we are told that 300 foot and 150 horse were killed. Alexander himself was slightly wounded in the thigh by a sword.³

thing as Arrian—that this Persian cavalry had crossed the Pinarus, and charged the Thessalians with bravery. Polybius censures him for it, as if he had affirmed something false and absurd (xii. 18). This shows that the criticisms of Polybius are not to be accepted without reserve. He reasons as if the Macedonian phalanx *could* not cross the Pinarus—converting a difficulty into an impossibility (xii. 22).

¹ Arrian, ii. 11; Curtius, iii. 11.

² Arrian, ii. 11, 11; Kallisthenês ap. Polyb. xii. 20.

³ Arrian, ii. 11; Diodor. xvii. 36. Curtius (iii. 11, 27) says that the Macedonians lost thirty-two foot and one hundred and fifty horse,

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The mother, wife, and family of Darius, who became captives, were treated by Alexander's order with the utmost consideration and respect. When Alexander returned at night from the pursuit, he found the Persian regal tent reserved and prepared for him. In an inner compartment of it he heard the tears and wailings of women. He was informed that the mourners were the mother and wife of Darius, who had learnt that the bow and shield of Darius had been taken, and were giving loose to their grief under the belief that Darius himself was killed. Alexander immediately sent Leonnatus to assure them that Darius was still living, and to promise further that they should be allowed to preserve the regal title and state—his war against Darius being undertaken not from any feelings of hatred, but as a fair contest for the empire of Asia.¹ Besides this anecdote, which depends on good authority, many others, uncertified or untrue, were recounted about his kind behaviour to these princesses; and Alexander himself, shortly after the battle, seems to have heard fictions about it, which he thought it necessary to contradict in a letter. It is certain (from the extract now remaining of this letter) that he never saw, nor ever entertained the idea of seeing, the captive wife of Darius, said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia; moreover he even declined to hear encomiums upon her beauty.²

How this vast host of fugitives got out of the narrow limits of Kilikia, or how many of them quitted that country by the same pass over Mount Amanus as that by which they had entered it—we cannot make out. It is probable that many, and Darius himself among the number, made their escape across the mountain by various subordinate roads and by-paths; which, though unfit for a regular army with baggage, would be found a welcome resource by scattered companies. Darius managed to get together 4000 of the fugitives, with whom he hastened to Thapsakus, and there recrossed the Euphrates. The only remnant of force, still in a position of defence after the battle, consisted of 8000 of the Grecian mercenaries under Amyntas and Thymôdês. These men, fighting their way out

killed; with 504 men wounded;—Justin states, 130 foot, and 150 horse (xi. 9).

¹ Arrian, ii. 12, 8—from Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Compare Diodor. xvii. 36; Curtius, iii. 11, 24; iii. 12, 17.

² Plutarch. Alex. 22. *ἐγὼ γὰρ (Alexander) οὐχ ὅτι ἑωρακὼς ἂν εὐρεθείην τὴν Δαρείου γυναῖκα ἢ βεβουλευμένος ἰδεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν λεγόντων περὶ τῆς εὐμορφίας αὐτῆς προσδεγμένος τὸν λόγον.*

of Kilikia (seemingly towards the south, by or near Myriandrus), marched to Tripolis on the coast of Phenicia, where they still found the same vessels in which they had themselves been brought from the armament of Lesbos. Seizing sufficient means of transport, and destroying the rest to prevent pursuit, they immediately crossed over to Cyprus, and from thence to Egypt.¹ With this single exception, the enormous Persian host disappears with the battle of Issus. We hear of no attempt to rally or re-form, nor of any fresh Persian force afoot until two years afterwards. The booty acquired by the victors was immense, not merely in gold and silver, but also in captives for the slave-merchant. On the morrow of the battle, Alexander offered a solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, with three altars erected on the banks of the Pinarus; while he at the same time buried the dead, consoled the wounded, and rewarded or complimented all who had distinguished themselves.²

No victory recorded in history was ever more complete in itself, or more far-stretching in its consequences, than that of Issus. Not only was the Persian force destroyed or dispersed, but the efforts of Darius for recovery were paralysed by the capture of his family. Portions of the dissipated army of Issus may be traced, reappearing in different places for operations of detail, but we shall find no further resistance to Alexander, during almost two years, except from the brave freemen of two fortified cities. Everywhere an overwhelming sentiment of admiration and terror was spread abroad, towards the force, skill, or good fortune of Alexander, by whichever name it might be called—together with contempt for the real value of a Persian army, in spite of so much imposing pomp and numerical show; a contempt not new to intelligent Greeks, but now communicated even to vulgar minds by the recent unparalleled catastrophe. Both as general and as soldier, indeed, the consummate excellence of Alexander stood conspicuous, not less than the signal deficiency of Darius. The fault in the latter, upon which most remark is usually made, was, that of fighting the battle, not in an open plain, but in a narrow valley, whereby his superiority of number was rendered unprofitable. But this (as I have already observed) was only one among many mistakes, and by no means the most serious. The result would

¹ Arrian, ii. 13, 2, 3; Diodor. xvii. 48. Curtius says that these Greeks got away by by-paths across the mountains (Amanus)—which may be true (Curtius, iii. 11, 19).

² Arrian, ii. 12, 1; Curtius, iii. 12, 27; Diodor. xvii. 40. The "*Aræ Alexandri, in radicibus Amani*," are mentioned by Cicero (*ad Famil. xv. 4*). When commanding in Kilikia, he encamped there with his army four days.

have been the same, had the battle been fought in the plains to the eastward of Mount Amanus. Superior numbers are of little avail on any ground, unless there be a general who knows how to make use of them; unless they be distributed into separate divisions ready to combine for offensive action on many points at once, or at any rate to lend support to each other in defence, so that a defeat of one fraction is not a defeat of the whole. The faith of Darius in simple multitude was altogether blind and childish;¹ nay, that faith, though overweening beforehand, disappeared at once when he found his enemies did not run away, but faced him boldly—as was seen by his attitude on the banks of the Pinarus, where he stood to be attacked instead of executing his threat of treading down the handful opposed to him.² But it was not merely as a general, that Darius acted in such a manner as to render the loss of the battle certain. Had his dispositions been ever so skilful, his personal cowardice, in quitting the field and thinking only of his own safety, would have sufficed to nullify their effect.³ Though the Persian grandees are generally conspicuous for personal courage, yet we shall find Darius hereafter again exhibiting the like melancholy timidity, and the like incompetence for using numbers with effect, at the battle of Arbela, though fought in a spacious plain chosen by himself.

Happy was it for Memnon that he did not live to see the renunciation of his schemes, and the ruin consequent upon it! The fleet in the *Ægean*, which had been transferred at his death to Pharnabazus, though weakened by the loss of those mercenaries whom Darius had recalled to Issus, and disheartened by a serious defeat which the Persian Orontobatês had received from the Macedonians in Karia,⁴ was nevertheless not inactive in trying to organise an anti-Macedonian manifestation in Greece. While Pharnabazus was at the island of Siphnos with his 100 triremes, he was visited by the Lacedæmonian king Agis, who pressed him to embark for

¹ See this faith put forward in the speech of Xerxês—Herodot. vii. 48: compare the speech of Achæmenês, vii. 236.

² Arrian, ii. 10, 2. *καὶ ταύτῃ ὡς δῆλος ἐγένετο* (Darius) *τοῖς ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένος* (a remarkable expression borrowed from Thucydides, iv. 34). Compare Arrian, ii. 6, 7.

³ Immediately before the battle of Kunaxa, Cyrus the younger was asked by some of the Grecian officers, whether he thought that his brother Artaxerxês (who had as yet made no resistance) would fight—"To be sure he will (was the reply); if he is the son of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not obtain the crown without fighting!" Personal cowardice, in a king of Persia at the head of his army, seemed inconceivable (Xenoph. Anab. i. 7, 9).

⁴ Arrian, ii. 5, 8.

Peloponnesus as large a force as he could spare, to second a movement projected by the Spartans. But such aggressive plans were at once crushed by the terror-striking news of the battle of Issus. Apprehending a revolt in the island of Chios, as the result of this news, Pharnabazus immediately sailed thither with a large detachment. Agis, obtaining nothing more than a subsidy of thirty talents and a squadron of ten triremes, was obliged to renounce his projects in Peloponnesus, and to content himself with directing some operations in Krete, to be conducted by his brother Agesilaus; while he himself remained among the islands, and ultimately accompanied the Persian Autophradatēs to Halikarnassus.¹ It appears, however, that he afterwards went to conduct the operations in Krete, and that he had considerable success in that island, bringing several Kretan towns to join the Persians.² On the whole, however, the victory of Issus overawed all free spirit throughout Greece, and formed a guarantee to Alexander for at least a temporary quiescence. The philo-Macedonian synod, assembled at Corinth during the period of the Isthmian festival, manifested their joy by sending to him an embassy of congratulation and a wreath of gold.³

With little delay after his victory, Alexander marched through Kœle-Syria to the Phenician coast, detaching Parmenio in his way to attack Damascus, whither Darius, before the battle, had sent most part of his treasure with many confidential officers, Persian women of rank, and envoys. Though the place might have held out a considerable siege, it was surrendered without resistance by the treason or cowardice of the governor; who made a feint of trying to convey away the treasure, but took care that it should fall into the hands of the enemy.⁴ There was captured a large treasure—with a prodigious number and variety of attendants and ministers of luxury, belonging to the court and the grandees.⁵ Moreover the prisoners made were so numerous, that most of the great Persian families had to deplore the loss of some relative, male or female. There were

¹ Arrian, ii. 13, 4-8.

² Diodor. xvii. 48.

³ Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 5, 11. Curtius seems to mention this vote later, but it must evidently have been passed at the first Isthmian festival after the battle of Issus.

⁴ Arrian, ii. 11, 13; Curtius, iii. 13. The words of Arrian (ii. 15, 1)—*ὁπίσω κομίσαντα ἐς Δαμασκὸν*—confirm the statement of Curtius, that this treasure was captured by Parmenio, not in the town, but in the hands of fugitives who were conveying it away from the town.

⁵ A fragment of the letter from Parmenio to Alexander is preserved, giving a detailed list of the articles of booty (Athenæus, xiii. p. 607).

among them the widow and daughters of king Ochus, the predecessor of Darius—the daughter of Darius's brother Oxathrês—the wives of Artabazus, and of Pharnabazus—the three daughters of Mentor, and Barsinê, widow of the deceased Memnon with her child, sent up by Memnon to serve as an hostage for his fidelity. There were also several eminent Grecian exiles, Theban, Lacedæmonian and Athenian, who had fled to Darius, and whom he had thought fit to send to Damascus, instead of allowing them to use their pikes with the army at Issus. The Theban and Athenian exiles were at once released by Alexander; the Lacedæmonians were for the time put under arrest, but not detained long. Among the Athenian exiles was a person of noble name and parentage—Iphikratês, son of the great Athenian officer of that name.¹ The captive Iphikratês not only received his liberty, but was induced by courteous and honourable treatment to remain with Alexander. He died however shortly afterwards from sickness, and his ashes were then collected, by order of Alexander, to be sent to his family at Athens.

I have already stated in a former chapter² that the elder Iphikratês had been adopted by Alexander's grandfather into the regal family of Macedonia, as the saviour of their throne. Probably this was the circumstance which determined the superior favour shown to the son, rather than any sentiment either towards Athens or towards the military genius of the father. The difference of position, between Iphikratês the father and Iphikratês the son, is one among the painful evidences of the downward march of Hellenism. The father, a distinguished officer moving amidst a circle of freemen, sustaining by arms the security and dignity of his own fellow-citizens, and even interfering for the rescue of the Macedonian regal family; the son, condemned to witness the degradation of his native city by Macedonian arms, and deprived of all other means of reviving or rescuing her, except such as could be found in the service of an Oriental prince, whose stupidity and cowardice threw away at once his own security and the freedom of Greece.

Master of Damascus and of Kœle-Syria, Alexander advanced

¹ Arrian, ii. 15, 5; Curtius, iii. 13, 13-16. There is some discrepancy between the two (compare Arrian, iii. 24, 7) as to the names of the Lacedæmonian envoys.

² See above, in this History, vol. x. chaps. lxxvii., lxxix.; and Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 263, c. 13.

Alexander himself had consented to be adopted by Ada princess of Karia as her son (Arrian, i. 23, 12).

onward to Phenicia. The first Phenician town which he approached was Marathus, on the mainland opposite the islet of Aradus, forming, along with that islet and some other neighbouring towns, the domain of the Aradian prince Gerostratus. That prince was himself now serving with his naval contingent among the Persian fleet in the *Ægean*; but his son Strato, acting as viceroy at home, despatched to Alexander his homage with a golden wreath, and made over to him at once Aradus with the neighbouring towns included in its domain. The example of Strato was followed, first by the inhabitants of Byblus, the next Phenician city in a southerly direction; next, by the great city of Sidon, the queen and parent of all Phenician prosperity. The Sidonians even sent envoys to meet him and invite his approach.¹ Their sentiments were unfavourable to the Persians, from remembrance of the bloody and perfidious proceedings which (about eighteen years before) had marked the recapture of their city by the armies of Ochus.² Nevertheless, the naval contingents both of Byblus and of Sidon (as well as that of Aradus), were at this moment sailing in the *Ægean* with the Persian admiral Autophradatês, and formed a large proportion of his entire fleet.³

While Alexander was still at Marathus, however, previous to his onward march, he received both envoys and a letter from Darius, asking for the restitution of his mother, wife, and children—and tendering friendship and alliance, as from one king to another. Darius further attempted to show, that the Macedonian Philip had begun the wrong against Persia—that Alexander had continued it—and that he himself (Darius) had acted merely in self-defence. In reply, Alexander wrote a letter, wherein he set forth his own case against Darius, proclaiming himself the appointed leader of the Greeks, to avenge the ancient invasion of Greece by Xerxês. He then alleged various complaints against Darius, whom he accused of having instigated the assassination of Philip as well as the hostilities of the anti-Macedonian cities in Greece. “Now (continued he), by the grace of the gods, I have been victorious, first over your satraps, next over yourself. I have taken care of all who submit to me, and made them satisfied with their lot. Come yourself to me also, as to the master of all Asia. Come without fear of suffering harm; ask me, and you shall receive back your mother and wife, and anything else which you please. When next you write to me, however, address me not as an

¹ Arrian, ii. 14, 11; ii. 15, 8.

² Diodor. xvi. 45.

³ Arrian, ii. 15, 8; ii. 20, 1. Curtius, iv. 1, 6–16.

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equal, but as lord of Asia and of all that belongs to you ; otherwise I shall deal with you as a wrong-doer. If you intend to contest the kingdom with me, stand and fight for it, and do not run away. I shall march forward against you, wherever you may be."¹

This memorable correspondence, which led to no result, is of importance only as it marks the character of Alexander, with whom fighting and conquering were both the business and the luxury of life, and to whom all assumption of equality and independence with himself, even on the part of other kings—every thing short of submission and obedience—appeared in the light of wrong and insult to be avenged. The recital of comparative injuries, on each side, was mere unmeaning pretence. The real and only question was (as Alexander himself had put it in his message to the captive Sisygambis²) which of the two should be master of Asia.

The decision of this question, already sufficiently advanced on the morrow after the battle of Issus, was placed almost beyond doubt by the rapid and unopposed successes of Alexander among most of the Phenician cities. The last hopes of Persia now turned chiefly upon the sentiments of these Phenicians. The greater part of the Persian fleet in the Ægean was composed of Phenician triremes, partly from the coast of Syria, partly from the island of Cyprus. If the Phenician towns made submission to Alexander, it was certain that their ships and seamen would either return home spontaneously or be recalled ; thus depriving the Persian quiver of its best remaining arrow. But if the Phenician towns held out resolutely against him, one and all, so as to put him under the necessity of besieging them in succession—each lending aid to the rest by sea, with superiority of naval force, and more than one of them being situated upon islets—the obstacles to be overcome would have been so multiplied, that even Alexander's energy and ability might hardly have proved sufficient for them. at any rate, he would have had hard work before him for perhaps two years, opening the door to many new accidents and efforts. It was therefore a signal good fortune to Alexander when the prince of the islet of Aradus spontaneously surrendered to him that difficult city, and when the example was

¹ Arrian, ii. 14 ; Curtius, iv. 1, 10 ; Diodor. xvii. 39. I give the substance of this correspondence from Arrian. Both Curtius and Diodorus represent Darius as offering great sums of money and large cessions of territory, in exchange for the restitution of the captives. Arrian says nothing of the kind.

² Arrian, ii. 12, 9.

followed by the still greater city of Sidon. The Phenicians, taking them generally, had no positive tie to the Persians; neither had they much confederate attachment one towards the other, although as separate communities they were brave and enterprising. Among the Sidonians, there was even a prevalent feeling of aversion to the Persians, from the cause above mentioned. Hence the prince of Aradus, upon whom Alexander's march first came, had little certainty of aid from his neighbours, if he resolved to hold out; and still less disposition to hold out single-handed, after the battle of Issus had proclaimed the irresistible force of Alexander not less than the impotence of Persia. One after another, all these important Phenician seaports, except Tyre, fell into the hands of Alexander without striking a blow. At Sidon, the reigning prince Strato, reputed as philo-Persian, was deposed, and a person named Abdalonymus—of the reigning family, yet poor in circumstances—was appointed in his room.¹

With his usual rapidity, Alexander marched onward towards Tyre; the most powerful among the Phenician cities, though apparently less ancient than Sidon. Even on the march, he was met by a deputation from Tyre, composed of the most eminent men in the city, and headed by the son of the Tyrian prince Azemilchus, who was himself absent commanding the Tyrian contingent in the Persian fleet. These men brought large presents and supplies for the Macedonian army, together with a golden wreath of honour; announcing formally that the Tyrians were prepared to do whatever Alexander commanded.² In reply, he commended the dispositions of the city, accepted the presents, and desired the deputation to communicate at home, that he wished to enter Tyre and offer sacrifice to Hêraklê. The Phenician God Melkart was supposed identical with the Grecian Hêraklê, and was thus ancestor of the Macedonian kings. His temple at Tyre was of the most venerable antiquity; moreover the injunction, to sacrifice there, is said to have been conveyed to Alexander in an oracle.³ The

¹ Curtius, iv. 1, 20–25; Justin, xi. 10. Diodorus (xvii. 47) tells the story as if it had occurred at Tyre, and not at Sidon; which is highly improbable.

² Arrian, ii. 15, 9. *ὡς ἐγνωκότων Τυρίων πράσσειν, ὅτι ἂν ἐπαγγέλοι Ἀλέξανδρος*. Compare Curtius, iv. 2, 3.

³ Curtius (*ut supra*) adds these motives: Arrian inserts nothing beyond the simple request. The statement of Curtius represents what is likely to have been the real fact and the real feeling of Alexander.

It is certainly true that Curtius overloads his narrative with rhetorical and dramatic amplification; but it is not less true that Arrian falls into the

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Tyrians at home, after deliberating on this message, sent out an answer declining to comply, and intimating that they would not admit within their walls either Macedonians or Persians; but that as to all other points, they would obey Alexander's orders.¹ They added that his wish to sacrifice to Hēraklēs might be accomplished without entering their city, since there was, in Palætyrus (on the mainland over against the islet of Tyre, separated from it only by the narrow strait) a temple of that god yet more ancient and venerable than their own.² Incensed at this qualified adhesion, in which he took note only of the point refused,—Alexander dismissed the envoys with angry menaces, and immediately resolved on taking Tyre by force.³

Those who (like Diodorus) treat such refusal on the part of the Tyrians as foolish wilfulness,⁴ have not fully considered how much the demand included. When Alexander made a solemn sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus, he marched to her temple with his whole force armed and in battle array.⁵ We cannot doubt that his sacrifice at Tyre to Hēraklēs—his ancestral Hero, whose especial attribute was force—would have been celebrated with an array equally formidable, as in fact it was, after the town had been taken.⁶ The Tyrians were thus required to admit within their walls an irresistible military force; which might indeed be withdrawn after the sacrifice was completed, but which might also remain, either wholly or in part, as permanent garrison of an almost impregnable position. They had not endured such treatment from Persia, nor were they disposed to endure it from a new master. It was, in fact, hazarding their all; submitting at once to a fate which might be as bad as could befall them after a successful siege. On the other hand, when we reflect that the Tyrians promised everything short of submission to military occupation, we see that Alexander, had he been so inclined, could have obtained from them all that was really essential to his purpose,

opposite extreme—squeezing out *his* narrative until little is left beyond the dry skeleton.

¹ Arrian, ii. 16, 11.

² Curtius, iv. 2, 4; Justin, xi. 10. This item, both prudent and probable, in the reply of the Tyrians, is not noticed by Arrian.

³ Arrian, ii. 16, 11. τοὺς μὲν πρέσβεις πρὸς ὀργὴν ὀπίσω ἀπέπεμψεν, &c. Curtius, iv. 2, 5. "Non tenuit iram, cujus alioqui potens non erat," &c.

⁴ Diodorus, xvii. 40. Οἱ δὲ Τύριοι, βουλομένου τοῦ βασιλέως τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ τῷ Τυρίῳ θῦσαι, προπετέστερον διεκάλυσαν αὐτὸν τῆς εἰς τὴν πόλιν εἰσόδου.

⁵ Arrian, i. 18, 4.

⁶ Arrian, ii. 24, 10.

without the necessity of besieging the town. The great value of the Phenician cities consisted in their fleet, which now acted with the Persians, and gave to them the command of the sea.¹ Had Alexander required that this fleet should be withdrawn from the Persians and placed in his service, there can be no doubt that he would have obtained it readily. The Tyrians had no motive to devote themselves for Persia, nor did they probably (as Arrian supposes) attempt to trim between the two belligerents, as if the contest was still undecided.² Yet rather than hand over their city to the chances of a Macedonian soldiery, they resolved to brave the hazards of a siege. The pride of Alexander, impatient of opposition even to his most extreme demands, prompted him to take a step politically unprofitable, in order to make display of his power, by degrading and crushing, with or without a siege, one of the most ancient, spirited, wealthy, and intelligent communities of the ancient world.

Tyre was situated on an islet nearly half a mile from the mainland;³ the channel between the two being shallow towards the land, but reaching a depth of eighteen feet in the part adjoining the city. The islet was completely surrounded by prodigious walls, the loftiest portion of which, on the side fronting the mainland, reached a height not less than 150 feet, with corresponding solidity and base.⁴ Besides these external fortifications, there was a brave and numerous population within, aided by a good stock of arms, machines, ships, provisions, and other things essential to defence.

It was not without reason, therefore, that the Tyrians, when driven to their last resource, entertained hopes of holding out even against the formidable army of Alexander; and against Alexander as he then stood, they might have held out successfully; for he had as yet no fleet, and they could defy any attack made simply from land. The question turned upon

¹ This is the view expressed by Alexander himself, in his addresses to the army, inviting them to undertake the siege of Tyre (Arrian, ii. 17, 3-8).

² Arrian, ii. 16, 12. Curtius says (iv. 2, 2), "*Tyros facilius societatem Alexandri acceptura videbatur, quam imperium.*" This is representing the pretensions of the Tyrians as greater than the fact warrants. They did not refuse the *imperium* of Alexander, though they declined compliance with one extreme demand.

Ptolemy I. (son of Lagus) afterwards made himself master of Jerusalem, by entering the town on the Sabba'h, under pretence of offering sacrifice (Josephus, Antiq. Jud. xii. 1).

³ Curtius, iv. 2, 7, 8. The site of Tyre at the present day presents nothing in the least conformable to the description of Alexander's time.

⁴ Arrian, ii. 18, 3; ii. 21, 4; ii. 22, 8.

the Phenician and Cyprian ships, which were for the most part (the Tyrian among them) in the Ægean under the Persian admiral. Alexander—master as he was of Aradus, Byblus, Sidon, and all the Phenician cities except Tyre—calculated that the seamen belonging to these cities would follow their countrymen at home and bring away their ships to join him. He hoped also, as the victorious potentate, to draw to himself the willing adhesion of the Cyprian cities. This could hardly have failed to happen, if he had treated the Tyrians with decent consideration; but it was no longer certain, now that he had made them his enemies.

What passed among the Persian fleet under Autophradatês in the Ægean, when they were informed, first that Alexander was master of the other Phenician cities—next, that he was commencing the siege of Tyre—we know very imperfectly. The Tyrian prince Azemilchus brought home his ships for the defence of his own city;¹ the Sidonian and Arcadian ships also went home, no longer serving against a power to whom their own cities had submitted; but the Cyprians hesitated longer before they declared themselves. If Darius, or even Autophradatês without Darius, instead of abandoning Tyre altogether (as they actually did), had energetically aided the resistance which it offered to Alexander, as the interests of Persia dictated—the Cypriot ships might not improbably have been retained on that side in the struggle. Lastly, the Tyrians might indulge a hope, that their Phenician brethren, if ready to serve Alexander against Persia, would be nowise hearty as his instruments for crushing a kindred city. These contingencies, though ultimately they all turned out in favour of Alexander, were in the beginning sufficiently promising to justify the intrepid resolution of the Tyrians; who were further encouraged by promises of aid from the powerful fleets of their colony Carthage. To that city, whose deputies were then within their walls for some religious solemnities, they sent many of their wives and children.²

¹ Azemilchus was with Autophradatês when Alexander declared hostility against Tyre (Arrian, ii. 15, 10); he was in Tyre when it was captured (Arrian, ii. 24, 8).

² Curtius, iv. 2, 10; Arrian, ii. 24, 8; Diodor. xvii. 40, 41. Curtius (iv. 2, 15) says that Alexander sent envoys to the Tyrians to invite them to peace; that the Tyrians not only refused the propositions, but put the deputies to death, contrary to the law of nations. Arrian mentions nothing about this sending of deputies, which he would hardly have omitted to do had he found it stated in his authorities, since it tends to justify the proceedings of Alexander. Moreover it is not conformable to Alexander's temperament, after what had passed between him and the Tyrians.

Alexander began the siege of Tyre without any fleet; the Sidonian and Aradian ships not having yet come. It was his first task to construct a solid mole two hundred feet broad, reaching across the half mile of channel between the mainland and the islet. He pressed into his service labouring hands by thousands from the neighbourhood; he had stones in abundance from Palætyrus, and wood from the forests in Lebanon. But the work, though prosecuted with ardour and perseverance, under pressing instigations from Alexander, was tedious and toilsome, even near the mainland, where the Tyrians could do little to impede it; and became far more tedious as it advanced into the sea, so as to be exposed to their obstruction, as well as to damage from winds and waves. The Tyrian triremes and small boats perpetually annoyed the workmen, and destroyed parts of the work, in spite of all the protection devised by the Macedonians, who planted two towers in front of their advancing mole, and discharged projectiles from engines provided for the purpose. At length, by unremitting efforts the mole was pushed forward until it came nearly across the channel to the city-wall; when suddenly, on a day of strong wind, the Tyrians sent forth a fireship loaded with combustibles, which they drove against the front of the mole and set fire to the two towers. At the same time, the full naval force of the city, ships and little boats, were sent forth to land men at once on all parts of the mole. So successful was this attack, that all the Macedonian engines were burnt,—the outer woodwork which kept the mole together was torn up in many places,—and a large part of the structure came to pieces.¹ Alexander had thus not only to construct fresh engines, but also to begin the mole nearly anew. He resolved to give it greater breadth and strength, for the purpose of carrying more towers abreast in front, and for better defence against lateral attacks. But it had now become plain to him, that while the Tyrians were masters of the sea, no efforts by land alone would enable him to take the town. Leaving Perdikkas and Kraterus therefore to reconstruct the mole and build new engines, he himself repaired to Sidon, for the purpose of assembling as large a fleet as he could. He got together triremes from various quarters—two from Rhodes, ten from the seaports in Lykia, three from Soli and Mallus. But his principal force was obtained by putting in requisition the ships of the Phenician towns, Sidon, Byblus, and Aradus, now subject to him. These ships, eighty in number, had left the

¹ Arrian, ii. 18, 19; Diodor. xvii. 42; Curtius, iv. 3, 6, 7.

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Persian admiral and come to Sidon, there awaiting his orders ; while not long afterwards, the princes of Cyprus came thither also, tendering to him their powerful fleet of 120 ships of war.¹ He was now master of a fleet of 200 sail, comprising the most part, and the best part, of the Persian navy. This was the consummation of Macedonian triumph—the last real and effective weapon wrested from the grasp of Persia. The prognostic afforded by the eagle near the ships at Miletus, as interpreted by Alexander, had now been fulfilled ; since by successful operations on land, he had conquered and brought into his power a superior Persian fleet.²

Having directed these ships to complete their equipments and training, with Macedonians as soldiers on board, Alexander put himself at the head of some light troops for an expedition of eleven days against the Arabian mountaineers on Libanus, whom he dispersed or put down, though not without some personal exposure and hazard.³ On returning to Sidon, he found Kleander arrived with a reinforcement of 4000 Grecian hoplites, welcome auxiliaries for prosecuting the siege. Then, going aboard his fleet in the harbour of Sidon, he sailed with it in good battle order to Tyre, hoping that the Tyrians would come out and fight. But they kept within, struck with surprise and consternation ; having not before known that their fellow-Phenicians were now among the besiegers. Alexander, having ascertained that the Tyrians would not accept a sea-fight, immediately caused their two harbours to be blocked up and watched ; that on the north, towards Sidon, by the Cyprians—that on the south, towards Egypt, by the Phenicians.⁴

From this time forward the doom of Tyre was certain. The Tyrians could no longer offer obstruction to the mole, which was completed across the channel and brought up to the town. Engines were planted upon it to batter the walls ; moveable towers were rolled up to take them by assault ; attack was also made from seaward. Yet though reduced altogether to the defensive, the Tyrians still displayed obstinate bravery, and

¹ Arrian, ii. 20, 1-4 ; Curtius, iv. 2, 14. It evinces how strongly Arrian looks at everything from Alexander's point of view, when we find him telling us, that the monarch *forgave* the Phenicians and Cyprians for their adherence and past service in the Persian fleet, considering that they had acted under compulsion.

² Arrian, i. 18, 15. In the siege of Tyre (four centuries earlier) by the Assyrian monarch Salmaneser. Sidon and other Phenician towns had lent their ships to the besieger (Menander apud Joseph. Antiq. Jud. ix. 14, 2).

³ Arrian, ii. 20, 5 ; Plutarch, Alexander, 24.

⁴ Arrian, ii. 20, 9-16.

exhausted all the resources of ingenuity in repelling the besiegers. So gigantic was the strength of the wall fronting the mole, and even that of the northern side fronting Sidon, that none of Alexander's engines could make any breach in it; but on the south side towards Egypt he was more successful. A large breach having been made in this south wall, he assaulted it with two ships manned by the hypaspists and the soldiers of his phalanx: he himself commanded in one and Admêtus in the other. At the same time he caused the town to be menaced all round, at every approachable point, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the defenders. Himself and his two ships having been rowed close up to the breach in the south wall, boarding bridges were thrown out from each deck, upon which he and Admêtus rushed forward with their respective storming parties. Admêtus got upon the wall, but was there slain; Alexander also was among the first to mount, and the two parties got such a footing on the wall as to overpower all resistance. At the same time his ships also forced their way into the two harbours, so that Tyre came on all sides into his power.¹

Though the walls were now lost, and resistance had become desperate, the gallant defenders did not lose their courage. They barricaded the streets, and concentrated their strength especially at a defensible post called the Agenorion, or chapel of Agenor. Here the battle again raged furiously until they were overpowered by the Macedonians, incensed with the long toils of the previous siege, as well as by the slaughter of some of their prisoners, whom the Tyrians had killed publicly on the battlements. All who took shelter in the temple of Hêrâklês were spared by Alexander, from respect to the sanctuary: among the number were the prince Azemilchus, a few leading Tyrians, the Carthaginian envoys, and some children of both sexes. The Sidonians also, displaying a tardy sentiment of kindred, and making partial amends for the share which they had taken in the capture, preserved some lives from the sword of the conqueror.² But the greater number of the adult freemen perished with arms in their hands; while 2000 of them who survived either from disabling wounds, or from the fatigue of the slaughterers, were hanged on the sea-shore by order of Alexander.³ The females,

¹ Arrian, ii. 23, 24; Curtius, iv. 4, 11; Diodor. xvii. 46.

² Curtius, iv. 4, 15.

³ This is mentioned both by Curtius (iv. 4, 17) and by Diodorus (xv. 46). It is not mentioned by Arrian, and perhaps may not have found a place in Ptolemy or Aristobulus; but I see no ground for disbelieving it.

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the children, and the slaves, were sold to the slave-merchant. The number sold is said to have been about 30,000 : a total rather small, as we must assume slaves to be included ; but we are told that many had been previously sent away to Carthage.¹

Thus master of Tyre, Alexander marched into the city and consummated his much-desired sacrifice to Hêraklês. His whole force, land and naval, fully armed and arrayed, took part in the procession. A more costly hecatomb had never been offered to that god, when we consider that it had been purchased by all the toils of an unnecessary siege, and by the extirpation of these free and high-spirited citizens, his former worshippers. What the loss of the Macedonians had been, we cannot say. The number of their slain is stated by Arrian at 400, which must be greatly beneath the truth ; for the courage and skill of the besieged had prolonged the siege to the prodigious period of seven months, though Alexander had left no means untried to accomplish it sooner.²

Towards the close of the siege of Tyre, Alexander received and rejected a second proposition from Darius, offering 10,000 talents, with the cession of all the territory westward of the Euphrates, as ransom for his mother and wife, and proposing that Alexander should become his son-in-law as well as his ally. "If I were Alexander (said Parmenio) I should accept such terms, instead of plunging into further peril."—"So would I (replied Alexander) if I were Parmenio ; but since I am Alexander, I must return a different answer." His answer to Darius was to this effect :—"I want neither your money nor your cession. All your money and territory are already mine, and you are tendering to me a part in place of the whole. If I choose to marry your daughter, I *shall* marry her—whether you give her to me or not. Come hither to me, if you wish to obtain from me any act of friendship."³ Alexander might spare the submissive and the prostrate ; but he could not brook an equal or a competitor, and his language towards them was that of brutal insolence. Of course this was the

¹ Arrian, iv. 24, 9 ; Diodorus, xvii. 46.

² The resuscitating force of commercial industry is seen by the fact, that in spite of this total destruction, Tyre again rose to be a wealthy and flourishing city (Strabo, xvi. p. 757).

³ Arrian, ii. 25, 5 ; Curtius, iv. 5. The answer is more insolent in the naked simplicity of Arrian, than in the pomp of Curtius. Plutarch (Alexand. 29) both abridges and softens it. Diodorus also gives the answer differently (xvii. 54)—and represents the embassy as coming somewhat later in time, after Alexander's return from Egypt.

last message sent by Darius, who now saw, if he had not before seen, that he had no chance open except by the renewal of war.

Being thus entire master of Syria, Phenicia, and Palestine, and having accepted the voluntary submission of the Jews, Alexander marched forward to conquer Egypt. He had determined, before he undertook any further expedition into the interior of the Persian empire, to make himself master of all the coast-lands which kept open the communications of the Persians with Greece, so as to secure his rear against any serious hostility. His great fear was, of Grecian soldiers or cities raised against him by Persian gold; ¹ and Egypt was the last remaining possession of the Persians, which gave them the means of acting upon Greece. Those means were indeed now prodigiously curtailed by the feeble condition of the Persian fleet in the *Ægean*, unable to contend with the increasing fleet of the Macedonian admirals Hegelochus and Amphoterus, now numbering 160 sail.² During the summer of 332 B.C., while Alexander was prosecuting the siege of Tyre, these admirals recovered all the important acquisitions—Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—which had been made by Memnon for the Persian interests. The inhabitants of Tenedos invited them and ensured their success; those of Chios attempted to do the same, but were coerced by Pharnabazus, who retained the city by means of his insular partisans, Apollonidês and others, with a military force. The Macedonian admirals laid siege to the town, and were presently enabled to carry it by their friends within. Pharnabazus was here captured with his entire force; twelve triremes thoroughly armed and manned, thirty store-ships, several privateers, and 3000 Grecian mercenaries. Aristonikus, philo-Persian despot of Methymna—arriving at Chios shortly afterwards, but ignorant of the capture—was entrapped into the harbour and made prisoner. There remained only Mitylênê, which was held for the Persians by the Athenian Charês, with a garrison of 2000 men: who however, seeing no hope of holding out against the Macedonians, consented to evacuate the city on condition of a free departure. The Persians were thus expelled from the sea, from all footing among the Grecian islands, and from the vicinity of Greece and Macedonia.³

These successes were in full progress, when Alexander himself directed his march from Tyre to Egypt, stopping in his way to besiege Gaza. This considerable town, the last before

¹ Arrian, ii. 17, 4.

² Curtius, iv. 5, 14.

³ Curtius, iv. 5, 14–22; Arrian, iii. 2, 4–8.

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entering on the desert track between Syria and Egypt, was situated between one and two miles from the sea. It was built upon a lofty artificial mound, and encircled with a high wall; but its main defence was derived from the deep sand immediately around it, as well as from the mud and quicksand on its coast. It was defended by a brave man, the eunuch Batis, with a strong garrison of Arabs, and abundant provision of every kind. Confiding in the strength of the place, Batis refused to admit Alexander. Moreover his judgement was confirmed by the Macedonian engineers themselves, who, when Alexander first surveyed the walls, pronounced it to be impregnable, chiefly from the height of its supporting mound. But Alexander could not endure the thought of tacitly confessing his inability to take Gaza. The more difficult the enterprise, the greater was the charm for him, and the greater would be the astonishment produced all around when he should be seen to have triumphed.¹

He began by erecting a mound south of the city, close by the wall, for the purpose of bringing up his battering engines. This external mound was completed, and the engines had begun to batter the wall, when a well-planned sally by the garrison overthrew the assailants and destroyed the engines. The timely aid of Alexander himself with his hypaspists, protected their retreat; but he himself, after escaping a snare from a pretended Arabian deserter, received a severe wound through the shield and the breastplate into the shoulder, by a dart discharged from a catapult; as the prophet Aristander had predicted—giving assurance at the same time, that Gaza would fall into his hands.² During the treatment of his wound, he ordered the engines employed at Tyre to be brought up by sea; and caused his mound to be carried around the whole circumference of the town, so as to render it approachable from every point. This Herculean work, the description of which we read with astonishment, was 250 feet high all round, and two stadia (1240 feet) broad; ³ the loose sand around could hardly

¹ Arrian, ii. 26, 5. Οἱ δὲ μηχανοποιοὶ γνώμην ἀπεδείκνυντο, ἔμπορον εἶναι βίᾳ ἐλεῖν τὸ τεῖχος, διὰ ὕψος τοῦ χώματος· ἀλλ' Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐδόκει αἰρετέον εἶναι, ὅσῳ ἀπωρότερον· ἐκπλήξγειν γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ ἔργον τῷ παραλόγῳ ἐπὶ μέγα, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐλεῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι οἱ, λεγόμενον ἔς τε τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ Δαρείον.

About the fidelity and obstinate defensive courage, shown more than once by the inhabitants of Gaza—see Polybius, xvi. 40.

² Arrian, ii. 26, 27; Curtius, iv. 6, 12-18; Plutarch, Alexand. 25.

³ Arrian, ii. 27, 5. Χῶμα χωνύνουσι ἐν κύκλῳ πάντοθεν τῆς πόλεως. It is certainly possible, as Droysen remarks (Gesch. Alex. des Grossen

have been suitable, so that materials must have been brought up from a distance. The undertaking was at length completed ; in what length of time we do not know, but it must have been considerable—though doubtless thousands of labourers would be pressed in from the circumjacent country.¹

Gaza was now attacked at all points by battering-rams, by mines, and by projectile engines with various missiles. Presently the walls were breached in several places, though the defenders were unremitting in their efforts to repair the damaged parts. Alexander attempted three distinct general assaults ; but in all three he was repulsed by the bravery of the Gazæans. At length, after still further breaching of the wall, he renewed for the fourth time his attempt to storm. The entire Macedonian phalanx being brought up to attack at different points, the greatest emulation reigned among the officers. The Æakid Neoptolemus was first to mount the wall ; but the other divisions manifested hardly less ardour, and the town was at length taken. Its gallant defenders resisted with unabated spirit to the last ; and all fell in their posts, the incensed soldiery being no way disposed to give quarter.

One prisoner alone was reserved for special treatment—the prince or governor himself, the eunuch Batis ; who, having manifested the greatest energy and valour, was taken severely wounded, yet still alive. In this condition he was brought by Leonnatus and Philôtas into the presence of Alexander, who cast upon him looks of vengeance and fury. The Macedonian prince had undertaken the siege mainly in order to prove to the world that he could overcome difficulties insuperable to others. But he had incurred so much loss, spent so much time and labour, and undergone so many repulses before he succeeded, that the palm of honour belonged rather to the minority vanquished than to the multitude of victors. To such disappointment, which would sting Alexander in the tenderest point, is to be added the fact, that he had himself incurred great personal risk, received a severe wound, besides his narrow escape from the dagger of the pretended Arabian deserter. Here was ample ground for violent anger ; which was moreover still further exasperated by the appearance of

p. 199), that *πάντοθεν* is not to be interpreted with literal strictness, but only as meaning in *many different portions* of the walled circuit. Yet if this had been intended, Arrian would surely have said *χώματα* in the plural, not *χῶμα*.

¹ Diodorus (xvii. 48) states the whole duration of the siege as two months. This seems rather under than over the probable truth.

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Batis—an eunuch—a black man—tall and robust, but at the same time fat and lumpish—and doubtless at the moment covered with blood and dirt. Such visible circumstances, repulsive to eyes familiar with Grecian gymnastics, contributed to kindle the wrath of Alexander to its highest pitch. After the siege of Tyre, his indignation had been satiated by the hanging of the 2000 surviving combatants; here, to discharge the pressure of a still stronger feeling, there remained only the single captive, upon whom therefore he resolved to inflict a punishment as novel as it was cruel. He directed the feet of Batis to be bored, and brazen rings to be passed through them; after which the naked body of this brave man, yet surviving, was tied with cords to the tail of a chariot driven by Alexander himself, and dragged at full speed amidst the triumphant jeers and shouts of the army.¹ Herein Alexander, emulous even from childhood of the exploits of his legendary ancestor Achilles, copied the ignominious treatment described in the *Iliad* as inflicted on the dead body of Hektor.²

This proceeding of Alexander, the product of Homeric reminiscences operating upon an infuriated and vindictive temperament, stands out in respect of barbarity from all that we read respecting the treatment of conquered towns in antiquity. His remaining measures were conformable to received usage. The wives and children of the Gazæans were sold into slavery. New inhabitants were admitted from the neighbourhood, and a garrison was placed there to hold the town for the Macedonians.³

¹ Curtius, iv. 6, 25-30; Dionys. Hal. *De Comp. Verbor.* p. 123-125—with the citation there given from Hegesias of Magnesia. Diodorus (xvii. 48, 49) simply mentions Gaza in two sentences, but gives no details of any kind.

Arrian says nothing about the treatment of Batis, nor did he probably find anything about it in Ptolemy or Aristobulus. There are assignable reasons why they should pass it over in silence, as disgraceful to Alexander. But Arrian, at the same time, says nothing inconsistent with or contradicting the statement of Curtius; while he himself recognises how emulous Alexander was of the proceedings of Achilles (vii. 14, 7).

The passage describing this scene, cited from the lost author Hegesias by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, as an example of bad rhythm and taste, has the merit of bringing out the details respecting the person of Batis, which were well calculated to disgust and aggravate the wrath of Alexander. The bad taste of Hegesias as a writer does not diminish his credibility as a witness.

² Arrian, vii. 14, 7.

³ Arrian, ii. 27, 11. About the circumstances and siege of Gaza, see the work of Stark, *Gaza und die Philistäische Küste*, p. 242. Leip. 1852.

The two sieges of Tyre and Gaza, which occupied both together nine months,¹ were the hardest fighting that Alexander had ever encountered, or in fact ever did encounter throughout his life. After such toils, the march to Egypt, which he now commenced (October 332 B.C.), was an affair of holiday and triumph. Mazakês, the satrap of Egypt, having few Persian troops and a disaffected native population, was noway disposed to resist the approaching conqueror. Seven days' march brought Alexander and his army from Gaza to Pelusium, the frontier fortress of Egypt, commanding the eastern branch of the Nile, whither his fleet, under the command of Hephæstion, had come also. Here he found not only open gates and a submissive governor, but also crowds of Egyptians assembled to welcome him.² He placed a garrison in Pelusium, sent his fleet up the river to Memphis, and marched himself to the same place by land. The satrap Mazakês surrendered himself, with all the treasure in the city, 800 talents in amount, and much precious furniture. Here Alexander reposed some time, offering splendid sacrifices to the gods generally, and especially to the Egyptian God Apis; to which he added gymnastic and musical matches, sending to Greece for the most distinguished artists.

From Memphis, he descended the westernmost branch of the Nile to Kanôpus at its mouth, from whence he sailed westerly along the shore to look at the island of Pharos, celebrated in Homer, and the lake Mareôtitis. Reckoning Egypt now as a portion of his empire, and considering that the business of keeping down an unquiet population, as well as of collecting a large revenue, would have to be performed by his extraneous land and sea force, he saw the necessity of withdrawing the seat of government from Memphis, where both the Persians and the natives had maintained it, and of founding a new city of his own on the seaboard, convenient for communication with Greece and Macedonia. His imagination, susceptible to all Homeric impressions and influenced by a dream, first fixed upon the isle of Pharos as a suitable place for his intended city.³ Perceiving soon, however, that this little isle was inadequate by itself, he included it as part of a larger city to be founded on the adjacent mainland. The gods were consulted, and encouraging responses were obtained; upon which Alexander himself marked out the circuit of the walls,

¹ Diodor. xvii. 48; Josephus, *Antiq.* xi. 4.

² Arrian, iii. 1, 3; Curtius, iv. 7, 1, 2; Diodor. xvii. 49.

³ Curtius, iv. 8, 1-4; Plutarch, *Alexand.* 26.

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the direction of the principal streets, and the sites of numerous temples to Grecian gods as well as Egyptian.¹ It was thus that the first stone was laid of the mighty, populous, and busy Alexandria; which however the founder himself never lived to see, and wherein he was only destined to repose as a corpse. The site of the place between the sea and the Lake Mareôtit, was found airy and healthy, as well as convenient for shipping and commerce. The protecting island of Pharos gave the means of forming two good harbours for ships coming by sea, on a coast harbourless elsewhere; while the Lake Mareôtit, communicating by various canals with the river Nile, received with facility the exportable produce from the interior.² As soon as houses were ready, commencement was made by the intendant Kleomenês, transporting to them in mass the population of the neighbouring town of Kanôpus, and probably of other towns besides.³

Alexandria became afterwards the capital of the Ptolemaic princes. It acquired immense grandeur and population during their rule of two centuries and a half, when their enormous revenues were spent greatly in its improvement and decoration. But we cannot reasonably ascribe to Alexander himself any prescience of such an imposing future. He intended it as a place from which he could conveniently rule Egypt, considered as a portion of his extensive empire all round the Ægean; and had Egypt remained thus a fraction, instead of becoming a substantive imperial whole, Alexandria would probably not have risen beyond mediocrity.⁴

The other most notable incident, which distinguished the four or five months' stay of Alexander in Egypt, was his march through the sandy desert to the temple of Zeus Ammon. This is chiefly memorable as it marks his increasing self-adoration and inflation above the limits of humanity. His achievements during the last three years had so transcended the expectations of every one, himself included—the gods had given to him such incessant good fortune, and so paralysed or put down his enemies—that the hypothesis of a superhuman personality

¹ Arrian, iii. 1, 8; Curtius, iv. 8, 2-6; Diodor. xvii. 52.

² Strabo, xvii. p. 793. Other authors however speak of the salubrity of Alexandria less favourably than Strabo: see St. Croix, *Examen des Hist. d'Alexandre*, p. 287.

³ Pseudo-Aristotle, *Œconomic*. ii. 32.

⁴ Arrian, iii. 5, 4-9. Tacitus (*Annal.* i. 11) says about Egypt under the Romans—"provinciam aditu difficilem, annonæ fecundam, superstitione et lasciviâ discordem et mobilem, insciam legum, ignaram magistratum," &c. Compare Polybius ap. Strabon. xvii. p. 797.

seemed the natural explanation of such a superhuman career.¹ He had to look back to the heroic legends, and to his ancestors Perseus and Hēraklēs, to find a worthy prototype.² Conceiving himself to be (like them) the son of Zeus, with only a nominal human parentage, he resolved to go and ascertain the fact by questioning the infallible oracle of Zeus Ammon. His march of several days, through a sandy desert—always fatiguing, sometimes perilous,—was distinguished by manifest evidences of the favour of the gods. Unexpected rain fell just when the thirsty soldiers required water. When the guides lost their track, from shifting of the sand, on a sudden two speaking serpents, or two ravens, appeared preceding the march and indicating the right direction. Such were the statements made by Ptolemy, Aristobulus, and Kallisthenēs, companions and contemporaries; while Arrian, four centuries afterwards, announces his positive conviction that there was a divine intervention on behalf of Alexander, though he cannot satisfy himself about the details.³ The priest of Zeus Ammon addressed Alexander, as being the son of the god, and further assured him that his career would be one of uninterrupted victory, until he was taken away to the gods; while his friends also, who consulted the oracle for their own satisfaction, received for answer that the rendering of divine honours to him would be acceptable to Zeus. After profuse sacrifices and presents, Alexander quitted the oracle, with a full and sincere faith that he really was the son of Zeus Ammon; which faith was further confirmed by declarations transmitted to him from other oracles—that of Erythræ in Ionia, and of Branchidæ near Miletus.⁴ Though he did not directly order himself to be addressed as the son of Zeus, he was pleased with those who volunteered such a recognition, and angry with sceptics or scoffers, who disbelieved the oracle of Ammon. Plutarch thinks that this was a mere political manœuvre of Alexander, for the purpose of overawing the non-Hellenic population over whom he was enlarging his

¹ Diodor. xvii. 51. τεκμήρια δ' εἶσθαι τῆς ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσεως τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι κατορθωμάτων (answer of the priest of Ammon to Alexander).

² Arrian, iii. 3, 2.

³ Arrian, iii. 3, 12. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν θεῶν τι ξυνεπέλαβεν αὐτῷ, ἔχω ἰσχυρίσασθαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ εἶδος ταύτῃ ἔχει· τὸ δ' ἀπρεκὲς τοῦ λόγου ἀφείλοντο οἱ ἄλλοι καὶ ἄλλοι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἐξηγησάμενοι.

Compare Curtius, iv. 7, 12–15; Diodor. xvii. 49–51; Plutarch, Alex. 27; Kallisthenēs ap. Strabon. xvii. p. 814.

⁴ Kallisthenēs, Fragm. xvi. ap. Alexand. Magn. Histor. Scriptor. ed. Geier. p. 257; Strabo. xvii. p. 814.

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empire.¹ But it seems rather to have been a genuine faith,—a simple exaggeration of that exorbitant vanity which from the beginning reigned so largely in his bosom. He was indeed aware that it was repugnant to the leading Macedonians in many ways, but especially as a deliberate insult to the memory of Philip. This is the theme always touched upon in moments of dissatisfaction. To Parmenio, to Philôtas, to Kleitus, and other principal officers, the insolence of the king, in disclaiming Philip and putting himself above the level of humanity, appeared highly offensive. Discontents on this subject among the Macedonian officers, though condemned to silence by fear and admiration of Alexander, became serious, and will be found reappearing hereafter.²

The last month of Alexander's stay in Egypt was passed at Memphis. While nominating various officers for the permanent administration of the country, he also received a visit of Hegelochus his admiral, who brought as prisoners Aristonikus of Methymna, and other despots of the various insular Grecian cities. Alexander ordered them to be handed over to their respective cities, to be dealt with as the citizens pleased; all except the Chian Apollonidês, who was sent to Elephantinê in the south of Egypt for detention. In most of the cities, the despots had incurred such violent hatred, that when delivered up, they were tortured and put to death.³ Pharnabazus also had been among the prisoners, but had found means to escape from his guards when the fleet touched at Kos.⁴

In the early spring, after receiving reinforcements of Greeks and Thracians, Alexander marched into Phenicia. It was there that he regulated the affairs of Phenicia, Syria, and Greece, prior to his intended expedition into the interior against Darius. He punished the inhabitants of Samaria, who had revolted and burnt alive the Macedonian prefect Andromachus.⁵ In addition to all the business transacted, Alexander made costly presents to the Tyrian Hêraklês, and offered splendid sacrifices to other gods. Choice festivals with tragedy were also celebrated, analogous to the Dionysia at Athens, with the best actors and chorists contending for the prize. The princes of Cyprus vied with each other in doing honour to the son of Zeus

¹ Plutarch, *Alexand.* 28. Arrian hints at the same explanation (*vii.* 29, 6).

² Curtius, *iv.* 10, 3—"fastidio esse patriam, abdicari Philippum patrem, cœlum vanis cogitationibus petere." Arrian, *iii.* 26, 1; Curtius, *vi.* 9, 18; *vi.* 11, 23.

³ Curtius, *iv.* 8, 11.

⁴ Arrian, *iii.* 2, 8, 9.

⁵ Curtius, *iv.* 8, 10.

Ammon; each undertaking the duty of chorêgus, getting up at his own cost a drama with distinguished chorus and actors, and striving to obtain the prize from pre-appointed judges—as was practised among the ten tribes at Athens.¹

In the midst of these religious and festive exhibitions, Alexander was collecting magazines for his march into the interior.² He had already sent forward a detachment to Thapsakus, the usual ford of the Euphrates, to throw bridges over the river. The Persian Mazæus was on guard on the other side, with a small force of 3000 men, 2000 of them Greeks; not sufficient to hinder the bridges from being built, but only to hinder them from being carried completely over to the left bank. After eleven days of march from Phenicia, Alexander and his whole army reached Thapsakus. Mazæus, on the other side, as soon as he saw the main army arrive, withdrew his small force without delay, and retreated to the Tigris; so that the two bridges were completed, and Alexander crossed forthwith.³

Once over the Euphrates, Alexander had the option of marching down the left bank of that river to Babylon, the chief city of the Persian empire, and the natural place to find Darius.⁴ But this march (as we know from Xenophon, who made it with the Ten Thousand Greeks) would be one of extreme suffering and through a desert country where no provisions were to be got. Moreover, Mazæus in retreating had taken a north-easterly direction towards the upper part of the Tigris; and some prisoners reported that Darius with his main army was behind the Tigris, intending to defend the passage of that river against Alexander. The Tigris appears not to be fordable below Nineveh (Mosul). Accordingly he directed his march, first nearly northward, having the Euphrates on his left hand; next eastward across Northern Mesopotamia, having the Armenian mountains on his left hand. On reaching the ford of the Tigris, he found it absolutely undefended. Not a single

¹ Plutarch, *Alexand.* 29; Arrian, *l. c.*

² Arrian, *iii.* 6, 12.

³ Arrian, *iii.* 7, 1-6; Curtius, *iv.* 9, 12—"undecimis castris pervenit ad Euphraten."

⁴ So Alexander considers Babylon (Arrian, *ii.* 17, 3-10)—*προχωρησάντων ξὺν τῇ δυνάμει ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνά τε καὶ Δαρείον τὸν τε ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνος στόλον ποιησόμεθα*, &c. This is the explanation of Arrian's remark, *iii.* 7, 6—where he assigns the reason why Alexander, after passing the Euphrates at Thapsakus, did not take the straight road towards Babylon. Cyrus the younger marched directly to Babylon to attack Artaxerxes. Susa, Ekbatana, and Persepolis were more distant, and less exposed to an enemy from the west.

enemy being in sight, he forded the river as soon as possible, with all his infantry, cavalry, and baggage. The difficulties and perils of crossing were extreme, from the depth of the water, above their breasts, the rapidity of the current, and the slippery footing.¹ A resolute and vigilant enemy might have rendered the passage almost impossible. But the good fortune of Alexander was not less conspicuous in what his enemies left undone, than in what they actually did.²

After this fatiguing passage, Alexander rested for two days. During the night an eclipse of the moon occurred, nearly total ; which spread consternation among the army, combined with complaints against his overweening insolence, and mistrust as to the unknown regions on which they were entering. Alexander, while offering solemn sacrifices to Sun, Moon, and Earth, combated the prevailing depression by declarations from his own prophet Aristander and from Egyptian astrologers, who proclaimed that Helios favoured the Greeks, and Selênê the Persians ; hence the eclipse of the moon portended victory to the Macedonians—and victory too (so Aristander promised), before the next new moon. Having thus reassured the soldiers, Alexander marched for four days in a south-easterly direction through the territory called Aturia, with the Tigris on his right hand, and the Gordyene or Kurd mountains on his left. Encountering a small advanced guard of the Persians, he here learnt from prisoners that Darius with his main host was not far off.³

Nearly two years had elapsed since the ruinous defeat of Issus. What Darius had been doing during this long interval, and especially during the first half of it, we are unable to say. We hear only of one proceeding on his part—his missions, twice repeated, to Alexander, tendering or entreating peace, with the especial view of recovering his captive family. Nothing else does he appear to have done, either to retrieve the losses of the past, or to avert the perils of the future ; nothing, to save his fleet from passing into the hands of the conqueror ; nothing, to relieve either Tyre or Gaza, the sieges of which collectively occupied Alexander for near ten months. The disgraceful flight of Darius at Issus had already lost him

¹ Arrian, iii. 7, 8 ; Diodor. xvii. 55 ; Curtius, iv. 9, 17-24. "Magna munimenta regni Tigris atque Euphrates erant," is a part of the speech put into the mouth of Darius before the battle of Arbêla, by Curtius (iv. 14, 10). Both these great defences were abandoned.

² Curtius, iv. 9, 23 ; Plutarch, Alexand. 39.

³ Arrian, iii. 7, 12 ; iii. 8, 3. Curtius, iv. 10, 11-18.

the confidence of several of his most valuable servants. The Macedonian exile Amyntas, a brave and energetic man, with the best of the Grecian mercenaries, gave up the Persian cause as lost,¹ and tried to set up for himself, in which attempt he failed and perished in Egypt. The satrap of Egypt, penetrated with contempt for the timidity of his master, was induced, by that reason as well as by others, to throw open the country to Alexander.² Having incurred so deplorable a loss, as well in reputation as in territory, Darius had the strongest motives to redeem it by augmented vigour.

But he was paralysed by the fact, that his mother, his wife, and several of his children, had fallen into the hands of the conqueror. Among the countless advantages growing out of the victory of Issus, this acquisition was not the least. It placed Darius in the condition of one who had given hostages for good behaviour to his enemy. The Persian kings were often in the habit of exacting from satraps or generals the deposit of their wives and families, as a pledge for fidelity; and Darius himself had received this guarantee from Memnon, as a condition of entrusting him with the Persian fleet.³ Bound by the like chains himself, towards one who had now become his superior, Darius was afraid to act with energy, lest success should bring down evil upon his captive family. By allowing Alexander to subdue unopposed all the territory west of the Euphrates, he hoped to be allowed to retain his empire eastward, and to ransom back his family at an enormous price. Such propositions did satisfy Parmenio, and would probably have satisfied even Philip, had Philip been the victor. The insatiate nature of Alexander had not yet been fully proved. It was only when the latter contemptuously rejected everything short of surrender at discretion, that Darius began to take measures east of the Euphrates for defending what yet remained.

The conduct of Alexander towards the regal hostages, honourable as it was to his sentiment, evinced at the same time that he knew their value as a subject of political negotiation.⁴ It was essential that he should treat them with the

¹ Arrian, ii. 13; Curtius, iv. 1, 27-30—"cum in illo statu rerum id quemque, quod occupasset, habiturum arbitraretur" (Amyntas).

² Arrian, iii. 1, 3. *τὴν τε ἐν Ἰσσοφ μάχην ὅπως συνέβη πεπυσμένος* (the satrap of Egypt) *καὶ Δαρεῖον ὅτι αἰσχρὰ φυγῇ ἔφυγε*, &c.

³ Diodor. xvii. 23. Compare Xenophon, *Anabasis*, i. 4, 9; Herodot. vii. 10.

⁴ The praise bestowed upon the continence of Alexander, for refusing to visit Statira the wife of Darius, is exaggerated even to absurdity.

full deference due to their rank, if he desired to keep up their price as hostages in the eyes of Darius as well as of his own army. He carried them along with his army, from the coast of Syria, over the bridge of the Euphrates, and even through the waters of the Tigris. To them, this must have proved a severe toil ; and in fact, the queen Statira became so worn out that she died shortly after crossing the Tigris ;¹ to him also, it must have been an onerous obligation, since he not only sought to ensure to them all their accustomed pomp, but must have assigned a considerable guard to watch them, at a moment when he was marching into an unknown country, and required all his military resources to be disposable. Simply for safe detention, the hostages would have been better guarded and might have been treated with still greater ceremony, in a city or a fortress. But Alexander probably wished to have them near him, in case of the possible contingency of serious reverses to his army on the eastern side of the Tigris. Assuming such a misfortune to happen, the surrender of them might ensure a safe retreat under circumstances otherwise fatal to its accomplishment.

Being at length convinced that Alexander would not be

In regard to women, Alexander was by temperament cold, the opposite of his father Philip. During his youth, his development was so tardy, that there was even a surmise of some physical disability (Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. x. p. 435). As to the most beautiful persons, of both sexes, he had only to refuse the numerous tenders made to him by those who sought to gain his favour (Plutarch, Alex. 22). Moreover, after the capture of Damascus, he did select for himself, from among the female captives, Barsinê, the widow of his illustrious rival Memnon ; daughter of Artabazus, a beautiful woman of engaging manners, and above all, distinguished, by having received Hellenic education, from the simple Oriental harem of Darius (Plutarch, Alex. 21). In adopting the widow of Memnon as his mistress, Alexander may probably have had present to his imagination the example of his legendary ancestor Neoptolemus, whose tender relations with Andromachê, widow of his enemy Hektor, would not be forgotten by any reader of Euripidês. Alexander had by Barsinê a son called Hêraklês.

Lastly, Alexander was so absorbed by ambition,—so overcharged with the duties and difficulties of command, which he always performed himself,—and so continually engaged in fatiguing bodily effort,—that he had little leisure left for indulgences ; such leisure as he had, he preferred devoting to wine-parties with the society and conversation of his officers.

¹ Curtius, iv. 10, 19. "*Itineris continui labore animique ægritudine fatigata,*" &c.

Curtius and Justin mention a third embassy sent by Darius (immediately after having heard of the death and honourable obsequies of Statira) to Alexander, asking for peace. The other authors allude only to two tentatives of this kind ; and the third seems by no means probable.

satisfied with any prize short of the entire Persian empire, Darius summoned all his forces to defend what he still retained. He brought together a host said to be superior in number to that which had been defeated at Issus.¹ Contingents arrived from the farthest extremities of the vast Persian territory—from the Caspian sea, the rivers Oxus and Indus, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. The plains eastward of the Tigris, about the latitude of the modern town of Mosul, between that river and the Gordyene mountains (Zagros), were fixed upon for the muster of this prodigious multitude; partly conducted by Darius himself from Babylon, partly arriving there by different routes from the north, east, and south. Arbêla—a considerable town about twenty miles east of the Great Zab river, still known under the name of Erbil, as a caravan station on the ordinary road between Erzeroum and Bagdad—was fixed on as the muster-place or head-quarters, where the chief magazines were collected and the heavy baggage lodged, and near which the troops were first assembled and exercised.²

But the spot predetermined for a pitched battle was, the neighbourhood of Gaugamela near the river Bumôdus, about thirty miles west of Arbêla, towards the Tigris, and about as much south-east of Mosul—a spacious and level plain, with nothing more than a few undulating slopes, and without any trees. It was by nature well adapted for drawing up a numerous army, especially for the free manœuvres of cavalry, and the rush of scythed chariots; moreover, the Persian officers had been careful beforehand to level artificially such of the slopes as they thought inconvenient.³ There seemed every thing in the ground to favour the operation both of the vast total, and the special forces, of Darius; who fancied that his defeat at Issus had been occasioned altogether by his having adventured himself in the narrow defiles of Kilikia—and that on open and level ground his superior numbers must be triumphant. He was even anxious that Alexander should come and attack him on the plain. Hence the undefended passage of the Tigris.

For those who looked only to numbers, the host assembled at Arbêla might well inspire confidence; for it is said to have

¹ Arrian, iii. 7, 7.

² Diodorus, xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 9, 9.

³ Arrian, iii. 8, 12. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὅσα ἀνώμαλα αὐτοῦ ἐς ἵππασίαν, ταῦτά τε ἐκ πολλοῦ οἱ Πέρσαι τοῖς τε ἄρμασιν ἐπελαύνειν εὐπετῇ ἐπεποιήκεσαν καὶ τῇ ἵππῃ ἱππάσμινα.

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consisted of 1,000,000 of infantry¹—40,000 cavalry—200 scythed chariots—and fifteen elephants; of which animals we now read for the first time in a field of battle. But besides the numbers, Darius had provided for his troops more effective arms; instead of mere javelins, strong swords and short thrusting pikes, such as the Macedonian cavalry wielded so admirably in close combat—together with shields for the infantry and breastplates for the horsemen.² He counted much also on the terrific charge of the chariots, each of which had a pole projecting before the horses and terminating in a sharp point, together with three sword-blades stretching from the yoke on each side, and scythes also laterally from the naves of the wheels.³

Informed of the approach of Alexander, about the time when the Macedonian army first reached the Tigris, Darius moved from Arbêla, where his baggage and treasure were left—crossed by bridges the river Lykus or Great Zab, an operation which occupied five days—and marched to take post on the prepared ground near Gaugamela. His battle array was formed—of the Baktrians on the extreme left, under command of Bessus the satrap of Baktria; next, the Dahæ and Arachôti, under command of Barsäentes, satrap of Arachosia; then the native Persians, horse and foot alternating,—the Susians, under Oxathrês,—and the Kadusians. On the extreme right were the contingents of Syria both east and west of the Euphrates, under Mazæus; then the Medes, under Atropatês; next, the Parthians, Sakæ, Tapyrians, and Hyrkanians, all cavalry, under Phrataphernês; then the Albanians and the Sakesinæ. Darius himself was in the centre, with the choice troops of the army near and around him—the Persian select Horse-guards, called the king's kinsmen—the Persian foot-guards, carrying pikes with a golden apple at the butt-end—a regiment of Karians, or descendants of Karians, who had been abstracted from their homes and

¹ This is the total given by Arrian as what he found set forth (ἐλέγγο), probably the best information which Ptolemy and Aristobulus could procure (Arrian, iii. 8, 8).

Diodorus (xvii. 53) says 800,000 foot, 200,000 horse, and 200 scythed chariots. Justin (xi. 12) gives 400,000 foot and 100,000 horse. Plutarch (Alex. 31) talks generally of a million of men. Curtius states the army to have been almost twice as large as that which had fought in Kilikia (iv. 9, 3); he gives the total as 200,000 foot, and 45,000 horse (iv. 12, 13).

² Diodor. xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 92.

³ Curtius, iv. 9, 3; Diodor. xvii. 53. Notwithstanding the instructive note of Mützel upon this passage of Curtius, the mode in which these chariots were armed is not clear on all points.

planted as colonists in the interior of the empire—the contingent of Mardi, good archers—and lastly, the mercenary Greeks, of number unknown, in whom Darius placed his greatest confidence.

Such was the first or main line of the Persians. In the rear of it stood deep masses of Babylonians—inhabitants of Sittakê down to the Persian Gulf—Uxians, from the territory adjoining Susiana, to the east—and others in unknown multitude. In front of it were posted the scythed chariots, with small advanced bodies of cavalry—Scythians and Baktrians on the left, with one hundred chariots—Armenians and Kappadokians on the right, with fifty more—and the remaining fifty chariots in front of the centre.¹

Alexander had advanced within about seven miles of the Persian army, and four days' march since his crossing the Tigris—when he first learnt from Persian prisoners how near his enemies were. He at once halted, established on the spot a camp with ditch and stockade, and remained there for four days, in order that the soldiers might repose. On the night of the fourth day, he moved forward, yet leaving under guard in the camp the baggage, the prisoners, and the ineffectives. He began his march, over a range of low elevations which divided him from the enemy, hoping to approach and attack them at daybreak. But his progress was so retarded, that day broke, and the two armies first came in sight, when he was still on the descending slope of the ground, more than three miles distant. On seeing the enemy, he halted, and called together his principal officers, to consult whether he should not prosecute his march and commence the attack forthwith.² Though most of them pronounced for the affirmative, yet Parmenio contended that this course would be rash; that the ground before them, with all its difficulties, natural or artificial, was unknown, and that the enemy's position, which they now saw for the first time, ought to be carefully reconnoitred. Adopting this latter view,

¹ The Persian battle order here given by Arrian (iii. 11), is taken from Aristobulus, who affirmed that it was so set down in the official scheme of the battle, drawn up by the Persian officers, and afterwards captured with the baggage of Darius. Though thus authentic as far as it goes, it is not complete, even as to names—while it says nothing about numbers or depth or extent of front. Several names, of various contingents stated to have been present in the field, are not placed in the official return—thus the Sogdiani, the Arians, and the Indian mountaineers are mentioned by Arrian as having joined Darius (iii. 8); the Kossæans, by Diodorus (xvii. 59); the Sogdiani, Massagetæ, Belitæ, Kossæans, Gortyæ, Phrygians, and Kataonians, by Curtius (iv. 12).

² Arrian, iii. 9, 5-7.

Alexander halted for the day; yet still retaining his battle order, and forming a new entrenched camp, to which the baggage and the prisoners were now brought forward from the preceding day's encampment.¹ He himself spent the day, with an escort of cavalry and light troops, in reconnoitring both the intermediate ground and the enemy, who did not interrupt him, in spite of their immense superiority in cavalry. Parmenio, with Polysperchon and others, advised him to attack the enemy in the night; which promised some advantages, since Persian armies were notoriously unmanageable by night,² and since their camp had no defence. But on the other hand, the plan involved so many disadvantages and perils, that Alexander rejected it; declaring—with an emphasis intentionally enhanced, since he spoke in the hearing of many others—that he disdained the meanness of stealing a victory; that he both would conquer, and could conquer, Darius fairly and in open daylight.³ Having then addressed to his officers a few brief encouragements, which met with enthusiastic response, he dismissed them to their evening meal and repose.

On the next morning, he marshalled his army, consisting of 40,000 foot, and 7000 horse, in two lines.⁴ The first or main line was composed, on the right, of the eight squadrons of Companion-cavalry, each with its separate captain, but all under the command of Philôtas son of Parmenio. Next (proceeding from right to left) came the Agêma or chosen band of the Hypaspistæ—then the remaining Hypaspistæ, under Nikanor—then the phalanx properly so called, distributed into six divisions, under the command of Kœnus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Polysperchon, Simmias, and Kraterus, respectively.⁵ Next on the left of the phalanx, were arranged the allied Grecian cavalry,

¹ Arrian, iii. 9, 2–8. It is not expressly mentioned by Arrian that the baggage, &c., was brought forward from the first camp to the second. But we see that such must have been the fact, from what happened during the battle. Alexander's baggage, which was plundered by a body of Persian cavalry, cannot have been so far in the rear of the army as the distance of the first camp would require. This coincides also with Curtius, iv. 13, 35. The words *ἐγνώσθαι ἀπολείπειν* (Arr. iii. 9, 2) indicate the contemplation of a purpose which was not accomplished—*ὥς αὖτ' ἡμέρα προσμῖξαι τοῖς πολεμοῖς* (iii. 9, 3). Instead of "coming into conflict" with the enemy at break of day—Alexander only arrived within sight of them at break of day; he then halted the whole day and night within sight of their position; and naturally brought up his baggage, having no motive to leave it so far in the rear.

² Xenoph. Anab. iii. 4, 35.

³ Arrian, iii. 10, 3; Curtius, iv. 13, 4–10.

⁴ Arrian, iii. 12, 1–9.

⁵ Arrian, iii. 11; Diodor. xvii. 57; Curtius, iv. 13, 26–30.

Lokrian and Phokian, Phthiot, Malians, and Peloponnesians ; after whom, at the extreme left, came the Thessalians under Philippos—among the best cavalry in the army, hardly inferior to the Macedonian Companions. As in the two former battles, Alexander himself took the command of the right half of the army, confiding the left to Parmenio.

Behind this main line, was placed a second or body of reserve, intended to guard against attacks in the flanks and rear, which the superior numbers of the Persians rendered probable. For this purpose, Alexander reserved,—on the right, the light cavalry or Lancers—the Pæonians, under Aretês and Aristo—half the Agrianes, under Attalus—the Macedonian archers, under Brison—and the mercenaries of old service, under Kleander ; on the left, various bodies of Thracian and allied cavalry, under their separate officers. All these different regiments were held ready to repel attack either in flank or rear. In front of the main line were some advanced squadrons of cavalry and light troops—Grecian cavalry, under Menidas on the right, and under Andromachus on the left—a brigade of darters under Balakrus, together with Agrianian darters, and some bowmen. Lastly, the Thracian infantry were left to guard the camp and the baggage.¹

Forewarned by a deserter, Alexander avoided the places where iron spikes had been planted to damage the Macedonian cavalry.² He himself, at the head of the Royal Squadron, on the extreme right, led the march obliquely in that direction, keeping his right somewhat in advance. As he neared the enemy, he saw Darius himself with the Persian left centre immediately opposed to him — Persian guards, Indians, Albanians, and Karians. Alexander went on inclining to the right, and Darius stretching his front towards the left to counteract this movement, but still greatly outflanking the Macedonians to the left. Alexander had now got so far to his right, that he was almost beyond the ground levelled by Darius for the operations of his chariots in front. To check any further movement in this direction, the Baktrian 1000 horse and the Scythians in front of the Persian left, were ordered to make a circuit and attack the Macedonian right flank. Alexander detached against them his regiment of cavalry under Menidas, and the action thus began.³

The Baktrian horse, perceiving the advance of Menidas, turned from their circuitous movement to attack him, and at

¹ Arrian, iii. 12, 2-6 ; Curtius, iv. 13, 30-32 ; Diodor. xvii. 57.

² Curtius, iv. 13, 36 ; Polyænus, iv. 3, 17.

³ Arrian, iii. 13, 1-5.

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first drove him back until he was supported by the other advanced detachments—Pæonians and Grecian cavalry. The Bactrians, defeated in their turn, were supported by the satrap Bessus with the main body of Bactrians and Scythians in the left portion of Darius's line. The action was here for some time warmly contested, with some loss to the Greeks; who at length however, by a more compact order against enemies whose fighting was broken and desultory, succeeded in pushing them out of their place in the line, and thus making a partial opening in it.¹

While this conflict was still going on, Darius had ordered his scythed chariots to charge, and his main line to follow them, calculating on the disorder which he expected that they would occasion. But the chariots were found of little service. The horses were terrified, checked, or wounded, by the Macedonian archers and darters in front; who even found means to seize the reins, pull down the drivers, and kill the horses. Of the hundred chariots in Darius's front, intended to bear down the Macedonian ranks by simultaneous pressure along their whole line, many were altogether stopped or disabled; some turned right round, the horses refusing to face the protended pikes, or being scared with the noise of pike and shield struck together; some which reached the Macedonian line, were let through without mischief by the soldiers opening their ranks; a few only inflicted wounds or damage.²

As soon as the chariots were thus disposed of, and the Persian main force laid open as advancing behind them, Alexander gave orders to the troops of his main line, who had hitherto been perfectly silent,³ to raise the war-shout and charge

¹ Arrian, iii. 13, 9.

² About the chariots, see Arrian, iii. 13, 11; Curtius, iv. 15, 14; Diodor. xvii. 57, 58.

Arrian mentions distinctly only those chariots which were launched on Darius's left, immediately opposite to Alexander. But it is plain that the chariots along the whole line must have been let off at one and the same signal—which we may understand as implied in the words of Curtius—"Ipse (Darius) ante se falcatos currus habebat, quos signo dato universos in hostem effudit" (iv. 14, 3).

The scythed chariots of Artaxerxês, at the battle of Kunaxa, did no mischief (Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 10-20). At the battle of Magnesia, gained by the Romans (B.C. 190) over the Syrian king Antiochus, his chariots were not only driven back, but spread disorder among his own troops (Appian. Reb. Syriac. 33).

³ See the remarkable passage in the address of Alexander to his soldiers, previous to the battle, about the necessity of absolute silence until the moment came for the terrific war-shout (Arrian, iii. 9, 14): compare Thucyd. ii. 89—a similar direction from Phormio to the Athenians.

at a quick pace ; at the same time directing Aretês with the Pæonians to repel the assailants on his right flank. He himself, discontinuing his slanting movement to the right, turned towards the Persian line, and dashed, at the head of all the Companion-cavalry, into that partial opening in it, which had been made by the flank movement of the Baktrians. Having by this opening got partly within the line, he pushed straight towards the person of Darius ; his cavalry engaging in the closest hand-combat, and thrusting with their short spikes at the faces of the Persians. Here, as at the Granikus, the latter were discomposd by this mode of fighting—accustomed as they were to rely on the use of missiles, with rapid wheeling of the horse for renewed attack.¹ They were unable to prevent Alexander and his cavalry from gaining ground and approaching nearer to Darius ; while at the same time, the Macedonian phalanx in front, with its compact order and long protended pikes, pressed upon the Persian line opposed to it. For a short interval, the combat here was close and obstinate ; and it might have been much prolonged—since the best troops of Darius's army—Greeks, Karians, Persian guards, regal kinsmen, &c., were here posted,—had the king's courage been equal to that of his soldiers. But here, even worse than at Issus, the flight of the army began with Darius himself. It had been the recommendation of Cyrus the younger, in attacking the army of his brother Artaxerxês at Kunaxa, to aim the main blow at the spot where his brother was in person—since he well knew that victory there was victory everywhere. Having already once followed this scheme successfully at Issus, Alexander repeated it with still more signal success at Arbêla. Darius, who had been long in fear, from the time when he first beheld his formidable enemy on the neighbouring hills, became still more alarmed when he saw the scythed chariots prove a failure, and when the Macedonians, suddenly breaking out from absolute silence into an universal war-cry, came to close quarters with his troops, pressing towards and menacing the conspicuous chariot on which he stood.² The sight and hearing of this terrific *mêlée*, combined with the prestige already attached to Alexander's name, completely overthrew the courage

¹ Arrian, iii. 15, 4. οὐτε ἀκοντισμῷ ἔτι, οὐτε ἐξελιγμοῖς τῶν ἵππων, ἤπερ ἵππομαχίας δίκη, ἐχρῶντο—about the Persian cavalry when driven to despair.

² Arrian, iii. 14, 2. ἦγε δρόμῳ τε καὶ ἀλαλαγμῷ ὥς ἐπὶ αὐτὸν Δαρεῖον—Diodor. xvii. 60. Alexander μετὰ τῆς βασιλικῆς ἰλῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἱππέων ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἤλαυνε τὸν Δαρεῖον.

and self-possession of Darius. He caused his chariot to be turned round, and himself set the example of flight.¹

From this moment, the battle, though it had lasted so short a time, was irreparably lost. The king's flight, followed of course immediately by that of the numerous attendants around him, spread dismay among all his troops, leaving them neither centre of command, nor chief to fight for. The best soldiers in his army, being those immediately around him, were under these circumstances the first to give way. The fierce onset of Alexander with the Companion-cavalry, and the unremitting pressure of the phalanx in front, were obstructed by little else than a mass of disordered fugitives. During the same time, Aretēs with his Pæonians had defeated the Baktrians on the right flank,² so that Alexander was free to pursue the routed main body,—which he did most energetically. The cloud of dust raised by the dense multitude is said to have been so thick, that nothing could be clearly seen, nor could the pursuers distinguish the track taken by Darius himself. Amidst this darkness, the cries and noises from all sides were only the more impressive ; especially the sound from the whips of the charioteers, pushing their horses to full speed.³ It was the dust alone which saved Darius himself from being overtaken by the pursuing cavalry.

¹ Arrian, iii. 14, 3. Καὶ χρόνον μὲν τινα ὀλίγον ἐν χερσὶν ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο. Ὡς δὲ οἱ τε ἱππεῖς οἱ ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος εὐρώστας ἐνέκειντο, ὠθισμοῖς τε χρώμενοι, καὶ τοῖς ξυστοῖς τὰ πρόσωπα τῶν Περσῶν κόπτοντες, ἢ τε φάλαγξ ἡ Μακεδονική, πυκνὴ καὶ ταῖς σαρίσαις πεφρικυῖα, ἐμβέβληκεν ἤδη αὐτοῖς, καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ τὰ δεῖνὰ καὶ πάλαι ἤδη φοβερῶ ὄντι Δαρεῖω ἐφαίνετο, πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἐπιστρέψας ἔφευγεν. At Issus, Arrian states that "Darius fled along with the first" (ii. 11, 6) ; at Arbēla here, he states that "Darius was the first to turn and flee ;" an expression yet stronger and more distinct. Curtius and Diodorus, who seem here as elsewhere to follow generally the same authorities, give details, respecting the conduct of Darius, which are not to be reconciled with Arrian, and which are decidedly less credible than Arrian's narrative. The fact that the two kings were here (as at Issus) near, and probably visible, to each other, has served as a basis for much embroidery. The statement that Darius, standing on his chariot, hurled his spear against the advancing Macedonians—and that Alexander also hurled his spear at Darius, but missing him, killed the charioteer—is picturesque and Homeric, but has no air of reality. Curtius and Diodorus tell us that this fall of the charioteer was mistaken for the fall of the king, and struck the Persian army with consternation, causing them forthwith to take flight, and thus ultimately forcing Darius to flee also (Diodor. xvii. 60 ; Curt. iv. 15, 26-32). But this is noway probable ; since the real fight then going on was close, and with hand-weapons.

² Arrian, iii. 14, 4.

³ Diodor. xvii. 60 ; Curtius, iv. 15, 32, 33. The cloud of dust, and the noise of the whips, are specified both by Diodorus and Curtius.

While Alexander was thus fully successful on his right and centre, the scene on his left under Parmenio was different. Mazæus, who commanded the Persian right, after launching his scythed chariots (which may possibly have done more damage than those launched on the Persian left, though we have no direct information about them), followed it up by vigorously charging the Grecian and Thessalian horse in his front, and also by sending round a detachment of cavalry to attack them on their left flank.¹ Here the battle was obstinately contested, and success for some time doubtful. Even after the flight of Darius, Parmenio found himself so much pressed, that he sent a message to Alexander. Alexander, though full of mortification at relinquishing the pursuit, checked his troops, and brought them back to the assistance of his left, by the shortest course across the field of battle. The two left divisions of the phalanx, under Simmias and Kraterus, had already stopped short in the pursuit, on receiving the like message from Parmenio; leaving the other four divisions to follow the advanced movement of Alexander.² Hence there arose a gap in the midst of the phalanx, between the four right divisions, and the two left; into which gap a brigade of Indian and Persian cavalry darted, galloping through the midst of the Macedonian line to get into the rear and attack the baggage.³ At first this movement was successful, the guard was found unprepared, and the Persian prisoners rose at once to set themselves free; though Sisygambis, whom these prisoners were above measure anxious to liberate, refused to accept their aid, either from mistrust of their force, or gratitude for the good treatment received from Alexander.⁴ But while

¹ Curtius, iv. 16, 1; Diodorus, xvii. 59, 60; Arrian, iii. 14, 11. The two first authors are here superior to Arrian, who scarcely mentions at all this vigorous charge of Mazæus, though he alludes to the effects produced by it.

² Arrian, iii. 14, 6. He speaks directly here only of the *τάξις* under the command of Simmias; but it is plain that what he says must be understood of the *τάξις* commanded by Kraterus also. Of the six *τάξεις* or divisions of the phalanx, that of Kraterus stood at the extreme left—that of Simmias (who commanded on this day the *τάξις* of Amyntas son of Andromenês) next to it (iii. 11, 16). If therefore the *τάξις* of Simmias was kept back from pursuit, on account of the pressure upon the general Macedonian left (iii. 14, 6)—*à fortiori*, the *τάξις* of Kraterus must have been kept back in like manner.

³ Arrian, iii. 14, 7.

⁴ Curtius, iv. 15, 9–11; Diodor. xvii. 59. Curtius and Diodorus represent the brigade of cavalry, who plundered the camp and rescued the prisoners, to have been sent round by Mazæus from the Persian right; while Arrian states, more probably, that they got through the break accidentally left in the phalanx, and traversed the Macedonian lines.

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these assailants were engaged in plundering the baggage, they were attacked in the rear by the troops forming the second Macedonian line, who though at first taken by surprise, had now had time to face about and reach the camp. Many of the Persian brigade were thus slain, the rest got off as they could.¹

Mazæus maintained for a certain time fair equality, on his own side of the battle, even after the flight of Darius. But when, to the paralysing effect of that fact in itself, there was added the spectacle of its disastrous effects on the left half of the Persian army, neither he nor his soldiers could persevere with unabated vigour in a useless combat. The Thessalian and Grecian horse, on the other hand, animated by the turn of fortune in their favour, pressed their enemies with redoubled energy, and at length drove them to flight; so that Parmenio was victor, on his own side and with his own forces, before the succours from Alexander reached him.²

In conducting those succours, on his way back from the pursuit, Alexander traversed the whole field of battle, and thus met face to face some of the best Persian and Parthian cavalry, who were among the last to retire. The battle was already lost, and they were seeking only to escape. As they could not turn back, and had no chance for their lives except by forcing their way through his Companion-cavalry, the combat here was desperate and murderous; all at close quarters, cut and thrust with hand weapons on both sides, contrary to the Persian custom. Sixty of the Macedonian cavalry were slain; and a still greater number, including Hephæstion, Kœnus, and Menidas, were wounded, and Alexander himself encountered great personal danger. He is said to have been victorious; yet probably most of these brave men forced their way through and escaped, though leaving many of their number on the field.³

Having rejoined his left, and ascertained that it was not only out of danger, but victorious, Alexander resumed his

¹ Arrian, iii. 14, 10. Curtius represents this brigade as having been driven off by Aretês and a detachment sent expressly by Alexander himself. Diodorus describes it as if it had not been defeated at all, but had ridden back to Mazæus after plundering the baggage. Neither of these accounts is so probable as that of Arrian.

² Diodor. xvii. 60. 'Ο Παρμενίων μόλις ἐτρέψατο τοὺς βαρβάρους, μάλιστα καταπλαγέοντας τῇ κατὰ τὸν Δαρεῖον φυγῇ. Curtius, iv. 16, 4-7. "Interim ad Mazæum fama superati regis pervenerat. Itaque, quanquam validior erat, tamen fortunâ partium territus, perculsis languidius instabat." Arrian, iv. 14, 11; iv. 15, 8.

³ Arrian, iii. 15, 6. Curtius also alludes to this combat; but with many particulars very different from Arrian (iv. 16, 19-25).

pursuit of the flying Persians, in which Parmenio now took part.¹ The host of Darius was only a multitude of disorderly fugitives, horse and foot mingled together. The greater part of them had taken no share in the battle. Here, as at Issus, they remained crowded in stationary and unprofitable masses, ready to catch the contagion of terror and to swell the number of runaways, so soon as the comparatively small proportion of real combatants in the front had been beaten. On recommencing the pursuit, Alexander pushed forward with such celerity, that numbers of the fugitives were slain or taken, especially at the passage of the river Lykus;² where he was obliged to halt for a while, since his men as well as their horses were exhausted. At midnight, he again pushed forward, with such cavalry as could follow him, to Arbêla, in hopes of capturing the person of Darius. In this he was disappointed, though he reached Arbêla the next day. Darius had merely passed through it, leaving an undefended town, with his bow, shield, chariot, a large treasure, and rich equipage, as prey to the victor. Parmenio had also occupied without resistance the Persian camp near the field of battle, capturing the baggage, the camels, and the elephants.³

To state anything like positive numbers of slain or prisoners, is impossible. According to Arrian, 300,000 Persians were slain, and many more taken prisoners. Diodorus puts the slain at 90,000, Curtius at 40,000. The Macedonian killed were, according to Arrian, not more than 100—according to Curtius, 300: Diodorus states the slain at 500, besides a great number of wounded.⁴ The estimate of Arrian is obviously too great on one side, and too small on the other; but whatever may be the numerical truth, it is certain that the prodigious army of Darius was all either killed, taken, or dispersed at the battle of Arbêla. No attempt to form a subsequent army ever succeeded; we read of nothing stronger than divisions or detachments. The miscellaneous contingents of this once mighty empire, such at least among them as survived, dispersed to their respective homes and could never be again mustered in mass.

¹ Arrian, iii. 15, 9.

² Arrian, iii. 15, 10. Curtius (iv. 16, 12–18) gives aggravated details about the sufferings of the fugitives in passing the river Lykus—which are probably founded on fact. But he makes the mistake of supposing that Alexander had got as far as this river in his first pursuit, from which he was called back to assist Parmenio.

³ Arrian, iii. 15, 14; Curtius, v. 1, 10.

⁴ Arrian, iii. 15, 16; Curtius, iv. 16, 27; Diodor. xvii. 61.

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The defeat of Arbêla was in fact the death-blow of the Persian empire. It converted Alexander into the Great King, and Darius into nothing better than a fugitive pretender. Among all the causes of the defeat—here as at Issus—the most prominent and indisputable was the cowardice of Darius himself. Under a king deficient not merely in the virtues of a general, but even in those of a private soldier, and who nevertheless insisted on commanding in person—nothing short of ruin could ensue. To those brave Persians whom he dragged into ruin along with him and who knew the real facts, he must have appeared as the betrayer of the empire. We shall have to recall this state of sentiment, when we describe hereafter the conspiracy formed by the Baktrian satrap Bessus. Nevertheless, even if Darius had behaved with unimpeachable courage, there is little reason to believe, that the defeat of Arbêla, much less that of Issus, could have been converted into a victory. Mere immensity of number, even with immensity of space, was of no efficacy without skill as well as bravery in the commander. Three-fourths of the Persian army were mere spectators, who did nothing, and produced absolutely no effect. The flank movement against Alexander's right, instead of being made by some unemployed division, was so carried into effect, as to distract the Baktrian troops from their place in the front line, and thus to create a fatal break, of which Alexander availed himself for his own formidable charge in front. In spite of amplitude of space—the condition wanting at Issus,—the attacks of the Persians on Alexander's flanks and rear were feeble and inefficient. After all, Darius relied mainly upon his front line of battle, strengthened by the scythe chariots; these latter being found unprofitable, there remained only the direct conflict, wherein the strong point of the Macedonians resided.

On the other hand, in so far as we can follow the dispositions of Alexander, they appear the most signal example recorded in antiquity, of military genius and sagacious combination. He had really as great an available force as his enemies, because every company in his army was turned to account, either in actual combat, or in reserve against definite and reasonable contingencies. All his successes, and this most of all, were fairly earned by his own genius and indefatigable effort, combined with the admirable organisation of his army. But his good fortune was no less conspicuous in the unceasing faults committed by his enemies. Except during the short period of Memnon's command, the Persian king exhibited nothing but ignorant rashness alternating with disgraceful apathy; turning

to no account his vast real power of resistance in detail—keeping back his treasures to become the booty of the victor—suffering the cities which stoutly held out to perish unassisted—and committing the whole fate of the empire, on two successive occasions, to that very hazard which Alexander most desired.

The decisive character of the victory was manifested at once by the surrender of the two great capitals of the Persian empire—Babylon and Susa. To Babylon, Alexander marched in person; to Susa, he sent Philoxenus. As he approached Babylon, the satrap Mazæus met him with the keys of the city; Bagophanês, collector of the revenue, decorated the road of march with altars, sacrifices, and scattered flowers; while the general Babylonian population and their Chaldæan priests poured forth in crowds with acclamations and presents. Susa was yielded to Philoxenus with the same readiness, as Babylon to Alexander.¹ The sum of treasure acquired at Babylon was great; sufficient to furnish a large donative to the troops—600 drachms per man to the Macedonian cavalry, 500 to the foreign cavalry, 200 to the Macedonian infantry, and something less to the foreign infantry.² But the treasure found and appropriated at Susa was yet greater. It is stated at 50,000 talents³ (=about £11,500,000 sterling), a sum which we might have deemed incredible, if we did not find it greatly exceeded by what is subsequently reported about the treasures in Persepolis. Of this Susian treasure four-fifths are said to have been in uncoined gold and silver, the remainder in golden Darics;⁴ the untouched accumulations of several preceding kings, who had husbanded them against a season of unforeseen urgency. A moderate portion of this immense wealth, employed by Darius three years earlier to push the operations of his fleet, subsidise able Grecian officers, and organise anti-Macedonian resistance—would have preserved both his life and his crown.

Alexander rested his troops for more than thirty days amidst the luxurious indulgences of Babylon. He gratified the feelings of the population and the Chaldæan priests by solemn sacrifices to Belus, as well as by directing that the temple of that god, and the other temples destroyed in the preceding century by Xerxês, should be rebuilt.⁵ Treating the

¹ Arrian, iii. 16, 5–11; Diodor. xvii. 64; Curtius, v. 1, 17–20.

² Curtius, v. 1, 45; Diodor. xvii. 64.

³ Arrian states this total of 50,000 talents (iii. 16, 12).

I have taken them as Attic talents; if they were Æginæan talents, the value of them would be greater in the proportion of five to three.

⁴ Curtius, v. 2, 11; Diodor. xvii. 66.

⁵ Arrian, iii. 16, 6–9: compare Strabo, xvi. p. 738.

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Persian empire now as an established conquest, he nominated the various satraps. He confirmed the Persian Mazæus in the satrapy of Babylon, but put along with him two Greeks as assistants and guarantees—Apollodorus of Amphipolis, as commander of the military force—Asklepiodorus as collector of the revenue. He rewarded the Persian traitor Mithrinês, who had surrendered at his approach the strong citadel of Sardis, with the satrapy of Armenia. To that of Syria and Phenicia, he appointed Menês, who took with him 3000 talents, to be remitted to Antipater for levying new troops against the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus.¹ The march of Alexander from Babylon to Susa occupied twenty days; an easy route through a country abundantly supplied. At Susa he was joined by Amyntas son of Andromenês, with a large reinforcement of about 15,000 men—Macedonians, Greeks, and Thracians. There were both cavalry and infantry—and what is not the least remarkable, fifty Macedonian youths of noble family, soliciting admission into Alexander's corps of pages.² The incorporation of these new-comers into the army afforded him the opportunity for remodelling on several points the organisation of his different divisions, the smaller as well as the larger.³

After some delay at Susa—and after confirming the Persian Abulitês, who had surrendered the city, in his satrapy, yet not without two Grecian officers as guarantees, one commanding the military force, the other governor of the citadel—Alexander crossed the river Eulæus or Pasitigris, and directed his march to the south-east towards Persis proper, the ancient hearth or primitive seat from whence the original Persian conquerors had issued.⁴ Between Susa and Persis lay a mountainous

¹ Arrian, iii. 16, 16; Curtius, v. 1, 44; Diodor. xvii. 64. Curtius and Diodorus do not exactly coincide with Arrian; but the discrepancy here is not very important.

² Curtius, v. 1, 42: compare Diodor. xvii. 65; Arrian, iii. 16, 18.

³ Arrian, iii. 16, 20; Curtius, v. 2, 6; Diodor. xvii. 65. Respecting this reorganisation, begun now at Susa and carried farther during the next year at Ekbatana, see Rüstow and Köchly, Griechisches Kriegswesen, p. 252 *seq.*

One among the changes now made was, that the divisions of cavalry—which, having hitherto coincided with various local districts or towns in Macedonia, had been officered accordingly—were redistributed and mingled together (Curtius, v. 2, 6).

⁴ Arrian, iii. 17, 1. "*Ἀπὸς δὲ ἐκ Σούων, καὶ διαβὰς τὸν Πασιτίγρην ποταμόν, ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὴν Οὐξίαν γῆν.*"

The Persian Susa was situated between two rivers; the Choaspes (now Kherkha) on the west; the Eulæus or Pasitigris, now Karun, on the east; both rivers distinguished for excellent water. The Eulæus appears to

region occupied by the Uxii—rude but warlike shepherds, to whom the Great King himself had always been obliged to pay a tribute whenever he went from Susa to Persepolis, being unable with his inefficient military organisation to overcome the difficulties of such a pass held by an enemy. The Uxii now demanded the like tribute from Alexander, who replied by inviting them to meet him at their pass and receive it. Meanwhile a new and little frequented mountain track had been made known to him, over which he conducted in person a detachment of troops so rapidly and secretly as to surprise the mountaineers in their own villages. He thus not only opened the usual mountain pass for the transit of his main army, but so cut to pieces and humiliated the Uxii, that they were forced to sue for pardon. Alexander was at first disposed to extirpate or expel them; but at length, at the request of the captive Sisygambis, permitted them to remain as subjects of the satrap of Susa, imposing a tribute of sheep, horses, and cattle, the only payment which their poverty allowed.¹

But bad as the Uxian pass had been, there remained another still worse—called the Susian or Persian Gates,² in the mountains which surrounded the plain of Persepolis, the centre of Persis proper. Ariobarzanês, satrap of the province, held this pass; a narrow defile walled across, with mountain positions on both sides, from whence the defenders, while out of reach themselves, could shower down missiles upon an approaching enemy. After four days of march, Alexander reached on the fifth day the Susian Gates; which, inexpugnable as they seemed, he attacked on the ensuing morning. In spite

have been called Pasitigris in the lower part of its course—Pliny, H. N. xxxi. 21. “Parthorum reges ex Choaspe et Eulæo tantum bibunt.”

Ritter has given an elaborate exposition respecting these two rivers and the site of the Persian Susa (Erdkunde, part ix. book iii. West-Asien, p. 291–320).

¹ Arrian, iii. 17; Curtius, v. 3, 5–12; Diodor. xvii. 67; Strabo, xv. p. 729. It would seem that the road taken by Alexander in this march, was that described by Kinneir, through Bebahan and Kala-Sefid to Schiraz (Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire, p. 72). Nothing can exceed the difficulties of the territory for military operation.

No certainty is attainable, however, respecting the ancient geography of these regions. Mr. Long’s Map of Ancient Persia shows how little can be made out.

² See the instructive notes of Mützel—on Quintus Curtius, v. 10, 3; and v. 12, 17, discussing the topography of this region, in so far as it is known from modern travellers. He supposes the Susian Gates to have been near Kala-Sefid, west of the plain of Merdasht or Persepolis. Herein he dissents from Ritter, apparently on good grounds, as far as an opinion can be formed.

of all the courage of his soldiers, however, he sustained loss without damaging his enemy, and was obliged to return to his camp. He was informed that there was no other track by which this difficult pass could be turned ; but there was a long circuitous march of many days whereby it might be evaded, and another entrance found into the plain of Persepolis. To recede from any enterprise as impracticable, was a humiliation which Alexander had never yet endured. On further inquiry, a Lykian captive, who had been for many years tending sheep as a slave on the mountains, acquainted him with the existence of a track known only to himself, whereby he might come on the flank of Ariobarzanês. Leaving Kraterus in command of the camp, with orders to attack the pass in front, when he should hear the trumpet give signal—Alexander marched forth at night at the head of a light detachment, under the guidance of the Lykian. He had to surmount incredible hardship and difficulty—the more so as it was mid-winter, and the mountain was covered with snow ; yet such were the efforts of his soldiers and the rapidity of his movements, that he surprised all the Persian outposts, and came upon Ariobarzanês altogether unprepared. Attacked as they were at the same time by Kraterus also, the troops of the satrap were forced to abandon the Gates, and were for the most part cut to pieces. Many perished in their flight among the rocks and precipices ; the satrap himself being one of a few that escaped.¹

Though the citadel of Persepolis is described as one of the strongest of fortresses,² yet after this unexpected conquest of a pass hitherto deemed inexpugnable, few had courage to think of holding it against Alexander. Nevertheless Ariobarzanês, hastening thither from the conquered pass, still strove to organise a defence, and at least to carry off the regal treasure, which some in the town were already preparing to pillage. But Tiridatês, commander of the garrison, fearing the wrath of the conqueror, resisted this, and despatched a message entreating Alexander to hasten his march. Accordingly Alexander, at the head of his cavalry, set forth with the utmost speed, and arrived in time to detain and appropriate the whole. Ariobarzanês, in a vain attempt to resist, was slain with all his companions. Persepolis and Pasargadæ—the two peculiar capitals of the Persian race, the latter memorable as containing the sepulchre of Cyrus the Great—both fell into the hands of the conqueror.³

¹ Arrian, iii. 18, 1-14 ; Curtius, v. 4, 10-20 ; Diodor. xvii. 68.

² Diodor. xvii. 71. ³ Arrian, iii. 18, 16 ; Curtius, v. 4, 5 ; Diodor. xvii. 69.

On approaching Persepolis, the compassion of the army was powerfully moved by the sight of about 800 Grecian captives, all of them mutilated in some frightful and distressing way, by loss of legs, arms, eyes, ears, or some other bodily members. Mutilation was a punishment commonly inflicted in that age by Oriental governors, even by such as were not accounted cruel. Thus Xenophon, in eulogising the rigid justice of Cyrus the younger, remarks that in the public roads of his satrapy, men were often seen who had been deprived of their arms or legs, or otherwise mutilated, by penal authority.¹ Many of these maimed captives at Persepolis were old, and had lived for years in their unfortunate condition. They had been brought up from various Greek cities by order of some of the preceding Persian kings; but on what pretences they had been thus cruelly dealt with we are not informed. Alexander, moved to tears at such a spectacle, offered to restore them to their respective homes, with a comfortable provision for the future. But most of them felt so ashamed of returning to their homes, that they entreated to be allowed to remain all together in Persis, with lands assigned to them, and with dependent cultivators to raise produce for them. Alexander granted their request in the fullest measure, conferring besides upon each an ample donation of money, clothing, and cattle.²

¹ Xenoph. Anab. i. 9, 13. Similar habits have always prevailed among Orientals. "The most atrocious part of the Mahomedan system of punishment is that which regards theft and robbery. Mutilation, by cutting off the hand or the foot, is the prescribed remedy for all higher degrees of the offence" (Mill, History of British India, book iii. ch. 5, p. 447).

"Tippoo Saib used to cut off the right hands and noses of the British camp-followers that fell into his hands" (Elphinstone, Hist. of India, vol. i. p. 380, ch. xi.).

A recent traveller notices the many mutilated persons, female as well as male, who are to be seen in the northern part of Scinde (Burton, Scenes in Scinde, vol. ii. p. 281).

² Diodor. xvii. 69; Curtius, v. 5; Justin, xi. 14. Arrian does not mention these mutilated captives; but I see no reason to mistrust the deposition of the three authors by whom it is certified. Curtius talks of 4000 captives; the other two mention 800. Diodorus calls them—*Ἕλληνες ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον βασιλέων ἀνάστατοι γεγονότες, δεκτακόσιοι μὲν σχεδὸν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες, ταῖς δ' ἡλικίαις οἱ πλείστοι μὲν γεγηρακότες, ἡκρωτηριασμένοι δὲ πάντες, &c.* Some *ἀναρπαστοὶ πρὸς βασιλεία διὰ σοφίαν* are noticed in Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 33: compare Herodot. iii. 93; iv. 204. I have already mentioned the mutilation of Macedonian invalids, taken at Issus by Darius.

Probably these Greek captives were mingled with a number of other captives, Asiatic and others, who had been treated in the same manner.

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The sight of these mutilated Greeks was well calculated to excite not merely sympathy for them, but rage against the Persians, in the bosoms of all spectators. Alexander seized this opportunity, as well for satiating the anger and cupidity of his soldiers, as for manifesting himself in his self-assumed character of avenger of Greece against the Persians, to punish the wrongs done by Xerxês a century and a half before. He was now amidst the native tribes and seats of the Persians, the descendants of those rude warriors who, under the first Cyrus, had overspread Western Asia from the Indus to the Ægean. In this their home the Persian kings had accumulated their national edifices, their regal sepulchres, the inscriptions commemorative of their religious or legendary sentiment, with many trophies and acquisitions arising out of their conquests. For the purposes of the Great King's empire, Babylon, or Susa, or Ekbatana, were more central and convenient residences; but Persepolis was still regarded as the heart of Persian nationality. It was the chief magazine, though not the only one, of those annual accumulations from the imperial revenue, which each king successively increased, and which none seems to have ever diminished. Moreover, the Persian grandees and officers, who held the lucrative satrapies and posts of the empire, were continually sending wealth home to Persis, for themselves or their relatives. We may therefore reasonably believe what we find asserted, that Persepolis possessed at this time more wealth, public and private, than any place within the range of Grecian or Macedonian knowledge.¹

Convening his principal officers, Alexander denounced Persepolis as the most hostile of all Asiatic cities,—the home of those impious invaders of Greece, whom he had come to attack. He proclaimed his intention of abandoning it to be plundered, as well as of burning the citadel. In this resolution he persisted, notwithstanding the remonstrance of Parmenio, who reminded him that the act would be a mere injury to himself by ruining his own property, and that the Asiatics would construe it as evidence of an intention to retire speedily,

None but the Greek captives would be likely to show themselves to Alexander and his army, because none but they would calculate on obtaining sympathy from an army of Macedonians and Greeks. It would have been interesting to know who these captives were, or how they came to be thus cruelly used. The two persons among them, named by Curtius as spokesmen in the interview with Alexander, are—Euktemon, a Kymæan—and Theætétus, an Athenian.

¹ Diodor. xvii. 70. *πλουσιωτάτης οὔσης τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον*, &c. Curtius, v. 6, 2, 3.

without founding any permanent dominion in the country.¹ After appropriating the regal treasure—to the alleged amount of 120,000 talents in gold and silver (= £27,600,000 sterling)²—

¹ Arrian, iii. 18, 18; Diodor. xvii. 70; Curtius, v. 6, 1; Strabo, xv. p. 731.

² This amount is given both by Diodorus (xvii. 71) and by Curtius (v. 6, 9). We see however from Strabo that there were different statements as to the amount. Such overwhelming figures deserve no confidence upon any evidence short of an official return. At the same time, we ought to expect a very great sum, considering the long series of years that had been spent in amassing it. Alexander's own letters (Plutarch, Alex. 37) stated that enough was carried away to load 10,000 mule carts and 5000 camels.

To explain the fact of a large accumulated treasure in the Persian capitals, it must be remarked, that what we are accustomed to consider as expenses of government, were not defrayed out of the regal treasure. The military force, speaking generally, was not paid by the Great King, but summoned by requisition from the provinces, upon which the cost of maintaining the soldiers fell, over and above the ordinary tribute. The king's numerous servants and attendants received no pay in money, but in kind; provisions for maintaining the court with its retinue were furnished by the provinces, over and above the tribute. See Herodot. i. 192; and iii. 91—and a good passage of Heeren, setting forth the small public disbursements out of the regal treasure, in his account of the internal constitution of the ancient Persian Empire (*Ideen über die Politik und den Verkehr der Völker der alten Welt*, part i. abth. 1, p. 511–519).

Respecting modern Persia, Jaubert remarks (*Voyage en Arménie et en Perse*, Paris, 1821, p. 272, ch. 30)—“Si les sommes que l'on verse dans le trésor du Shah ne sont pas exorbitantes, comparativement à l'étendue et à la population de la Perse, elles n'en sortent pas non plus que pour des dépenses indispensables qui n'en absorbent pas la moitié. Le reste est converti en lingots, en pierreries, et en divers objets d'une grande valeur et d'un transport facile en cas d'événement: ce qui doit suffire pour empêcher qu'on ne trouve exagérés les rapports que tous les voyageurs ont faits de la magnificence de la cour de Perse. Les Perses sont assez clairvoyans pour pénétrer les motifs réels qui portent Futteh Ali Shah à thésauriser.”

When Nadir-Shah conquered the Mogul Emperor Mahomed, and entered Delhi in 1739,—the imperial treasure and effects which fell into his hands is said to have amounted to £32,000,000 sterling, besides heavy contributions levied on the inhabitants (Mill, *History of British India*, vol. ii. B. iii. ch. 4, p. 403).—Runjeet Sing left at his death (1839) a treasure of £8,000,000 sterling; with jewels and other effects to several millions more. [The Punjaub, by Col. Steinbach, p. 16. London, 1845.]

Mr. Mill remarks, in another place, that “in Hindostan, gold, silver, and gems are most commonly hoarded, and not devoted to production” (vol. i. p. 254, B. ii. ch. 5).

Herodotus (iii. 96) tells us that the gold and silver brought to the Persian regal treasure was poured in a melted state into earthen vessels; when it cooled, the earthen vessel was withdrawn, and the solid metallic mass left standing; a portion of it was cut off when occasion

Alexander set fire to the citadel. A host of mules, with 5000 camels, were sent for from Mesopotamia and elsewhere, to carry off this prodigious treasure; the whole of which was conveyed out of Persis proper, partly to be taken along with Alexander himself in his ulterior marches, partly to be lodged in Susa and Ekbatana. Six thousand talents more, found in Pasargadæ, were added to the spoil.¹ The persons and property of the inhabitants were abandoned to the licence of the soldiers, who obtained an immense booty, not merely in gold and silver, but also in rich clothing, furniture, and ostentatious ornaments of every kind. The male inhabitants were slain,² the females dragged into servitude; except such as obtained safety by flight, or burned themselves with their property in their own houses. Among the soldiers themselves, much angry scrambling took place for the possession of precious articles, not without occasional bloodshed.³ As soon as their ferocity and cupidity had been satiated, Alexander arrested the massacre. His encouragement and sanction of it was not a burst of transient fury, provoked by unexpected length of resistance, such as the hanging of the 2000 Tyrians and the dragging of Batis at Gaza—but a deliberate proceeding, intended partly as a recompense and gratification to the soldiery, but still more as an imposing manifestation of retributive vengeance

required for disbursements. This practice warrants the supposition that a large portion of it was habitually accumulated, and not expended.

¹ Arrian, iii. 18, 17. He does not give the amount, which I transcribe from Curtius. v. 6, 10.

² Diodor. xvii. 70. *Οἱ Μακεδόνες ἐπῆσαν, τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας πάντας φονεύοντες, τὰς δὲ κτήσεις διαρπάζοντες.* &c. Curtius, v. 6, 6.

³ Diodor. xvii. 70, 71; Curtius, v. 6, 3-7. These two authors concur in the main features of the massacre and plunder in Persepolis, permitted to the soldiers by Alexander. Arrian does not mention it: he mentions only the deliberate resolution of Alexander to burn the palace or citadel, out of revenge on the Persian name. And such feeling, assuming it to exist, would also naturally dictate the general licence to plunder and massacre. Himself entertaining such vindictive feeling, and regarding it as legitimate, Alexander would either presume it to exist, or love to kindle it, in his soldiers; by whom indeed the licence to plunder would be sufficiently welcomed, with or without any antecedent sentiment of vengeance.

The story (told by Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch, Alex. 38) that Alexander, in the drunkenness of a banquet, was first instigated by the courtesan Thais to set fire to the palace of Persepolis, and accompanied her to begin the conflagration with his own hand—may perhaps be so far true, that he really showed himself in the scene and helped in the burning. But that his resolution to burn was deliberately taken, and even maintained against the opposition of esteemed officers, is established on the authority of Arrian.

against the descendants of the ancient Persian invaders. In his own letters seen by Plutarch, Alexander described the massacre of the native Persians as having been ordered by him on grounds of state policy.¹

As it was now winter or very early spring, he suffered his main army to enjoy a month or more of repose at or near Persepolis. But he himself, at the head of a rapidly moving division, traversed the interior of Persis proper; conquering or receiving into submission the various towns and villages.² The greatest resistance which he experienced was offered by the rude and warlike tribe called the Mardi; but worse than any enemy was the severity of the season and the rugged destitution of a frozen country. Neither physical difficulties, however, nor human enemies, could arrest the march of Alexander. He returned from his expedition, complete master of Persis; and in the spring, quitted that province with his whole army, to follow Darius into Media. He left only a garrison of 3000 Macedonians at Persepolis, preserving to Tiridatês, who had surrendered to him the place, the title of satrap.³

Darius was now a fugitive, with the mere title of king, and with a simple body-guard rather than an army. On leaving Arbêla after the defeat, he had struck in an easterly direction across the mountains into Media; having only a few attendants round him, and thinking himself too happy to preserve his own life from an indefatigable pursuer.⁴ He calculated that once across these mountains, Alexander would leave him for a time unmolested, in haste to march southward for the purpose of appropriating the great and real prizes of the campaign—Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis. The last struggles of this ill-starred prince will be recounted in another chapter.

¹ Plutarch, Alexand. 37. *Φόνον μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα πολλὸν τῶν ἀλίσκομένων γενέσθαι συνέπεσε· γράφει γὰρ αὐτός, ὡς νομίζων αὐτῷ τοῦτο λυσιτελεῖν ἐκέλευεν ἀποσφάττεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· νομίσματος δὲ εὐρεῖν πλῆθος ὅσον ἐν Σούσοις, τὴν δὲ ἑλλην κατασκευὴν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐκκομισθῆναι φησι μυρίοις ὀρικοῖς ζεύγεσι, καὶ πεντακισχίλιαις καμήλοισι. That ἐνταῦθα means Persepolis, is shown by the immediately following comparison with the treasure found at Susa.*

² Diod. xvii. 73; Curtius, v. 6, 12-20.

³ Curtius, v. 6, 11.

⁴ Arrian, iii. 16, 1-4.

CHAPTER XCIV

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONQUESTS OF ALEXANDER, AFTER HIS WINTER-QUARTERS IN PERSIS, DOWN TO HIS DEATH AT BABYLON

FROM this time forward to the close of Alexander's life—a period of about seven years—his time was spent in conquering the eastern half of the Persian empire, together with various independent tribes lying beyond its extreme boundary. But neither Greece, nor Asia Minor, nor any of his previous western acquisitions, was he ever destined to see again.

Now, in regard to the history of Greece—the subject of these volumes—the first portion of Alexander's Asiatic campaigns (from his crossing the Hellespont to the conquest of Persis, a period of four years, March 334 B.C. to March 330 B.C.), though not of direct bearing, is yet of material importance. Having in his first year completed the subjugation of the Hellenic world, he had by these subsequent campaigns absorbed it as a small fraction into the vast Persian empire, renovated under his imperial sceptre. He had accomplished a result substantially the same as would have been brought about if the invasion of Greece by Xerxês, destined, a century and a half before, to incorporate Greece with the Persian monarchy, had succeeded instead of failing.¹ Towards the kings of Macedonia alone, the subjugation of Greece would never have become complete, so long as she could receive help from the native Persian kings—who were perfectly adequate as a countervailing and tutelary force, had they known how to play their game. But all hope for Greece from without was extinguished, when Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis became subject to the same ruler as Pella and Amphipolis—and that ruler too, the ablest general, and most insatiate aggressor, of his age; to whose name was attached the prestige of success almost superhuman. Still, against even this overwhelming power, some of the bravest of the Greeks at home tried to achieve their liberation with the sword: we shall see presently how sadly the attempt miscarried.

¹ Compare the language addressed by Alexander to his weary soldiers, on the banks of the Hyphasis (Arrian, v. 26), with that which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Xerxês, when announcing his intended expedition against Greece (Herodot. vii. 8).

But though the first four years of Alexander's Asiatic expedition, in which he conquered the Western half of the Persian empire, had thus an important effect on the condition and destinies of the Grecian cities—his last seven years, on which we are now about to enter, employed chiefly in conquering the Eastern half, scarcely touched these cities in any way. The stupendous marches to the rivers Jaxartès, Indus, and Hyphasis, which carried his victorious armies over so wide a space of Central Asia, not only added nothing to his power over the Greeks, but even withdrew him from all dealings with them, and placed him almost beyond their cognisance. To the historian of Greece, therefore, these latter campaigns can hardly be regarded as included within the range of his subject. They deserve to be told as examples of military skill and energy, and as illustrating the character of the most illustrious general of antiquity—one who, though not a Greek, had become the master of all Greeks. But I shall not think it necessary to recount them in any detail, like the battles of Issus and Arbêla.

About six or seven months had elapsed from the battle of Arbêla to the time when Alexander prepared to quit his most recent conquest—Persis proper. During all this time, Darius had remained at Ekbatana,¹ the chief city of Media, clinging to the hope, that Alexander, when possessed of the three southern capitals and the best part of the Persian empire, might have reached the point of satiation, and might leave him unmolested in the more barren East. As soon as he learnt that Alexander was in movement towards him, he sent forward his harem and his baggage to Hyrkania, on the south-eastern border of the Caspian sea. Himself, with the small force around him, followed in the same direction, carrying off the treasure in the city (7000 talents = £1,610,000 in amount), and passed through the Caspian Gates into the territory of Parthyênê. His only

¹ I see no reason for doubting that the Ekbatana here meant is the modern Hamadan. See a valuable Appendix added by Dr. Thirlwall to the sixth volume of his *History of Greece*, in which this question is argued against Mr. Williams.

Sir John Malcolm observes—"There can hardly be said to be any roads in Persia; nor are they much required, for the use of wheel carriages has not yet been introduced into that kingdom. Nothing can be more rugged and difficult than the paths which have been cut over the mountains by which it is bounded and intersected" (ch. xxiv. vol. ii. p. 525).

In this respect, indeed, as in others, the modern state of Persia must be inferior to the ancient; witness the description given by Herodotus of the road between Sardis and Susa.

chance was to escape to Bactria at the eastern extremity of the empire, ruining the country in his way for the purpose of retarding pursuers. But this chance diminished every day, from desertion among his few followers, and angry disgust among many who remained.¹

Eight days after Darius had quitted Ekbatana, Alexander entered it. How many days had been occupied in his march from Persepolis, we cannot say: in itself a long march, it had been further prolonged, partly by the necessity of subduing the intervening mountaineers called Parætakeni,² partly by rumours exaggerating the Persian force at Ekbatana, and inducing him to advance with precaution and regular array. Possessed of Ekbatana—the last capital stronghold of the Persian kings, and their ordinary residence during the summer months—he halted to rest his troops, and establish a new base of operations for his future proceedings eastward. He made Ekbatana his principal dépôt; depositing in the citadel, under the care of Harpalus as treasurer, with a garrison of 6000 or 7000 Macedonians, the accumulated treasures of his past conquests out of Susa and Persepolis; amounting, we are told, to the enormous sum of 180,000 talents = £41,400,000 sterling.³ Parmenio was invested with the chief command of this important post, and of the military force left in Media; of which territory Oxodatès, a Persian who had been imprisoned at Susa by Darius, was named satrap.⁴

At Ekbatana Alexander was joined by a fresh force of 6000 Grecian mercenaries,⁵ who had marched from Kilikia into the interior, probably crossing the Euphrates and Tigris at the same points as Alexander himself had crossed. Hence he was enabled the better to dismiss his Thessalian cavalry, with other Greeks who had been serving during his four years of Asiatic war, and who now wished to go home.⁶ He distributed among them the sum of 2000 talents in addition to their full pay, and gave them the price of their horses, which they sold before departure. The operations which he was now about to commence against the eastern territories of Persia were not against regular armies, but against flying corps and distinct native

¹ Arrian, iii. 19, 2-9; iii. 20, 3.

² Arrian, iii. 19, 5.

³ Arrian, iii. 19, 14; Diodor. xvii. 80. Diodorus had before stated (xvii. 66, 71) the treasure in Susa as being 49,000 talents, and that in Persepolis as 120,000. Arrian announces the treasure in Susa as 50,000 talents—Curtius gives the uncoined gold and silver alone as 50,000 talents (v. 8, 11). The treasure of both places was transported to Ekbatana.

⁴ Arrian, iii. 20, 4.

⁵ Curtius, v. 23, 12.

⁶ Arrian, iii. 19, 10: compare v. 27, 7.

tribes, relying for defence chiefly on the difficulties which mountains, deserts, privation, or mere distance, would throw in the way of an assailant. For these purposes he required an increased number of light troops, and was obliged to impose even upon his heavy-armed cavalry the most rapid and fatiguing marches, such as none but his Macedonian Companions would have been contented to execute; moreover he was called upon to act less with large masses, and more with small and broken divisions. He now therefore for the first time established a regular *Taxis*, or divisions of horse-bowmen.¹

Remaining at Ekbatana no longer than was sufficient for these new arrangements, Alexander recommenced his pursuit of Darius. He hoped to get before Darius to the Caspian Gates, at the north-eastern extremity of Media; by which Gates² was understood a mountain-pass, or rather a road of many hours' march, including several difficult passes stretching eastward along the southern side of the great range of Taurus towards Parthia. He marched with his Companion-cavalry, the light-horse, the Agrianians, and the bowmen—the greater

¹ Arrian, iii. 24, 1. *ἥδη γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ἵππακοντισταὶ ἦσαν τάξις.*

See the remarks of Rüstow and Köchly upon the change made by Alexander in his military organisation about this period, as soon as he found that there was no further chance of a large collected Persian force, able to meet him in the field (*Geschichte des Griech. Kriegswesens*, p. 252 *seq.*). The change which they point out was real,—but I think they exaggerate it in degree.

² The passes called the Caspian Gates appear to be those described by Morier, Fraser, and other modern travellers, as the series of narrow valleys and defiles called Ser-Desch, Sirdari, or Serdara Khan,—on the southernmost of the two roads which lead eastward from Teheran towards Damaghan, and thence further eastward towards Mesched and Herat. See the note of Müttel in his edition of Curtius, v. 35, 2, p. 489; also Morier, *Second Journey through Persia*, p. 363; Fraser's *Narrative of a Journey into Khorasan*, p. 291.

The long range of mountains, called by the ancients Taurus, extends from Lesser Media and Armenia in an easterly direction along the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. Its northern declivity, covered by prodigious forests with valleys and plains of no great breadth reaching to the Caspian, comprehends the moist and fertile territories now denominated Ghilan and Mazanderan. The eastern portion of Mazanderan was known in ancient times as Hyrkania, then productive and populous; while the mountain range itself was occupied by various rude and warlike tribes—Kadusii, Mardi, Tapyri, &c. The mountain range, now called Elburz, includes among other lofty eminences the very high peak of Demavend.

The road from Ekbatana to Baktria, along which both the flight of Darius and the pursuit of Alexander lay, passed along the broken ground skirting the southern flank of the mountain range Elburz. Of this broken ground the Caspian Gates formed the worst and most difficult portion.

part of the phalanx keeping up as well as it could—to Rhagæ, about fifty miles north of the Caspian Gates; which town he reached in eleven days, by exertions so severe that many men as well as horses were disabled on the road. But in spite of all speed, he learnt that Darius had already passed through the Caspian Gates. After five days of halt at Rhagæ, indispensable for his army, Alexander passed them also. A day's march on the other side of them, he was joined by two eminent Persians, Bagistanês and Antibêlus, who informed him that Darius was already dethroned and in imminent danger of losing his life.¹

The conspirators by whom this had been done, were Bessus, satrap of Baktria—Barsaentês, satrap of Drangiana and Arachosia—and Nabarzanês, general of the regal guards. The small force of Darius having been thinned by daily desertion, most of those who remained were the contingents of the still unconquered territories, Baktria, Arachosia, and Drangiana, under the orders of their respective satraps. The Grecian mercenaries, 1500 in number, and Artabazus, with a band under his special command, adhered inflexibly to Darius, but the soldiers of Eastern Asia followed their own satraps. Bessus and his colleagues intended to make their peace with Alexander by surrendering Darius, should Alexander pursue so vigorously as to leave them no hope of escape; but if they could obtain time to reach Baktria and Sogdiana, they resolved to organise an energetic resistance, under their own joint command, for the defence of those eastern provinces—the most warlike population of the empire.² Under the desperate circumstances of the case, this plan was perhaps the least unpromising that could be proposed. The chance of resisting Alexander, small as it was at the best, became absolutely nothing under the command of Darius, who had twice set the example of flight from the field of battle, betraying both his friends and his empire, even when surrounded by the full force of Persia. For brave and energetic Persians, unless they were prepared at once to submit to the invader, there was no choice but to set aside Darius; nor does it appear that the conspirators intended at first anything worse. At a village called Thara in Parthia, they bound him in chains of gold—placed him in a covered chariot surrounded by the Baktrian troops,—and thus carried him onward, retreating as fast as they could; Bessus assuming

¹ Arrian, iii. 20, 21.

² Masistês, after the shocking outrage upon his wife by Queen Amestris, was going to Baktria to organise a revolt: see Herodot. ix. 113—about the importance of that satrapy.

the command. Artabazus, with the Grecian mercenaries, too feeble to prevent the proceeding, quitted the army in disgust, and sought refuge among the mountains of the Tapyri bordering on Hyrkania towards the Caspian Sea.¹

On hearing this intelligence, Alexander strained every nerve to overtake the fugitives and get possession of the person of Darius. At the head of his Companion-cavalry, his light-horse, and a body of infantry picked out for their strength and activity, he put himself in instant march, with nothing but arms and two days' provisions for each man; leaving Kraterus to bring on the main body by easier journeys. A forced march of two nights and one day, interrupted only by a short midday repose (it was now the month of July), brought him at daybreak to the Persian camp which his informant Bagistanês had quitted. But Bessus and his troops were already beyond it, having made considerable advance in their flight; upon which Alexander, notwithstanding the exhaustion both of men and horses, pushed on with increased speed through all the night to the ensuing day at noon. He there found himself in the village where Bessus had encamped on the preceding day. Yet learning from deserters that his enemies had resolved to hasten their retreat by night marches, he despaired of overtaking them, unless he could find some shorter road. He was informed that there was another shorter, but leading through a waterless desert. Setting out by this road late in the day with his cavalry, he got over no less than forty-five miles during the night, so as to come on Bessus by complete surprise on the following morning. The Persians, marching in disorder without arms, and having no expectation of an enemy, were so panic-struck at the sudden appearance of their indefatigable conqueror, that they dispersed and fled without any attempt to resist. In this critical moment, Bessus and Barsaentês urged Darius to leave his chariot, mount his horse, and accompany them in their flight. But he refused to comply. They were determined however that he should not fall alive into the hands of Alexander, whereby his name would have been employed against them, and would have materially lessened their chance

¹ Arrian, iii. 21-23. Justin (xi. 15) specifies the name of the place—Thara. Both he and Curtius mention the *golden chain* (Curtius, v. 34, 20). Probably the conspirators made use of some chains which had formed a part of the ornaments of the royal wardrobe. Among the presents given by Darius son of Hystaspes to the surgeon Demokêdês, there were two pairs of golden chains—*Δαπέραι δὲ μιν Δαρείου πεδῶν χρυσεῶν δύο ζεύγασιν*—Herodot. iii. 130: compare iii. 15. The Persian king and grandees habitually wore golden chains round neck and arms.

of defending the eastern provinces ; they were moreover incensed by his refusal, and had contracted a feeling of hatred and contempt to which they were glad to give effect. Casting their javelins at him, they left him mortally wounded, and then pursued their flight.¹ His chariot, not distinguished by any visible mark, nor known even to the Persian soldiers themselves, was for some time not detected by the pursuers. At length a Macedonian soldier named Polystratus found him expiring, and is said to have received his last words ; wherein he expressed thanks to Alexander for the kind treatment of his captive female relatives, and satisfaction that the Persian throne, lost to himself, was about to pass to so generous a conqueror. It is at least certain that he never lived to see Alexander himself.²

Alexander had made the prodigious and indefatigable marches of the last four days, not without destruction to many men and horses, for the express purpose of taking Darius alive. It would have been a gratification to his vanity to exhibit the Great King as a helpless captive, rescued from his own servants by the sword of his enemy, and spared to occupy some subordinate command as a token of ostentatious indulgence. Moreover, apart from such feelings, it would have been a point of real advantage to seize the person of Darius, by means of whose name Alexander would have been enabled to stifle all further resistance in the extensive and imperfectly known regions eastward of the Caspian Gates. The satraps of these regions had now gone thither with their hands free, to kindle as much Asiatic sentiment and levy as large a force as they could, against the Macedonian conqueror ; who was obliged to follow them,

¹ " *Rarus apud Medos regum cruor ; unaque cuncto
Pœna manet generi : quamvis crudelibus æque
Paretur dominis.*"

(Claudian. in *Eutrop.* ii. p. 478.)

Court conspiracies and assassinations of the prince, however, were not unknown either among the Achæmenidæ or the Arsakidæ.

² This account of the remarkable incidents immediately preceding the death of Darius, is taken mainly from Arrian (iii. 21), and seems one of the most authentic chapters of his work. He is very sparing in telling what passed in the Persian camp ; he mentions indeed only the communications made by the Persian deserters to Alexander.

Curtius (v. 27-34) gives the narrative far more vaguely and loosely than Arrian, but with ample details of what was going on in the Persian camp. We should have been glad to know from whom these details were borrowed. In the main they do not contradict the narrative of Arrian, but rather amplify and dilute it.

Diodorus (xvii. 73), Plutarch (*Alexand.* 42, 43), and Justin (xi. 15) give no new information.

if he wished to complete the subjugation of the empire. We can understand therefore that Alexander was deeply mortified in deriving no result from this ruinously fatiguing march, and can the better explain that savage wrath which we shall hereafter find him manifesting against the satrap Bessus.

Alexander caused the body of Darius to be buried, with full pomp and ceremonial, in the regal sepulchres of Persis. The last days of this unfortunate prince have been described with almost tragic pathos by historians; and there are few subjects in history better calculated to excite such a feeling, if we regard simply the magnitude of his fall, from the highest pitch of power and splendour to defeat, degradation, and assassination. But an impartial review will not allow us to forget that the main cause of such ruin was his own blindness—his long apathy after the battle of Issus, and abandonment of Tyre and Gaza, in the fond hope of repurchasing queens whom he had himself exposed to captivity—lastly, what is still less pardonable, his personal cowardice in both the two decisive battles deliberately brought about by himself. If we follow his conduct throughout the struggle, we shall find little of that which renders a defeated prince either respectable or interesting. Those who had the greatest reason to denounce and despise him were his friends and countrymen, whom he possessed ample means of defending, yet threw those means away. On the other hand, no one had better grounds for indulgence towards him than his conqueror; for whom he had kept unused the countless treasures of the three capitals, and for whom he had lightened in every way the difficulties of a conquest, in itself hardly less than impracticable.¹

The recent forced march, undertaken by Alexander for the purpose of securing Darius as a captive, had been distressing in the extreme to his soldiers, who required a certain period of repose and compensation. This was granted to them at the town of Hekatompylus in Parthia, where the whole army was again united. Besides abundant supplies from the neighbouring region, the soldiers here received a donative derived from the large booty taken in the camp of Darius.² In the enjoyment

¹ Arrian (iii. 22) gives an indulgent criticism on Darius, dwelling chiefly upon his misfortunes, but calling him *ἀνδρὶ τὰ μὲν πολέμια, εἴπερ τινὶ ἔλλω, μαλθακῷ τε καὶ οὐ φρενήρει*, &c.

² Curtius, vi. 5, 10; vi. 6, 15; Diodor, xvii. 74. Hekatompylus was an important position, where several roads joined (Polyb. x. 28). It was situated on one of the roads running eastward from the Caspian Gates, on the southern flank of Mount Taurus (Elburz). Its locality cannot be fixed with certainty: Ritter (Erdkunde, part viii. 465, 467) with others conceives it to have been near Damaghan; Forbiger (Handbuch der Alten Geographie,

and revelry universal throughout the army, Alexander himself partook. His indulgences in the banquet and in wine-drinking, to which he was always addicted when leisure allowed, were now unusually multiplied and prolonged. Public solemnities were celebrated, together with theatrical exhibitions by artists who joined the army from Greece. But the change of most importance in Alexander's conduct was, that he now began to feel and act manifestly as successor of Darius on the Persian throne ; to disdain the comparative simplicity of Macedonian habits, and to assume the pomp, the ostentatious apparatus of luxuries, and even the dress, of a Persian king.

To many of Alexander's soldiers, the conquest of Persia appeared to be consummated and the war finished, by the death of Darius. They were reluctant to exchange the repose and enjoyments of Hekatompylus for fresh fatigues ; but Alexander, assembling the select regiments, addressed to them an emphatic appeal which revived the ardour of all.¹ His first march was across one of the passes from the south to the north of Mount Elburz, into Hyrkania, the region bordering the south-eastern corner of the Caspian Sea. Here he found no resistance ; the Hyrkanian satrap Phrataphernês, together with Nabarzanês, Artabazus, and other eminent Persians, surrendered themselves to him, and were favourably received. The Greek mercenaries, 1500 in number, who had served with Darius, but had retired when that monarch was placed under arrest by Bessus, sent envoys requesting to be allowed to surrender on capitulation. But Alexander—reproaching them with guilt for having taken service with the Persians, in contravention of the vote passed by the Hellenic synod—required them to surrender at discretion ; which they expressed their readiness to do, praying that an officer might be despatched to conduct them to him in safety.² The Macedonian Andronikus was sent for this purpose, while Alexander undertook an expedition into the mountains of the Mardi ; a name seemingly borne by several distinct tribes in parts remote from each other, but all poor and brave mountaineers. These Mardi occupied parts of the northern slope of the range of Mount Elburz, a few miles from the Caspian Sea (Mazanderan and Ghilan). Alexander pursued

vol. ii. p. 549) places it farther eastward, near Jai-Jerm. Mr. Long notes it on his map, as *site unknown*.

¹ This was attested by his own letters to Antipater, which Plutarch had seen (Plutarch, Alexand. 47). Curtius composes a long speech for Alexander (vi. 7, 9).

² Arrian, iii. 23, 15.

them into all their retreats,—overcame them, when they stood on their defence, with great slaughter,—and reduced the remnant of the half-destroyed tribes to sue for peace.¹

From this march, which had carried him in a westerly direction, he returned to Hyrkania. At the first halt he was met by the Grecian mercenaries who came to surrender themselves, as well as by various Grecian envoys from Sparta, Chalkedon, and Sinopê, who had accompanied Darius in his flight. Alexander put the Lacedæmonians under arrest, but liberated the other envoys, considering Chalkedon and Sinopê to have been subjects of Darius, not members of the Hellenic synod. As to the mercenaries, he made a distinction between those who had enlisted in the Persian service before the recognition of Philip as leader of Greece, and those whose enlistment had been of later date. The former he liberated at once; the latter he required to remain in his service under the command of Andronikus, on the same pay as they had hitherto received.² Such was the untoward conclusion of Grecian mercenary service with Persia; a system whereby the Persian monarchs, had they known how to employ it with tolerable ability, might well have maintained their empire even against such an enemy as Alexander.³

After fifteen days of repose and festivity at Zeudracarta, the chief town of Hyrkania, Alexander marched eastward with his united army through Parthia into Aria—the region adjoining the modern Herat with its river now known as Herirood. Satibarzanês, the satrap of Aria, came to him near the border, to a town named Susia,⁴ submitted, and was allowed to retain

¹ Arrian, iii. 24, 4. In reference to the mountain tribes called Mardi, who are mentioned in several different localities—on the parts of Mount Taurus south of the Caspian, in Armenia, on Mount Zagros, and in Persia proper (see Strabo. xi. p. 508–523; Herodot. i. 125), we may note, that the Nomadic tribes, who constitute a considerable fraction of the population of the modern Persian Empire, are at this day found under the same name in spots widely distant: see Jaubert, *Voyage en Arménie et en Perse*, p. 254.

² Arrian, iii. 24, 8; Curtius, vi. 5, 9. An Athenian officer named Demokratês slew himself in despair, disdaining to surrender.

³ See a curious passage on this subject, at the end of the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon.

⁴ Arrian, iii. 25, 3–8. Droysen and Dr. Thirlwall identify Susia with the town now called Tûs or Toos, a few miles north-west of Mesched. Professor Wilson (*Ariana Antiqua*, p. 177) thinks that this is too much to the west, and too far from Herat: he conceives Susia to be Zuzan, on the desert side of the mountains west of Herat. Mr. Prinsep (*Notes on the historical results deducible from discoveries in Afghanistan*, p. 14) places it at Subzawar, south of Herat, and within the region of fertility.

Tûs seems to lie in the line of Alexander's march, more than the other

his satrapy; while Alexander, first been rting the northern border of Aria, marched in an admijn' nearly east towards Baktria against the satrap Bessus, who was reported as having proclaimed himself King of Persia. But it was discovered, after three or four days, that Satibarzanês was in league with Bessus; upon which Alexander suspended for the present his plans against Baktria, and turned by forced marches to Artakoana, the chief city of Aria.¹ His return was so unexpectedly rapid, that the Arians were overawed, and Satibarzanês was obliged to escape. A few days enabled him to crush the disaffected Arians and to await the arrival of his rear division under Kraterus. He then marched southward into the territory of the Drangi, or Drangiana (the modern Seiestan), where he found no resistance—the satrap Barsaentês having sought safety among some of the Indians.²

In the chief town of Drangiana occurred the revolting tragedy, of which Philotas was the first victim, and his father Parmenio the second. Parmenio, now seventy years of age, and therefore little qualified for the fatigue inseparable from the invasion of the eastern satrapies, had been left in the important post of commanding the great depôt and treasure at Ekbatana. His long military experience, and confidential position even under Philip, rendered him the second person in the Macedonian army, next to Alexander himself. His three sons were all soldiers. The youngest of them, Hektor, had been accidentally drowned in the Nile, while in the suite of Alexander in Egypt; the second, Nikanor, had commanded the hypaspists or light infantry, but had died of illness, fortunately for himself, a short time before;³ the eldest, Philotas, occupied the high rank of general of the Companion-cavalry, in daily communication with Alexander, from whom he received personal orders.

two places indicated; Subzawar is too far to the south. Alexander appears to have first directed his march from Parthia to Baktria (in the line from Asterabad to Balkh through Margiana), merely touching the borders of Aria in his route.

¹ Artakoana, as well as the subsequent city of Alexandria in Ariis, are both supposed by Wilson to coincide with the locality of Herat (Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, p. 152-177).

There are two routes from Herat to Asterabad, at the south-east corner of the Caspian; one by Schahrood, which is 533 English miles; the other by Mesched, which is 688 English miles (Wilson, p. 149).

² Arrian, iii. 25; Curtius, vi. 24, 36. The territory of the Drangi, or Zarangi, southward from Aria, coincides generally with the modern Seiestan, adjoining the lake now called Zareh, which receives the waters of the river Hilmend.

³ Arrian, iii. 25, 6; Curtius, iv. 8, 7; vi. 6, 19.

Greece

, from Kebalinus, brother of a
t a soldier, named Dimnus of
Nikomachus, his intimate friend
ws of secrecy, of an intended con-
, inviting him to become an accom-
first struck with abhorrence, at length
e, asked who were the accomplices of
ved intimation of a few names ; all of which
presently communicated to his brother Kebalinus, for the
purpose of being divulged. Kebalinus told the facts to Philotas,
entreating him to mention them to Alexander. But Philotas,
though every day in communication with the king, neglected
to do this for two days ; upon which Kebalinus began to sus-
pect him of connivance, and caused the revelation to be made
to Alexander through one of the pages named Metron. Dimnus
was immediately arrested, but ran himself through with his
sword, and expired without making any declaration.²

Of this conspiracy, real or pretended, everything rested on
the testimony of Nikomachus. Alexander indignantly sent for
Philotas, demanding why he had omitted for two days to com-
municate what he had heard. Philotas replied that the source
from which it came was too contemptible to deserve notice—
that it would have been ridiculous to attach importance to the
simple declarations of such a youth as Nikomachus, recounting
the foolish boasts addressed to him by a lover. Alexander
received, or affected to receive, the explanation, gave his hand
to Philotas, invited him to supper, and talked to him with his
usual familiarity.³

But it soon appeared that advantage was to be taken of this
incident for the disgrace and ruin of Philotas, whose free-spoken
criticisms on the pretended divine paternity,—coupled with
boasts, that he and his father Parmenio had been chief agents
in the conquest of Asia,—had neither been forgotten nor for-
given. These and other self-praises, disparaging to the glory
of Alexander, had been divulged by a mistress to whom Philo-
tas was attached ; a beautiful Macedonian woman of Pydna,

¹ Curtius, vi. 7, 2. "Dimnus, modicæ apud regem auctoritatis et gratiæ, exoleti, cui Nicomacho erat nomen, amore flagrabat, obsequio uni sibi dediti corporis vinctus." Plutarch, Alex. 49 ; Diodor. xvii. 79.

² Curtius, vi. 7, 29 ; Plutarch, Alex. 49. The latter says that Dimnus resisted the officer sent to arrest him, and was killed by him in the combat.

³ Curtius, vi. 7, 33. "Philotas respondit, Kebalinum quidem scorti sermonem ad se detulisse, sed ipsum tam levi auctori nihil credidisse—veritum, ne jurgium inter amatorem et exoletum non sine risu aliorum detulisset."

named Antigonê, who, having first been made a prize in visiting Samothrace by the Persian admiral Autophradatês, was afterwards taken amidst the spoils of Damascus by the Macedonians victorious at Issus. The reports of Antigonê, respecting some unguarded language held by Philotas to her, had come to the knowledge of Kraterus, who brought her to Alexander, and caused her to repeat them to him. Alexander desired her to take secret note of the confidential expressions of Philotas, and report them from time to time to himself.¹

It thus turned out that Alexander, though continuing to Philotas his high military rank, and talking to him constantly with seeming confidence, had for at least eighteen months, ever since his conquest of Egypt and perhaps even earlier, disliked and suspected him, keeping him under perpetual watch through the suborned and secret communication of a treacherous mistress.² Some of the generals around Alexander—especially Kraterus, the first suborner of Antigonê—fomented these suspicions, from jealousy of the great ascendancy of Parmenio and his family. Moreover, Philotas himself was ostentatious and overbearing in his demeanour, so as to have made many enemies among the soldiers.³ But whatever may have been his defects on this head—defects which he shared with the other Macedonian generals, all gorged with plunder and presents⁴—his fidelity as well as his military merits stand attested by the fact that Alexander had continued to employ him in the highest and most confidential command throughout all the long subsequent interval; and that Parmenio was now general at Ekbatana, the most important military appointment which the king had to confer. Even granting the deposition of Nikomachus to be trustworthy, there was nothing to implicate Philotas, whose name had not been included among the accomplices said to have been enumerated by Dimnus. There

¹ Plutarch, Alexand. 48.

² Plutarch, Alexand. 48, 49. *Πρὸς δὲ αὐτὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκ πάντων πολλῶν χρόνων ἐτύγχανε διαβεβλημένος* (Philotas). . . . *Ὁ μὲν οὖν Φιλώτας ἐπιβουλευόμενος οὕτως ἡγνόει, καὶ συνῆν τῇ Ἀντιγόνῃ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ μεγαλαυχίαν ῥήματα καὶ λόγους κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἀνεπιτηδείους προϊέμενος.*

Both Ptolemy and Aristobulus recognised these previous communications made to Alexander against Philotas in Egypt, but stated that he did not believe them (Arrian, iii. 26, 1).

³ Plutarch, Alexand. 40-48; Curtius, vi. 11, 3.

⁴ Phylarchus, Fragment. 41, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 539; Plutarch, Alexand. 39, 40. Even Eumenês enriched himself much; though being only secretary, and a Greek, he could not take the same liberties as the great native Macedonian generals (Plutarch, Eumenês, 2).

was not a tittle of evidence against him, except the fact that the deposition had been made known to him, and that he had seen Alexander twice without communicating it. Upon this single fact, however, Kraterus and the other enemies of Philotas worked so effectually as to inflame the suspicions and the pre-existing ill-will of Alexander into fierce rancour. He resolved on the disgrace, torture, and death, of Philotas,—and on the death of Parmenio besides.¹

To accomplish this, however, against the two highest officers in the Macedonian service, one of them enjoying a separate and distant command—required management. Alexander was obliged to carry the feelings of the soldiers along with him, and to obtain a condemnation from the army; according to an ancient Macedonian custom, in regard to capital crimes, though (as it seems) not uniformly practised. He not only kept the resolution secret, but is even said to have invited Philotas to supper with the other officers, conversing with him just as usual.² In the middle of the night, Philotas was arrested while asleep in his bed,—put in chains,—and clothed in an ignoble garb. A military assembly was convened at daybreak, before which Alexander appeared with the chief officers in his confidence. Addressing the soldiers in a vehement tone of mingled sorrow and anger, he proclaimed to them that his life had just been providentially rescued from a dangerous conspiracy organised by two men hitherto trusted as his best friends—Philotas and Parmenio—through the intended agency of a soldier named Dimnus, who had slain himself when arrested. The dead body of Dimnus was then exhibited to the meeting, while Nikomachus and Kebalinus were brought forward to tell their story. A letter from Parmenio to his sons Philotas and Nikanor, found among the papers seized on the arrest, was read to the meeting. Its terms were altogether vague and unmeaning; but Alexander chose to construe them as it suited his purpose.³

We may easily conceive the impression produced upon these assembled soldiers by such denunciations from Alexander himself—revelations of his own personal danger, and reproaches against treacherous friends. Amyntas, and even Kœnus, the brother-in-law of Philotas, were yet more unmeasured in their

¹ Plutarch, *Alexand.* 49; Curtius, vi. 8.

² Curtius, vi. 8, 16. “Invitatus est etiam Philotas ad ultimas sibi epulas; et rex non cœnare modo, sed etiam familiariter colloqui, cum eo quem damnaverat, sustinuit.”

³ Arrian, iii. 26, 2. λέγει δὲ Πτολεμαῖος εἰσαχθῆναι ἐς Μακεδόνας Φιλώταν, καὶ κατηγορῆσαι αὐτοῦ ἰσχυρῶς Ἀλέξανδρον, &c. Curtius, vi. 9, 13; Diodor. xvii. 80.

invectives against the accused.¹ They, as well as the other officers with whom the arrest had been concerted, set the example of violent manifestation against him, and ardent sympathy with the king's danger. Philotas was heard in his defence, which, though strenuously denying the charge, is said to have been feeble. It was indeed sure to be so, coming from one seized thus suddenly, and overwhelmed with disadvantages; while a degree of courage, absolutely heroic, would have been required for any one else to rise and presume to criticise the proofs. A soldier named Bolon harangued his comrades on the insupportable insolence of Philotas, who always (he said) treated the soldiers with contempt, turning them out of their quarters to make room for his countless retinue of slaves. Though this allegation (probably enough well-founded) was noway connected with the charge of treason against the king, it harmonised fully with the temper of the assembly, and wound them up to the last pitch of fury. The royal pages began the cry, echoed by all around, that they would with their own hands tear the parricide in pieces.²

It would have been fortunate for Philotas if their wrath had been sufficiently ungovernable to instigate the execution of such a sentence on the spot. But this did not suit the purpose of his enemies. Aware that he had been condemned upon the regal word, with nothing better than the faintest negative ground of suspicion, they determined to extort from him a confession such as would justify their own purposes, not only against him, but against his father Parmenio—whom there was as yet nothing to implicate. Accordingly, during the ensuing night, Philotas was put to the torture. Hephæstion, Kraterus, and Kœnus—the last of the three being brother-in-law of Philotas³—themselves superintended the ministers of physical suffering. Alexander himself too was at hand, but concealed by a curtain. It is said that Philotas manifested little firmness under torture, and that Alexander, an unseen witness, indulged in sneers against the cowardice of one who had fought by his side in so many battles.⁴ All who stood by were enemies, and likely to describe the conduct of Philotas in such manner as to justify their own hatred. The tortures inflicted,⁵ cruel

¹ Curtius, vi. 9, 30.

² Curtius, vi. 11, 8. "Tum vero universa concio accensa est, et à corporis custodibus initium factum, clamantibus discerpendum esse parricidam nianibus eorum. Id quidem Philotas, qui graviora supplicia metueret, haud sane iniquo animo audiebat."

³ Curtius, vi. 9, 30; vi. 11, 11.

⁴ Plutarch, *Alexander*. 49.

⁵ Curtius, vi. 11, 15. "Per ultimos deinde cruciatus, utpote et

in the extreme and long continued, wrung from him at last a confession, implicating his father along with himself. He was put to death; and at the same time, all those whose names had been indicated by Nikomachus, were slain also—apparently by being stoned, without preliminary torture. Philotas had serving in the army a numerous kindred, all of whom were struck with consternation at the news of his being tortured. It was the Macedonian law that all kinsmen of a man guilty of treason were doomed to death along with him. Accordingly, some of these men slew themselves, others fled from the camp, seeking refuge wherever they could. Such was the terror and tumult in the camp, that Alexander was obliged to proclaim a suspension of this sanguinary law for the occasion.¹

It now remained to kill Parmenio, who could not be safely left alive after the atrocities used towards Philotas; and to kill him, moreover, before he could have time to hear of them, since he was not only the oldest, most respected, and most influential of all Macedonian officers, but also in separate command of the great dépôt at Ekbatana. Alexander summoned to his presence one of the Companions named Polydamas; a particular friend, comrade, or *aide de camp*, of Parmenio. Every friend of Philotas felt at this moment that his life hung by a thread; so that Polydamas entered the king's presence in extreme terror, the rather as he was ordered to bring with him his two younger brothers. Alexander addressed him, denouncing Parmenio as a traitor, and intimating that Polydamas would be required to carry a swift and confidential message to Ekbatana, ordering his execution. Polydamas was selected as the attached friend of Parmenio, and therefore as best calculated to deceive him. Two letters were placed in his hands, addressed to Parmenio; one from Alexander himself, conveying ostensibly military communications and orders; the other, signed with the seal-ring of the deceased Philotas, and purporting to be addressed by the son to the father. Together with these, Polydamas received the real and important despatch, addressed by Alexander to Kleander and Menidas, the officers immediately subordinate to Parmenio at Ekbatana; proclaiming

damnatus et inimicis in gratiam regis torquentibus, laceratur. Ac primo quidem, quanquam hinc ignis, illinc verbera, jam non ad quæstionem, sed ad pœnam, ingerebantur, non vocem modo, sed etiam gemitus habuit in potestate; sed postquam intumescens corpus ulceribus flagellorum ictus nudis ossibus incussos ferre non poterat," &c.

¹ Curtius, vi. 11, 20.

Parmenio guilty of high treason, and directing them to kill him at once. Large rewards were offered to Polydamas if he performed this commission with success, while his two brothers were retained as hostages against scruples or compunction. He promised even more than was demanded—too happy to purchase this reprieve from what had seemed impending death. Furnished with native guides and with swift dromedaries, he struck by the straightest road across the desert of Khorasan, and arrived at Ekbatana on the eleventh day—a distance usually requiring more than thirty days to traverse.¹ Entering the camp by night, without the knowledge of Parmenio, he delivered his despatch to Kleander, with whom he concerted measures. On the morrow he was admitted to Parmenio, while walking in his garden with Kleander and the other officers marked out by Alexander's order as his executioners. Polydamas ran to embrace his old friend, and was heartily welcomed by the unsuspecting veteran, to whom he presented the letters professedly coming from Alexander and Philotas. While Parmenio was absorbed in the perusal, he was suddenly assailed by a mortal stab from the hand and sword of Kleander. Other wounds were heaped upon him as he fell, by the remaining officers,—the last even after life had departed.²

¹ Strabo, xv. p. 724; Diodor. xvii. 80; Curtius, vii. 2, 11-18.

² Curtius, vii. 2, 27. The proceedings respecting Philotas and Parmenio are recounted in the greatest detail by Curtius; but his details are in general harmony with the brief heads given by Arrian from Ptolemy and Aristobulus—except as to one material point. Plutarch (Alex. 49), Diodorus (xvii. 79, 80), and Justin (xii. 5), also state the facts in the same manner.

Ptolemy and Aristobulus, according to the narrative of Arrian, appear to have considered that Philotas was really implicated in a conspiracy against Alexander's life. But when we analyse what they are reported to have said, their opinion will not be found entitled to much weight. In the first place, they state (Arr. iii. 26, 1) that the *conspiracy of Philotas had been before made known to Alexander while he was in Egypt*, but that he did not then believe it. Now eighteen months had elapsed since the stay in Egypt; and the idea of a conspiracy going on for eighteen months is preposterous. That Philotas was in a mood in which he might be supposed likely to conspire, is one proposition; that he actually did conspire, is another; Arrian and his authorities run the two together as if they were one. As to the evidence purporting to prove that Philotas did conspire, Arrian tells us that "the informers came forward before the assembled soldiers and convicted Philotas with the rest by other *indicia* not obscure *but chiefly by this*—that Philotas confessed to have heard of a conspiracy going on, without mentioning it to Alexander, though twice a day in his presence"—καὶ τοὺς μηνυτὰς τοῦ ἔργου παρελθόντας ἐξελέγξει Φιλώταν τε καὶ τοὺς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ἄλλοις τε ἐλέγχοις οὐκ ἀφανέσι, καὶ μάλιστα δὴ ὅτι αὐτὸς Φιλώτας πεπύσθαι μὲν—συνέφη, &c. What

The soldiers in Ekbatana, on hearing of this bloody deed, burst into furious mutiny, surrounded the garden wall, and threatened to break in for the purpose of avenging their general, unless Polydamas and the other murderers should be delivered to them. But Kleander, admitting a few of the ringleaders, exhibited to them Alexander's written orders, to which the soldiers yielded, not without murmurs of reluctance and indignation. Most of them dispersed, yet a few remained, entreating permission to bury Parmenio's body. Even this

these other *indicia* were, we are not told; but we may see how slender was their value, when we learn that the non-revelation admitted by Philotas was stronger than any of them. The non-revelation, when we recollect that Nikomachus was the *only* informant (Arrian loosely talks of *μυητάς*, as if there were more), proves absolutely nothing as to the complicity of Philotas, though it may prove something as to his indiscretion. Even on this minor charge, Curtius puts into his mouth a very sufficient exculpation. But if Alexander had taken a different view, and dismissed or even confined him for it, there would have been little room for remark.

The point upon which Arrian is at variance with Curtius, is that he states "Philotas with the rest to have been shot to death by the Macedonians"—thus, seemingly contradicting, at least by implication, the fact of his having been tortured. Now Plutarch, Diodorus, and Justin, all concur with Curtius in affirming that he was tortured. On such a matter, I prefer their united authority to that of Ptolemy and Aristobulus. These two last-mentioned authors were probably quite content to believe in the complicity of Philotas upon the authority of Alexander himself; without troubling themselves to criticise the proofs. They tell us that Alexander vehemently denounced (*κατηγοῖσαι ἰσχυρῶς*) Philotas before the assembled soldiers. After this, any mere shadow or pretence of proof would be sufficient. Moreover, let us recollect that Ptolemy obtained his promotion, to be one of the confidential *body-guards* (*σωματοφύλακες*), out of this very conspiracy, real or fictitious; he was promoted to the post of the condemned Demetrius (Arrian, iii. 27, 11).

How little Ptolemy and Aristobulus cared to do justice to any one whom Alexander hated, may be seen by what they say afterwards about the philosopher Kallisthenês. Both of them affirmed that the pages, condemned for conspiracy against Alexander, deposed against Kallisthenês as having instigated them to the deed (Arrian, iv. 14, 1). Now we know, from the authority of Alexander himself, whose letters Plutarch quotes (Alexand. 55), that the pages denied the privity of any one else—maintaining the project to have been altogether their own. To their great honour, the pages persisted in this deposition, even under extreme tortures—though they knew that a deposition against Kallisthenês was desired from them.

My belief is, that Diodorus, Plutarch, Curtius, and Justin, are correct in stating that Philotas was tortured. Ptolemy and Aristobulus have thought themselves warranted in omitting this fact, which they probably had little satisfaction in reflecting upon. If Philotas was not tortured, there could have been no evidence at all against Parmenio—for the only evidence against the latter was the extorted confession of Philotas.

was long refused by Kleander, from dread of the king's displeasure. At last, however, thinking it prudent to comply in part, he cut off the head, delivering to them the trunk alone for burial. The head was sent to Alexander.¹

Among the many tragical deeds recounted throughout the course of this history, there is none more revolting than the fate of these two generals. Alexander, violent in all his impulses, displayed on this occasion a personal rancour worthy of his ferocious mother Olympias, exasperated rather than softened by the magnitude of past services.² When we see the greatest officers of the Macedonian army directing in person, and under the eye of Alexander, the laceration and burning of the naked body of their colleague Philotas, and assassinating with their own hands the veteran Parmenio,—we feel how much we have passed out of the region of Greek civic feeling into that of the more savage Illyrian warrior, partially orientalised. It is not surprising to read, that Antipater, viceroy of Macedonia, who had shared with Parmenio the favour and confidence of Philip as well as of Alexander, should tremble when informed of such proceedings, and cast about for a refuge against the like possibilities to himself. Many other officers were alike alarmed and disgusted with the transactions.³ Hence Alexander, opening and examining the letters sent home from his army to Macedonia, detected such strong expressions of indignation, that he thought it prudent to transfer many pronounced malcontents into a division by themselves, parting them off from the remaining army.⁴ Instead of appointing any substitute for Philotas in the command of the Companion-cavalry, he cast that body into two divisions, nominating Hephæstion to the command of one, and Kleitus to that of the other.⁵

The autumn and winter were spent by Alexander in reducing Drangiana, Gedrôsia, Arachosia, and the Paropamisadæ; the modern Seistan, Affghanistan, and the western part of Kabul, lying between Ghazna on the north, Kandahar or Kelat on the south, and Furrah in the west. He experienced no combined resistance, but his troops suffered severely from cold and privation.⁶ Near the southern termination of one of the

¹ Curtius, vii. 2, 32, 33.

² Contrast the conduct of Alexander towards Philotas and Parmenio, with that of Cyrus the younger towards the conspirator Orontês, as described in Xenophon, *Anab.* i. 6. ³ Plutarch. *Alexand.* 49.

⁴ Curtius, vii. 2, 36; Diodor. xvii. 80; Justin, xii. 5.

⁵ Arrian, iii. 27, 8.

⁶ Arrian, iii. 28, 2. About the geography, compare Wilson's *Ariana*

passes of the Hindoo-Koosh (apparently north-east of the town of Kabul) he founded a new city, called Alexandria ad Caucasum, where he planted 7000 old soldiers, Macedonians, and others as colonists.¹ Towards the close of winter he crossed over the mighty range of the Hindoo-Koosh; a march of fifteen days through regions of snow, and fraught with hardship to his army. On reaching the north side of these mountains, he found himself in Baktria.

The Baktrian leader Bessus, who had assumed the title of king, could muster no more than a small force, with which he laid waste the country, and then retired across the river Oxus into Sogdiana, destroying all the boats. Alexander overran Baktria with scarce any resistance; the chief places, Baktra (Balkh) and Aornos surrendering to him on the first demonstration of attack. Having named Artabazus satrap of Baktria, and placed Archelaus with a garrison in Aornos,² he marched northward towards the river Oxus, the boundary between

Antiqua, p. 173-178. "By perambulator, the distance from Herat to Kandahar is 371 miles; from Kandahar to Kabul, 309 miles: total 680 miles (English)." The principal city in Drangiana (Seistan) mentioned by the subsequent Greek geographers is, Prophthasia; existing seemingly before Alexander's arrival. See the fragments of his *mensores*, ap. Didot, *Fragm. Hist. Alex. Magn.* p. 135; Pliny, *H. N.* vi. 21. The quantity of remains of ancient cities, still to be found in this territory, is remarkable. Wilson observes this (p. 154).

¹ Arrian, iii. 28, 6; Curtius, vii. 3, 23; Diodor. xvii. 83. Alexandria in Ariis is probably Herat; Alexandria in Arachosia is probably Kandahar. But neither the one nor the other is mentioned as having been founded by Alexander, either in Arrian or Curtius, or Diodorus. The name Alexandria does not prove that they were founded by him; for several of the Diadochi called their own foundations by his name (Strabo, xiii. p. 593). Considering how very short a time Alexander spent in these regions, the wonder is that he could have found time to establish those foundations which are expressly ascribed to him by Arrian and his other historians. The authority of Pliny and Steph. Byzant. is hardly sufficient to warrant us in ascribing to him more. The exact site of Alexandria ad Caucasum cannot be determined, for want of sufficient topographical data. There seems much probability that it was at the place called Beghrum, twenty-five miles north-east of Kabul—in the way between Kabul on the south side of the Hindoo-Koosh, and Anderab on the north side. The prodigious number of coins and relics, Greek as well as Mahometan, discovered by Mr. Masson at Beghrum, supply better evidence for identifying the site with that of Alexandria ad Caucasum, than can be pleaded on behalf of any other locality. See Masson's *Narrative of Journeys in Affghanistan*, &c., vol. iii. ch. 7, p. 148 *seq.*

In crossing the Hindoo-Koosh from south to north, Alexander probably marched by the pass of Bamian, which seems the only one among the four passes open to an army in the winter. See Wood's *Journey to the Oxus*, p. 195.

² Arrian, iii. 29, 3; Curtius, vii. 5, 1.

Baktria and Sogdiana. It was a march of extreme hardship ; reaching for two or three days across a sandy desert destitute of water, and under very hot weather. The Oxus, six furlongs in breadth, deep, and rapid, was the most formidable river that the Macedonians had yet seen.¹ Alexander transported his army across it on the tent-skins inflated and stuffed with straw. It seems surprising that Bessus did not avail himself of this favourable opportunity for resisting a passage in itself so difficult ; he had however been abandoned by his Baktrian cavalry at the moment when he quitted their territory. Some of his companions, Spitamenês and others, terrified at the news that Alexander had crossed the Oxus, were anxious to make their own peace by betraying their leader.² They sent a proposition to this effect ; upon which Ptolemy with a light division was sent forward by Alexander, and was enabled, by extreme celerity of movements, to surprise and seize Bessus in a village. Alexander ordered that he should be held in chains, naked and with a collar round his neck, at the side of the road along which the army were marching. On reaching the spot, Alexander stopped his chariot, and sternly demanded from Bessus, on what pretence he had first arrested, and afterwards slain, his king and benefactor Darius. Bessus replied, that he had not done this single-handed ; others were concerned in it along with him, to procure for themselves lenient treatment from Alexander. The king said no more, but ordered Bessus to be scourged, and then sent back as prisoner to Baktra³—where we shall again hear of him.

¹ Arrian, iii. 29, 4 ; Strabo, xi. p. 509. Evidently Ptolemy and Aristobulus were much more awe-struck with the Oxus, than with either the Tigris or the Euphrates. Arrian (iv. 6, 13) takes his standard of comparison, in regard to rivers, from the river Peneius in Thessaly.

² Curtius, vii. 5, 19. The exactness of Quintus Curtius, in describing the general features of Baktria and Sogdiana, is attested in the strongest language by modern travellers. See Burnes's Travels into Bokhara, vol. ii. ch. 8, p. 211, 2nd edit. ; also Morier, Second Journey in Persia, p. 282.

But in the geographical details of the country, we are at fault. We have not sufficient data to identify more than one or two of the localities mentioned, in the narrative of Alexander's proceedings, either by Curtius or Arrian. That Marakanda is the modern Samarkand—the river Polytimetus, the modern Kohik—and Baktra or Zariaspa the modern Balkh—appears certain ; but the attempts made by commentators to assign the site of other places are not such as to carry conviction.

In fact, these countries, at the present moment, are known only superficially as to their general scenery ; for purposes of measurement and geography, they are almost unknown ; as may be seen by any one who reads the Introduction to Erskine's translation of the Memoirs of Sultan Baber.

³ Arrian, iii. 30, 5-10. These details are peculiarly authentic, as coming from Ptolemy, the person chiefly concerned.

In his onward march, Alexander approached a small town, inhabited by the Branchidæ; descendants of those Branchidæ near Miletus on the coast of Ionia, who had administered the great temple and oracle of Apollo on Cape Poseidion, and who had yielded up the treasures of that temple to the Persian king Xerxês, 150 years before. This surrender had brought upon them so much odium, that when the dominion of Xerxês was overthrown on the coast, they retired with him into the interior of Asia. He assigned to them lands in the distant region of Sogdiana, where their descendants had ever since remained; bilingual and partially dishellenised, yet still attached to their traditions and origin. Delighted to find themselves once more in commerce with Greeks, they poured forth to meet and welcome the army, tendering all that they possessed. Alexander, when he heard who they were and what was their parentage, desired the Milesians in his army to determine how they should be treated. But as these Milesians were neither decided nor unanimous, Alexander announced that he would determine for himself. Having first occupied the city in person with a select detachment, he posted his army all round the walls, and then gave orders not only to plunder it, but to massacre the entire population—men, women, and children. They were slain without arms or attempt at resistance, resorting to nothing but prayers and suppliant manifestations. Alexander next commanded the walls to be levelled, and the sacred groves cut down, so that no habitable site might remain, nor anything except solitude and sterility.¹

Aristobulus agreed in the description of the guise in which Bessus was exhibited, but stated that he was brought up in this way by Spitamenês and Dataphernês. Curtius (vii. 24, 36) follows this version. Diodorus also gives an account very like it, mentioning nothing about Ptolemy (xvii. 83).

¹ Curtius, vii. 23; Plutarch de Serâ Numinis Vindictâ, p. 557 B; Strabo, xi. p. 518: compare also xiv. p. 634, and xvii. p. 814. This last-mentioned passage of Strabo helps us to understand the peculiarly strong pious fervour with which Alexander regarded the temple and oracle of Branchidæ. At the time when Alexander went up to the oracle of Ammon in Egypt, for the purpose of affiliating himself to Zeus Ammon, there came to him envoys from Miletus announcing that the oracle at Branchidæ, which had been silent ever since the time of Xerxês, had just begun again to give prophecy, and had certified the fact that Alexander was the son of Zeus, besides many other encouraging predictions.

The massacre of the Branchidæ by Alexander was described by Diodorus, but was contained in that portion of the seventeenth book which is lost; there is a great lacuna in the MSS. after cap. 83. The fact is distinctly indicated in the table of contents prefixed to book xvii.

Arrian makes no mention of these descendants of the Branchidæ in Sogdiana, nor of the destruction of the town and its inhabitants by Alexander.

Such was the revenge taken upon these unhappy victims for the deeds of their ancestors in the fourth or fifth generation before. Alexander doubtless considered himself to be executing the wrath of Apollo against an accursed race who had robbed the temple of the god.¹ The Macedonian expedition had been proclaimed to be undertaken originally for the purpose of revenging upon the contemporary Persians the ancient wrongs done to Greece by Xerxês ; so that Alexander would follow out the same sentiment in revenging upon the contemporary Branchidæ the acts of their ancestors—yet more guilty than Xerxês, in his belief. The massacre of this unfortunate population was in fact an example of human sacrifice on the largest scale, offered to the gods by the religious impulses of Alexander, and worthy to be compared to that of the Carthaginian general Hannibal, when he sacrificed 3000 Grecian prisoners on the field of Himera, where his grandfather Hamilkar had been slain seventy years before.²

Alexander then continued his onward progress, first to Marakanda (Samarcand), the chief town of Sogdiana—next to the river Jaxartês, which he and his companions, in their imperfect geographical notions, believed to be the Tanais, the boundary between Asia and Europe.³ In his march, he left Perhaps neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus said anything about it. Their silence is not at all difficult to explain, nor does it, in my judgement, impeach the credibility of the narrative. They do not feel under obligation to give publicity to the worst acts of their hero.

¹ The Delphian oracle pronounced, in explaining the subjugation and ruin of Kroesus king of Lydia, that he had thereby expiated the sin of his ancestor in the fifth generation before (Herodot. i. 91 : compare vi. 86). Immediately before the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedæmonians called upon the Athenians to expel the descendants of those who had taken part in the Kylonian sacrilege, 180 years before ; they addressed this injunction with a view to procure the banishment of Periklês, yet still τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες (Thucyd. i. 125-127).

The idea that the sins of fathers were visited upon their descendants, even to the third and fourth generation, had great currency in the ancient world.

² Diodor. xiii. 62. See vol. x. ch. lxxxi. of this History.

³ Pliny, H. N. vi. 16. In the Meteorologica of Aristotle (i. 13, 15-18) we read that the rivers Baktrus, Choaspes, and Araxes flowed from the lofty mountain Parnasus (Paropamisus?) in Asia ; and that the Araxes bifurcated, one branch forming the Tanais, which fell into the Palus Mæotis. For this fact he refers to the γῆς περίοδοι current in his time. It seems plain that by the Araxes Aristotle must mean the Jaxartês. We see therefore that Alexander and his companions, in identifying the Jaxartês with the Tanais, only followed the geographical descriptions and ideas current in their time. Humboldt remarks several cases in which the Greek geographers were fond of supposing bifurcation of rivers (Asie Centrale, vol. ii. p. 291).

garrisons in various towns,¹ but experienced no resistance, though detached bodies of the natives hovered on his flanks. Some of these bodies, having cut off a few of his foragers, took refuge afterwards on a steep and rugged mountain, conceived to be unassailable. Thither however Alexander pursued them, at the head of his lightest and most active troops. Though at first repulsed, he succeeded in scaling and capturing the place. Of its defenders, thirty thousand in number, three-fourths were either put to the sword, or perished in jumping down the precipices. Several of his soldiers were wounded with arrows, and he himself received a shot from one of them through his leg.² But here, as elsewhere, we perceive that nearly all the Orientals whom Alexander subdued were men little suited for close combat hand to hand,—fighting only with missiles.

Here, on the river Jaxartês, Alexander projected the foundation of a new city to bear his name ; intended partly as a protection against incursions from the Scythian Nomads on the other side of the river, partly as a facility for himself to cross over and subdue them, which he intended to do as soon as he could find opportunity.³ He was however called off for the time by the news of a wide-spread revolt among the newly-conquered inhabitants both of Sogdiana and Bactria. He suppressed the revolt with his habitual vigour and celerity, distributing his troops so as to capture five townships in two days, and Kyropolis or Kyra, the largest of the neighbouring Sogdian towns (founded by the Persian Cyrus), immediately afterwards. He put all the defenders and inhabitants to the sword. Returning then to the Jaxartês, he completed in twenty days the fortifications of his new town of Alexandria (perhaps at or near Khodjend), with suitable sacrifices and festivities to the gods. He planted in it some Macedonian veterans and Grecian mercenaries, together with volunteer settlers from the natives around.⁴ An army of Scythian Nomads, showing themselves on the other side of the river, piqued his vanity to cross over and attack them. Carrying over a division of his army on inflated skins, he defeated them with little difficulty, pursuing them briskly into the desert. But the weather was intensely hot, and the army suffered much from thirst ; while the little water to be found was so bad, that it brought upon Alexander a diarrhoea which endangered his life.⁵ This

¹ Arrian, iv. 1, 5.

² Arrian, iii. 30, 17.

³ Arrian, iv. 1, 3.

⁴ Arrian, iv. 3, 17 ; Curtius, vii. 6, 25.

⁵ Arrian, iv. 5, 6 ; Curtius, vii. 9.

chase, of a few miles on the right bank of the Jaxartès (seemingly in the present Khanat of Kokand), marked the utmost limit of Alexander's progress northward.

Shortly afterwards, a Macedonian detachment, unskilfully conducted, was destroyed in Sogdiana by Spitamenès and the Scythians: a rare misfortune, which Alexander avenged by overrunning the region¹ near the river Polytimétus (the Kohik), and putting to the sword the inhabitants of all the towns which he took. He then recrossed the Oxus, to rest during the extreme season of winter at Zariaspa in Baktria, from whence his communications with the West and with Macedonia were more easy, and where he received various reinforcements of Greek troops.² Bessus, who had been here retained as a prisoner, was now brought forward amidst a public assembly; wherein Alexander, having first reproached him for his treason to Darius, caused his nose and ears to be cut off—and sent him in this condition to Ekbatana, to be finally slain by the Medes and Persians.³ Mutilation was a practice altogether Oriental and non-Hellenic: even Arrian, admiring and indulgent as he is towards his hero, censures this savage order, as one among many proofs how much Alexander had taken on Oriental dispositions. We may remark that his extreme wrath on this occasion was founded partly on disappointment that Bessus had frustrated his toilsome efforts for taking Darius alive—partly on the fact that the satrap had committed treason against the king's person, which it was the policy as well as the feeling of Alexander to surround with a circle of Deity.⁴ For as to traitors against Persia, as a cause and country, Alexander had never discouraged, and had sometimes signally recompensed them. Mithrinès, the governor of Sardis, who opened to him the gates of that almost impregnable fortress immediately

¹ Arrian, iv. 6, 11; Curtius, vii. 9, 22. The river, called by the Macedonians Polytimétus (Strabo, xi. p. 518), now bears the name of Kohik or Zurufshan. It rises in the mountains east of Samarkand, flowing westward on the north of that city and of Bokhara. It does not reach so far as the Oxus; during the full time of the year, it falls into a lake called Karakul; during the dry months, it is lost in the sands, as Arrian states (Burnes's Travels, vol. ii. ch. xi. p. 299, 2nd. ed.).

² Arrian, iv. 7, 1; Curtius, vii. 10, 12.

³ Arrian, iv. 7, 5.

⁴ After describing the scene at Rome, when the Emperor Galba was deposed and assassinated in the forum, Tacitus observes—"Plures quam centum et viginti libellos præmia exposcentium, ob aliquam notabilem illâ die operam, Vitellius postea invenit, omnesque conqueri et interfici jussit: *non honore Galba, sed tradito principibus more, munimentum ad præsens, in posterum ultionem*" (Tacitus, Hist. i. 44).

after the battle of the Granikus—the traitor who perhaps, next to Darius himself, had done most harm to the Persian cause—obtained from him high favour and promotion.¹

The rude, but spirited tribes of Baktria and Sogdiana were as yet but imperfectly subdued, seconded as their resistance was by wide spaces of sandy desert, by the neighbourhood of the Scythian Nomads, and by the presence of Spitamenês as a leader. Alexander, distributing his army into five divisions, traversed the country and put down all resistance, while he also took measures for establishing several military posts, or new towns, in convenient places.² After some time the whole army was reunited at the chief place of Sogdiana—Marakanda—where some halt and repose was given.³

During this halt at Marakanda (Samarcand) the memorable banquet occurred wherein Alexander murdered Kleitus. It has been already related that Kleitus had saved his life at the battle of the Granikus, by cutting off the sword arm of the Persian Spithridatês when already uplifted to strike him from behind. Since the death of Philotas, the important function of general of the Companion-cavalry had been divided between Hephæstion and Kleitus. Moreover the family of Kleitus had been attached to Philip, by ties so ancient, that his sister, Lanikê, had been selected as the nurse of Alexander himself when a child. Two of her sons had already perished in the Asiatic battles. If therefore there were any man who stood

¹ Arrian, i. 17, 3; iii. 16, 8. Curtius, iii. 12, 6; v. 1, 44.

² Curtius (vii. 10, 15) mentions six cities (oppida) founded by Alexander in these regions; apparently somewhere north of the Oxus, but the sites cannot be made out. Justin (xii. 5) alludes to twelve foundations in Baktria and Sogdiana.

³ Arrian, iv. 16, 4; Curtius, vii. 10, 1. "*Sogdiana regio magnâ ex parte deserta est; octingenta ferè stadia in latitudinem vastæ soliitudines tenent.*"

Respecting the same country (Sogdiana and Baktria), Mr. Erskine observes (Introduction to the Memoirs of Sultan Baber, p. xliii.):—

"The face of the country is extremely broken, and divided by lofty hills; even the plains are diversified by great varieties of soil,—some extensive districts along the Kohik river, nearly the whole of Ferghana (along the Jaxartês), the greater part of Kwarizm along the branches of the Oxus, with the large portions of Balkh, Badakshan, Kesh, and Hissar, being of uncommon fertility; while the greater part of the rest is a barren waste, and in some places a sandy desert. Indeed the whole country north of the Oxus has a decided tendency to degenerate into desert, and many of its most fruitful spaces are nearly surrounded by barren sands; so that the population of all these districts still, as in the time of Baber, consists of the fixed inhabitants of the cities and fertile lands, and of the unsettled and roving wanderers of the desert, who dwell in tents of felt, and live on the produce of their flocks."

high in the service, or was privileged to speak his mind freely to Alexander, it was Kleitus.

In this banquet at Marakanda, when wine, according to the Macedonian habit, had been abundantly drunk, and when Alexander, Kleitus, and most of the other guests were already nearly intoxicated, enthusiasts or flatterers heaped immoderate eulogies upon the king's past achievements.¹ They exalted him above all the most venerated legendary heroes; they proclaimed that his superhuman deeds proved his divine paternity, and that he had earned an apotheosis like Hêraklê's, which nothing but envy could withhold from him even during his life. Alexander himself joined in these boasts, and even took credit for the later victories of the reign of his father, whose abilities and glory he depreciated. To the old Macedonian officers, such an insult cast on the memory of Philip was deeply offensive. But among them all, none had been more indignant than Kleitus, with the growing insolence of Alexander—his assumed filiation from Zeus Ammon, which put aside Philip as unworthy—his preference for Persian attendants, who granted or refused admittance to his person—his extending to Macedonian soldiers the contemptuous treatment habitually endured by Asiatics, and even allowing them to be scourged by Persian hands and Persian rods.² The pride of a Macedonian general in the stupendous successes of the last five years, was effaced by his mortification, when he saw that they tended only to merge his countrymen amidst a crowd of servile Asiatics, and to inflame the prince with high-flown aspirations transmitted from Xerxês or Ochus. But whatever might be the internal thoughts of Macedonian officers, they held their peace before Alexander, whose formidable character and exorbitant self-estimation would tolerate no criticism.

At the banquet of Marakanda, this long-suppressed repugnance found an issue, accidental indeed and unpremeditated, but for that very reason all the more violent and unmeasured. The wine, which made Alexander more boastful, and his flatterers fulsome to excess, overpowered altogether the reserve of Kleitus. He rebuked the impiety of those who degraded the ancient heroes in order to make a pedestal for Alexander.

¹ Arrian, iv. 8, 7.

² Plutarch, Alexand. 51. Nothing can be more touching than the words put by Plutarch into the mouth of Kleitus—'Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ νῦν χαίρομεν, Ἀλέξανδρε, τοιαῦτα τέλη τῶν πόνων κομιζόμενοι, μακαρίζομεν δὲ τοὺς ἤδη τεθνηκότας πρὶν ἐπιδεῖν Μηδικαῖς ῥάβδοις ξαινομένους Μακεδόνας, καὶ Περσῶν δεομένους ἵνα τῷ βασιλεῖ προσέλθωμεν.

He protested against the injustice of disparaging the exalted and legitimate fame of Philip ; whose achievements he loudly extolled, pronouncing them to be equal, and even superior, to those of his son. For the exploits of Alexander, splendid as they were, had been accomplished, not by himself alone, but by that unconquerable Macedonian force which he had found ready made to his hands ;¹ whereas those of Philip had been his own—since he had found Macedonia prostrate and disorganised, and had had to create for himself both soldiers and a military system. The great instruments of Alexander's victories had been Philip's old soldiers, whom he now despised—and among them Parmenio, whom he had put to death.

Remarks such as these, poured forth in the coarse language of a half intoxicated Macedonian veteran, provoked loud contradiction from many, and gave poignant offence to Alexander ; who now for the first time heard the open outburst of disapprobation, before concealed and known to him only by surmise. But wrath and contradiction, both from him and from others, only made Kleitus more reckless in the outpouring of his own feelings, now discharged with delight after having been so long pent up. He passed from the old Macedonian soldiers to himself individually. Stretching forth his right hand towards Alexander, he exclaimed—"Recollect that you owe your life to me ; this hand preserved you at the Granikus. Listen to the outspoken language of truth, or else abstain from asking freemen to supper, and confine yourself to the society of barbaric slaves." All these reproaches stung Alexander to the quick. But nothing was so intolerable to him as the respectful sympathy for Parmenio, which brought to his memory one of the blackest deeds of his life—and the reminiscence of his preservation at the Granikus, which lowered him into the position of a debtor towards the very censor under whose reproof he was now smarting. At length wrath and intoxication together drove him into uncontrollable fury. He started from his couch, and felt for his dagger to spring at Kleitus ; but the dagger had been put out of reach by one of his attendants. In a loud voice and with the Macedonian word of command, he summoned the body-guards and ordered the trumpeter to sound an alarm. But no one obeyed so grave an order, given in his condition of drunkenness. His principal officers, Ptolemy, Perdikkas and others, clung round him, held his arms and body, and besought him to abstain from violence ;

¹ Arrian, iv. 8, 8. οὐκ οὖν μόνον γε (Ἀλέξανδρον) καταπρᾶξει αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τὸ γὰρ πολλὸν μέρος Μακεδόνων εἶναι τὰ ἔργα, &c.

others at the same time tried to silence Kleitus and hurry him out of the hall, which had now become a scene of tumult and consternation. But Kleitus was not in a humour to confess himself in the wrong by retiring; while Alexander, furious at the opposition now, for the first time, offered to his will, exclaimed, that his officers held him in chains as Bessus had held Darius, and left him nothing but the name of a king. Though anxious to restrain his movements, they doubtless did not dare to employ much physical force; so that his great personal strength, and continued efforts, presently set him free. He then snatched a pike from one of the soldiers, rushed upon Kleitus, and thrust him through on the spot, exclaiming, "Go now to Philip and Parmenio."¹

¹ Arrian, iv. 8; Curtius, viii. 1; Plutarch, Alexand. 50, 51; Justin, xii. 6. The description given by Diodorus was contained in the lost part of his seventeenth book; the table of contents, prefixed thereunto, notes the incident briefly.

All the authors describe in the same general way the commencement, progress, and result, of this impressive scene in the banquetting hall of Marakanda; but they differ materially in the details. In giving what seems to me the most probable account, I have borrowed partly from all, yet following mostly the account given by Arrian from Ptolemy, himself present. For Arrian's narrative down to sect. 14 of c. 8 (before the words *Ἀριστόβουλος δὲ*) may fairly be presumed to be derived from Ptolemy.

Both Plutarch and Curtius describe the scene in a manner more dishonourable to Alexander than Arrian; and at the same time (in my judgement) less probable. Plutarch says that the brawl took its rise from a poet named Pierion singing a song which turned into derision those Macedonians who had been recently defeated in Sogdiana; that Alexander and those around him greatly applauded this satire; that Kleitus protested against such an insult to soldiers, who, though unfortunate, had behaved with unimpeachable bravery; that Alexander then turned upon Kleitus, saying that he was seeking an excuse for himself by extenuating cowardice in others; that Kleitus retorted by reminding him of the preservation of his life at the Granikus. Alexander is thus made to provoke the quarrel by aspersing the courage of Kleitus, which I think noway probable; nor would he be likely to encourage a song of that tenor.

Curtius agrees with Arrian in ascribing the origin of the mischief to the extravagant boasts of Alexander and his flatterers, and to their depreciation of Philip. He then tells us that Kleitus, on hearing their unseemly talk, turned round and whispered to his neighbour some lines out of the *Andromachê* of Euripidês (which lines Plutarch also ascribes to him, though at a later moment); that Alexander, not hearing the words, asked what had been said, but no one would tell him; at length Kleitus himself repeated the sentiment in language of his own. This would suit a literary Greek; but an old Macedonian officer half-intoxicated, when animated by a vehement sentiment, would hardly express it by whispering a Greek poetical quotation to his neighbour. He would either hold his tongue, or speak what he felt broadly and directly. Nevertheless Curtius has stated two points very material to the case, which do not appear in Arrian.

1. It was Alexander himself not his flatterers, who vilipended Philip;

No sooner was the deed perpetrated, than the feelings of Alexander underwent an entire revolution. The spectacle of Kleitus, a bleeding corpse on the floor,—the marks of stupefaction and horror evident in all the spectators, and the reaction from a furious impulse instantaneously satiated—plunged him at once into the opposite extreme of remorse and self-condemnation. Hastening out of the hall, and retiring to bed, he passed three days in an agony of distress, without food or drink. He burst into tears and multiplied exclamations on his own mad act; he dwelt upon the names of Kleitus and Lanikê with the debt of gratitude which he owed to each, and denounced himself as unworthy to live after having requited such services with a foul murder.¹ His friends at length prevailed on him to take food, and return to activity. All joined in trying to restore his self-satisfaction. The Macedonian army passed a public vote that Kleitus had been justly slain, and that his body should remain unburied; which afforded opportunity to Alexander to reverse the vote, and to direct that it should be buried by his own order.² The prophets comforted him by the assurance that his murderous impulse had arisen, not from his own natural mind, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the God Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but withheld.³

at least the flatterers only did so, after him, and following his example. The topic would be dangerous for them to originate, and might easily be carried too far. 2. Among all the topics touched upon by Kleitus, none was so intolerable as the open expression of sympathy, friendship, and regret, for Parmenio. This stung Alexander in the sorest point of his conscience; he must have known that there were many present who sympathised with it; and it was probably the main cause which worked him up to frenzy. Moreover we may be pretty sure that Kleitus, while expatiating upon Philip, would not forget Philip's general in chief and his own old friend, Parmenio.

I cannot believe the statement of Aristobulus, that Kleitus was forced by his friends out of the hall, and afterwards returned to it of his own accord, to defy Alexander once more. It seems plain from Arrian, that Ptolemy said no such thing. The murderous impulse of Alexander was gratified on the spot, and without delay, as soon as he got clear from the gentle restraint of his surrounding friends.

¹ Arrian, iv. 9, 4; Curtius, viii. 2, 2.

² Curtius, viii. 2, 12. "Quoque minus cædis puderet, jure interfectum Clitum Macedones decernunt; sepulturâ quoque prohibitori, ni rex humari jussisset."

In explanation of this monstrous verdict of the soldiers, we must recollect that the safety of the whole army (now at Samarkand, almost beyond the boundary of inhabited regions, ἔξω τῆς οἰκουμένης) was felt to depend on the life of Alexander. Compare Justin, xii. 6, 15.

³ Arrian, iv. 9, 6. Alexander imagined himself to have incurred the

Lastly, the Greek sophist or philosopher, Anaxarchus of Abdera, revived Alexander's spirits by well-timed flattery, treating his sensibility as nothing better than generous weakness; reminding him that in his exalted position of conqueror and Great King, he was entitled to prescribe what was right and just, instead of submitting himself to laws dictated from without.¹ Kallisthenés the philosopher was also summoned, along with Anaxarchus, to the king's presence, for the same purpose of offering consolatory reflections. But he is said to have adopted a tone of discourse altogether different, and to have given offence rather than satisfaction to Alexander.

To such remedial influences, and probably still more to the absolute necessity for action, Alexander's remorse at length yielded. Like the other emotions of his fiery soul, it was violent and overpowering while it lasted. But it cannot be shown to have left any durable trace on his character, nor any effects justifying the unbounded admiration of Arrian; who has little but blame to bestow on the murdered Kleitus, while he expresses the strongest sympathy for the mental suffering of the murderer.

After ten days,² Alexander again put his army in motion, to complete the subjugation of Sogdiana. He found no enemy capable of meeting him in pitched battle; yet Spitamenés, with the Sogdians and some Scythian allies, raised much hostility of detail, which it cost another year to put down. Alexander underwent the greatest fatigue and hardships in his marches through the mountainous parts of this wide, rugged, and poorly supplied country, with rocky positions, strong by nature, which his enemies sought to defend. One of these fastnesses, held by a native chief named Sisymithrês, seemed almost unattackable, and was indeed taken rather by intimidation than by actual force.³ The Scythians, after a partial success over a small Macedonian detachment, were at length so thoroughly

displeasure of Dionysus by having sacked and destroyed the city of Thebes, the supposed birth-place and favourite locality of that god (Plutarch, *Alex.* 13).

The maddening delusion brought upon men by the wrath of Dionysus is awfully depicted in the *Bacchæ* of Euripidês. Under the influence of that delusion, Agavê, mother of Pentheus, tears her son in pieces and bears away his head in triumph, not knowing what is in her hands. Compare also Euripid. *Hippolyt.* 440-1412.

¹ Arrian, iv. 9, 10; Plutarch, *Alex.* 52.

² Curtius, viii. 2, 13—"decem diebus ad confirmandum pudorem apud Maracanda consumptis," &c.

³ Curtius, viii. 2, 20-30.

beaten and overawed, that they slew Spitamenês, and sent his head to the conqueror as a propitiatory offering.¹

After a short rest at Naütaka during the extreme winter, Alexander resumed operations, by attacking a strong post called the Sogdian Rock, whither a large number of fugitives had assembled, with an ample supply of provision. It was a precipice supposed to be inexpugnable; and would seemingly have proved so, in spite of the energy and abilities of Alexander, had not the occupants altogether neglected their guard, and yielded at the mere sight of a handful of Macedonians who had scrambled up the precipice. Among the captives taken by Alexander on this rock, were the wife and family of the Baktrian chief Oxyartês; one of whose daughters, named Roxana, so captivated Alexander by her beauty that he resolved to make her his wife.² He then passed out of Sogdiana into the neighbouring territory Parætakênê, where there was another inexpugnable site called the Rock of Choriênes, which he was also fortunate enough to reduce.³

From hence Alexander went to Baktra. Sending Kraterus with a division to put the last hand to the reduction of Parætakênê, he himself remained at Baktra, preparing for his expedition across the Hindoo-Koosh to the conquest of India. As a security for the tranquillity of Baktria and Sogdiana during his absence, he levied 30,000 young soldiers from those countries to accompany him.⁴

It was at Baktra that Alexander celebrated his marriage with the captive Roxana. Amidst the repose and festivities connected with that event, the Oriental temper which he was now acquiring displayed itself more forcibly than ever. He could no longer be satisfied without obtaining prostration, or worship, from Greeks and Macedonians as well as from Persians; a public and unanimous recognition of his divine origin and superhuman dignity. Some Greeks and Macedonians had already rendered to him this homage. Nevertheless to the greater number, in spite of their extreme deference and admiration for him, it was repugnant and degrading. Even the imperious Alexander shrank from issuing public and formal orders on such a subject; but a manœuvre was concerted, with

¹ Arrian, iv. 17, 11. Curtius (viii. 3) gives a different narrative of the death of Spitamenês.

² Arrian, iv. 18, 19.

³ Arrian, iv. 21. Our geographical knowledge does not enable us to verify these localities, or to follow Alexander in his marches of detail.

⁴ Curtius, viii. 5, 1; Arrian, iv. 22, 2.

his privity, by the Persians and certain compliant Greek sophists or philosophers, for the purpose of carrying the point by surprise.

During a banquet at Baktra, the philosopher Anaxarchus, addressing the assembly in a prepared harangue, extolled Alexander's exploits as greatly surpassing those of Dionysus and Héraklès. He proclaimed that Alexander had already done more than enough to establish a title to divine honours from the Macedonians; who (he said) would assuredly worship Alexander after his death, and ought in justice to worship him during his life, forthwith.¹

This harangue was applauded, and similar sentiments were enforced, by others favourable to the plan; who proceeded to set the example of immediate compliance, and were themselves the first to tender worship. Most of the Macedonian officers sat unmoved, disgusted at the speech. But though disgusted, they said nothing. To reply to a speech doubtless well-turned and flowing, required some powers of oratory; moreover, it was well known that whoever dared to reply stood marked out for the antipathy of Alexander. The fate of Kleitus, who had arraigned the same sentiments in the banquet hall of Marakanda, was fresh in the recollection of every one. The repugnance which many felt, but none ventured to express, at length found an organ in Kallisthenês of Olynthus.

This philosopher, whose melancholy fate imparts a peculiar interest to his name, was nephew of Aristotle, and had enjoyed through his uncle an early acquaintance with Alexander during the boyhood of the latter. At the recommendation of Aristotle, Kallisthenês had accompanied Alexander in his Asiatic expedition. He was a man of much literary and rhetorical talent, which he turned towards the composition of history—and to the history of recent times.² Alexander, full of ardour for conquest, was at the same time anxious that his achievements should be commemorated by poets and men of letters;³ there

¹ Arrian, iv. 10, 7-9. Curtius (viii. 5, 9-13) represents the speech proposing divine honours to have been delivered, not by Anaxarchus, but by another lettered Greek, a Sicilian named Kleon. The tenor of the speech is substantially the same, as given by both authors.

² Kallisthenês had composed three historical works—1. *Hellenica*—from the year 387-357 B.C. 2. *History of the Sacred War*—from 357-346 B.C. 3. *Tà kat' 'Aléξανδρον*. His style is said by Cicero to have been rhetorical; but the Alexandrine critics included him in their Canon of Historians. See Didot, *Fragm. Hist. Alex. Magn.* p. 6-9.

³ See the observation ascribed to him, expressing envy towards Achilles for having been immortalised by Homer (Arrian, i. 12, 2).

were seasons also when he enjoyed their conversation. On both these grounds he invited several of them to accompany the army. The more prudent among them declined, but Kallisthenês obeyed, partly in hopes of procuring the reconstitution of his native city Olynthus, as Aristotle had obtained the like favour for Stageira.¹ Kallisthenês had composed a narrative (not preserved) of Alexander's exploits, which certainly reached to the battle of Arbêla, and may perhaps have gone down farther. The few fragments of this narrative remaining seem to betoken extreme admiration, not merely of the bravery and ability, but also of the transcendent and unbroken good fortune, of Alexander—marking him out as the chosen favourite of the gods. This feeling was perfectly natural under the grandeur of the events. In so far as we can judge from one or two specimens, Kallisthenês was full of complimentary tribute to the hero of his history. But the character of Alexander himself had undergone a material change during the six years between his first landing in Asia and his campaign in Sogdiana. All his worst qualities had been developed by unparalleled success and by Asiatic example. He required larger doses of flattery, and had now come to thirst, not merely for the reputation of divine paternity, but for the actual manifestations of worship as towards a god.

To the literary Greeks who accompanied Alexander, this change in his temper must have been especially palpable and full of serious consequence; since it was chiefly manifested, not at periods of active military duty, but at his hours of leisure, when he recreated himself by their conversation and discourses. Several of these Greeks—Anaxarchus, Kleon, the poet Agis of Argos—accommodated themselves to the change, and wound up their flatteries to the pitch required. Kallisthenês could not do so. He was a man of sedate character, of simple, severe, and almost unsocial habits—to whose sobriety the long Macedonian potations were distasteful. Aristotle said of him, that he was a great and powerful speaker, but that he had no judgement; according to other reports, he was a vain and arrogant man, who boasted that Alexander's reputation and immortality were dependent on the composition and tone of *his* history.² Of personal vanity,—a common quality among

¹ It is said that Ephorus, Xenokratês, and Menedemus, all declined the invitation of Alexander (Plutarch, *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis*, p. 1043). Respecting Menedemus, the fact can hardly be so; he must have been then too young to be invited.

² Arrian, iv. 10, 2; Plutarch, *Alex.* 53, 54. It is remarkable that

literary Greeks — Kallisthenês probably had his full share. But there is no ground for believing that *his* character had altered. Whatever his vanity may have been, it had given no offence to Alexander during the earlier years; nor would it have given offence now, had not Alexander himself become a different man.

On occasion of the demonstration led up by Anaxarchus at the banquet, Kallisthenês had been invited by Hephæstion to join in the worship intended to be proposed towards Alexander; and Hephæstion afterwards alleged, that he had promised to comply.¹ But his actual conduct affords reasonable ground for believing that he made no such promise; for he not only thought it his duty to refuse the act of worship, but also to state publicly his reasons for disapproving it; the more so, as he perceived that most of the Macedonians present felt like himself. He contended that the distinction between gods and men was one which could not be confounded without impiety and wrong. Alexander had amply earned,—as a man, a general, and a king,—the highest honours compatible with humanity; but to exalt him into a god would be both an injury to him and an offence to the gods. Anaxarchus (he said) was the last person from whom such a proposition ought to come, because he was one of those whose only title to Alexander's society was founded upon his capacity to give instructive and wholesome counsel.²

Timæus denounced Kallisthenês as having in his historical work flattered Alexander to excess (Polybius, xii. 12). Kallisthenês seems to have recognised various special interpositions of the gods, to aid Alexander's successes—see Fragments 25 and 36 of the *Fragmenta Callisthenis* in the edition of Didot.

In reading the censure which Arrian passes on the arrogant pretensions of Kallisthenês, we ought at the same time to read the pretensions raised by Arrian on his own behalf as an historian (i. 12, 7-9)—*καὶ ἐπὶ τῷδε οὐκ ἀπαξίῳ ἐμαυτὸν τῶν πρώτων ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῇ Ἑλλάδι, εἶπερ καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρος τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις*, &c. I doubt much whether Kallisthenês pitched his self-estimation so high. In this chapter, Arrian recounts, that Alexander envied Achilles for having been fortunate enough to obtain such a poet as Homer for panegyrist; and Arrian laments that Alexander had not, as yet, found an historian equal to his deserts. This, in point of fact, is a re-assertion of the same truth which Kallisthenês stands condemned for asserting—that the fame even of the greatest warrior depends upon his commemorators. The boastfulness of a poet is at least pardonable, when he exclaims, like Theokritus, *Idyll. xvi. 73*—

Ἔσσεται οὗτος ἀνὴρ, ὃς ἐμεῦ κεχρήσεται ἀοιδῷ,
Ρέξας ἢ Ἀχιλεὺς ὅσσον μέγας, ἢ βαρὺς Αἴας
Ἐν πεδίῳ Σιμόεντος, ὅθι Φρυγὸς ἡρίον Ἴλου.

¹ Plutarch, *Alex.* 55.

² Arrian, *iv. 11.* *ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συνόντα.*

Kallisthenês here spoke out, what numbers of his hearers felt. The speech was not only approved, but so warmly applauded by the Macedonians present, especially the older officers,—that Alexander thought it prudent to forbid all further discussion upon this delicate subject. Presently the Persians present, according to Asiatic custom, approached him and performed their prostration; after which Alexander pledged, in successive goblets of wine, those Greeks and Macedonians with whom he had held previous concert. To each of them the goblet was handed, and each, after drinking to answer the pledge, approached the king, made his prostration, and then received a salute. Lastly, Alexander sent the pledge to Kallisthenês, who, after drinking like the rest, approached him, for the purpose of receiving the salute, but without any prostration. Of this omission Alexander was expressly informed by one of the Companions; upon which he declined to admit Kallisthenês to a salute. The latter retired, observing, "Then I shall go away, worse off than others as far as the salute goes."¹

Kallisthenês was imprudent, and even blameable, in making this last observation, which, without any necessity or advantage, aggravated the offence already given to Alexander. He was more imprudent still, if we look simply to his own personal safety, in standing forward publicly to protest against the suggestion for rendering divine honours to that prince, and in thus creating the main offence which even in itself was inexpiable. But here the occasion was one serious and important, so as to convert the imprudence into an act of genuine moral courage. The question was, not about obeying an order given by Alexander, for no order had been given—but about accepting or rejecting a motion made by Anaxarchus; which Alexander, by a shabby preconcerted manœuvre, affected to leave to the free decision of the assembly, in full confidence that no one would be found intrepid enough to oppose it. If one Greek sophist made a proposition, in itself servile and disgraceful, another sophist could do himself nothing but honour by entering public protest against it; more especially since this was done (as we may see by the report in Arrian) in terms noway insulting, but full of respectful admiration towards Alexander personally. The perfect success of the speech is in itself a proof of the propriety of its tone;² for the Macedonian

¹ Arrian, iv. 12, 7. φιλήματι ἔλαττον ἔχων ἀπειμι.

² Arrian, iv. 12, 1. ἀνιάσαι μὲν μεγαλωστί 'Αλέξανδρον, Μακεδόσι δὲ πρὸς θυμοῦ εἰπεῖν. . . .

officers would feel indifference, if not contempt, towards a rhetor like Kallisthenês, while towards Alexander they had the greatest deference short of actual worship. There are few occasions on which the free spirit of Greek letters and Greek citizenship, in their protest against exorbitant individual insolence, appears more conspicuous and estimable than in the speech of Kallisthenês.¹ Arrian disapproves the purpose of Alexander, and strongly blames the motion of Anaxarchus; nevertheless such is his anxiety to find some excuse for Alexander, that he also blames Kallisthenês for unseasonable frankness, folly, and insolence, in offering opposition. He might have said with some truth, that Kallisthenês would have done well to withdraw earlier (if indeed he could have withdrawn without offence) from the camp of Alexander, in which no lettered Greek could now associate without abnegating his freedom of speech and sentiment, and emulating the servility of Anaxarchus. But being present, as Kallisthenês was, in the hall at Baktra when the proposition of Anaxarchus was made, and when silence would have been assent—his protest against it was both seasonable and dignified; and all the more dignified for being fraught with danger to himself.

Kallisthenês knew that danger well, and was quickly enabled to recognise it in the altered demeanour of Alexander towards him. He was, from that day, a marked man in two senses: first, to Alexander himself, as well as to the rival sophists and all promoters of the intended deification,—for hatred, and for getting up some accusatory pretence such as might serve to ruin him; next, to the more free-spirited Macedonians, indignant witnesses of Alexander's increased insolence, and admirers of the courageous Greek who had protested against the motion

Curtius, viii. 5, 20. "*Æquis auribus Callisthenes velut vindex publicæ libertatis audiebatur. Expresserat non assensionem modo, sed etiam vocem, seniorum præcipue, quibus gravis erat inveterati moris externa mutatio.*"

¹ There was no sentiment more deeply rooted in the free Grecian mind, prior to Alexander's conquests, than the repugnance to arrogant aspirations on the part of the fortunate man, swelling himself above the limits of humanity—and the belief that such aspirations were followed by the Nemesis of the gods. In the dying speech which Xenophon puts into the mouth of Cyrus the Great, we find—"Ye Gods, I thank you much, that I have been sensible of your care for me, and that I have never in my successes raised my thoughts above the measure of man" (*Cyropæd.* viii. 7, 3). Among the most striking illustrations of this sentiment is the story of Solon and Croesus (*Herodot.* i. 32-34).

I shall recount in the next chapter examples of monstrous flattery on the part of the Athenians, proving how this sentiment expired with their freedom.

of Anaxarchus. By such men he was doubtless much extolled ; which praises aggravated his danger, as they were sure to be reported to Alexander. The pretext for his ruin was not long wanting.

Among those who admired and sought the conversation of Kallisthenês, was Hermolaus, one of the royal pages,—the band, selected from noble Macedonian families, who did duty about the person of the king. It had happened that this young man, one of Alexander's companions in the chase, on seeing a wild boar rushing up to attack the king, darted his javelin, and slew the animal. Alexander, angry to be anticipated in killing the boar, ordered Hermolaus to be scourged before all the other pages, and deprived him of his horse.¹ Thus humiliated and outraged—for an act not merely innocent, but the omission of which, if Alexander had sustained any injury from the boar, might have been held punishable—Hermolaus became resolutely bent on revenge.² He enlisted in the project his intimate friend Sostratus, with several others among the pages ; and it was agreed among them to kill Alexander in his chamber, on the first night when they were all on guard together. The appointed night arrived, without any divulga-tion of their secret ; yet the scheme was frustrated by the accident, that Alexander continued till daybreak drinking with his officers, and never retired to bed. On the morrow, one of the conspirators, becoming alarmed or repentant, divulged the scheme to his friend Chariklês, with the names of those concerned. Eurylochus, brother to Chariklês, apprised by him of what he had heard, immediately informed Ptolemy, through whom it was conveyed to Alexander. By Alexander's order, the persons indicated were arrested and put to the torture ;³ under which they confessed that they had themselves conspired to kill him, but named no other accomplices, and even denied that any one else was privy to the scheme. In this denial they persisted, though extreme suffering was applied to extort the revelation of new names. They were then brought up and arraigned as conspirators before the assembled Macedonian soldiers. There their confession was repeated. It is even said that Hermolaus, in repeating it, boasted of the enterprise as legitimate and glorious ; denouncing the tyranny and cruelty of Alexander as having become insupportable to a freeman.

¹ Plutarch, *Alexand.* 54. He refers to Hermippus, who mentions what was told to Aristotle by Strœbeus, the reader attendant on Kallisthenês.

² Arrian, *iv.* 13 ; Curtius, *viii.* 6, 7.

³ Arrian, *iv.* 13, 13.

Whether such boast was actually made or not, the persons brought up were pronounced guilty, and stoned to death forthwith by the soldiers.¹

The pages thus executed were young men of good Macedonian families, for whose condemnation accordingly Alexander had thought it necessary to invoke—what he was sure of obtaining against any one—the sentence of the soldiers. To satisfy his hatred against Kallisthenês—not a Macedonian, but only a Greek citizen, one of the surviving remnants of the subverted city of Olynthus—no such formality was required.² As yet, there was not a shadow of proof to implicate this philosopher; for obnoxious as his name was known to be, Hermolaus and his companions had, with exemplary fortitude, declined to purchase the chance of respite from extreme torture by pronouncing it. Their confessions,—all extorted by suffering, unless confirmed by other evidence, of which we do not know whether any was taken—were hardly of the least value, even against themselves; but against Kallisthenês they had no bearing whatever; nay, they tended indirectly, not to convict, but to absolve him. In his case, therefore, as in that of Philotas before, it was necessary to pick up matter of suspicious tendency from his reported remarks and conversations. He was alleged³ to have addressed dangerous and inflammatory language to the pages, holding up Alexander to odium, instigating them to conspiracy, and pointing out Athens as a place of refuge; he was moreover well known to have been often in conversation with Hermolaus. For a man of the violent temper and omnipotent authority of Alexander, such indications were quite sufficient as grounds of action against one whom he hated.

On this occasion, we have the state of Alexander's mind disclosed by himself, in one of the references to his letters given by Plutarch. Writing to Kraterus and to others immediately afterwards, Alexander distinctly stated that the pages throughout all their torture had deposed against no one but

¹ Arrian, iv. 14, 4. Curtius expands this scene into great detail; composing a long speech for Hermolaus, and another for Alexander (viii. 6, 7, 8).

He says that the soldiers who executed these pages, tortured them first, in order to manifest zeal for Alexander (viii. 8, 20).

² "Quem, si Macedo esset, (Callisthenem) tecum introduxissem, dignissimum te discipulo magistrum: nunc Olynthiô non idem juris est" (Curtius, viii. 8, 19—speech of Alexander before the soldiers, addressing Hermolaus especially).

³ Plutarch, Alexand. 55; Arrian, iv. 10, 4.

themselves. Nevertheless, in another letter addressed to Antipater in Macedonia, he used these expressions—"The pages were stoned to death by the Macedonians; but I myself shall punish the sophist, as well as those who sent him out here, and those who harbour in their cities conspirators against me."¹ The sophist Kallisthenês had been sent out by Aristotle, who is here designated; and probably the Athenians after him. Fortunately for Aristotle, he was not at Baktra, but at Athens. That he could have had any concern in the conspiracy of the pages, was impossible. In this savage outburst of menace against his absent preceptor, Alexander discloses the real state of feeling which prompted him to the destruction of Kallisthenês; hatred towards that spirit of citizenship and free speech, which Kallisthenês not only cherished, in common with Aristotle and most other literary Greeks, but had courageously manifested in his protest against the motion for worshipping a mortal.

Kallisthenês was first put to the torture and then hanged.²

¹ Plutarch, *Alex.* 55. *Καίτοι τῶν περὶ Ἑρμόλαον οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ διὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνάγκης Καλλισθένους κατεῖπεν. Ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος αὐτὸς εὐθὺς γράφων Κρατέρῳ καὶ Ἀττάλῳ καὶ Ἀλκέτῃ φησὶ τοὺς παῖδας βασανιζομένους ὁμολογεῖν, ὡς αὐτοὶ ταῦτα πράξειαν, ἄλλος δὲ οὐδεὶς συνειδείη. Ὡς τὸν δὲ γράφων πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον, καὶ τὸν Καλλισθένην συνεπαίτιασάμενος, οἱ μὲν παῖδες φησὶν ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων κατελεύσθησαν, τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ἐγὼ κολάσω, καὶ τοὺς ἐκπέψαντας αὐτόν, καὶ τοὺς ὑποδεχομένους ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς ἐμοὶ ἐπιβουλευόντας . . . ἄντικρυς ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἀποκαλυπτόμενοις πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην, &c.*

About the hostile dispositions of Alexander towards Aristotle, see Dio Chrysostom, *Orat.* 64, de Fortunâ, p. 598.

Kraterus was at this time absent in Sogdiana, engaged in finishing the suppression of the resistance (Arrian, *iv.* 22, 1). To him, therefore, Alexander would naturally write.

This statement, from the pen of Alexander himself, distinctly contradicts and refutes (as I have before observed) the affirmation of Ptolemy and Aristobulus as given by Arrian (*iv.* 14, 1)—that the pages deposed against Kallisthenês.

² Arrian, *iv.* 15, 5. Curtius also says—"Callisthenes quoque tortus interiit, initi consilii in caput regis innoxius, sed haudquaquam aulæ et assentantium accommodatus ingenio" (*viii.* 8, 21). Compare Plutarch, *Alex.* 55.

This is the statement of Ptolemy; who was himself concerned in the transactions, and was the officer through whom the conspiracy of the pages had been revealed. His partiality might permit him to omit or soften what was discreditable to Alexander, but he may be fully trusted when he records an act of cruelty. Aristobulus and others affirmed that Kallisthenês was put in chains and carried about in this condition for some time; after which he died of disease and a wretched state of body. But the witnesses here are persons whose means of information we do not know to be so good as those of Ptolemy; besides that the statement is intrinsically less probable.

His tragical fate excited a profound sentiment of sympathy and indignation among the philosophers of antiquity.¹

The halts of Alexander were formidable to friends and companions; his marches, to the unconquered natives whom he chose to treat as enemies. On the return of Kraterus from Sogdiana, Alexander began his march from Baktra (Balkh) southward to the mountain range Paropamisus or Caucasus (Hindoo-Koosh); leaving however at Baktra Amyntas with a large force of 10,000 foot and 3500 horse, to keep these intractable territories in subjugation.² His march over the mountains occupied ten days; he then visited his newly-founded city Alexandria in the Paropamisadæ. At or near the river Kophen (Kabool river), he was joined by Taxilès, a powerful Indian prince, who brought as a present twenty-five elephants, and whose alliance was very valuable to him. He then divided his army, sending one division under Hephæstion and Perdikkas, towards the territory called Peukelaôtis (apparently that immediately north of the confluence of the Kabool river with the Indus); and conducting the remainder himself in an easterly direction, over the mountainous regions between the Hindoo-Koosh and the right bank of the Indus. Hephæstion was ordered, after subduing all enemies in his way, to prepare a bridge ready for passing the Indus by the time when Alexander should arrive. Astes, prince of Peukelaôtis, was taken and slain in the city where he had shut himself up; but the reduction of it cost Hephæstion a siege of thirty days.³

Alexander, with his own half of the army, undertook the reduction of the Aspasii, the Guræi, and the Assakeni, tribes occupying mountainous and difficult localities along the southern slopes of the Hindoo-Koosh; but neither they nor their various towns mentioned—Arigæon, Massaga, Bazira, Ora, Dyrta, &c., except perhaps the remarkable rock of Aornos,⁴

¹ See the language of Seneca, *Nat. Quest.* vi. 23; Plutarch, *De Adulator. et Amici Discrimine*, p. 65; Theophrast. *ap. Ciceron. Tusc. Disp.* iii. 10.

Curtius says that this treatment of Kallisthenês was followed by a late repentance on the part of Alexander (viii. 8, 23). On this point there is no other evidence—nor can I think the statement probable.

² Arrian, *iv.* 22, 4.

³ Arrian, *iv.* 22, 8-12.

⁴ Respecting the rock called Aornos, a valuable and elaborate article, entitled "*Gradus ad Aornon*," has been published by Major Abbott in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, No. iv. 1854. This article gives much information, collected mainly by inquiries on the spot, and accompanied by a map, about the very little known country west of the Indus, between the Kabool river on the south, and the Hindoo-Koosh on the north.

near the Indus—can be more exactly identified. These tribes were generally brave, and seconded by towns of strong position as well as by a rugged country, in many parts utterly without roads.¹ But their defence was conducted with little union, no

Major Abbott attempts to follow the march and operations of Alexander, from Alexandria ad Caucasum to the rock of Aornos (p. 311 *seq.*). He shows highly probable reason for believing that the Aornos described by Arrian is the Mount Mahabunn, near the right bank of the Indus (lat. 34° 20'), about sixty miles above its confluence with the Kabool river. "The whole account of Arrian of the rock Aornos is a faithful picture of the Mahabunn. It was the most remarkable feature of the country. It was the refuge of all the neighbouring tribes. It was covered with forest. It had good soil sufficient for a thousand ploughs, and pure springs of water everywhere abounded. It was 4125 feet above the plain, and fourteen miles in circuit. The summit was a plain where cavalry could act. It would be difficult to offer a more faithful description of the Mahabunn. The side on which Alexander scaled the main summit had certainly the character of a rock. But the whole description of Arrian indicates a table mountain" (p. 341). The Mahabunn "is a mountain table, scarped on the east by tremendous precipices, from which descends one large spur down upon the Indus between Sitana and Umb" (p. 340).

To this similarity in so many local features, is to be added the remarkable coincidence of name, between the town Embolina, where Arrian states that Alexander established his camp for the purpose of attacking Aornos—and the modern names Umb and Balimah (between the Mahabunn and the Indus)—"the one in the river valley, the other on the mountain immediately above it" (p. 344). Mount Mahabunn is the natural refuge for the people of the neighbourhood from a conqueror, and was among the places taken by Nadir Shah (p. 338).

A strong case of identity is thus made out between this mountain and the Aornos described by Arrian. But undoubtedly it does not coincide with the Aornos described by Curtius, who compares Aornos to a Meta (the conical goal of the stadium), and says that the Indus washed its base,—that at the first assault several Macedonian soldiers were hurled down into the river. This close juxtaposition of the Indus has been the principal feature looked for by travellers who have sought for Aornos; but no place has yet been found answering the conditions required. We have here to make our election between Arrian and Curtius. Now there is a general presumption in Arrian's favour, in the description of military operations, where he makes a positive statement; but in this case, the presumption is peculiarly strong, because Ptolemy was in the most conspicuous and difficult command for the capture of Aornos, and was therefore likely to be particular in the description of a scene where he had reaped much glory.

¹ Arrian, iv. 30, 13. ἡ στρατιὰ αὐτῷ ὠδοποιεῖτο πρόσω ἰούσα, ἀπορα ἄλλως ὄντα τὰ ταύτη χωρία, &c.

The countries here traversed by Alexander include parts of Kafiristan, Swart, Bajore, Chitral, the neighbourhood of the Kameh and other affluents of the river Kabul before it falls into the Indus near Attock. Most of this is Terra Incognita even at present; especially Kafiristan, a territory inhabited by a population said to be rude and barbarous, but which has never been conquered—nor indeed ever visited by strangers. It is remarkable, that among the inhabitants of Kafiristan—as well as among those of Badakshan, on the other or northern side of the Hindoo-Koosh—

military skill, and miserable weapons; so that they were no way qualified to oppose the excellent combination and rapid movements of Alexander, together with the confident attack and very superior arms, offensive as well as defensive, of his soldiers. All those who attempted resistance were successively attacked, overpowered, and slain. Even those who did not resist, but fled to the mountains, were pursued and either slaughtered or sold for slaves. The only way of escaping the sword was to remain, submit, and await the fiat of the invader. Such a series of uninterrupted successes, all achieved with little loss, it is rare in military history to read. The capture of the rock of Aornos was peculiarly gratifying to Alexander, because it enjoyed the legendary reputation of having been assailed in vain by Héraklès—and indeed he himself had deemed it, at first sight, unassailable. After having thus subdued the upper regions (above Attock or the confluence of the Kabul river) on the right bank of the Indus, he availed himself of some forests alongside to fell timber and build boats. These boats were sent down the stream, to the point where Hephæstion and Perdikkas were preparing the bridge.¹

Such fatiguing operations of Alexander, accomplished amidst all the hardships of winter, were followed by a halt of thirty days, to refresh the soldiers, before he crossed the Indus, in the early spring of 326 B.C.² It is presumed, probably enough, that he crossed at or near Attock, the passage now frequented. He first marched to Taxila, where the prince Taxilus at once submitted, and reinforced the army with a strong contingent of Indian soldiers. His alliance and information was found extremely valuable. The whole neighbouring territory submitted, and was placed under Philippus as satrap, with a garrison and dépôt at Taxila. He experienced no resistance until he reached the river Hydaspes (Jelum), on the other side of which the Indian prince Porus stood prepared to dispute the passage; a brave man, with a formidable force, better armed than Indians generally were, and with many trained elephants; which animals the Macedonians had never yet encountered in battle. By a series of admirable military

there exist traditions respecting Alexander, together with a sort of belief that they themselves are descended from his soldiers. See Ritter's *Erdkunde*, part vii. book iii. p. 200 *seq.*; Burnes's *Travels*, vol. iii. ch. 4, p. 186, 2nd ed.; Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, p. 194 *seq.*

¹ Arrian, iv. 30, 16; v. 7, 2.

² The halt of thirty days is mentioned by Diodorus, xvii. 86. For the proof that these operations took place in winter, see the valuable citation from Aristobulus given in Strabo (xv. p. 691).

combinations, Alexander eluded the vigilance of Porus, stole the passage of the river at a point a few miles above, and completely defeated the Indian army. In spite of their elephants, which were skilfully managed, the Indians could not long withstand the shock of close combat, against such cavalry and infantry as the Macedonian. Porus, a prince of gigantic stature, mounted on an elephant, fought with the utmost gallantry, rallying his broken troops and keeping them together until the last. Having seen two of his sons slain, himself wounded and perishing with thirst, he was only preserved by the special directions of Alexander. When Porus was brought before him, Alexander was struck with admiration at his stature, beauty, and undaunted bearing.¹ Addressing him first, he asked, what Porus wished to be done for him. "That you should treat me as a king," was the reply of Porus. Alexander, delighted with these words, behaved towards Porus with the utmost courtesy and generosity; not only ensuring to him his actual kingdom, but enlarging it by new additions. He found in Porus a faithful and efficient ally. This was the greatest day of Alexander's life; if we take together the splendour and difficulty of the military achievement, and the generous treatment of his conquered opponent.²

¹ Arrian, v. 19, 1. Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὡς προσάγοντα ἐπύθετο, προσιπτεύσας πρὸ τῆς τάξεως σὺν ὀλίγοις τῶν ἑταίρων ἀπαντᾷ τῷ Πύρρῳ, καὶ ἐπιστήσας τὸν ἵππον, τό τε μέγεθος θαυμάζειν ὑπὲρ πέντε πήχεις μάλιστα ξυμβαίνειν, καὶ τὸ κάλλος τοῦ Πύρρου, καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεδουλωμένος τῇ γνώμῃ ἐφαίνετο, &c.

We see here how Alexander was struck with the stature and personal beauty of Porus, and how much these visual impressions contributed to determine, or at least to strengthen, his favourable sympathies towards the captive prince. This illustrates what I have observed in the last chapter, in recounting his treatment of the eunuch Batis after the capture of Gaza; that the repulsive appearance of Batis greatly heightened Alexander's indignation. With a man of such violent impulses as Alexander, these external impressions were of no inconsiderable moment.

² These operations are described in Arrian, v. 9; v. 19 (we may remark, that Ptolemy and Aristobulus, though both present, differed on many points, v. 14); Curtius, viii. 13, 14; Diodor. xvii. 87, 88. According to Plutarch (Alex. 60), Alexander dwelt much upon the battle in his own letters.

There are two principal points—Jelum and Julalpoor—where high roads from the Indus now cross the Hydaspes. Each of these points has been assigned by different writers, as the probable scene of the crossing of the river by Alexander. Of the two, Jelum (rather higher up the river than Julalpoor) seems the more probable. Burnes points out, that near Jelum the river is divided into five or six channels with islands (Travels, vol. ii. ch. 2, p. 50, 2nd ed.). Captain Abbott (in the Journal of the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, Dec. 1848) has given an interesting memoir on

Alexander celebrated his victory by sacrifices to the gods, and festivities on the banks of the Hydaspes; where he also gave directions for the foundation of two cities—Nikæa, on the eastern bank; and Bukephalia, on the western, so named in commemoration of his favourite horse, who died here of age and fatigue.¹ Leaving Kraterus to lay out and erect these new establishments, as well as to keep up communication, he conducted his army onward in an easterly direction towards the river Akesinês (Chenab).² His recent victory had spread terror around; the Glaukæ, a powerful Indian tribe, with thirty-seven towns and many populous villages, submitted, and

the features and course of the Hydaspes a little above Jelum, comparing them with the particulars stated by Arrian, and showing highly plausible reasons in support of this hypothesis—that the crossing took place near Jelum.

Diodorus mentions a halt of thirty days, after the victory (xvii. 89), which seems not probable. Both he and Curtius allude to numerous serpents, by which the army was annoyed between the Akesinês and the Hydratês (Curtius, ix. 1, 11).

¹ Arrian states (v. 19, 5) that the victory over Porus was gained in the month Munychion of the archon Hegemon at Athens—that is, about the end of April 326 B.C. This date is not to be reconciled with another passage, v. 9, 6—where he says that the summer solstice had already passed, and that all the rivers of the Punjab were full of water, turbid and violent. This swelling of the rivers begins about June; they do not attain their full height until August. Moreover, the description of the battle, as given both by Arrian and by Curtius, implies that it took place after the rainy season had begun (Arrian, v. 9, 7; v. 12, 5. Curtius, viii. 14, 4).

Some critics have proposed to read *Metageitnion* (July–August) as the month, instead of *Munychion*; an alteration approved by Mr. Clinton and received into the text by Schmieder. But if this alteration be admitted, the name of the Athenian archon must be altered also; for Metageitnion of the archon Hegemon would be eight months earlier (July–August, 327 B.C.); and at this date, Alexander had not as yet crossed the Indus, as the passage of Aristobulus (ap. Strabo. xv. p. 691) plainly shows—and as Droysen and Mützel remark. Alexander did not cross the Indus before the spring of 326 B.C. If, in place of the archon Hegemon, we substitute the next following archon Chremês (and it is remarkable that Diodorus assigns the battle to this later archonship, xvii. 87), this would be July–August 326 B.C.; which would be a more admissible date for the battle than the preceding month of Munychion. At the same time, the substitution of Metageitnion is mere conjecture; and seems to leave hardly time enough for the subsequent events. As far as an opinion can be formed, it would seem that the battle was fought about the end of June or beginning of July 326 B.C., after the rainy season had commenced; towards the close of the archonship of Hegemon, and the beginning of that of Chremês.

² Arrian, v. 20; Diodor. xvii. 95. Lieut. Wood (Journey to the Source of the Oxus, p. 11–39) remarks that the large rivers of the Punjab change their course so often and so considerably, that monuments and indications of Alexander's march in that territory cannot be expected to remain, especially in ground near rivers.

were placed under the dominion of Porus ; while embassies of submission were also received from two considerable princes—Abisarês, and a second Porus, hitherto at enmity with his namesake. The passage of the great river Akesinês, now full and impetuous in its current, was accomplished by boats and by inflated hides, yet not without difficulty and danger. From thence he proceeded onward in the same direction, across the Punjab—finding no enemies, but leaving detachments at suitable posts to keep up his communications and ensure his supplies—to the river Hydraotês or Ravee ; which, though not less broad and full than the Akesinês, was comparatively tranquil, so as to be crossed with facility.¹ Here some free Indian tribes, Kathæans and others, had the courage to resist. They first attempted to maintain themselves in Sangala by surrounding their town with a triple entrenchment of waggons. These being attacked and carried, they were driven within the walls, which they now began to despair of defending, and resolved to evacuate by night ; but the project was divulged to Alexander by deserters, and frustrated by his vigilance. On the next day he took the town by storm, putting to the sword 17,000 Indians, and taking (according to Arrian) 70,000 captives. His own loss before the town was less than 100 killed, and 1200 wounded. Two neighbouring towns, in alliance with Sangala, were evacuated by their terrified inhabitants. Alexander pursued, but could not overtake them, except 500 sick or weakly persons, whom his soldiers put to death. Demolishing the town of Sangala, he added the territory to the dominion of Porus, then present, with a contingent of 5000 Indians.²

Sangala was the easternmost of all Alexander's conquests. Presently his march brought him to the river Hyphasis (Sutledge), the last of the rivers in the Punjab—seemingly at a point below its confluence with the Beas. Beyond this river, broad and rapid, Alexander was informed that there lay a desert of eleven days' march, extending to a still greater river called the Ganges ; beyond which dwelt the Gandaridæ, the most powerful, warlike, and populous, of all the Indian tribes, distinguished for the number and training of their elephants.³ The prospect of a difficult march, and of an enemy esteemed invincible, only instigated his ardour. He gave orders for the crossing. But here for the first time his

¹ Arrian, v. 20.

² Arrian, v. 23, 24 ; Curtius, ix. 1, 15.

³ Curtius, ix. 2, 3 ; Diodor. xvii. 93 ; Plutarch, Alex. 62.

army, officers as well as soldiers, manifested symptoms of uncontrollable weariness; murmuring aloud at these endless toils, and marches they knew not whither. They had already overpassed the limits where Dionysus and Hēraklēs were said to have stopped: they were travelling into regions hitherto unvisited either by Greeks or by Persians, merely for the purpose of provoking and conquering new enemies. Of victories they were sated; of their plunder, abundant as it was, they had no enjoyment;¹ the hardships of a perpetual onward march, often excessively accelerated, had exhausted both men and horses; moreover, their advance from the Hydaspes had been accomplished in the wet season, under rains more violent and continued than they had ever before experienced.² Informed of the reigning discontent, Alexander assembled his officers and harangued them, endeavouring to revive in them that forward spirit and promptitude which he had hitherto found not inadequate to his own.³ But he entirely failed. No one indeed dared openly to contradict him. Kœnus alone hazarded some words of timid dissuasion; the rest manifested a passive and sullen repugnance, even when he proclaimed that those who desired might return, with the shame of having deserted their king, while he would march forward with the volunteers only. After a suspense of two days, passed in solitary and

¹ Curtius, ix. 3, 11 (speech of Kœnus). "Quoto cuique lorica est? Quis equum habet? Jube quæri, quam multos servi ipsorum persecuti sint, quid cuique supersit ex prædâ. Omnium victores, omnium inopes sumus."

² Aristobulus ap. Strabo. xv. p. 691-697. ὕεσθαι συνεχῶς. Arrian, v. 29, 8; Diodor. xvii. 93. χειμῶνες ἄγριοι κατεβράχησαν ἐφ' ἡμέρας ἐβδομήκοντα, καὶ βρονταὶ συνεχεῖς καὶ κεραυνοὶ κατέσκηπτον, &c.

³ In the speech which Arrian (v. 25, 26) puts into the mouth of Alexander, the most curious point is, the geographical views which he promulgates. "We have not much farther now to march (he was standing on the western bank of the Sutledge) to the river Ganges, and the great Eastern Sea which surrounds the whole earth. The Hyrkanian (Caspian) Sea joins on to this great sea on one side, the Persian Gulf on the other; after we have subdued all those nations which lie before us eastward towards the Great Sea, and northward towards the Hyrkanian Sea, we shall then sail by water first to the Persian Gulf, next round Libya to the pillars of Hēraklēs; from thence we shall march back all through Libya, and add it to all Asia as parts of our empire." (I here abridge rather than translate.)

It is remarkable, that while Alexander made so prodigious an error in narrowing the eastern limits of Asia, the Ptolemaic geography, recognised in the time of Columbus, made an error not less in the opposite direction, stretching it too far to the East. It was upon the faith of this last mistake, that Columbus projected his voyage of circumnavigation from Western Europe, expecting to come to the eastern coast of Asia from the West, after no great length of voyage.

silent mortification—he still apparently persisted in his determination, and offered the sacrifice usual previous to the passage of a river. The victims were inauspicious; he bowed to the will of the gods; and gave orders for return, to the unanimous and unbounded delight of his army.¹

To mark the last extremity of his eastward progress, he erected twelve altars of extraordinary height and dimension on the western bank of the Hyphasis, offering sacrifices of thanks to the gods, with the usual festivities, and matches of agility and force. Then, having committed all the territory west of the Hyphasis to the government of Porus, he marched back, repassed the Hydraotês and Akesinês, and returned to the Hydaspes near the point where he had first crossed it. The two new cities—Bukephalia and Nikæa—which he had left orders for commencing on that river, had suffered much from the rains and inundations during his forward march to the Hyphasis, and now required the aid of the army to repair the damage.² The heavy rains continued throughout most of his return march to the Hydaspes.³

On coming back to this river, Alexander received a large reinforcement both of cavalry and infantry, sent to him from Europe, together with 25,000 new panoplies, and a considerable stock of medicines.⁴ Had these reinforcements reached him on the Hyphasis, it seems not impossible that he might have prevailed on his army to accompany him in his farther advance to the Ganges and the regions beyond. He now employed himself, assisted by Porus and Taxilus, in collecting and constructing a fleet for sailing down the Hydaspes, and thence down to the mouth of the Indus. By the early part of November, a fleet of nearly 2000 boats or vessels of various sizes having been prepared, he began his voyage.⁵ Kraterus

¹ Arrian, v. 28, 7. The fact that Alexander, under all this insuperable repugnance of his soldiers, still offered the sacrifice preliminary to crossing—is curious as an illustration of his character, and was specially attested by Ptolemy.

² Arrian, v. 29, 8; Diodor. xvii. 95.

³ Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 691—until the rising of Arkturus. Diodorus says 70 days (xvii. 93), which seems more probable.

⁴ Diodor. xvii. 95; Curtius, ix. 3, 21.

⁵ The voyage was commenced a few days before the setting of the Pleiades (Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 692).

For the number of the ships, see Ptolemy ap. Arrian. vi. 2, 8.

On seeing crocodiles in the Indus, Alexander was at first led to suppose that it was the same river as the Nile, and that he had discovered the higher course of the Nile, from whence it flowed into Egypt. This is curious, as an illustration of the geographical knowledge of the time (Arrian, vi. 1, 3).

marched with one division of the army, along the right bank of the Hydaspes—Hephæstion on the left bank with the remainder, including 200 elephants; Nearchus had the command of the fleet in the river, on board of which was Alexander himself. He pursued his voyage slowly down the river, to the confluence of the Hydaspes with the Akesinês—with the Hydraotês—and with the Hyphasis—all pouring, in one united stream, into the Indus. He sailed down the Indus to its junction with the Indian Ocean. Altogether this voyage occupied nine months,¹ from November 326 B.C. to August 325 B.C. But it was a voyage full of active military operations on both sides of the river. Alexander perpetually disembarked, to attack, subdue, and slaughter all such nations near the banks as did not voluntarily submit. Among them were the Malli and Oxydrakæ, free and brave tribes, who resolved to defend their liberty, but, unfortunately for themselves, were habitually at variance, and could not now accomplish any hearty co-operation against the common invader.² Alexander first assailed the Malli with his usual celerity and vigour, beat them with slaughter in the field, and took several of their towns.³ There remained only their last and strongest town, from which the defenders were already driven out and forced to retire to the citadel.⁴ Thither they were pursued by the Macedonians, Alexander himself being among the foremost, with only a few guards near him. Impatient because the troops with their scaling-ladders did not come up more rapidly, he mounted upon a ladder that happened to be at hand, attended only by Peukestês and one or two others, with an adventurous courage even transcending what he was wont to display. Having cleared the wall by killing several of its defenders, he jumped down into the interior of the citadel, and made head for some time, nearly alone, against all within. He received however a bad wound from an arrow in the breast, and was on the point of fainting, when his soldiers burst in, rescued him, and took

¹ Aristobulus ap. Strab. xv. p. 692. Aristobulus said that the downward voyage occupied ten months; this seems longer than the exact reality. Moreover Aristobulus said that they had no rain during all the voyage down, through all the summer months: Nearchus stated the contrary (Strabo, *l. c.*).

² Curtius, ix. 4, 15; Diodor. xvii. 98.

³ Arrian, vi. 7, 8.

⁴ This last stronghold of the Malli is supposed, by Mr. Cunningham and others, to have been the modern city of Multan. The river Ravee or Hydraotês is said to have formerly run past the city of Multan into the Chenab or Akesinês.

the place. Every person within—man, woman, and child—was slain.¹

The wound of Alexander was so severe, that he was at first reported to be dead, to the great consternation and distress of the army. However, he became soon sufficiently recovered to show himself, and to receive their ardent congratulations, in the camp established at the point of junction between the Hydraotês (Ravee) and (Akesinês) Chenab.² His voyage down the river, though delayed by the care of his wound, was soon resumed and prosecuted, with the same active operations by his land-force on both sides to subjugate all the Indian tribes and cities within accessible distance. At the junction of the river Akesinês (Punjab) with the Indus, Alexander directed the foundation of a new city, with adequate docks and conveniences for ship-building, whereby he expected to command the internal navigation.³ Having no further occasion now for so large a land-force, he sent a large portion of it under Kraterus westward (seemingly through the pass now called Bolan) into Karmania.⁴ He established another military and naval post at Pattala, where the Delta of the Indus divided; and he then sailed with a portion of his fleet down the right arm of the river to have the first sight of the Indian Ocean. The view of ebbing and flowing tide, of which none had had experience on the scale there exhibited, occasioned to all much astonishment and alarm.⁵

The fleet was now left to be conducted by the admiral Nearchus, from the mouth of the Indus round by the Persian

¹ Arrian, vi. 9, 10, 11. He notices the great discrepancy in the various accounts given of this achievement and dangerous wound of Alexander. Compare Diodor. xvii. 98, 99; Curtius, ix. 4, 5; Plutarch, Alex. 63.

² Arrian, xi. 13.

³ Arrian, xi. 15, 5.

⁴ Arrian, xi. 17, 6; Strabo, xv. p. 721.

⁵ Arrian, xi. 18, 19; Curtius, ix. 9. He reached Pattala towards the middle or end of July, *περὶ κυνὸς ἐπιτολήν* (Strabo, xv. p. 692).

The site of Pattala has been usually looked for near the modern Tatta. But Dr. Kennedy, in his recent Narrative of the Campaign of the Army of the Indus in Scinde and Kabool (ch. v. p. 104), shows some reasons for thinking that it must have been considerably higher up the river than Tatta; somewhere near Sehwan. "The Delta commencing about 130 miles above the sea, its northern apex would be somewhere midway between Hyderabad and Sehwan; where local traditions still speak of ancient cities destroyed, and of greater changes having occurred than in any other part of the course of the Indus."

The constant changes in the course of the Indus, however (compare p. 73 of his work), noticed by all observers, render every attempt at such identification conjectural—see Wood's Journey to the Oxus, p. 12.

Gulf to that of the Tigris ; a memorable nautical enterprise in Grecian antiquity. Alexander himself (about the month of August) began his march by land westward through the territories of the Arabitæ and the Oritæ, and afterwards through the deserts of Gedrôsia. Pura, the principal town of the Gedrôsiens, was sixty days' march from the boundary of the Oritæ.¹

Here his army, though without any formidable opposing enemy, underwent the most severe and deplorable sufferings ; their march being through a sandy and trackless desert, with short supplies of food, and still shorter supplies of water, under a burning sun. The loss in men, horses, and baggage-cattle, from thirst, fatigue, and disease, was prodigious ; and it required all the unconquerable energy of Alexander to bring through even the diminished number.² At Pura the army obtained repose and refreshment, and was enabled to march forward into Karmania, where Kraterus joined them with his division from the Indus, and Kleander with the division which had been left at Ekbatana. Kleander, accused of heinous crimes in his late command, was put to death or imprisoned ; several of his comrades were executed. To recompense the soldiers for their recent distress in Gedrôsia, the king conducted them for seven days in drunken bacchanalian procession through Karmania, himself and all his friends taking part in the revelry ; an imitation of the jovial festivity and triumph with which the god Dionysus had marched back from the conquest of India.³

¹ Arrian, vi. 24, 2 ; Strabo, xv. p. 723.

² Arrian, vi. 25, 26 ; Curtius, ix. 10 ; Plutarch, Alex. 66.

³ Curtius, ix. 10 ; Diodor. xvii. 106 ; Plutarch, Alex. 67. Arrian (vi. 28) found this festal progress mentioned in some authorities, but not in others. Neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus mentioned it. Accordingly Arrian refuses to believe it. There may have been exaggerations or falsities as to the details of the march ; but as a general fact, I see no sufficient ground for disbelieving it. A season of excessive licence to the soldiers, after their extreme suffering in Gedrôsia, was by no means unnatural to grant. Moreover, it corresponds to the general conception of the returning march of Dionysus in antiquity, while the imitation of that god was quite in conformity with Alexander's turn of sentiment.

I have already remarked, that the silence of Ptolemy and Aristobulus is too strongly insisted on, both by Arrian and by others, as a reason for disbelieving affirmations respecting Alexander.

Arrian and Curtius (x. 1) differ in their statements about the treatment of Kleander. According to Arrian, he was put to death ; according to Curtius, he was spared from death, and simply put in prison, in consequence of the important service which he had rendered by killing Parmenio with his own hand ; while 600 of his accomplices and agents were put to death.

During the halt in Karmania Alexander had the satisfaction of seeing his admiral Nearchus,¹ who had brought the fleet round from the mouth of the Indus to the harbour called Harmozeia (Ormuz), not far from the entrance of the Persian Gulf; a voyage of much hardship and distress, along the barren coasts of the Oritæ, the Gedrôsiens, and the Ichthyophagi.² Nearchus, highly commended and honoured, was presently sent back to complete his voyage as far as the mouth of the Euphrates; while Hephæstion also was directed to conduct the larger portion of the army, with the elephants and heavy baggage, by the road near the coast from Karmania into Persis. This road, though circuitous, was the most convenient, as it was now the winter season;³ but Alexander himself, with the lighter divisions of his army, took the more direct mountain road from Karmania to Pasargadæ and Persepolis. Visiting the tomb of Cyrus the Great, founder of the Persian empire, he was incensed to find it violated and pillaged. He caused it to be carefully restored, put to death a Macedonian named Polymachus as the offender, and tortured the Magian guardians of it for the purpose of discovering accomplices, but in vain.⁴ Orsinês, satrap of Persis, was however accused of connivance in the deed, as well as of various acts of murder and spoliation: according to Curtius, he was not only innocent, but had manifested both good faith and devotion to Alexander;⁵ in spite of which he became a victim of the hostility of the favourite eunuch Bagoas, who both poisoned the king's mind with calumnies of his own, and suborned other accusers with false testimony.⁶ Whatever may be the truth of the story, Alexander caused Orsinês to be hanged; naming as satrap Peukestês, whose favour was now high, partly as comrade and preserver of the king in his imminent danger

¹ Nearchus had begun his voyage about the end of September, or beginning of October (Arrian, *Indic.* 21; Strabo, xv. p. 721).

² Arrian, vi. 28, 7; Arrian, *Indica*, c. 33-37.

³ Arrian, vi. 28, 12-29, 1.

⁴ Plutarch, *Alex.* 69; Arrian, vi. 29, 17; Strabo, xv. p. 730.

⁵ Arrian, vi. 30, 2; Curtius, x. 1, 23-28. "Hic fuit exitus nobilissimi Persarum, nec insonitis modo, sed eximie quoque benignitatis in regem." The great favour which the beautiful eunuch Bagoas (though Arrian does not mention him) enjoyed with Alexander, and the exalted position which he occupied, are attested by good contemporary evidence, especially the philosopher Dikæarchus—see *Athenæ.* xiii. p. 603; *Dikæarch. Fragm.* 19, ap. *Hist. Græc. Fragm.* Didot, vol. ii. p. 241. Compare the Fragments of Eumenês and Diodotus (*Ælian.* V. H. iii. 23) in Didot, *Fragm. Scriptor. Hist. Alex. Magni*, p. 121; Plutarch *De Adul. et Amic. Discrim.* p. 65.

⁶ Arrian, vi. 30; Curtius, x. 1, 22-30.

at the citadel of the Malli—partly from his having adopted the Persian dress, manners, and language, more completely than any other Macedonian.

It was about February, in 324 B.C.,¹ that Alexander marched out of Persis to Susa. During this progress, at the point where he crossed the Pasitigris, he was again joined by Nearchus, who having completed his circumnavigation from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, had sailed back with the fleet from the latter river and come up the Pasitigris.² It is probable that the division of Hephæstion also rejoined him at Susa, and that the whole army was there for the first time brought together, after the separation in Karmania.

In Susa and Susiana Alexander spent some months. For the first time since his accession to the throne, he had now no military operations in hand or in immediate prospect. No enemy was before him, until it pleased him to go in quest of a new one; nor indeed could any new one be found, except at a prodigious distance. He had emerged from the perils of the untrodden East, and had returned into the ordinary localities and conditions of Persian rule, occupying that capital city from whence the great Achæmenid kings had been accustomed to govern the Western as well as the Eastern portions of their vast empire. To their post, and to their irritable love of servility, Alexander had succeeded; but bringing with him a restless energy such as none of them except the first founder

¹ Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fast. Hellen.* B.C. 325, also *Append.* p. 232) places the arrival of Alexander in Susiana, on his return march, in the month of February B.C. 325; a year too early, in my opinion. I have before remarked on the views of Mr. Clinton respecting the date of Alexander's victory over Porus on the Hydaspes, where (following Schmieder's conjecture) he alters the name of the month as it stands in the text of Arrian, and supposes that battle to have occurred in August B.C. 327 instead of April B.C. 326. Mr. Clinton antedates by one year all the proceedings of Alexander subsequent to his quitting Baktria for the last time in the summer of B.C. 327. Dr. Vincent's remark—that "the supposition of *two winters* occurring after Alexander's return to Susa is not borne out by the historians" (see Clinton, p. 232), is a perfectly just one; and Mitford has not replied to it in a satisfactory manner. In my judgment, there was only an interval of sixteen months (not an interval of twenty-eight months, as Mr. Clinton supposes) between the return of Alexander to Susa and his death at Babylon (Feb. 324 B.C. to June 323 B.C.).

² Arrian, vii. 5, 9; Arrian, *Indica*, c. 42. The voluntary death of Kalanus the Indian Gymnosophist must have taken place at Susa (where Diodorus places it—xvii. 107), and not in Persis; for Nearchus was seemingly present at the memorable scene of the funeral pile (Arrian, vii. 3, 9)—and he was not with Alexander in Persis.

Cyrus had manifested—and a splendid military genius, such as was unknown alike to Cyrus and to his successors.

In the new position of Alexander, his principal subjects of uneasiness were, the satraps and the Macedonian soldiers. During the long interval (more than five years) which had elapsed since he marched eastward from Hyrkania in pursuit of Bessus, the satraps had necessarily been left much to themselves. Some had imagined that he would never return; an anticipation noway unreasonable, since his own impulse towards forward march was so insatiate, that he was only constrained to return by the resolute opposition of his own soldiers; moreover his dangerous wound among the Malli, and his calamitous march through Gedrôsia, had given rise to reports of his death, credited for some time even by Olympias and Kleopatra in Macedonia.¹ Under these uncertainties, some satraps stood accused of having pillaged rich temples, and committed acts of violence towards individuals. Apart from all criminality, real or alleged, several of them, also, had taken into pay bodies of mercenary troops, partly as a necessary means of authority in their respective districts, partly as a protection to themselves in the event of Alexander's decease. Respecting the conduct of the satraps and their officers, many denunciations and complaints were sent in, to which Alexander listened readily and even eagerly, punishing the accused with indiscriminate rigour, and resenting especially the suspicion that they had calculated upon his death.² Among those executed, were Abulitês, satrap of Susiana, with his son Oxathrês; the latter was even slain by the hands of Alexander himself, with a sarissa³—the dispensation of punishment becoming in his hands an outburst of exasperated temper. He also despatched peremptory orders to all the satraps, enjoining them to dismiss their mercenary troops without delay.⁴ This measure produced considerable effect on the condition of Greece—about which I shall speak in a subsequent chapter. Harpalus, satrap of Babylon (about whom also more, presently), having squandered large sums out of the revenues of the post upon ostentatious luxury, became terrified when Alexander was approaching Susiana, and fled to Greece with a large treasure and a small body of soldiers.⁵

¹ Plutarch, *Alexand.* 68.

² Arrian, vii. 4, 2-5; Diodor. xvii. 108; Curtius, x. 1, 7. "*Cœperat esse præceps ad repræsentanda supplicia, item ad deteriora credenda*" (Curtius, x. 1, 39).

³ Plutarch, *Alex.* 68.

⁴ Diodor. xvii. 106-111.

⁵ Among the accusations which reached Alexander against this satrap, we

Serious alarm was felt among all the satraps and officers, innocent as well as guilty. That the most guilty were not those who fared worst, we may see by the case of Kleomenēs in Egypt, who remained unmolested in his government, though his iniquities were no secret.¹

Among the Macedonian soldiers, discontent had been perpetually growing, from the numerous proofs which they witnessed that Alexander had made his election for an Asiatic character, and abnegated his own country. Besides his habitual adoption of the Persian costume and ceremonial, he now celebrated a sort of national Asiatic marriage at Susa. He had already married the captive Roxana in Baktria; he next took two additional wives—Statira, daughter of Darius—and Parysatis, daughter of the preceding king Ochus. He at the same time caused eighty of his principal friends and officers, some very reluctantly, to marry (according to Persian rites) wives selected from the noblest Persian families, providing dowries for all of them.² He made presents besides, to all those Macedonians

are surprised to find a letter addressed to him (ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον ἐπιστολῇ) by the Greek historian Theopompus; who set forth with indignation the extravagant gifts and honours heaped by Harpalus upon his two successive mistresses—Pythionikē and Glykera; celebrated Hetærae from Athens. These proceedings Theopompus describes as insults to Alexander (Theopompus ap. Athenæ. xiii. p. 586–595; Fragment. 277, 278, ed. Didot).

The satyric drama called Ἀγῆν, represented before Alexander at a period subsequent to the flight of Harpalus, cannot have been represented (as Athenæus states it to have been) on the banks of the *Hydaspes*, because Harpalus did not make his escape until he was frightened by the approach of Alexander returning from India. At the *Hydaspes*, Alexander was still on his outward progress; very far off, and without any idea of returning. It appears to me that the words of Athenæus respecting this drama—ἐδίδαξε Διονυσίων ὄντων ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὑδάσπου τοῦ ποταμοῦ (xiii. p. 595)—involve a mistake or misreading; and that it ought to stand ἐπὶ τοῦ Χοάσπου τοῦ ποταμοῦ. I may remark that the words *Medus Hydaspes* in Virgil, Georg. iv. 211, probably involve the same confusion. The *Choaspes* was the river near Susa; and this drama was performed before Alexander at Susa during the Dionysia of the year 324 B.C., after Harpalus had fled. The Dionysia were in the month Elaphebolion; now Alexander did not fight Porus on the *Hydaspes* until the succeeding month *Muny-chion* at the earliest—and probably later. And even if we suppose (which is not probable) that he reached the *Hydaspes* in Elaphebolion, he would have no leisure to celebrate dramas and a Dionysiac festival, while the army of Porus was waiting for him on the opposite bank. Moreover it is noway probable that, on the remote *Hydaspes*, he had any actors or chorus, or means of celebrating dramas at all.

¹ Arrian, vii. 18, 2; vii. 23, 9–13.

² Arrian, vii. 4, 6–9. By these two marriages, Alexander thus engrafted himself upon the two lines of antecedent Persian kings. Ochus was of the Achæmenid family, but Darius Codomannus, father of Statira, was not of

who gave in their names as having married Persian women. Splendid festivities¹ accompanied these nuptials, with honorary rewards distributed to favourites and meritorious officers. Macedonians and Persians, the two imperial races, one in Europe, the other in Asia, were thus intended to be amalgamated. To soften the aversion of the soldiers generally towards these Asiatising marriages,² Alexander issued proclamation that he would himself discharge their debts, inviting all who owed money to give in their names with an intimation of the sums due. It was known that the debtors were numerous; yet few came to enter their names. The soldiers suspected the proclamation as a stratagem, intended for the purpose of detecting such as were spendthrifts, and obtaining a pretext for punishment; a remarkable evidence how little confidence or affection Alexander now inspired, and how completely the sentiment entertained towards him was that of fear mingled with admiration. He himself was much hurt at their mistrust, and openly complained of it; at the same time proclaiming that paymasters and tables should be planted openly in the camp, and that any soldier might come and ask for money enough to pay his debts, without being bound to give in his name. Assured of secrecy, they now made application in such numbers that the total distributed was prodigiously great; reaching, according to some, to 10,000 talents—according to Arrian, not less than 20,000 talents or £4,600,000 sterling.³

Large as this donative was, it probably gave but partial satisfaction, since the most steady and well-conducted soldiers could have received no benefit, except in so far as they might choose to come forward with fictitious debts. A new mortification moreover was in store for the soldiers generally. There arrived from the various satrapies—even from those most distant, Sogdiana, Bactria, Aria, Drangiana, Arachosia, &c.—contingents of young and fresh native troops, amounting in total to 30,000 men; all armed and drilled in the Macedonian manner. From the time when the Macedonians had refused to cross the river Hyphasis and march forward into India,

that family; he began a new lineage. About the overweening regal state of Alexander, outdoing even the previous Persian kings, see Phylarchus ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 539.

¹ Chares ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 538.

² Arrian, vii. 6, 3. καὶ τοὺς γάμους ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῷ Περσικῷ ποιηθέντας οὐ πρὸς θυμοῦ γενέσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ τῶν γημάντων, ἔστιν οἷς, &c.

³ Arrian, vii. 5; Plutarch, Alex. 70; Curtius, x. 2, 9; Diodor. xvii. 109.

Alexander saw, that for his large aggressive schemes it was necessary to disband the old soldiers, and to organise an army at once more fresh and more submissive. He accordingly despatched orders to the satraps to raise and discipline new Asiatic levies, of vigorous native youths ; and the fruit of these orders was now seen.¹ Alexander reviewed the new levies, whom he called the Epigoni, with great satisfaction. He moreover incorporated many native Persians, both officers and soldiers, into the Companion-cavalry, the most honourable service in the army ; making the important change of arming them with the short Macedonian thrusting-pike in place of the missile Persian javelin. They were found such apt soldiers, and the genius of Alexander for military organisation was so consummate, that he saw himself soon released from his dependence on the Macedonian veterans ; a change evident enough to them as well as to him.²

The novelty and success of Nearchus in his exploring voyage had excited in Alexander an eager appetite for naval operations. Going on board his fleet in the Pasitigris (the Karun, the river on the east side of Susa), he sailed in person down to the Persian Gulf, surveyed the coast as far as the mouth of the Tigris, and then sailed up the latter river as far as Opis. Hephæstion meanwhile, commanding the army, marched by land in concert with this voyage, and came back to Opis, where Alexander disembarked.³

Sufficient experiment had now been made with the Asiatic levies to enable Alexander to dispense with many of his Macedonian veterans. Calling together the army, he intimated his intention of sending home those who were unfit for service, either from age or wounds, but of allotting to them presents at departure sufficient to place them in an enviable condition, and attract fresh Macedonian substitutes. On hearing this intimation, all the long-standing discontent of the soldiers at once broke out. They felt themselves set aside, as worn out and useless,—and set aside, not to make room for younger men of their own country, but in favour of those Asiatics into whose arms their king had now passed. They demanded with a loud voice that he should dismiss them all—advising him by way of taunt to make his future conquests along with his father Ammon. These manifestations so incensed Alexander, that

¹ Diodor. xvii. 108. It must have taken some time to get together and discipline these young troops ; Alexander must therefore have sent the orders from India.

² Arrian, vii. 6.

³ Arrian, vii. 7.

he leaped down from the elevated platform on which he had stood to speak, rushed with a few of his guards among the crowd of soldiers, and seized or caused to be seized thirteen of those apparently most forward, ordering them immediately to be put to death. The multitude were thoroughly overawed and reduced to silence, upon which Alexander remounted the platform and addressed them in a speech of considerable length. He boasted of the great exploits of Philip, and of his own still greater : he affirmed that all the benefit of his conquests had gone to the Macedonians, and that he himself had derived from them nothing but a double share of the common labours, hardships, wounds, and perils. Reproaching them as base deserters from a king who had gained for them all these unparalleled acquisitions, he concluded by giving discharge to all—commanding them forthwith to depart.¹

After this speech—teeming (as we read it in Arrian) with that exorbitant self-exaltation which formed the leading feature in his character—Alexander hurried away into the palace, where he remained shut up for two days without admitting any one except his immediate attendants. His guards departed along with him, leaving the discontented soldiers stupefied and motionless. Receiving no further orders, nor any of the accustomed military indications,² they were left in the helpless condition of soldiers constrained to resolve for themselves, and at the same time altogether dependent upon Alexander whom they had offended. On the third day, they learnt that he had convened the Persian officers, and had invested them with the chief military commands, distributing the newly-arrived Epigoni into divisions of infantry and cavalry, all with Macedonian military titles, and passing over the Macedonians themselves as if they did not exist. At this news the soldiers were overwhelmed with shame and remorse. They rushed to the gates

¹ Arrian, vii. 9, 10 ; Plutarch, Alex. 1 ; Curtius, x. 2 ; Justin, xii. 11.

² See the description given by Tacitus (Hist. ii. 29) of the bringing round of the Vitellian army,—which had mutinied against the general Fabius Valens :—" Tum Alphenus Varus, præfectus castrorum, deflagrante paulatim seditione, addit consilium—vetitis obire vigilias centurionibus, omisso tubæ sono, quo miles ad belli munia cietur. Igitur torpere cuncti, circumspectare inter se attoniti, *et id ipsum, quod nemo regeret, paventes* ; silentio, patientiâ, postremo precibus et lacrymis veniam quærebant. Ut vero deformis et flens, et præter spem incolumis, Valens processit, gaudium, miseratio, favor ; versi in lætitiâ (ut est vulgus utroque immodicum) laudantes gratantesque, circumdatum aquilis signisque, in tribunal ferunt."

Compare also the narrative in Xenophon (Anab. i. 3) of the embarrassment of the Ten Thousand Greeks at Tarsus, when they at first refused to obey Klearchus and march against the Great King.

of the palace, threw down their arms, and supplicated with tears and groans for Alexander's pardon. Presently he came out, and was himself moved to tears by seeing their prostrate deportment. After testifying his full reconciliation, he caused a solemn sacrifice to be celebrated, coupled with a multitudinous banquet of mixed Macedonians and Persians. The Grecian prophets, the Persian magi, and all the guests present, united in prayer and libation for fusion, harmony, and community of empire, between the two nations.¹

This complete victory over his own soldiers was probably as gratifying to Alexander as any one gained during his past life ; carrying as it did a consoling retribution for the memorable stoppage on the banks of the Hyphasis, which he had neither forgotten nor forgiven. He selected 10,000 of the oldest and most exhausted among the soldiers to be sent home under Kraterus, giving to each full pay until the time of arrival in Macedonia, with a donation of one talent besides. He intended that Kraterus, who was in bad health, should remain in Europe as viceroy of Macedonia, and that Antipater should come out to Asia with a reinforcement of troops.² Pursuant to this resolution, the 10,000 soldiers were now singled out for return, and separated from the main army. Yet it does not appear that they actually did return, during the ten months of Alexander's remaining life.

Of the important edict issued this summer by Alexander to the Grecian cities, and read at the Olympic festival in July—directing each city to recall its exiled citizens—I shall speak in a future chapter. He had now accomplished his object of organising a land-force half Macedonian, half Asiatic. But since the expedition of Nearchus, he had become bent upon a large extension of his naval force also ; which was indeed an indispensable condition towards his immediate projects of conquering Arabia, and of pushing both nautical exploration and aggrandisement from the Persian Gulf round the Arabian coast. He despatched orders to the Phenician ports, directing that a numerous fleet should be built ; and that the ships should then be taken to pieces, and conveyed across to Thapsakus on the Euphrates, from whence they would sail down to Babylon. At that place, he directed the construction of other ships from the numerous cypress trees around—as

¹ Arrian, vii. 11.

² Arrian, vii. 12, 1-7 ; Justin, xii. 12. Kraterus was especially popular with the Macedonian soldiers, because he had always opposed, as much as he dared, the Oriental transformation of Alexander (Plutarch, Euménès, 6).

well as the formation of an enormous harbour in the river at Babylon, adequate to the accommodation of 1000 ships of war. Mikkalus, a Greek of Klazomenæ, was sent to Phenicia with 500 talents, to enlist, or to purchase, seamen for the crews. It was calculated that these preparations (probably under the superintendence of Nearchus) would be completed by the spring, for which period contingents were summoned to Babylon for the expedition against Arabia.¹

In the mean time, Alexander himself paid a visit to Ekbatana, the ordinary summer residence of the Persian kings. He conducted his army by leisurely marches, reviewing by the way the ancient regal parks of the celebrated breed called Nisean horses—now greatly reduced in number.² On the march, a violent altercation occurred between his personal favourite, Hephæstion,—and his secretary, Eumenês, the most able, dexterous, and long-sighted man in his service. Eumenês, as a Greek of Kardia, had been always regarded with slight and jealousy by the Macedonian officers, especially by Hephæstion: Alexander now took pains to reconcile the two, experiencing no difficulty with Eumenês, but much with Hephæstion.³ During his stay at Ekbatana, he celebrated magnificent sacrifices and festivities, with gymnastic and musical exhibitions, which were further enlivened, according to the Macedonian habits, by banquets and excessive wine-drinking. Amidst these proceedings, Hephæstion was seized with a fever. The vigour of his constitution emboldened him to neglect all care or regimen, so that in a few days the disease carried him off. The final crisis came on suddenly, and Alexander was warned of it while sitting in the theatre; but though he instantly hurried to the bedside, he found Hephæstion already dead. His sorrow for this loss was unbounded, manifesting itself in excesses suitable to the general violence of his impulses, whether of affection or of antipathy. Like Achilles mourning

¹ Arrian, vii. 19. He also sent an officer named Herakleidês to the shores of the Caspian Sea, with orders to construct ships and make a survey of that sea (vii. 16).

² Arrian, vii. 13, 2; Diodor. xvii. 110. How leisurely the march was, may be seen in Diodorus.

The direction of Alexander's march from Susa to Ekbatana, along a frequented and good road which Diodorus in another place calls a royal road (xix. 19), is traced by Ritter, deriving his information chiefly from the recent researches of Sir Henry Rawlinson. The larger portion of the way lay along the western side of the chain of Mount Zagros, and on the right bank of the river Kerkha (Ritter, *Erdkunde*, part ix. b. 3, p. 329, *West-Asia*).

³ Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, *Eumenês*, 2.

for Patroklos, he cast himself on the ground near the dead body, and remained there wailing for several hours; he refused all care, and even food, for two days; he cut his hair close, and commanded that all the horses and mules in the camp should have their manes cut close also; he not only suspended the festivities, but interdicted all music and every sign of joy in the camp; he directed that the battlements of the walls belonging to the neighbouring cities should be struck off; he hung, or crucified, the physician Glaukias, who had prescribed for Hephæstion; he ordered that a vast funeral pile should be erected at Babylon, at a cost given to us as 10,000 talents (£2,300,000), to celebrate the obsequies; he sent messengers to the oracle of Ammon, to inquire whether it was permitted to worship Hephæstion as a god. Many of those around him, accommodating themselves to this passionate impulse of the ruler, began at once to show a sort of worship towards the deceased, by devoting to him themselves and their arms; of which Eumenês set the example, conscious of his own personal danger, if Alexander should suspect him of being pleased at the death of his recent rival. Perdikkas was instructed to convey the body in solemn procession to Babylon, there to be burnt in state when preparations should be completed.¹

Alexander stayed at Ekbatana until winter was at hand, seeking distraction from his grief in exaggerated splendour of festivals and ostentation of life. His temper became so much more irascible and furious, that no one approached him without fear, and he was propitiated by the most extravagant flatteries.² At length he roused himself and found his true consolation, in gratifying the primary passions of his nature—fighting and man-hunting.³ Between Media and Persis, dwelt the tribes

¹ Arrian, vii. 14; Plutarch, Alex. 72; Diodor. xvii. 110. It will not do to follow the canon of evidence tacitly assumed by Arrian, who thinks himself authorised to discredit all the details of Alexander's conduct on this occasion, which transgress the limits of a dignified, though vehement sorrow.

When Masistius was slain, in the Persian army commanded by Mardonius in Boeotia, the manes of the horses were cut, as token of mourning (Herodot. ix. 24): compare also Plutarch, Pelopidas, 33; and Euripid. Alkestis, 442.

² See the curious extracts from Ephippus the Chalkidian,—seemingly a contemporary, if not an eye-witness (ap. Athenæ. xii. pp. 537, 538)—*εὐφημία δὲ καὶ σιγὴ κατεῖχε πάντας ὑπὸ δέους τοὺς παρόντας· ἀφόρητος γὰρ ἦν (Alexander) καὶ φοινικός· ἐδόκει γὰρ εἶναι μελαγχολικός, &c.*

³ I translate here, literally, Plutarch's expression—*Τοῦ δὲ πένθους παραγορά τῷ πολέμῳ χρώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν, καὶ κυνηγέσιον ἀνθρώπων ἐξῆλθε, καὶ τὸ Κοσσαίων ἔθνος κατεστρέψατο, πάντας ἡβηδὸν ἀποσφάττων. Τοῦτο δὲ Ἡφαιστίωνος ἐναγισμὸς ἐκαλεῖτο* (Plutarch, Alexand. 72: compare Polyænus, iv. 3, 31).

called Kossæi, amidst a region of lofty, trackless, inaccessible mountains. Brave and predatory, they had defied the attacks of the Persian kings. Alexander now conducted against them a powerful force, and in spite of increased difficulties arising from the wintry season, pushed them from point to point, following them into the loftiest and most impenetrable recesses of their mountains. These efforts were continued for forty days, under himself and Ptolemy, until the entire male population was slain; which passed for an acceptable offering to the manes of Hephæstion.¹

Not long afterwards, Alexander commenced his progress to Babylon; but in slow marches, further retarded by various foreign embassies which met him on the road. So widely had the terror of his name and achievements been spread, that several of these envoys came from the most distant regions. There were some from the various tribes of Libya—from Carthage—from Sicily and Sardinia—from the Illyrians and Thracians—from the Lucanians, Bruttians, and Tuscans, in Italy—nay, even (some affirmed) from the Romans, as yet a people of moderate power.² But there were other names yet more surprising—Æthiopians, from the extreme south, beyond Egypt—Scythians from the north, beyond the Danube—Iberians and Gauls, from the far west, beyond the Mediterranean Sea. Legates also arrived from various Grecian cities, partly to tender congratulations and compliments upon his matchless successes, partly to remonstrate against his sweeping mandate for the general restoration of the Grecian exiles.³ It

¹ Arrian, vii. 15; Plutarch, Alex. 72; Diodor, xvii. 111. This general slaughter, however, can only be true of portions of the Kossæan name; for Kossæans occur in after years (Diodor. xix. 19).

² Pliny, H. N. iii. 9. The story in Strabo, v. p. 232, can hardly apply to Alexander the Great. Livy (ix. 18) conceives that the Romans knew nothing of Alexander even by report, but this appears to me not credible.

On the whole, though the point is doubtful, I incline to believe the assertion of a Roman embassy to Alexander. Nevertheless, there were various false statements which afterwards became current about it—one of which may be seen in Memnon's history of the Pontic Herakleia ap. Photium, Cod. 224; Orelli Fragment. Memnon, p. 36. Kleitarchus (contemporary of Alexander), whom Pliny quotes, can have had no motive to insert falsely the name of Romans, which in his time was nowise important.

³ Arrian, vii. 15; Justin, xii. 13; Diodor. xvii. 113. The story mentioned by Justin in another place (xxi. 6) is probably referable to this last season of Alexander's career. A Carthaginian named Hamilkar Rhodanus was sent by his city to Alexander; really as an emissary to acquaint himself with the king's real designs, which occasioned to the Carthaginians serious alarm—but under colour of being an exile tendering his services. Justin

was remarked that these Grecian legates approached him with wreaths on their heads, tendering golden wreaths to him,—as if they were coming into the presence of a god.¹ The proofs which Alexander received, even from distant tribes with names and costumes unknown to him, of fear for his enmity and anxiety for his favour, were such as had never been shown to any historical person, and such as entirely to explain his superhuman arrogance.

In the midst of this exuberant pride and good fortune, however, dark omens and prophecies crowded upon him as he approached Babylon. Of these the most remarkable was, the warning of the Chaldean priests, who apprised him, soon after he crossed the Tigris, that it would be dangerous for him to enter that city, and exhorted him to remain outside of the gates. At first he was inclined to obey; but his scruples were overruled, either by arguments from the Greek sophist Anaxarchus, or by the shame of shutting himself out from the most memorable city of the empire, where his great naval preparations were now going on. He found Nearchus with his fleet, who had come up from the mouth of the river,—and also the ships directed to be built in Phenicia, which had come down the river from Thapsakus, together with large numbers of seafaring men to serve aboard.² The ships of cypress wood, and the large docks, which he had ordered to be constructed at Babylon, were likewise in full progress. He lost no time in concerting with Nearchus the details of an expedition into Arabia and the Persian Gulf, by his land-force and naval force co-operating. From various naval officers, who had been sent to survey the Persian Gulf, and now made their reports, he learnt, that though there were no serious difficulties within it or along its southern coast, yet to double the eastern cape which terminated that coast—to circumnavigate the unknown peninsula of Arabia,—and thus to reach the Red Sea—was an enterprise perilous at least, if not impracticable.³

says that Parmenio introduced Hamilkar—which must, I think, be an error.

¹ Arrian, vii. 19, 1; vii. 23, 3.

² Arrian, vii. 19, 5–12; Diodor. xvii. 112.

³ Arrian, vii. 20, 15; Arrian, Indica, 43. To undertake this circumnavigation, Alexander had despatched a shipmaster of Soli in Cyprus, named Hiero; who, becoming alarmed at the distance to which he was advancing, and at the apparently interminable stretch of Arabia towards the south, returned without accomplishing the object.

Even in the time of Arrian, in the second century after the Christian æra, Arabia had never been circumnavigated, from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea—at least so far as his knowledge extended.

But to achieve that which other men thought impracticable, was the leading passion of Alexander. He resolved to circumnavigate Arabia as well as to conquer the Arabians, from whom it was sufficient offence that they had sent no envoys to him. He also contemplated the foundation of a great maritime city in the interior of the Persian Gulf, to rival in wealth and commerce the cities of Phenicia.¹

Amidst preparations for this expedition—and while the immense funeral pile destined for Hephæstion was being built—Alexander sailed down the Euphrates to the great dyke called Pallakopas, about ninety miles below Babylon; a sluice constructed by the ancient Assyrian kings, for the purpose of being opened when the river was too full, so as to let off the water into the interminable marshes stretching out near the western bank. The sluice being reported not to work well, he projected the construction of a new one somewhat farther down. He then sailed through the Pallakopas in order to survey the marshes, together with the tombs of the ancient Assyrian kings which had been erected among them. Himself steering his vessel, with the *kausia* on his head, and the regal diadem above it,² he passed some time among these lakes and swamps, which were so extensive that his fleet lost the way among them. He stayed long enough also to direct, and even commence, the foundation of a new city, in what seemed to him a convenient spot.³

On returning to Babylon, Alexander found large reinforcements arrived there—partly under Philoxenus, Menander, and Menidas, from Lydia and Karia—partly 20,000 Persians, under Peukestês the satrap. He caused these Persians to be incorporated in the files of the Macedonian phalanx. According to the standing custom, each of these files was sixteen deep, and each soldier was armed with the long pike or *sarissa* wielded by two hands; the lochage, or front-rank man, being always an officer receiving double pay, of great strength and attested valour—and those second and third in the file, as well as the rearmost man of all, being likewise strong and good men, receiving larger pay than the rest. Alexander, in his new arrangement, retained the first three ranks and the rear rank unchanged, as well as the same depth of file; but he substituted twelve Persians in place of the twelve Macedonians who followed after the third-rank man; so that the file was

¹ Arrian, vii. 19, 11.

² Arrian, vii. 22, 2, 3; Strabo, xvi. p. 741.

³ Arrian, vii. 21, 11. *πόλιν ἐξφικοδόμησέ τε καὶ ἐτείχισε.*

composed first of the lochage and two other chosen Macedonians, each armed with the sarissa—then of twelve Persians armed in their own manner with bow or javelin—lastly, of a Macedonian with his sarissa bringing up the rear.¹ In this Macedonico-Persian file, the front would have only three projecting pikes, instead of five, which the ordinary Macedonian phalanx presented; but then, in compensation, the Persian soldiers would be able to hurl their javelins at an advancing enemy, over the heads of their three front-rank men. The supervening death of Alexander prevented the actual execution of this reform, interesting as being his last project for amalgamating Persians and Macedonians into one military force.

Besides thus modifying the phalanx, Alexander also passed in review his fleet, which was now fully equipped. The order was actually given for departing, so soon as the obsequies of Hephæstion should be celebrated. This was the last act which remained for him to fulfil. The splendid funeral pile stood ready—two hundred feet high, occupying a square area, of which the side was nearly one furlong, loaded with costly decorations from the zeal, real and simulated, of the Macedonian officers. The invention of artists was exhausted, in long discussions with the king himself, to produce at all cost an exhibition of magnificence singular and stupendous. The outlay (probably with addition of the festivals immediately following) is stated at 12,000 talents, or £2,760,000 sterling.² Alexander awaited the order from the oracle of Ammon, having sent thither messengers to inquire what measure of reverential honour he might properly and piously show to his departed friend.³ The answer was now brought back, intimating that Hephæstion was to be worshipped as a Hero—the secondary form of worship, not on a level with that paid to the gods. Delighted with this divine testimony to Hephæstion, Alexander caused the pile to be lighted, and the obsequies celebrated, in a manner suitable to the injunctions of the oracle.⁴ He further directed that magnificent chapels or sacred edifices should be erected for the worship and honour of Hephæstion, at

¹ Arrian, vii. 23, 5. Even when performing the purely military operation of passing these soldiers in review, inspecting their exercise, and determining their array,—Alexander sat upon the regal throne, surrounded by Asiatic eunuchs; his principal officers sat upon couches with silver feet, near to him (Arrian, vii. 24, 4). This is among the evidences of his altered manners.

² Diodorus, xvii. 115; Plutarch, Alex. 72.

³ Arrian, vii. 23, 8.

⁴ Diodor. xvii. 114, 115: compare Arrian, vii. 14, 16; Plutarch, Alex.

Alexandria in Egypt,—at Pella in Macedonia, and probably in other cities also.¹

Respecting the honours intended for Hephæstion at Alexandria, he addressed to Kleomenês the satrap of Egypt a despatch which becomes in part known to us. I have already stated that Kleomênes was among the worst of the satraps; having committed multiplied public crimes, of which Alexander was not uninformed. The regal despatch enjoined him to erect in commemoration of Hephæstion a chapel on the terra firma of Alexandria, with a splendid turret in the islet of Pharos; and to provide besides that all mercantile written contracts, as a condition of validity, should be inscribed with the name of Hephæstion. Alexander concluded thus:—"If on coming I find the Egyptian temples and the chapels of Hephæstion completed in the best manner, I will forgive you for all your past crimes; and in future, whatever magnitude of crime you may commit, you shall suffer no bad treatment from me."² This despatch strikingly illustrates how much the wrong doings of satraps were secondary considerations in his view, compared with splendid manifestations towards the gods, and personal attachment towards friends.

The intense sorrow felt by Alexander for the death of Hephæstion—not merely an attached friend, but of the same age and exuberant vigour as himself—laid his mind open to

¹ Arrian, vii. 23, 10–13; Diod. xviii. 4. Diodorus speaks indeed, in this passage, of the *πυρὰ* or funeral pile in honour of Hephæstion, as if it were among the vast expenses included in the memoranda left by Alexander (after his decease) of prospective schemes. But the funeral pile had already been erected at Babylon, as Diodorus himself had informed us. What Alexander left unexecuted at his decease, but intended to execute if he had lived, was the splendid edifices and chapels in Hephæstion's honour—as we see by Arrian, vii. 23, 10. And Diodorus must be supposed to allude to these intended sacred buildings, though he has inadvertently spoken of the funeral pile. Kraterus, who was under orders to return to Macedonia, was to have built one at Pella.

The Olynthian Ehippus had composed a book *περὶ τῆς Ἡφαιστίωνος καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου ταφῆς*, of which there appear four or five citations in Athenæus. He dwelt especially on the luxurious habits of Alexander, and on his unmeasured potations—common to him with other Macedonians.

² Arrian, vii. 23, 9–14. *Καὶ Κλεομένει ἀνδρὶ κακῷ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδίκησαντι ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ἐπιστάλλει ἐπιστολήν. . . .* *Ὦν γὰρ καταλάβω ἐγὼ (ἔλεγε τὰ γράμματα) τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καλῶς κατεσκευασμένα καὶ τὰ ἡρώα τὰ Ἡφαιστίωνος, εἴτε τι πρότερον ἡμάρτηκας, ἀφήσω σε τούτων, καὶ τολοιπὸν δηπλίκον ἂν ἡμάρτης, οὐδὲν πείσῃ ἐξ ἐμοῦ ἄχαρι.—In the oration of Demosthenês against Dionysodorus (p. 1285), Kleomenês appears as enriching himself by the monopoly of corn exported from Egypt: compare Pseudo-Aristot. *Œconom.* c. 33. Kleomenês was afterwards put to death by the first Ptolemy, who became king of Egypt (Pausanias, i. 6, 3).

gloomy forebodings from numerous omens, as well as to jealous mistrust even of his oldest officers. Antipater especially, no longer protected against the calumnies of Olympias by the support of Hephæstion,¹ fell more and more into discredit; whilst his son Kassander, who had recently come into Asia with a Macedonian reinforcement, underwent from Alexander during irascible moments much insulting violence. In spite of the dissuasive warning of the Chaldean priests,² Alexander had been persuaded to distrust their sincerity, and had entered Babylon, though not without hesitation and uneasiness. However, when, after having entered the town, he went out of it again safely on his expedition for the survey of the lower Euphrates, he conceived himself to have exposed them as deceitful alarmists, and returned to the city with increased confidence, for the obsequies of his deceased friend.³

The sacrifices connected with these obsequies were on the most prodigious scale. Victims enough were offered to furnish a feast for the army, who also received ample distributions of wine. Alexander presided in person at the feast, and abandoned himself to conviviality like the rest. Already full of wine, he was persuaded by his friend Medius to sup with him, and to pass the whole night in yet further drinking, with the boisterous indulgence called by the Greeks *Kômus* or Revelry. Having slept off his intoxication during the next day, he in the evening again supped with Medius, and spent a second night in the like unmeasured indulgence.⁴ It appears that he already

¹ Plutarch, *Alex.* 74; Diodor. xvii. 114.

² Arrian, vii. 16, 9; vii. 17, 6. Plutarch, *Alex.* 73. Diodor. xvii. 112.

³ Arrian, vii. 22, 1. *Αὐτὸς δὲ ὡς ἐξελέγξας δὴ τῶν Χαλδαίων μαντείας, ἥτις οὐδὲν πεπονθὼς εἶη ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἄχαρι (ἀλλ' ἐφθη γὰρ ἐλάσας ἐξω Βαβυλῶνος πρὶν τι παθεῖν) ἀνέπλει αὐτὸς κατὰ τὰ ἐλη θαρρόων, &c.*

The uneasiness here caused by these prophecies and omens, in the mind of the most fearless man of his age, is worthy of notice as a psychological fact, and is perfectly attested by the authority of Aristobulus and Nearchus. It appears that Anaxarchus and other Grecian philosophers encouraged him by their reasonings to despise all prophecy, but especially that of the Chaldean priests; who (they alleged) wished to keep Alexander out of Babylon in order that they might continue to possess the large revenues of the temple of Belus, which they had wrongfully appropriated; Alexander being disposed to rebuild that ruined temple, and to re-establish the suspended sacrifices to which its revenues had been originally devoted (Arrian, vii. 17; Diodor. xvii. 112). Not many days afterwards, Alexander greatly repented of having given way to these dangerous reasoners, who by their sophistical cavils set aside the power and the warnings of destiny (Diodor. xvii. 116).

⁴ Arrian, vii. 24, 25. Diodorus states (xvii. 117) that Alexander, on this convivial night, swallowed the contents of a large goblet called the cup of

had the seeds of fever upon him, which was so fatally aggravated by this intemperance that he was too ill to return to his palace. He took the bath, and slept in the house of Medius; on the next morning, he was unable to rise. After having been carried out on a couch to celebrate sacrifice (which was his daily habit), he was obliged to lie in bed all day. Nevertheless he summoned the generals to his presence, prescribing all the details of the impending expedition, and ordering that the land-force should begin its march on the fourth day following, while the fleet, with himself aboard, would sail on the fifth day. In the evening he was carried on a couch across the Euphrates into a garden on the other side, where he bathed and rested for the night. The fever still continued, so that in the morning, after bathing and being carried out to perform the sacrifices, he remained on his couch all day, talking and playing at dice with Medius; in the evening, he bathed, sacrificed again, and ate a light supper, but endured a bad night with increased fever. The next two days passed in the same manner, the fever becoming worse and worse; nevertheless Alexander still summoned Nearchus to his bedside, discussed with him many points about his maritime projects, and repeated his order that the fleet should be ready by the third day. On the ensuing morning the fever was violent; Alexander reposed all day in a bathing-house in the garden, yet still calling in the generals to direct the filling up of vacancies among the officers, and ordering that the armament should be ready to move. Throughout the two next days, his malady became hourly more aggravated. On the second of the two, Alexander could with difficulty support the being lifted out of bed to perform the sacrifice; even then, however, he continued to give orders to the generals about the expedition. On the morrow, though desperately ill, he still made the effort requisite for performing the sacrifice; he was then carried across from the garden-house to the palace, giving orders that the generals and officers should remain in permanent attendance in and near the hall. He caused some of them to be called to his bedside; but though he knew them perfectly, he had by this time become incapable

Hêraklès, and felt very ill after it; a statement repeated by various other writers of antiquity, and which I see no reason for discrediting, though some modern critics treat it with contempt. The Royal Ephemerides, or Court Journal, attested only the general fact of his large potations and the long sleep which followed them: see Athenæus, x. p. 434.

To drink to intoxication at a funeral, was required as a token of respectful sympathy towards the deceased—see the last words of the Indian Kalanus, before he ascended the funeral pile—Plutarch, Alexander, 69.

of utterance. One of his last words spoken is said to have been, on being asked to whom he bequeathed his kingdom, "*To the strongest*;" one of his last acts was, to take the signet ring from his finger, and hand it to Perdikkas.¹

For two nights and a day he continued in this state, without either amendment or repose. Meanwhile the news of his malady had spread through the army, filling them with grief and consternation. Many of the soldiers, eager to see him once more, forced their way into the palace, and were admitted unarmed. They passed along by the bedside, with all the demonstrations of affliction and sympathy: Alexander knew them, and made show of friendly recognition as well as he could; but was unable to say a word. Several of the generals slept in the temple of Serapis, hoping to be informed by the god in a dream whether they ought to bring Alexander into it as a suppliant to experience the divine healing power. The god informed them in their dream, that Alexander ought not to be brought into the temple—that it would be better for him to be left where he was. In the afternoon he expired—June 323 B.C.—after a life of thirty-two years and eight months—and a reign of twelve years and eight months.²

¹ These last two facts are mentioned by Arrian (vii. 26, 5), and Diodorus (xvii. 117), and Justin (xii. 15): but they found no place in the Court Journal. Curtius (x. v. 4) gives them with some enlargement.

² The details, respecting the last illness of Alexander, are peculiarly authentic, being extracted both by Arrian and by Plutarch, from the *Ephemerides Regiæ*, or short Court Journal; which was habitually kept by his secretary Eumênês, and another Greek named Diodotus (Athenæ. x. p. 434): see Arrian, vii. 25, 26; Plutarch, Alex. 76.

It is surprising that throughout all the course of this malady, no mention is made of any physician as having been consulted. No advice was asked; if we except the application to the temple of Serapis, during the last day of Alexander's life. A few months before, Alexander had hanged or crucified the physician who attended Ἡεφæστιον in his last illness. Hence it seems probable that he either despised or mistrusted medical advice, and would not permit any to be invoked. His views must have been much altered since his dangerous fever at Tarsus, and the successful treatment of it by the Akamanian physician Philippus.

Though the fever (see some remarks from Littré attached to Didot's *Fragm. Script. Alex. Magn.* p. 124) which caused Alexander's death is here a plain fact satisfactorily made out, yet a different story was circulated some time afterwards, and gained partial credit (Plutarch, *De Invidiâ*, p. 538), that he had been poisoned. The poison was said to have been provided by Aristotle,—sent over to Asia by Antipater through his son Kassander,—and administered by Iollas (another son of Antipater), Alexander's cupbearer (Arrian, vii. 27, 2; Curtius, x. 10, 17; Diodor. xvii. 118; Justin, xii. 13). It is quite natural that fever and intemperance (which latter moreover was frequent with Alexander) should not be regarded as causes sufficiently marked and impressive to explain a decease at once so

The death of Alexander, thus suddenly cut off by a fever in the plenitude of health, vigour, and aspirations, was an event impressive as well as important in the highest possible degree, to his contemporaries far and near. When the first report of it was brought to Athens, the orator Demadēs exclaimed—"It cannot be true: if Alexander were dead, the whole habitable world would have smelt of his carcass."¹ This coarse, but emphatic comparison, illustrates the immediate, powerful, and wide-reaching impression produced by the sudden extinction of the great conqueror. It was felt by each of the many remote envoys who had so recently come to propitiate this far-shooting Apollo—by every man among the nations who had sent these envoys—throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa, as then known,—to affect either his actual condition or his probable future.² The first growth and development of Macedonia, during the twenty-two years preceding the battle of Chæroneia, from an embarrassed secondary state into the first of all known powers, had excited the astonishment of contemporaries, and admiration for Philip's organising genius. But the achievements of Alexander, during his twelve years of reign, throwing Philip into the shade, had been on a scale so much grander and vaster, and so completely without serious reverse or even interruption, as to transcend the measure, not only of human expectation, but almost of human belief. The Great King (as the King of Persia was called by excellence), was, and had long been, the type of worldly power and felicity, even down to the time when Alexander crossed the Hellespont. Within four years and three months from this event, by one stupendous defeat after another, Darius had lost all his Western Empire, and had become a fugitive eastward of the Caspian Gates,

unexpected and so momentous. There seems ground for supposing, however, that the report was intentionally fomented, if not originally broached, by the party-enemies of Antipater and Kassander—especially by the rancorous Olympias. The violent enmity afterwards displayed by Kassander against Olympias, and all the family of Alexander, helped to encourage the report. In the life of Hyperidēs in Plutarch (Vit. X. Oratt. p. 849), it is stated, that he proposed at Athens public honours to Iollas for having given the poison to Alexander. If there is any truth in this, it might be a stratagem for casting discredit on Antipater (father of Iollas), against whom the Athenians entered into the Lamian war, immediately after the death of Alexander.

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Demetrius Phaler. De Elocution. s. 300. Οὐ τέθνηκεν Ἀλέξανδρος, ὃ ἄνθρωπος Ἀθηναῖοι—ᾧς γὰρ ἂν ἡ οἰκουμένη τοῦ νεκροῦ.

² Dionysius, despot of the Pontic Herakleia, fainted away with joy when he heard of Alexander's death, and erected a statue of *Εὐθυμία* or Comfort (Memn. Heracl. Fragm. ap. Photium, Cod. 224, c. 4).

escaping captivity at the hands of Alexander only to perish by those of the satrap Bessus. All antecedent historical parallels—the ruin and captivity of the Lydian Cræsus, the expulsion and mean life of the Syracusan Dionysius, both of them impressive examples of the mutability of human condition,—sank into trifles compared with the overthrow of this towering Persian colossus. The orator Æschinês expressed the genuine sentiment of a Grecian spectator, when he exclaimed (in a speech delivered at Athens shortly before the death of Darius)—“What is there among the list of strange and unexpected events, that has not occurred in our time? Our lives have transcended the limits of humanity; we are born to serve as a theme for incredible tales to posterity. Is not the Persian king—who dug through Athos and bridged the Hellespont,—who demanded earth and water from the Greeks,—who dared to proclaim himself in public epistles master of all mankind from the rising to the setting sun—is not *he* now struggling to the last, not for dominion over others, but for the safety of his own person?”¹

Such were the sentiments excited by Alexander's career even in the middle of 330 B.C., more than seven years before his death. During the following seven years, his additional achievements had carried astonishment yet further. He had mastered, in defiance of fatigue, hardship, and combat, not merely all the eastern half of the Persian empire, but unknown Indian regions beyond its easternmost limits. Besides Macedonia, Greece, and Thrace, he possessed all that immense treasure and military force which had once rendered the Great King so formidable. By no contemporary man had any such power ever been known or conceived. With the turn of imagination then prevalent, many were doubtless disposed to take him for a god on earth, as Grecian spectators had once supposed with regard to Xerxês, when they beheld the innumerable Persian host crossing the Hellespont.²

¹ Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 524, c. 43. *Τοιγάροι τί τῶν ἀνελπίστων καὶ ἀπροσδοκῆτων ἐφ' ἡμῶν οὐ γέγονεν; οὐ γὰρ βίον γ' ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπινον βεβίωκαμεν, ἀλλ' εἰς παραδοξολογίαν τοῖς ἐσομένοις μεθ' ἡμᾶς ἐφυμεν. Οὐχ ὁ μὲν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεὺς, ὁ τὸν Ἀθῶν διорύξας καὶ τὸν Ἑλλησποντον ζεύξας, ὁ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ τοὺς Ἕλληνας αἰτῶν, ὁ τολμῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς γράφειν ὅτι δεσπότης ἐστὶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἀφ' ἡλίου ἀνιόντος μέχρι δυομένου, νῦν οὐ περὶ τοῦ κύριος ἐτέρων εἶναι διαγωνίζεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη περὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος σωτηρίας;*

Compare the striking fragment, of a like tenor, out of the lost work of the Phalerean Demetrius—Περὶ τῆς τύχης—Fragment. *Histor. Græcor.* vol. ii. p. 368.

² Herod. vii. 56.

Exalted to this prodigious grandeur, Alexander was at the time of his death little more than thirty-two years old—the age at which a citizen of Athens was growing into important commands; ten years less than the age for a consul at Rome;¹ two years younger than the age at which Timour first acquired the crown, and began his foreign conquests.² His extraordinary bodily powers were unabated; he had acquired a large stock of military experience; and, what was still more important, his appetite for further conquest was as voracious, and his readiness to purchase it at the largest cost of toil or danger, as complete, as it had been when he first crossed the Hellespont. Great as his past career had been, his future achievements, with such increased means and experience, were likely to be yet greater. His ambition would have been satisfied with nothing less than the conquest of the whole habitable world as then known;³ and if his life had been prolonged, he would probably have accomplished it. Nowhere (so far as our knowledge reaches) did there reside any military power capable of making head against him; nor were his soldiers, when he commanded them, daunted or baffled by any extremity of cold, heat, or fatigue. The patriotic feelings of Livy dispose him to maintain⁴ that Alexander, had he invaded Italy and assailed Romans or Samnites, would have failed and perished like his relative Alexander of Epirus. But this conclusion cannot be accepted. If we grant the courage and discipline of the Roman infantry to have been equal to the best infantry of Alexander's army, the same cannot be said of the Roman cavalry as compared with the Macedonian Companions. Still less is it likely that a Roman consul, annually changed, would have been found a match for Alexander in military genius and combinations; nor, even if

¹ Cicero, *Philippic.* v. 17, 48.

² See *Histoire de Timour-Bec*, par Cherefeddin Ali, translated by Petit de la Croix, vol. i. p. 203.

³ This is the remark of his great admirer Arrian, vii. 1, 6.

⁴ Livy, ix. 17–19. A discussion of Alexander's chances against the Romans—extremely interesting and beautiful, though the case appears to me very partially set forth. I agree with Niebuhr in dissenting from Livy's result; and with Plutarch in considering it as one of the boons of Fortune to the Romans, that Alexander did not live long enough to attack them (*Plutarch De Fortunâ Romanor.* p. 326).

Livy however had great reason for complaining of those Greek authors (he calls them "*levissimi ex Græcis*"), who said the Romans would have quailed before the terrible reputation of Alexander, and submitted without resistance. Assuredly his victory over them would have been dearly bought.

personally equal, would he have possessed the same variety of troops and arms, each effective in its separate way, and all conspiring to one common purpose—nor the same unbounded influence over their minds in stimulating them to full effort. I do not think that even the Romans could have successfully resisted Alexander the Great; though it is certain that he never throughout all his long marches encountered such enemies as they, nor even such as Samnites and Lucanians—combining courage, patriotism, discipline, with effective arms both for defence and for close combat.¹

Among all the qualities which go to constitute the highest military excellence, either as a general or as a soldier, none was wanting in the character of Alexander. Together with his own chivalrous courage—sometimes indeed both excessive and unseasonable, so as to form the only military defect which can be fairly imputed to him—we trace in all his operations the most careful dispositions taken beforehand, vigilant precaution in guarding against possible reverse, and abundant resource in adapting himself to new contingencies. Amidst constant success, these precautionary combinations were never discontinued. His achievements are the earliest recorded evidence of scientific military organisation on a large scale, and of its overwhelming effects. Alexander overawes the imagination more than any other personage of antiquity, by the matchless development of all that constitutes effective force—as an individual warrior, and as organiser and leader of armed masses; not merely the blind impetuosity ascribed by Homer to Arés, but also the intelligent, methodised, and all-subduing compression which he personifies in Athênê. But all his great qualities were fit for use only against enemies; in which category indeed were numbered all mankind, known and unknown, except those who chose to submit to him. In his Indian campaigns, amidst tribes of utter strangers, we perceive that not only those who stand on their defence, but also those who abandon their property and flee to the mountains, are alike pursued and slaughtered.

Apart from the transcendent merits of Alexander as a soldier and a general, some authors give him credit for grand and beneficent views on the subject of imperial government, and

¹ Alexander of Epirus is said to have remarked, that he, in his expeditions into Italy, had fallen upon the *ἀνδρωνίτις* or chamber of the men; while his nephew (Alexander the Great), in invading Asia, had fallen upon the *γυναικωνίτις* or chamber of the women (Aulus Gellius, xvii. 21; Curtius, viii. 1, 37).

for intentions highly favourable to the improvement of mankind. I see no ground for adopting this opinion. As far as we can venture to anticipate what would have been Alexander's future, we see nothing in prospect except years of ever-repeated aggression and conquest, not to be concluded until he had traversed and subjugated all the inhabited globe. The acquisition of universal dominion—conceived not metaphorically, but literally, and conceived with greater facility in consequence of the imperfect geographical knowledge of the time—was the master-passion of his soul. At the moment of his death, he was commencing fresh aggression in the south against the Arabians, to an indefinite extent;¹ while his vast projects against the western tribes in Africa and Europe, as far as the Pillars of Hêraklês, were consigned in the orders and memoranda confidentially communicated to Kraterus.² Italy, Gaul, and Spain, would have been successively attacked and conquered; the enterprises proposed to him when in Baktria by the Chorasmian prince Pharasmanês, but postponed then until a more convenient season, would have been next taken up, and he would have marched from the Danube northward round the Euxine and Palus Mæotis against the Scythians and the tribes of Caucasus.³ There remained moreover the Asiatic regions east of the Hyphasis, which his soldiers had refused to enter upon, but which he certainly would have invaded at a future opportunity, were it only to efface the poignant humiliation of having been compelled to relinquish his proclaimed purpose. Though this sounds like romance and hyperbole, it was nothing more than the real insatiate aspiration of Alexander, who looked upon every new acquisition mainly as a capital for acquiring more:⁴ “You are a man like all of us, Alexander (said the naked Indian to him)—except that you abandon your home like a meddlesome destroyer, to invade the most distant regions; enduring hardship yourself, and inflicting hardship upon others.”⁵ Now, how an empire thus

¹ Arrian, vii. 28, 5.

² Diodor. xviii. 4.

³ Arrian, iv. 15, 11.

⁴ Arrian, vii. 19, 12. Τὸ δὲ ἀληθές, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ἀπληστος ἦν τοῦ κτᾶσθαι τι αἰεὶ Ἀλέξανδρος. Compare vii. 1, 3-7; vii. 15, 6, and the speech made by Alexander to his soldiers on the banks of the Hyphasis when he was trying to persuade them to march forward, v. 26 *seq.* We must remember that Arrian had before him the work of Ptolemy, who would give, in all probability, the substance of this memorable speech from his own hearing.

⁵ Arrian, vii. 1, 8. σὺ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὢν, παραπλήσιος τοῖς ἄλλοις, πλήν γε δὴ, ὅτι πολυπράγμων καὶ ἀτάσθαλος, ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας τοσαύτην γῆν ἐπεξέρχῃ, πράγματα ἔχων τε καὶ παρέχων ἄλλοις.

boundless and heterogeneous, such as no prince has ever yet realised, could have been administered with any superior advantages to subjects, it would be difficult to show. The mere task of acquiring and maintaining—of keeping satraps and tribute-gatherers in authority as well as in subordination—of suppressing resistances ever liable to recur in regions distant by months of march¹—would occupy the whole life of a world-conqueror, without leaving any leisure for the improvements suited to peace and stability, if we give him credit for such purposes in theory.

But even this last is more than can be granted. Alexander's acts indicate that he desired nothing better than to take up the traditions of the Persian empire; a tribute-levying and army-levying system, under Macedonians, in large proportion, as his instruments; yet partly also under the very same Persians who had administered before, provided they submitted to him. It has indeed been extolled among his merits that he was thus willing to reappoint Persian grandees (putting their armed force however under the command of a Macedonian officer)—and to continue native princes in their dominions, if they did willing homage to him, as tributary subordinates. But all this had been done before him by the Persian kings, whose system it was to leave the conquered princes undisturbed, subject only to the payment of tribute, and to the obligation of furnishing a military contingent when required.² In like manner Alexander's Asiatic empire would thus have been composed of an aggregate of satrapies and dependent principalities, furnishing money and soldiers; in other respects, left to the discretion of local rule, with occasional extreme inflictions of punishment, but no systematic examination or control.³ Upon this, the condition of Asiatic empire in all ages, Alexander would have grafted one special improvement: the military organisation of the empire, feeble under the Achæmenid princes, would have been greatly strengthened by his genius, and by the able officers formed in his school, both for foreign aggression and for home control.⁴

¹ Arrian, vii. 4, 4, 5.

² Herodot. iii. 15. Alexander offered to Phokion (Plutarch, Phok. 18) his choice between four Asiatic cities, of which (that is, of any one of them) he was to enjoy the revenues; just as Artaxerxês Longimanus had acted towards Themistoklès in recompense for his treason. Phokion refused the offer.

³ See the punishment of Sisamnês by Kambysês (Herodot. v. 25).

⁴ The rhetor Aristeidês, in his Encomium on Rome, has some good remarks on the character and ascendancy of Alexander, exercised by will

The Persian empire was a miscellaneous aggregate, with no strong feeling of nationality. The Macedonian conqueror who seized its throne was still more indifferent to national sentiment. He was neither Macedonian nor Greek. Though the absence of this prejudice has sometimes been counted to him as a virtue, it only made room, in my opinion, for prejudices still worse. The substitute for it was an exorbitant personality and self-estimation, manifested even in his earliest years, and inflamed by extraordinary success into the belief in divine parentage; which, while setting him above the idea of communion with any special nationality, made him conceive all mankind as subjects under one common sceptre to be wielded by himself. To this universal empire the Persian king made the nearest approach,¹ according to the opinions then prevalent. Accordingly Alexander, when victorious, accepted the position and pretensions of the overthrown Persian court as approaching most nearly to his full due. He became more Persian than either Macedonian or Greek. While himself adopting, as far as he could safely venture, the personal habits of the Persian court, he took studied pains to transform his Macedonian officers into Persian grandees, encouraging and even forcing intermarriages with Persian women according to Persian rites. At the time of Alexander's death, there was comprised, in his written orders given to Kraterus, a plan for the wholesale transportation of inhabitants both out of Europe into Asia, and out of Asia into Europe, in order to fuse these populations into one by multiplying intermarriages and intercourse.² Such reciprocal translation of peoples would have been felt as eminently odious, and could not have been accomplished without coercive authority.³ It is rash to speculate

and personal authority, as contrasted with the systematic and legal working of the Roman Empire (Orat. xvi. p. 332-360, vol. i. ed. Dindorf).

¹ Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* viii. 6, 21; *Anab.* i. 7, 6; Herodot. vii. 8, 13; compare Arrian, v. 26, 4-10.

² Diodor. xviii. 4. *Πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις πόλεων συνοικισμοὺς καὶ σωμάτων μεταγωγὰς ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην, καὶ κατὰ τοῦναντίον ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν, ὅπως τὰς μεγίστας ἡπείρους ταῖς ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ταῖς οἰκειώσεσιν εἰς κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν καὶ συγγενικὴν φιλίαν καταστήσῃ.*

³ See the effect produced upon the Ionians by the false statement of Histæus (Herodot. vi. 3) with Wesseling's note—and the eagerness of the Pæonians to return (Herod. v. 98; also Justin, viii. 5).

Antipater afterwards intended to transport the Ætolians in mass from their own country into Asia, if he had succeeded in conquering them (Diodor. xviii. 25). Compare Pausanias (i. 9, 8-10) about the forcible measures used by Lysimachus, in transporting new inhabitants, at Ephesus and Lysimacheia.

upon unexecuted purposes ; but, as far as we can judge, such compulsory mingling of the different races promises nothing favourable to the happiness of any of them, though it might serve as an imposing novelty and memento of imperial omnipotence.

In respect of intelligence and combining genius, Alexander was Hellenic to the full ; in respect of disposition and purpose, no one could be less Hellenic. The acts attesting his Oriental violence of impulse, unmeasured self-will,¹ and exaction of reverence above the limits of humanity—have been already recounted. To describe him as a son of Hellas, imbued with the political maxims of Aristotle, and bent on the systematic diffusion of Hellenic culture for the improvement of mankind²—is, in my judgement, an estimate of his character contrary to the evidence. Alexander is indeed said to have invited suggestions from Aristotle as to the best mode of colonising ; but his temper altered so much, after a few years of Asiatic conquest, that he came not only to lose all deference for Aristotle's advice, but even to hate him bitterly.³ Moreover, though the philosopher's full suggestions have not been preserved, yet we are told generally that he recommended Alexander to behave to the Greeks as a leader or president, or limited chief—and to the Barbarians (non-Hellenes) as a master ;⁴ a distinction substantially coinciding with that pointed

¹ Livy, ix. 18. "Referre in tanto rege piget superbam mutationem vestis, et desideratas humi jacentium adulationes, etiam victis Macedonibus graves, nedom victoribus : et fœda supplicia, et inter vinum et epulas cædes amicorum, et vanitatem ementiendæ stirpis. Quid si vini amor in dies fieret acrior ? quid si trux et præservida ira ? (*nec quidquam dubium inter scriptores refiro*) nullane hæc damna imperatoriis virtutibus ducimus ?"

The appeal here made by Livy to the full attestation of these points in Alexander's character deserves notice. He had doubtless more authorities before him than we possess.

² Among other eulogists of Alexander, it is sufficient to name Droysen—in his two works, both of great historical research—*Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*—and *Geschichte des Hellenismus oder der Bildung des Hellenistischen Staaten Systemes* (Hamburg, 1843). See especially the last and most recent work, p. 27 seq. p. 651 seq.—and elsewhere *passim*.

³ Plutarch, Alex. 55-74.

⁴ Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. M. p. 329. 'Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἔργον παρέσχεν· οὐ γάρ, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης συνεβούλευεν αὐτῷ, τοῖς μὲν Ἑλλησιν ἡγεμονικῶς, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χρώμενον . . . , ἀλλὰ κοινὸς ἦκειν θεόθεν ἁρμοστὴς καὶ διαλλακτὴς τῶν ὄλων νομίζων, οὗς τῷ λόγῳ μὴ συνῆγε, τοῖς ὅλοις βιάζόμενος, εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συνενεγκὼν τὰ πανταχόθεν, &c.

Strabo (or Eratosthenēs, see Strabo, i. p. 66) and Plutarch understand the expression of Aristotle erroneously—as if that philosopher had meant to recommend harsh and cruel treatment of the non-Hellenes, and kind treatment only towards Greeks. That Aristotle could have meant no such

out by Burke in his speeches at the beginning of the American war, between the principles of government proper to be followed by England in the American colonies, and in British India. No Greek thinker believed the Asiatics to be capable of that free civil polity¹ upon which the march of every Grecian community was based. Aristotle did not wish to degrade the Asiatics below the level to which they had been accustomed, but rather to preserve the Greeks from being degraded to the same level. Now Alexander recognised no such distinction as that drawn by his preceptor. He treated Greeks and Asiatics alike, not by elevating the latter, but by degrading the former. Though he employed all indiscriminately as instruments, yet he presently found the free speech of Greeks, and even of Macedonians, so distasteful and offensive, that his preferences turned more and more in favour of the servile Asiatic sentiment and customs. Instead of hellenising Asia, he was tending to asiaticise Macedonia and Hellas. His temper and character, as modified by a few years of conquest, rendered him quite unfit to follow the course recommended by Aristotle towards the Greeks—quite as unfit as any of the Persian kings, or as the French Emperor Napoleon, to endure that partial frustration, compromise, and smart from free criticism, which is inseparable from the position of a limited chief. Among a multitude of subjects more diverse-coloured than even the army of Xerxēs, it is quite possible that he might have turned his power towards the improvement of the rudest portions. We are told (though the fact is difficult to credit, from his want of time) that he abolished various barbarisms of the Hyrkanians, Arachosians, and Sogdians.² But

thing, is evident from the whole tenor of his treatise on Politics. The distinction really intended is between a greater and a less measure of extra-popular authority—not between kind and unkind purposes in the exercise of authority. Compare Tacitus, *Annal.* xii. 11—the advice of the Emperor Claudius to the Parthian prince Meherdatēs.

¹ Aristot. *Politic.* i. 1, 5; vii. 6, 1. See the memorable comparison drawn by Aristotle (*Polit.* vii. 6) between the Europeans and Asiatics generally. He pronounces the former to be courageous and energetic, but wanting in intelligence or powers of political combination; the latter to be intelligent, and clever in contrivance, but destitute of courage. Neither of them have more than a “one-legged aptitude” (*φύσιν μονόκωλον*); the Greek alone possesses both the courage and the intelligence united. The Asiatics are condemned to perpetual subjection; the Greeks might govern the world, could they but combine in one political society.

Isokratēs ad Philippum, *Or.* v. p. 85, s. 18. *ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πείθειν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας συμφέρον, τὸ δὲ βιάζεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους χρήσιν.*

² Plutarch, *Fortun. Alex. M.* p. 328. The stay of Alexander in these

Macedonians as well as Greeks would have been pure losers by being absorbed into an immense Asiatic aggregate.

Plutarch states that Alexander founded more than seventy new cities in Asia.¹ So large a number of them is neither verifiable nor probable, unless we either reckon up simple military posts, or borrow from the list of foundations really established by his successors. Except Alexandria in Egypt, none of the cities founded by Alexander himself can be shown to have attained any great development. Nearly all were planted among the remote, warlike, and turbulent peoples eastward of the Caspian Gates. Such establishments were really fortified posts to hold the country in subjection: Alexander lodged in them detachments from his army, but none of these detachments can well have been large, since he could not afford materially to weaken his army, while active military operations were still going on, and while farther advance was in contemplation. More of these settlements were founded in Sogdiana than elsewhere; but respecting the Sogdian foundations, we know that the Greeks whom he established there, chained to the spot only by fear of his power, broke away

countries was however so short, that even with the best will he could not have enforced the suppression of any inveterate customs.

¹ Plutarch, *Fortun. Al. M.* p. 328. Plutarch mentions, a few lines afterwards, Seleukeia in Mesopotamia, as if he thought that it was among the cities established by Alexander himself. This shows that he has not been exact in distinguishing foundations made by Alexander, from those originated by Seleukus and other Diadochi.

The elaborate article of Droysen (in the Appendix to his *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, p. 588-651) ascribes to Alexander the largest plans of colonisation in Asia, and enumerates a great number of cities alleged to have been founded by him. But in regard to the majority of these foundations, the evidence upon which Droysen grounds his belief that Alexander was the founder, appears to me altogether slender and unsatisfactory. If Alexander founded so many cities as Droysen imagines, how does it happen that Arrian mentions only so comparatively small a number? The argument derived from Arrian's silence, for rejecting what is affirmed by other ancients respecting Alexander, is indeed employed by modern authors (and by Droysen himself among them), far oftener than I think warrantable. But if there be any one proceeding of Alexander more than another, in respect of which the silence of Arrian ought to make us suspicious—it is the foundation of a new colony; a solemn act, requiring delay and multiplied regulations, intended for perpetuity, and redounding to the honour of the founder. I do not believe in any colonies founded by Alexander, beyond those comparatively few which Arrian mentions, except such as rest upon some other express and good testimony. Whoever will read through Droysen's list, will see that most of the names in it will not stand this test. The short life, and rapid movements, of Alexander, are of themselves the strongest presumption against his having founded so large a number of colonies.

in mutiny immediately on the news of his death.¹ Some Greek soldiers in Alexander's army on the Jaxartês or the Hydaspes, sick and weary of his interminable marches, might prefer being enrolled among the colonists of a new city on one of these unknown rivers, to the ever-repeated routine of exhausting duty.² But it is certain that no volunteer emigrants would go forth to settle at distances such as their imaginations could hardly conceive. The absorbing appetite of Alexander was conquest, to the East, West, South, and North; the cities which he planted were established, for the most part, as garrisons to maintain his most distant and most precarious acquisitions. The purpose of colonisation was altogether subordinate; and that of hellenising Asia, so far as we can see, was not even contemplated, much less realised.

This process of hellenising Asia—in so far as Asia was ever hellenised—which has often been ascribed to Alexander, was in reality the work of the Diadochi who came after him; though his conquests doubtless opened the door and established the military ascendancy which rendered such a work practicable. The position, the aspirations, and the interests of these Diadochi—Antigonos, Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, &c.—were materially different from those of Alexander. They had neither appetite nor means for new and remote conquest; their great rivalry was with each other; each sought to strengthen himself near home against the rest. It became a matter of fashion and pride with them, not less than of interest, to found new cities immortalising their family names. These foundations were chiefly made in the regions of Asia near and known to Greeks, where Alexander had planted none. Thus the great and numerous foundations of Seleukus Nikator and his successors covered Syria, Mesopotamia, and parts of Asia Minor. All these regions were known to Greeks, and more or less tempting to new Grecian immigrants—not out of reach or hearing of the Olympic and other festivals, as the Jaxartês and the Indus were. In this way a considerable influx of new Hellenic blood was poured into Asia during the century succeeding Alexander—probably in great measure from Italy and Sicily, where the condition of the Greek cities became

¹ Diodor. xvii. 99; xviii. 7. Curtius, ix. 7, 1. Curtius observes (vii. 10, 15) respecting Alexander's colonies in Sogdiana—that they were founded “*velut fræni domitarum gentium; nunc originis suæ oblita serviunt, quibus imperaverunt.*”

² See the plain-spoken outburst of the Thurian Antileon, one of the soldiers in Xenophon's Ten Thousand Greeks, when the army reached Trapezus (Xenoph. Anab. v. 1, 2).

more and more calamitous—besides the numerous Greeks who took service as individuals under these Asiatic kings. Greeks, and Macedonians speaking Greek, became predominant, if not in numbers, at least in importance, throughout most of the cities in Western Asia. In particular, the Macedonian military organisation, discipline, and administration, was maintained systematically among these Asiatic kings. In the account of the battle of Magnesia, fought by the Seleukid king Antiochus the Great against the Romans in 190 B.C., the Macedonian phalanx, constituting the main force of his Asiatic army, appears in all its completeness, just as it stood under Philip and Perseus in Macedonia itself.¹

When it is said however that Asia became hellenised under Alexander's successors, the phrase requires explanation. Hellenism, properly so called—the aggregate of habits, sentiments, energies, and intelligence, manifested by the Greeks during their epoch of autonomy²—never passed over into Asia; neither the highest qualities of the Greek mind, nor even the entire character of ordinary Greeks. This genuine Hellenism could not subsist under the over-ruling compression of Alexander, nor even under the less irresistible pressure of his successors. Its living force, productive genius, self-organising power, and active spirit of political communion, were stifled, and gradually died out. All that passed into Asia was a faint and partial resemblance of it, carrying the superficial marks of the original. The administration of the Greco-Asiatic kings was not Hellenic (as it has been sometimes called), but completely despotic, as that of the Persians had been before. Whoever follows their history, until the period of Roman dominion, will see that it turned upon the tastes, temper, and ability of the prince, and on the circumstances of the regal family. Viewing their government as a system, its prominent difference, as compared with their Persian predecessors, consisted in their retaining the military traditions and organisation

¹ Appian, *Syriac.* 32.

² This is the sense in which I have always used the word *Hellenism*, throughout the present Work.

With Droysen, the word *Hellenismus*—*Das Hellenistische Staatensystem*—is applied to the state of things which followed upon Alexander's death; to the aggregate of kingdoms into which Alexander's conquests became distributed, having for their point of similarity the common use of Greek speech, a certain proportion of Greeks both as inhabitants and as officers, and a partial streak of Hellenic culture.

This sense of the word (if admissible at all) must at any rate be constantly kept in mind, in order that it may not be confounded with *hellenism* in the stricter meaning.

of Philip and Alexander ; an elaborate scheme of discipline and manœuvring, which could not be kept up without permanent official grades and a higher measure of intelligence than had ever been displayed under the Achæmenid kings, who had no military school or training whatever. Hence a great number of individual Greeks found employment in the military as well as in the civil service of these Greco-Asiatic kings. The intelligent Greek, instead of a citizen of Hellas, became the instrument of a foreign prince ; the details of government were managed to a great degree by Greek officials, and always in the Greek language.

Moreover, besides this, there was the still more important fact of the many new cities founded in Asia by the Seleukidæ and the other contemporary kings. Each of these cities had a considerable infusion of Greek and Macedonian citizens, among the native Orientals located there, often brought by compulsion from neighbouring villages. In what numerical ratio these two elements of the civic population stood to each other, we cannot say. But the Greeks and Macedonians were the leading and active portion, who exercised the greatest assimilating force, gave imposing effect to the public manifestations of religion, had wider views and sympathies, dealt with the central government, and carried on that contracted measure of municipal autonomy which the city was permitted to retain. In these cities the Greek inhabitants, though debarred from political freedom, enjoyed a range of social activity suited to their tastes. In each, Greek was the language of public business and dealing ; each formed a centre of attraction and commerce for an extensive neighbourhood ; all together, they were the main Hellenic, or quasi-Hellenic, element in Asia under the Greco-Asiatic kings, as contrasted with the rustic villages, where native manners, and probably native speech, still continued with little modification. But the Greeks of Antioch, or Alexandria, or Seleukeia, were not like citizens of Athens or Thebes, nor even like men of Tarentum or Ephesus. While they communicated their language to Orientals, they became themselves substantially orientalised. Their feelings, judgements, and habits of action, ceased to be Hellenic. Polybius, when he visited Alexandria, looked with surprise and aversion on the Greeks there resident, though they were superior to the non-Hellenic population, whom he considered worthless.¹ Greek social habits, festivals, and legends, passed

¹ Strabo, xvii. p. 797. ὁ γοῦν Πολύβιος, γεγονὼς ἐν τῇ πόλει (Alexandria), βδελύσσεται τὴν αὐτὴν κατάστασιν, &c.

with the Hellenic settlers into Asia; all becoming amalgamated and transformed so as to suit a new Asiatic abode. Important social and political consequences turned upon the diffusion of the language, and upon the establishment of such a common medium of communication throughout Western Asia. But after all, the hellenised Asiatic was not so much a Greek as a foreigner with Grecian speech, exterior varnish, and superficial manifestations; distinguished fundamentally from those Greek citizens with whom the present history has been concerned. So he would have been considered by Sophoklēs, by Thucydidēs, by Sokratēs.

Thus much is necessary, in order to understand the bearing of Alexander's conquests, not only upon the Hellenic population, but upon Hellenic attributes and peculiarities. While crushing the Greeks as communities at home, these conquests opened a wider range to the Greeks as individuals abroad; and produced—perhaps the best of all their effects—a great increase of intercommunication, multiplication of roads, extension of commercial dealing, and enlarged facilities for the acquisition of geographical knowledge. There already existed in the Persian empire an easy and convenient royal road (established by Darius son of Hystaspes, and described as well as admired by Herodotus) for the three months' journey between Sardis and Susa; and there must have been another regular road from Susa and Ekbatana to Baktria, Sogdiana, and India. Alexander, had he lived, would doubtless have multiplied on a still larger scale the communications both by sea and land between the various parts of his world-empire. We read that among the gigantic projects which he was contemplating when surprised by death, one was, the construction of a road all along the northern coast of Africa, as far as the Pillars of Hêraklēs.¹ He had intended to found a new maritime

The Museum of Alexandria (with its library) must be carefully distinguished from the city and the people. It was an artificial institution, which took its rise altogether from the personal taste and munificence of the earlier Ptolemies, especially the second. It was one of the noblest and most useful institutions recorded in history, and forms the most honourable monument of what Droysen calls the *hellenistic* period, between the death of Alexander and the extension of the Roman empire into Asia. But this Museum, though situated at Alexandria, had no peculiar connexion with the city or its population; it was a College of literary Fellows (if we may employ a modern word) congregated out of various Grecian towns. Eratosthenēs, Kallimachus, Aristophanēs, Aristarchus, were not natives of Alexandria.

¹ Diodor. xviii. 4. Pausanias (ii. i, 5) observes that Alexander wished to cut through Mount Mimas (in Asia Minor), but that this was the only

city on the Persian Gulf, at the mouth of the Euphrates, and to incur much outlay for regulating the flow of water in its lower course. The river would probably have been thus made again to afford the same conveniences, both for navigation and irrigation, as it appears to have furnished in earlier times under the ancient Babylonian kings. Orders had been also given for constructing a fleet to explore the Caspian Sea. Alexander believed that sea to be connected with the Eastern Ocean,¹ and intended to make it his point of departure for circumnavigating the eastern limits of Asia, which country yet remained for him to conquer. The voyage already performed by Nearchus, from the mouth of the Indus to that of the Euphrates, was in those days a splendid maritime achievement; to which another still greater was on the point of being added—the circumnavigation of Arabia from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea; though here we must remark, that this same voyage (from the mouth of the Indus round Arabia into the Red Sea) had been performed in thirty months, a century and a half before, by Skylax of Karyanda, under the orders of Darius son of Hystaspes;² yet, though recorded by Herodotus, forgotten (as it would appear) by Alexander and his contemporaries. This enlarged and systematic exploration of the earth, combined with increased means of communication among its inhabitants, is the main feature in Alexander's career which presents itself as promising real consequences beneficial to humanity.

We read that Alexander felt so much interest in the extension of science, that he gave to Aristotle the immense sum of

one, among all his undertakings, which did not succeed. "So difficult is it (he goes on) to put force upon the divine arrangements," τὰ θεῖα βιάσασθαι. He wished to cut through the isthmus between Teos and Klazomenæ, so as to avoid the navigation round the cliffs of Mimas (σκόπελον νιφόντα Μίμαντος—Aristophan. Nub. 274) between Chios and Erythræ. Probably this was among the projects suggested to Alexander, in the last year of his life. We have no other information about it.

¹ Arrian, v. 26, 2.

² Herodot. iv. 44: compare iii. 102. That Arrian had not present to his memory this narrative of Herodotus, is plain from the last chapter of his Indica; though in his history of Alexander he alludes several times to Herodotus. Some authors have concluded from Arrian's silence that he disbelieved the fact: if he had disbelieved it, I think that he would have mentioned the statement of Herodotus nevertheless, with an intimation that he did not think it worthy of credit. Moreover, Arrian's disbelief (even granting that such was the state of his mind) is not to be held as a conclusive disproof of the story. I confess that I see no sufficient reason for discrediting the narrative of Herodotus—though some eminent modern writers are of an opposite opinion.

800 talents in money, placing under his directions several thousand men, for the purpose of prosecuting zoological researches.¹ These exaggerations are probably the work of those enemies of the philosopher who decried him as a pensioner of the Macedonian court; but it is probable enough that Philip, and Alexander in the early part of his reign, may have helped Aristotle in the difficult process of getting together facts and specimens for observation—from esteem towards him personally, rather than from interest in his discoveries. The intellectual turn of Alexander was towards literature, poetry, and history. He was fond of the *Iliad* especially, as well as of the Attic tragedians; so that Harpalus, being directed to send some books to him in Upper Asia, selected as the most acceptable packet various tragedies of Æschylus, Sophoklês, and Euripidês, with the dithyrambic poems of Telestês and the histories of Phlistus.²

CHAPTER XCV

GRECIAN AFFAIRS FROM THE LANDING OF ALEXANDER IN
ASIA TO THE CLOSE OF THE LAMIAN WAR

EVEN in 334 B.C., when Alexander first entered upon his Asiatic campaigns, the Grecian cities, great as well as small, had been robbed of all their free agency, and existed only as appendages of the kingdom of Macedonia. Several of them were occupied by Macedonian garrisons, or governed by local despots who leaned upon such armed force for support. There existed among them no common idea or public sentiment, formally proclaimed and acted on, except such as it suited Alexander's purpose to encourage. The miso-Persian sentiment—once a genuine expression of Hellenic patriotism, to the recollection of which Demosthenês was wont to appeal, in animating the Athenians to action against Macedonia, but now extinct and supplanted by nearer apprehensions—had been converted by Alexander to his own purposes, as a pretext for headship, and a help for ensuring submission during his absence in Asia. Greece had become a province of Macedonia; the affairs of the Greeks (observes

¹ Pliny, H. N. viii. 17; Athenæus, ix. p. 398. See Schneider's Preface to his edition of Aristotle's *Historiæ De Animalibus*, p. xxxix. *seq.*

² Plutarch, *Alexand.* 8.

Aristotle in illustrating a philosophical discussion) are "in the hands of the king."¹ A public synod of the Greeks sat from time to time at Corinth; but it represented only philo-Macedonian sentiment; all that we know of its proceedings consisted in congratulations to Alexander on his victories. There is no Grecian history of public or political import; there are no facts except the local and municipal details of each city—"the streets and fountains which we are repairing, and the battlements which we are whitening," to use a phrase of Demosthenês²—the good management of the Athenian finances by the orator Lykurgus, and the contentions of orators respecting private disputes or politics of the past.

But though Grecian history is thus stagnant and suspended during the first years of Alexander's Asiatic campaigns, it might at any moment have become animated with an active spirit of self-emancipation, if he had experienced reverses, or if the Persians had administered their own affairs with skill and vigour. I have already stated, that during the first two years of the war, the Persian fleet (we ought rather to say, the Phœnician fleet in the Persian service) had a decided superiority at sea. Darius possessed untold treasures which might have indefinitely increased that superiority and multiplied his means of transmarine action, had he chosen to follow the advice of Memnon, by acting vigorously from the sea and strictly on the defensive by land. The movement or quiescence of the Greeks therefore depended on the turn of affairs in Asia; as Alexander himself was well aware.

During the winter of 334-333 B.C., Memnon with the Persian fleet appeared to be making progress among the islands in the Ægean,³ and the anti-Macedonian Greeks were expecting him farther westward in Eubœa and Peloponnesus. Their hopes being dashed by his unexpected death, and still more by Darius's abandonment of the Memnonian plans, they had next to wait for the chance of what might be achieved by the immense Persian land-force. Even down to the eve of the battle of Issus, Demosthenês⁴ and others (as has already been mentioned) were encouraged by their correspondents in Asia to anticipate success for Darius even in pitched battle. But after the great disaster at Issus, during a year and a half

¹ Aristot. *Physic.* iv. 3, p. 210 a. 21. *ἔτι ὡς ἐν βασιλεῖ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινήτικῳ.*

² Demosthen. *Olynthiac.* iii. p. 36.

³ Arrian, ii. 1.

⁴ Æschinês cont. Ktesiph. 552.

(from November 333 B.C. to March or April 331 B.C.), no hope was possible. The Persian force seemed extinct, and Darius was so paralysed by the captivity of his family, that he suffered even the citizens of Tyre and Gaza to perish in their gallant efforts of defence, without the least attempt to save them. At length, in the spring of 331 B.C., the prospects again appeared to improve. A second Persian army, countless like the first, was assembling eastward of the Tigris; Alexander advanced into the interior, many weeks' march from the shores of the Mediterranean, to attack them; and the Persians doubtless transmitted encouragements with money to enterprising men in Greece, in hopes of provoking auxiliary movements. Presently (October 331 B.C.) came the catastrophe at Arbela; after which no demonstration against Alexander could have been attempted with any reasonable hope of success.

Such was the varying point of view under which the contest in Asia presented itself to Grecian spectators, during the three years and a half between the landing of Alexander in Asia and the battle of Arbela. As to the leading states in Greece, we have to look at Athens and Sparta only; for Thebes had been destroyed and demolished as a city; and what had been once the citadel of the Kadmeia was now a Macedonian garrison.¹ Moreover, besides that garrison, the Boeotian cities, Orchomenus, Plataea, &c., were themselves strongholds of Macedonian dependence; being hostile to Thebes of old, and having received among themselves assignments of all the Theban lands.² In case of any movement in Greece, therefore, Antipater, the viceroy of Macedonia, might fairly count on finding in Greece interested allies, serving as no mean check upon Attica.

At Athens, the reigning sentiment was decidedly pacific. Few were disposed to brave the prince who had just given so fearful an evidence of his force by the destruction of Thebes and the enslavement of the Thebans. Ephialtēs and Charidēmus, the military citizens at Athens most anti-Macedonian in sentiment, had been demanded as prisoners by Alexander, and had withdrawn to Asia, there to take service with Darius. Other Athenians, men of energy and action, had followed their example, and had fought against Alexander at the Granikus, where they became his prisoners, and were sent to Macedonia to work in fetters at the mines. Ephialtēs

¹ Vita Demosthenis ap. Westermann, Scriptt. Biograph. p. 301. φρουρὰν καταστήσαντος Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις μετὰ τὸ κατασκάψαι τοὺς Θεβαίους, &c.

² Pausanias, i. 25, 4.

perished at the siege of Halikarnassus, while defending the place with the utmost gallantry; Charidêmus suffered a more unworthy death from the shameful sentence of Darius. The anti-Macedonian leaders who remained at Athens, such as Demosthenês and Lykurgus, were not generals or men of action, but statesmen and orators. They were fully aware that submission to Alexander was a painful necessity, though they watched not the less anxiously for any reverse which might happen to him, such as to make it possible for Athens to head a new struggle on behalf of Grecian freedom.

But it was not Demosthenês or Lykurgus who now guided the general policy of Athens.¹ For the twelve years between the destruction of Thebes and the death of Alexander, Phokion and Demadês were her ministers for foreign affairs; two men of totally opposite characters, but coinciding in pacific views, and in looking to the favour of Alexander and Antipater as the principal end to be attained. Twenty Athenian triremes were sent to act with the Macedonian fleet, during Alexander's first campaign in Asia; these, together with the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, served to him further as a guarantee for the continued submission of the Athenians generally.² There can be no doubt that the pacific policy of Phokion was now prudent and essential to Athens, though the same cannot be said (as I have remarked in the proper place) for his advocacy of the like policy twenty years before, when Philip's power was growing and might have been arrested by vigorous opposition. It suited the purpose of Antipater to ensure his hold upon Athens by frequent presents to Demadês, a man of luxurious and extravagant habits. But Phokion, incorruptible as well as poor to the end, declined all similar offers, though often made to him, not only by Antipater, but even by Alexander.³

It deserves particular notice, that though the macedonising policy was now decidedly in the ascendent—accepted, even by dissentients, as the only course admissible under the circumstances, and confirmed the more by each successive victory of Alexander—yet statesmen, like Lykurgus and Demosthenês, of notorious anti-Macedonian sentiment, still

¹ "Since Macedonian dominion became paramount (observes Demosthenês, *De Coronâ*, p. 331), Æschinês and men of his stamp are in full ascendancy and affluence—I am impotent: there is no place at Athens for free citizens and counsellors, but only for men who do what they are ordered, and flatter the ruling potentate."

² Arrian, i. 29, 8.

³ Plutarch, Phokion, 30.

held a conspicuous and influential position, though of course restricted to matters of internal administration. Thus Lykurgus continued to be the real acting minister of finance, for three successive Panathenaic intervals of four years each, or for an uninterrupted period of twelve years. He superintended not merely the entire collection, but also the entire disbursement of the public revenue; rendering strict periodical account, yet with a financial authority greater than had belonged to any statesman since Periklēs. He improved the gymnasia and stadia of the city—multiplied the donatives and sacred furniture in the temples,—enlarged, or constructed anew, docks and arsenals,—provided a considerable stock of arms and equipments, military as well as naval—and maintained four hundred triremes in a seaworthy condition, for the protection of Athenian commerce. In these extensive functions he was never superseded, though Alexander at one time sent to require the surrender of his person, which was refused by the Athenian people.¹ The main cause of his firm hold upon the public mind, was, his known and indisputable pecuniary probity, wherein he was the parallel of Phokion.

As to Demosthenēs, he did not hold any such commanding public appointments as Lykurgus; but he enjoyed great esteem and sympathy from the people generally, for his marked line of public counsel during the past. The proof of this is to be found in one very significant fact. The indictment, against Ktesiphon's motion for crowning Demosthenēs, was instituted by Æschinēs, and official entry made of it before the death of Philip—which event occurred in August 336 B.C. Yet Æschinēs did

¹ See the remarkable decree in honour of Lykurgus, passed by the Athenian people seventeen or eighteen years after his death, in the archonship of Anaxikratēs, B.C. 307 (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 852). The reciting portion of this decree, constituting four-fifths of the whole, goes over the public conduct of Lykurgus, and is very valuable.

It seems that the twelve years of financial administration exercised by Lykurgus, are to be taken probably, either from 342–330 B.C.—or four years later, from 338–326 B.C. Boeckh leaves the point undetermined between the two. Droysen and Meier prefer the earlier period—O. Müller the later. (Boeckh, *Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen*, also the second edition of his *Staats-haushaltung der Athener*, vol. ii. p. 114–118).

The total of public money, recorded by the Inscription as having passed through the hands of Lykurgus in the twelve years, was 18,900 talents = £4,340,000, or thereabouts. He is said to have held, besides, in deposit, a great deal of money entrusted to him by private individuals. His official duties as treasurer were discharged, for the first four years, in his own name; during the last eight years, in the names of two different friends.

not venture to bring it on for trial until August 330 B.C., after Antipater had subdued the ill-fated rising of the Lacedæmonian king Agis; and even at that advantageous moment, when the macedonisers seemed in full triumph, he signally failed. We thus perceive, that though Phokion and Demadês were now the leaders of Athenian affairs, as representing a policy which every one felt to be unavoidable—yet the preponderant sentiment of the people went with Demosthenês and Lykurgus. In fact, we shall see that after the Lamian war, Antipater thought it requisite to subdue or punish this sentiment by disfranchising or deporting two-thirds of the citizens.¹ It seems however that the anti-Macedonian statesmen were very cautious of giving offence to Alexander, between 334 and 330 B.C. Ktesiphon accepted a mission of condolence to Kleopatra, sister of Alexander, on the death of her husband Alexander of Epirus; and Demosthenês stands accused of having sent humble and crouching letters to Alexander (the Great) in Phenicia, during the spring of 331 B.C. This assertion of Æschinês, though not to be trusted as correct, indicates the general prudence of Demosthenês as to his known and formidable enemy.²

It was not from Athens, but from Sparta, that anti-Macedonian movements now took rise. In the decisive battle unsuccessfully fought by Athens and Thebes at Chæroneia against Philip, the Spartans had not been concerned. Their king Archidamus,—who had been active conjointly with Athens in the Sacred War, trying to uphold the Phokians

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 28.

² Æschinês (adv. Ktesiph. p. 635) mentions this mission of Ktesiphon to Kleopatra. He also (in the same oration, p. 550) charges Demosthenês with having sent letters to Alexander, soliciting pardon and favour. He states that a young man named Ariston, a friend of Demosthenês, was much about the person of Alexander, and that through him the letters were sent. He cites as his authority the seamen of the public Athenian vessel called *Paralus*, and the Athenian envoys who went to Alexander in Phenicia in the spring or summer of 331 B.C. (compare Arrian, iii. 6, 3). Hyperidês also seems to have advanced the like allegation against Demosthenês—see Harpokration, v. Ἀριστών.

The oration of Hyperidês in defence of Euxenippus (recently published by Mr. Churchill Babington), delivered at some period during the reign of Alexander, gives general evidence of the wide-spread feeling of jealous aversion to the existing Macedonian ascendancy. Euxenippus had been accused of devotion to Macedonia; Hyperidês strenuously denies it, saying that Euxenippus had never been in Macedonia, nor ever conversed with any Macedonian who came to Athens. Even boys at school (says Hyperidês) know the names of the corrupt orators, or flatterers, who serve Macedonia—Euxenippus is not among them (pp. 11, 12).

against Philip and the Thebans,—had afterwards withdrawn himself from Central Greece to assist the Tarentines in Italy, and had been slain in a battle against the Messapians.¹ He was succeeded by his son Agis, a brave and enterprising man, under whom the Spartans, though abstaining from hostilities against Philip, resolutely declined to take part in the synod at Corinth, whereby the Macedonian prince was nominated Leader of the Greeks; and even persisted in the same denial on Alexander's nomination also. When Alexander sent to Athens three hundred panoplies after his victory at the Granikus, to be dedicated in the temple of Athênê, he expressly proclaimed in the inscription, that they were dedicated "by Alexander and the Greeks, *excepting the Lacedæmonians*."² Agis took the lead in trying to procure Persian aid for anti-Macedonian operations in Greece. Towards the close of summer 333 B.C., a little before the battle of Issus, he visited the Persian admirals at Chios, to solicit men and money for intended action in Peloponnesus.³ At that moment, they were not zealous in the direction of Greece, anticipating (as most Asiatics then did) the complete destruction of Alexander in Kilikia. As soon, however, as the disaster of Issus became known, they placed at the disposal of Agis thirty talents and ten triremes; which he employed, under his brother Agesilaus, in making himself master of Krete—feeling that no movement in Greece could be expected at such a discouraging crisis. Agis himself soon afterwards went to that island, having strengthened himself by a division of the Greek mercenaries who had fought under Darius at Issus. In Krete, he appears to have had considerable temporary success; and even in Peloponnesus, he organised some demonstrations which Alexander sent Amphoterus with a large naval force to repress, in the spring of 331 B.C.⁴ At that time, Phenicia, Egypt, and all the naval mastery of the Ægean, had passed into the hands of the conqueror, so that the Persians had no direct means of acting upon Greece. Probably Amphoterus recovered Krete, but he had no land-force to attack Agis in Peloponnesus.

¹ Plutarch, Camill. 19; Diodor. xvi. 88; Plutarch, Agis, 3.

² Arrian, i. 16, 11: compare Pausan. vii. 10, 1.

³ Arrian, ii. 13, 4.

⁴ Arrian, iii. 6, 4; Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 1, 39. It is to this war in Krete, between Agis and the Macedonian party and troops, that Aristotle probably alludes (in the few words contained, *Politica*, ii. 7, 8), as having exposed the weakness of the Kretan institutions—see Schneider's note on the passage. At least we do not know of any other event, suitable to the words.

In October 331 B.C., Darius was beaten at Arbela and became a fugitive in Media, leaving Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis, with the bulk of his immense treasures, as a prey to the conqueror during the coming winter. After such prodigious accessions to Alexander's force, it would seem that any anti-Macedonian movement, during the spring of 330 B.C., must have been obviously hopeless and even insane. Yet it was just then that King Agis found means to enlarge his scale of operations in Peloponnesus, and prevailed on a considerable body of new allies to join him. As to himself personally, he and the Lacedæmonians had been previously in a state of proclaimed war with Macedonia,¹ and therefore incurred little additional risk; moreover, it was one of the effects of the Asiatic disasters to cast back upon Greece small bands of soldiers who had hitherto found service in the Persian armies. These men willingly came to Cape Tænarus to enlist under a warlike king of Sparta; so that Agis found himself at the head of a force which appeared considerable to Peloponnesians, familiar only with the narrow scale of Grecian war-muster, though insignificant as against Alexander or his viceroy in Macedonia.² An unexpected ray of hope broke out from the

¹ Alexander, as soon as he got possession of the Persian treasures at Susa (about December 331 B.C.), sent a large remittance of 3000 talents to Antipater, as means for carrying on the war against the Lacedæmonians (Arrian, iii. 16, 17). The manifestations of Agis in Peloponnesus had begun in the spring of 331 B.C. (Arrian, iii. 6, 4); but his aggressive movements in Peloponnesus did not assume formidable proportions until the spring of 330 B.C. At the date of the speech of Æschinês against Ktesiphon (August 330 B.C.), the decisive battle by which Antipater crushed the forces of Agis had only recently occurred; for the Lacedæmonian prisoners were only *about to be sent* to Alexander to learn their fate (Æsch. adv. Kt. p. 524). Curtius (vii. 1, 21) is certainly mistaken in saying that the contest was terminated before the battle of Arbela. Moreover, there were Lacedæmonian envoys, present with Darius until a few days before his death (July 330 B.C.), who afterwards fell into the hands of Alexander (Arrian, iii. 24, 7); these men could hardly have known of the prostration of their country at home. I suppose the victory of Antipater to have taken place about June 330 B.C.—and the Peloponnesian armament of Agis to have been got together about three months before (March 330 B.C.).

Mr. Clinton (Fast. H. App. c. 4, p. 234) discusses the chronology of this event, but in a manner which I cannot think satisfactory. He seems inclined to put it some months earlier. I see no necessity for construing the dictum ascribed to Alexander (Plutarch, Agesilaus, 15) as proving close coincidence of time between the battle of Arbela and the final defeat of Agis.

² Alexander in Media, when informed of the whole affair after the death of Agis, spoke of it with contempt as a battle of frogs and mice, if we are to believe the dictum of Plutarch, Agesilaus, 15.

revolt of Memnon, the Macedonian governor of Thrace. Antipater was thus compelled to withdraw some of his forces to a considerable distance from Greece; while Alexander, victorious as he was, being in Persis or Media, east of Mount Zagros, appeared in the eyes of a Greek to have reached the utmost limits of the habitable world.¹ Of this partial encouragement Agis took advantage, to march out of Lakonia with all the troops, mercenary and native, that he could muster. He called on the Peloponnesians for a last effort against Macedonian dominion, while Darius still retained all the eastern half of his empire, and while support from him in men and money might yet be anticipated.²

Respecting this war, we know very few details. At first, a flush of success appeared to attend Agis. The Eleians, the Achæans (except Pellênê), the Arcadians (except Megalopolis) and some other Peloponnesians, joined his standard; so that he was enabled to collect an army stated at 20,000 foot and 2000 horse. Defeating the first Macedonian forces sent against him, he proceeded to lay siege to Megalopolis; which city, now as previously, was the stronghold of Macedonian influence in the peninsula, and was probably occupied by a Macedonian garrison. An impulse manifested itself at Athens in favour of active sympathy, and equipment of a fleet to aid this anti-Macedonian effort. It was resisted by Phokion and Demadês, doubtless upon all views of prudence, but especially upon one financial ground, taken by the latter, that the people would be compelled to forego the Theôric distribution.³ Even Demosthenês himself, under circumstances so obviously discouraging, could not recommend the formidable step of declaring against Alexander—though he seems to have indulged in the expression of general anti-Macedonian sympathies, and to have complained of the helplessness into which Athens had been brought by past bad policy.⁴ Antipater, closing the war in

¹ Æschinês adv. Ktesiphont. p. 553. ὁ δ' Ἀλέξανδρος ἔξω τῆς ἕρκτους καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ὀλίγου δεῖν πάσης μεθειστήκει, &c.

² Diodor. xvii. 62; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 35.

³ Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. p. 818.

⁴ This is what we make out, as to the conduct of Demosthenês, from Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 553.

It is however difficult to believe, what Æschinês insinuates, that Demosthenês boasted of having himself got up the Lacedæmonian movement—and yet that he made no proposition or suggestion for countenancing it. Demosthenês can hardly have lent any positive aid to the proceeding, though of course his anti-Macedonian feelings would be counted upon, in case things took a favourable turn.

Thrace on the best terms that he could, hastened into Greece with his full forces, and reached Peloponnesus in time to relieve Megalopolis, which had begun to be in danger. One decisive battle, which took place in Arcadia, sufficed to terminate the war. Agis and his army, the Lacedæmonians especially, fought with gallantry and desperation, but were completely defeated. Five thousand of their men were slain, including Agis himself; who, though covered with wounds, disdained to leave the field, and fell resisting to the last. The victors, according to one account, lost 3500 men; according to another, 1000 slain, together with a great many wounded. This was a greater loss than Alexander had sustained either at Issus or Arbela; a plain proof, that Agis and his companions, however unfortunate in the result, had manifested courage worthy of the best days of Sparta.

The allied forces were now so completely crushed, that all submitted to Antipater. After consulting the philo-Macedonian synod at Corinth, he condemned the Achæans and Eleians to pay 120 talents to Megalopolis, and exacted from the Tegeans the punishment of those among their leading men who had advised the war.¹ But he would not take upon him to determine the treatment of the Lacedæmonians without special reference to Alexander. Requiring from them fifty hostages, he sent up to Alexander in Asia some Lacedæmonian envoys or prisoners, to throw themselves on his mercy.² We are told that they did not reach the king until a long time afterwards, at Baktra;³ what he decided about Sparta generally, we do not know.

The rising of the Thebans, not many months after Alexander's accession, had been the first attempt of the Greeks to emancipate themselves from Macedonian dominion; this enterprise of Agis was the second. Both unfortunately had been partial, without the possibility of any extensive or organised combination beforehand; both ended miserably, riveting the chains of Greece more powerfully than ever. Thus was the self-defensive force of Greece extinguished piecemeal. The scheme of Agis was in fact desperate from the very outset, as against the gigantic power of Alexander; and would perhaps never have

Deinarchus (*ut supra*) also accuses Demosthenês of having remained inactive at this critical moment.

¹ Curtius, vi. 1, 15-20; Diodor. xvii. 63-73. After the defeat, a suspensive decree was passed by the Spartans, releasing from *ἀριπύλα* those who had escaped from the battle—as had been done after Leuktra (Diodor. xix. 70).

² Æschinês *adv. Ktesiph.* p. 524.

³ Curtius, vii. 4, 32.

been undertaken, had not Agis himself been already compromised in hostility against Macedonia, before the destruction of the Persian force at Issus. This unfortunate prince, without any superior ability (so far as we know), manifested a devoted courage and patriotism worthy of his predecessor Leonidas at Thermopylæ; whose renown stands higher, only because the banner which he upheld ultimately triumphed. The Athenians and Ætolians, neither of whom took part with Agis, were now left, without Thebes and Sparta, as the two great military powers of Greece; which will appear presently, when we come to the last struggle for Grecian independence—the Lamian war; better combined and more promising, yet not less disastrous in its result.

Though the strongest considerations of prudence kept Athens quiet during this anti-Macedonian movement in Peloponnesus, a powerful sympathy must have been raised among her citizens while the struggle was going on. Had Agis gained the victory over Antipater, the Athenians might probably have declared in his favour; and although no independent position could have been permanently maintained against so overwhelming an enemy as Alexander, yet considering that he was thoroughly occupied and far in the interior of Asia, Greece might have held out against Antipater for an interval not inconsiderable. In the face of such eventualities, the fears of the macedonising statesmen now in power at Athens, the hopes of their opponents, and the reciprocal antipathies of both, must have become unusually manifest; so that the reaction afterwards, when the Macedonian power became more irresistible than ever, was considered by the enemies of Demosthenês to offer a favourable opportunity for ruining and dishonouring him.

To the political peculiarity of this juncture we owe the judicial contest between the two great Athenian orators; the memorable accusation of Æschinês against Ktesiphon, for having proposed a crown to Demosthenês—and the still more memorable defence of Demosthenês, on behalf of his friend as well as of himself. It was in the autumn or winter of 337–336 B.C., that Ktesiphon had proposed this vote of public honour in favour of Demosthenês, and had obtained the (*probouleuma*) preliminary acquiescence of the Senate; it was in the same Attic year, and not long afterwards, that Æschinês attacked the proposition under the *Graphê Paranomôn*, as illegal, unconstitutional, mischievous, and founded on false allegations.¹

¹ Among the various documents, real or pretended, inserted in the oration of Demosthenês *De Coronâ*, there appears one (*no. 266*) which

More than six years had thus elapsed since the formal entry of the accusation; yet Æschinês had not chosen to bring it to actual trial; which indeed could not be done without some risk to himself, before the numerous and popular judicature of Athens. Twice or thrice before his accusation was entered, other persons had moved to confer the same honour upon Demosthenês,¹ and had been indicted under the *Graphê Paranomôn*; but with such signal ill success, that their accusers did not obtain so much as one-fifth of the suffrages of the *Dikasts*, and therefore incurred (under the standing regulation of Attic law) a penalty of 1000 drachmæ. The like danger awaited Æschinês; and although, in reference to the illegality of Ktesiphon's motion (which was the direct and ostensible purpose aimed at under the *Graphê Paranomôn*), his indictment was grounded on special circumstances such as the previous accusers may not have been able to show, still it was not his real object to confine himself within this narrow and technical argument. He intended to enlarge the range of accusation, so as to include the whole character and policy of

to be the very decree moved by Ktesiphon; and another (p. 243) purporting to be the accusation preferred by Æschinês. I have already stated that I agree with Droysen in mistrusting all the documents annexed to this oration; all of them bear the name of wrong archons, most of them names of unknown archons; some of them do not fit the place in which they appear. See my preceding chaps. lxxxix. xc. (vol. xi.).

We know from the statement of Æschinês himself that the motion of Ktesiphon was made after the appointment of Demosthenês to be one of the inspectors of the fortifications of the city; and that this appointment took place in the last month of the archon Chærondas (June 337 B.C.—see Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 421-426). We also know that the accusation of Æschinês against Ktesiphon was preferred before the assassination of Philip, which took place in August 336 B.C. (Æschin. ib. pp. 612, 613). It thus appears that the motion of Ktesiphon (with the *probouleuma* which preceded it) must have occurred some time during the autumn or winter of 337-336 B.C.—that the accusation of Æschinês must have been handed in shortly after it—and that this accusation cannot have been handed in at the date borne by the pseudo-document, p. 243—the month *Elaphebolion* of the archon Chærondas, which would be anterior to the appointment of Demosthenês. Moreover, whoever compares the so-called motion of Ktesiphon, as it stands inserted in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 266, with the words in which Æschinês himself (adv. Ktesiph. p. 631. *ἔθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ψηφίσματος ἐποίησεν*, see also p. 439) describes the exordium of that motion, will see that it cannot be genuine.

¹ Demosthenês De Coronâ, pp. 253, 302, 303, 310. He says (p. 267-313) that he had been crowned *often* (*πολλάκις*) by the Athenians and other Greek citizens. The crown which he received on the motion of Aristonikûs (after the successes against Philip at Byzantium and the Chersonesus, &c. in 340 B.C.) was the *second* crown (p. 253)—Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 848.

Demosthenês; who would thus, if the verdict went against him, stand publicly dishonoured both as citizen and as politician. Unless this latter purpose were accomplished, indeed, Æschinês gained nothing by bringing the indictment into court; for the mere entry of the indictment would have already produced the effect of preventing the probouleuma from passing into a decree, and the crown from being actually conferred. Doubtless Ktesiphon and Demosthenês might have forced Æschinês to the alternative of either dropping his indictment or bringing it into the Dikastery. But this was a forward challenge, which, in reference to a purely honorary vote, they had not felt bold enough to send; especially after the capture of Thebes in 335 B.C., when the victorious Alexander demanded the surrender of Demosthenês with several other citizens.

In this state of abeyance and compromise—Demosthenês enjoying the inchoate honour of a complimentary vote from the Senate, Æschinês intercepting it from being matured into a vote of the people—both the vote and the indictment had remained for rather more than six years. But the accuser now felt encouraged to push his indictment to trial under the reactionary party feeling, following on abortive anti-Macedonian hopes, which succeeded to the complete victory of Antipater over Agis, and which brought about the accusation of anti-Macedonian citizens in Naxos, Thasos, and other Grecian cities also.¹ Amidst the fears prevalent that the victor would carry his resentment still further, Æschinês could now urge that Athens was disgraced by having adopted or even approved the policy of Demosthenês,² and that an emphatic condemnation of him was the only way of clearing her from the charge of privity with those who had raised the standard against Macedonian supremacy. In an able and bitter harangue, Æschinês first shows that the motion of Ktesiphon was illegal, in consequence of the public official appointments held by Demosthenês

¹ Demosthenês De Coronâ, p. 294.

² Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 645. διαβέβληται δ' ἡμῶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ τῶν Δημοσθένους πολιτευμάτων περὶ τοὺς νῦν καιροὺς· δόξετε δ' εἰ μὲν τοῦτον στεφανώσητε, ὁμογνώμονες εἶναι τοῖς παραβαίνουσι τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην· εἰ δὲ τοῦναντίον τούτου πράξητε, ἀπολύσετε τὸν δῆμον τῶν αἰτιῶν.—Compare with this, the last sentence of the oration of Demosthenês in reply, where he puts up a prayer to the gods—ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς τὴν ταχίστην ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν ἐπηρτημένων φόβων δότε καὶ σωτηρίαν ἀσφαλῆ.

The mention by Æschinês (immediately before) of the Pythian games, as about to be celebrated in a few days, marks the date of this judicial trial—August 330 B.C.

at the moment when it was proposed—next he enters at large into the whole life and character of Demosthenês, to prove him unworthy of such an honour, even if there had been no formal grounds of objection. He distributes the entire life of Demosthenês into four periods, the first ending at the peace of 346 B.C. between Philip and the Athenians—the second, ending with the breaking out of the next ensuing war in 341–340 B.C.—the third, ending with the disaster at Chæroneia—the fourth, comprising all the time following.¹ Throughout all the four periods, he denounces the conduct of Demosthenês as having been corrupt, treacherous, cowardly, and ruinous to the city. What is more surprising still—he expressly charges him with gross subservience both to Philip and to Alexander, at the very time when he was taking credit for a patriotic and intrepid opposition to them.²

That Athens had undergone sad defeat and humiliation, having been driven from her independent and even presidential position into the degraded character of a subject Macedonian city, since the time when Demosthenês first began political life—was a fact but too indisputable. Æschinês even makes this a part of his case; arraigning the traitorous mismanagement of Demosthenês as the cause of so melancholy a revolution, and denouncing him as candidate for public compliment on no better plea than a series of public calamities.³ Having thus animadverted on the conduct of Demosthenês prior to the battle of Chæroneia, Æschinês proceeds to the more recent past, and contends that Demosthenês cannot be sincere in his pretended enmity to Alexander, because he has let slip three successive occasions, all highly favourable, for instigating Athens to hostility against the Macedonians. Of these three occasions, the earliest was, when Alexander first crossed into Asia; the second, immediately before the battle of Issus; the third, during the flush of success obtained by Agis in Peloponnesus.⁴ On none of these occasions did Demosthenês call for any public action against Macedonia; a proof (according to Æschinês) that his anti-Macedonian professions were insincere.

I have more than once remarked, that considering the bitter enmity between the two orators, it is rarely safe to trust the unsupported allegation of either against the other. But in regard to the last-mentioned charges advanced by Æschinês,

¹ Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 443.

² Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. pp. 449, 456, 467, 551.

³ Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. pp. 526, 538, 541.

⁴ Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 551–553.

there is enough of known fact, and we have independent evidence, such as is not often before us, to appreciate him as an accuser of Demosthenês. The victorious career of Alexander, set forth in the preceding chapters, proves amply that not one of the three periods, here indicated by Æschinês, presented even decent encouragement for a reasonable Athenian patriot to involve his country in warfare against so formidable an enemy. Nothing can be more frivolous than these charges against Demosthenês, of having omitted promising seasons for anti-Macedonian operations. Partly for this reason, probably, Demosthenês does not notice them in his reply; still more, perhaps, on another ground, that it was not safe to speak out what he thought and felt about Alexander. His reply dwells altogether upon the period before the death of Philip. Of the boundless empire subsequently acquired, by the son of Philip, he speaks only to mourn it as a wretched visitation of fortune, which has desolated alike the Hellenic and the barbaric world—in which Athens has been engulfed along with others—and from which even those faithless and trimming Greeks, who helped to aggrandise Philip, have not escaped better than Athens, nor indeed so well.¹

I shall not here touch upon the Demosthenic speech *De Coronâ* in a rhetorical point of view, nor add anything to those encomiums which have been pronounced upon it with one voice, both in ancient and in modern times, as the unapproachable masterpiece of Grecian oratory. To this work it belongs as a portion of Grecian history; a retrospect of the efforts made by a patriot and a statesman to uphold the dignity of Athens and the autonomy of the Grecian world, against a dangerous aggressor from without. How these efforts were directed, and how they lamentably failed, has been recounted in my preceding chapters. Demosthenês here passes them in review, replying to the criminations against his public conduct during the interval of ten years, between the peace of 346 B.C. (or the period immediately preceding it) and the death of Philip. It is remarkable, that though professing to enter upon a defence of his whole public life,² he nevertheless can afford to leave unnoticed that portion of it which is perhaps the most honourable to him—the early period of his first Philippics and Olynthiacs—when, though a politician as yet immature and of no established footing, he was the first to descry in the distance

¹ Demosthen. *De Coronâ*, p. 311–316.

² Demosthen. *De Coronâ*, p. 227. μέλλων τοῦ τε ἰδίου βίου παντός, ὡς εἰκε, λόγον δίδοναι τῇμερον καὶ τῶν κοινῇ πεπολιτευμένων, &c.

the perils threatened by Philip's aggrandisement, and the loudest in calling for timely and energetic precautions against it, in spite of apathy and murmurs from older politicians as well as from the general public. Beginning with the peace of 346 B.C., Demosthenês vindicates his own share in the antecedents of that event against the charges of Æschinês, whom he denounces as the cause of all the mischief; a controversy which I have already tried to elucidate in a former chapter. Passing next to the period after that peace—to the four years first of hostile diplomacy, then of hostile action, against Philip, which ended with the disaster of Chæroneia—Demosthenês is not satisfied with simple vindication. He reasserts this policy as matter of pride and honour, in spite of its results. He congratulates his countrymen on having manifested a Pan-Hellenic patriotism worthy of their forefathers, and takes to himself only the credit of having been forward to proclaim and carry out this glorious sentiment common to all. Fortune has been adverse; yet the vigorous anti-Macedonian policy was no mistake; Demosthenês swears it by the combatants of Marathon, Plataea and Salamis.¹ To have had a foreign dominion obtruded upon Greece, is an overwhelming calamity; but to have had this accomplished without strenuous resistance on the part of Athens, would have been calamity aggravated by dishonour.

Conceived in this sublime strain, the reply of Demosthenês to his rival has an historical value, as a funeral oration of extinct Athenian and Grecian freedom. Six years before, the orator had been appointed by his countrymen to deliver the usual public oration over the warriors slain at Chæroneia. That speech is now lost, but it probably touched upon the same topics. Though the sphere of action, of every Greek city as well as of every Greek citizen, was now cramped and confined by irresistible Macedonian force, there still remained the sentiment of full political freedom and dignity enjoyed during the past—the admiration of ancestors who had once defended it successfully—and the sympathy with leaders who had recently stood forward to uphold it, however unsuccessfully. It is among the most memorable facts in Grecian history, that in spite of the victory of Philip at Chæroneia—

¹ Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 297. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἡμάρτετε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀπάντων ἐλευθερίας καὶ σωτηρίας κίνδυνον ἀράμενοι—οὐ μὰ τοὺς Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων καὶ τοὺς ἐν Πλαταιαῖς παραταξαμένους καὶ τοὺς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχήσαντας, &c., the oath so often cited and admired.

in spite of the subsequent conquest of Thebes by Alexander, and the danger of Athens after it—in spite of the Asiatic conquests which had since thrown all Persian force into the hands of the Macedonian king—the Athenian people could never be persuaded either to repudiate Demosthenés, or to disclaim sympathy with his political policy. How much art and ability was employed, to induce them to do so, by his numerous enemies, the speech of Æschinés is enough to teach us. And when we consider how easily the public sicken of schemes which end in misfortune—how great a mental relief is usually obtained by throwing blame on unsuccessful leaders—it would have been no matter of surprise, if, in one of the many prosecutions wherein the fame of Demosthenés was involved, the Dikasts had given a verdict unfavourable to him. That he always came off acquitted, and even honourably acquitted, is a proof of rare fidelity and steadiness of temper in the Athenians. It is a proof that those noble, patriotic, and Pan-Hellenic sentiments, which we constantly find inculcated in his orations, throughout a period of twenty years, had sunk into the minds of his hearers; and that amidst the many general allegations of corruption against him, loudly proclaimed by his enemies, there was no one well-ascertained fact which they could substantiate before the Dikastery.

The indictment now preferred by Æschinés against Ktesiphon only procured for Demosthenés a new triumph. When the suffrages of the Dikasts were counted, Æschinés did not obtain so much as one-fifth. He became therefore liable to the customary fine of 1000 drachmæ. It appears that he quitted Athens immediately, without paying the fine, and retired into Asia, from whence he never returned. He is said to have opened a rhetorical school at Rhodes, and to have gone into the interior of Asia during the last year of Alexander's life (at the time when that monarch was ordaining on the Grecian cities compulsory restoration of all their exiles), in order to procure assistance for returning to Athens. This project was disappointed by Alexander's death.¹

We cannot suppose that Æschinés was unable to pay the fine of 1000 drachmæ, or to find friends who would pay it for him. It was not therefore legal compulsion, but the extreme disappointment and humiliation of so signal a defeat, which made him leave Athens. We must remember that this was a gratuitous challenge sent by himself; that the celebrity of the

¹ See the various lives of Æschinés—in Westermann, *Scriptores Biographici*, pp. 268, 269.

two rivals had brought together auditors, not merely from Athens, but from various other Grecian cities; and that the effect of the speech of Demosthenês in his own defence—delivered with all his perfection of voice and action, and not only electrifying hearers by the sublimity of its public sentiment, but also full of admirably managed self-praise, and contemptuous bitterness towards his rival—must have been inexpressibly powerful and commanding. Probably the friends of Æschinês became themselves angry with him for having brought the indictment forward. For the effect of his defeat must have been that the vote of the Senate which he indicted, was brought forward and passed in the public assembly; and that Demosthenês must have received a public coronation.¹ In no other way, under the existing circumstances of Athens, could Demosthenês have obtained so emphatic a compliment. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that such a mortification was insupportable to Æschinês. He became disgusted with his native city. We read that afterwards, in his rhetorical school at Rhodes, he one day declaimed, as a lesson to his pupils, the successful oration of his rival, *De Coronâ*. Of course it excited a burst of admiration. "What, if you had heard the beast himself speak it!"—exclaimed Æschinês.

From this memorable triumph of the illustrious orator and defendant, we have to pass to another trial—a direct accusation brought against him, from which he did not escape so successfully. We are compelled here to jump over five years and a half (August 330 B.C. to January 324 B.C.) during which we have no information about Grecian history; the interval between Alexander's march into Bactria and his return to Persis and Susiana. Displeased with the conduct of the satraps during his absence, Alexander put to death or punished several, and directed the rest to disband without delay the mercenary soldiers whom they had taken into pay. This peremptory order filled both Asia and Europe with roving detachments of unprovided soldiers, some of whom sought subsistence in the Grecian islands and on the Lacedæmonian southern coast, at Cape Tænarus in Laconia.

It was about this period (the beginning of 324 B.C.) that Harpalus the satrap of Babylonia and Syria, becoming alarmed

¹ Demosthen. *De Coronâ*, p. 315. ἀλλὰ νυνὶ τήμερον ἐγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφανωθῆναι δοκιμάζομαι, τὸ δὲ μὴδ' ὅτι οὖν ἀδικεῖν ἀνωμολόγηται—σοὶ δὲ συκοφάντῃ μὲν εἶναι δοκεῖν ὑπάρχει, κινδυνεύεις δέ, εἴτε δεῖ σε ἔτι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἤδη πεπαῦσθαι μὴ μεταλαβόντα τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων, &c.

Yet Æschinês had become opulent, according to Demosthenês, p. 329.

at the prospect of being punished by Alexander for his ostentatious prodigalities, fled from Asia into Greece, with a considerable treasure and a body of 5000 soldiers.¹ While satrap, he had invited into Asia, in succession, two Athenian women as mistresses, Pythionikê and Glykera, to each of whom he was much attached, and whom he entertained with lavish expense and pomp. On the death of the first, he testified his sorrow by two costly funereal monuments to her memory; one at Babylon, the other in Attica, between Athens and Eleusis. With Glykera he is said to have resided at Tarsus in Kilikia—to have ordered that men should prostrate themselves before her, and address her as queen—and to have erected her statue along with his own at Rhossus, a seaport on the confines of Kilikia and Syria.² To please these mistresses, or perhaps to ensure a retreat for himself in case of need, he had sent to Athens profuse gifts of wheat for distribution among the people, for which he had received votes of thanks with the grant of Athenian citizenship.³ Moreover he had consigned to Chariklês, son-in-law of Phokion, the task of erecting the monument in Attica to the honour of Pythionikê, with a large remittance of money for the purpose.⁴ The profit or embezzlement arising out of this expenditure secured to him the good-will of Chariklês—a man very different from his father-in-law, the honest and austere Phokion. Other Athenians were probably conciliated by various presents, so that when Harpalus found it convenient to quit Asia, about the beginning of 324 B.C., he had already acquired some hold both on the public of Athens and on some of her leading men. He sailed with his treasure and his

¹ Diodor. xvii. 108. He states the treasure brought out of Asia by Harpalus as 5000 talents.

² See the fragments of the letter or pamphlet of Theopompus addressed to Alexander, while Harpalus was still at Tarsus, and before his flight to Athens—Theopomp. Fragm. 277, 278, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 586–595. Theopompus speaks in the present tense—καὶ ὁρᾷ (Harpalus) ὑπὸ τοῦ λαοῦ προσκυνουμένην (Glykera), &c. Kleitarchus stated these facts, as well as Theopompus (Athenæ. *ibid.*).

³ Athenæus, xiii. p. 596—the extract from the satirical drama called *Agên*, represented before Alexander at Susa, in the Dionysiac festival or early months of 324 B.C.

⁴ Plutarch, Phokion, 22; Pausanias, i. 37, 4; Dikæarchi Fragment, 72, ed. Didot.

Plutarch's narrative is misleading, inasmuch as it seems to imply that Harpalus gave this money to Chariklês *after* his arrival at Athens. We know from Theopompus (Fr. 277) that the monument had been finished some time before Harpalus quitted Asia. Plutarch treats it as a mean structure, unworthy of the sum expended on it; but both Dikæarchus and Pausanias describe it as stately and magnificent.

armament straight to Cape Sunium in Attica, from whence he sent to ask shelter and protection in that city.¹

The first reports transmitted to Asia appear to have proclaimed that the Athenians had welcomed Harpalus as a friend and ally, thrown off the Macedonian yoke, and prepared for a war to re-establish Hellenic freedom. Such is the colour of the case, as presented in the satyric drama called *Agên*, exhibited before Alexander in the Dionysiac festival at Susa, in February or March 324 B.C. Such news, connecting itself in Alexander's mind with the recent defeat of Zopyrion in Thrace and other disorders of the disbanded mercenaries, incensed him so much, that he at first ordered a fleet to be equipped, determining to cross over and attack Athens in person.² But he was presently calmed by more correct intelligence, certifying that the Athenians had positively refused to espouse the cause of Harpalus.³

The fact of such final rejection by the Athenians is quite

¹ Curtius, x. 2, 1.

² Curtius, x. 2, 1. "Igitur triginta navibus Sunium transmittunt" (Harpalus and his company), "unde portum urbis petere decreverunt. His cognitis, rex Harpalo Atheniensibusque juxta infestus, classem parari jubet, Athenas protinus petiturus." Compare Justin, xiii. 5, 7—who mentions this hostile intention in Alexander's mind, but gives a different account of the cause of it.

The extract from the drama *Agên* (given in Athenæus, xiii. p. 596) represents the reports which excited this anger of Alexander. It was said that Athens had repudiated her slavery, with the abundance which she had before enjoyed under it,—to enter upon a struggle for freedom, with the certainty of present privations and future ruin:—

A. ὅτε μὲν ἔφασκον (the Athenians) δοῦλον ἐκτῆσθαι βίον,
ικανὸν ἰδεῖν πρὸν· νῦν δέ, τὸν χειρὸς μόνον
καὶ τὸν μάραθρον ἔσθονσι, πυρὸς δ' οὐ μάλα.

B. καὶ μὴν ἀκούω μυριάδας τὸν Ἄρπαλον
αὐτοῖσι τῶν Ἀγῆνων οὐκ ἐλάττονας
σίτου παραπέμψαι, καὶ πολίτην γεγονέναι.

A. Γλυκέρας ὁ σίτος οὗτος ἦν· ἔστιν δ' ἴσως
αὐτοῖσιν δ' ἐλέθρου κούχ' ἐταίρας ἀρραβιών·

I conceive this drama *Agên* to have been represented on the banks of the *Choaspes* (not the *Hydaspes*—see my note in the Chapter immediately preceding), that is, at Susa, in the Dionysia of 324 B.C. It is interesting as a record of the feelings of the time.

³ Nevertheless the impression, that Alexander was intending to besiege Athens, must have prevailed in the army for several months longer, during the autumn of 324 B.C., when he was at Ekbatana. Ephippus the historian, in recounting the flatteries addressed to Alexander at Ekbatana, mentions the rhodomontade of a soldier named Gorgus — Γόργος ὁ ὀπλοφύλαξ 'Ἀλέξανδρον' Ἀμμωνος υἱὸν στεφανοῦ χρυσοῖς τρισχιλίοις, καὶ ἔταν' Ἀθήνας πολιορκῇ, μυρίαίς πανοπλίαις καὶ ταῖς ἴσαις καταπέλταις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἔλλοις βέλεσιν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἱκανοῖς (Ephippus ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 538. Fragment. 3, ed. Didot).

indisputable. But it seems, as far as we can make out from imperfect evidence, that this step was not taken without debate, nor without symptoms of a contrary disposition, sufficient to explain the rumours first sent to Alexander. The first arrival of Harpalus with his armament at Sunium, indeed, excited alarm, as if he were coming to take possession of Peiræus; and the admiral Philoklēs was instructed to adopt precautions for defence of the harbour.¹ But Harpalus, sending away his armament to Krete or to Tænarus, solicited and obtained permission to come to Athens, with a single ship and his own personal attendants. What was of still greater moment, he brought with him a large sum of money, amounting, we are told, to upwards of 700 talents, or more than £160,000. We must recollect that he was already favourably known to the people by large presents of corn, which had procured for him a vote of citizenship. He now threw himself upon their gratitude as a suppliant seeking protection against the wrath of Alexander; and while entreating from the Athenians an interference so hazardous to themselves, he did not omit to encourage them by exaggerating the means at his own disposal. He expatiated on the universal hatred and discontent felt against Alexander, and held out assurance of being joined by powerful allies, foreign as well as Greek, if once a city like Athens would raise the standard of liberation.² To many

¹ Deinarchus adv. Philokl. s. 1. φάσκων κωλύσειν Ἀρπαλον εἰς τὴν Πειραιᾷ καταπλεῦσαι στρατηγὸς ὑφ' ὧν ἐπὶ τὰ νεώρια καὶ τὴν Μουνυχίαν κεχειροτονημένος, &c. Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton. s. 4. ὃς παρ' Ἀρπάλου λαβεῖν χρήματα ἐτόλμησεν, ὃν ᾗσθεθ' ἤκειν καταληψόμενον τὴν πόλιν ὧν, &c.

² See the new and interesting, though unfortunately scanty, fragments of the oration of Hyperidēs against Demosthenēs, published and elucidated by Mr. Churchill Babington from a recently discovered Egyptian papyrus (Cambridge, 1850). From Fragn. 14 (p. 38 of Mr. Babington's edition) we may see that the promises mentioned in the text were actually held out by Harpalus—indeed we might almost have presumed it without positive evidence. Hyperidēs addresses Demosthenēs—ταύτας ὅπ . . . ἰς τῷ ψηφίσματι, συλλαβὼν τὸν Ἀρπαλον καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἅπαντας πρεσβεύεσθαι πεποίηκας ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον, οὐκ ἔχοντας ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν ἀποστροφὴν τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἂν ἦκον φέροντες εἰς ταῦτ' τὴν δύναμιν, ἔχοντες τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ὅσους ἕκαστος αὐτῶν εἶχε, τοὺτους σύμπαντας οὐ μόνον ἐκεῷ λυκάς ἀποστῆναι ἐκείνου τῇ συλλήψει τοῦ Ἀρπάλου, ἀλλὰ καὶ . . .

From the language thus used by Hyperidēs in his accusation, we are made to perceive what prospects he (and of course Harpalus, upon whose authority he must have spoken) had held out to the people when the case was first under discussion.

The fragment here cited is complete as to the main sense, not requiring very great help from conjecture. In some of the other fragments, the

Athenian patriots, more ardent than long-sighted, such appeals inspired both sympathy and confidence. Moreover Harpalus would of course purchase every influential partisan who would accept a bribe; in addition to men like Chariklēs, who were already in his interest. His cause was espoused by Hyperidēs,¹ an earnest anti-Macedonian citizen, and an orator second only to Demosthenēs. There seems good reason for believing that, at first, a strong feeling was excited in favour of taking part with the exile; the people not being daunted even by the idea of war with Alexander.²

Phokion, whom Harpalus vainly endeavoured to corrupt, resisted of course the proposition of espousing his cause. And Demosthenēs also resisted it, not less decidedly, from the very outset.³ Notwithstanding all his hatred of Macedonian supremacy, he could not be blind to the insanity of declaring war against Alexander. Indeed those who study his orations throughout, will find his counsels quite as much distinguished for prudence as for vigorous patriotism. His prudence on this occasion, however, proved injurious to his political position; for while it incensed Hyperidēs and the more sanguine anti-Macedonians, it probably did not gain for himself anything beyond a temporary truce from his old macedonising opponents.

The joint opposition of politicians so discordant as Demosthenēs and Phokion, prevailed over the impulse which the partisans of Harpalus had created. No decree could be obtained in his favour. Presently however the case was complicated by the coming of envoys from Antipater and Olympias in Macedonia, requiring that he should be surrendered.⁴ The like requisition was also addressed by the Macedonian admiral Philoxenus, who arrived with a small squadron from Asia. These demands were refused, at the instance of Phokion no less than of Demosthenēs. Nevertheless the prospects of Macedonian vengeance were now brought

conjectural restorations of Mr. Babington, though highly probable and judicious, form too large a proportion of the whole to admit of our citing them with confidence as testimony.

¹ Pollux, x. 159.

² Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, p. 531. τῶν γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ὠρμημένων Ἀρπάλας βοηθεῖν, καὶ κορυτσόντων ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον, ἐξαίφνης ἐπεφάνη φιλόξενος, ὁ τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάσῃ πραγμάτων Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγός· ἐκπλαγέντος δὲ τοῦ δήμου, καὶ σιωπῶντος διὰ τὸν φόβον, ὁ Δημοσθένης—τί ποιήσουσιν, ἔφη, πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον ἰδόντες, οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι πρὸς τὸν λύχρον ἀντιβλέπειν;

³ Plutarch, Phokion, c. 21; Plutarch, Demosthen. 25.

⁴ Diodor. xvii. 108.

in such fearful proximity before the people, that all disposition to support Harpalus gave way to the necessity of propitiating Alexander. A decree was passed to arrest Harpalus, and to place all his money under sequestration in the acropolis, until special directions could be received from Alexander; to whom, apparently, envoys were sent, carrying with them the slaves of Harpalus to be interrogated by him, and instructed to solicit a lenient sentence at his hands.¹ Now it was Demosthenês who moved these decrees for personal arrest and for sequestration of the money;² whereby he incurred still warmer resentment from Hyperidês and the other Harpalian partisans, who denounced him as a subservient creature of the all-powerful monarch. Harpalus was confined, but presently made his escape; probably much to the satisfaction of Phokion, Demosthenês, and every one else; for even those who were most anxious to get rid of him would recoil from the odium and dishonour of surrendering him, even under constraint, to a certain death. He fled to Krete, where he was soon after slain by one of his own companions.³

At the time when the decrees for arrest and sequestration were passed, Demosthenês requested a citizen near him to ask Harpalus publicly in the assembly, what was the amount of his money, which the people had just resolved to impound.⁴ Harpalus answered, 720 talents; and Demosthenês proclaimed

¹ Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69. *ἐὰν τοὺς παῖδας καταπέμψῃ* (Alexander) *πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς νῦν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνακεκομισμένους, καὶ τούτων ἀξιοὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν πυθέσθαι, &c.*

² See the fragment cited in a preceding note from the oration of Hyperidês against Demosthenês. That it was *Demosthenês* who moved the decree for depositing the money in the acropolis, we learn also from one of his other accusers—the citizen who delivered the speech composed by Deinarchus (adv. Demosthen. sect. 68, 71, 89)—*ἔγραψεν αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ δήμῳ Δημοσθένους, ὡς δηλονότι δικαίου τοῦ πράγματος ὄντος, φυλάττειν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τὰ εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἀφικόμενα μετὰ Ἀρπάλου χρήματα.*

Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. s. 97–106) accuses Demosthenês of base flattery to Alexander. Hyperidês also makes the same charge—see the Fragments in Mr. Babington's edition, sect. 2, Fr. 11, p. 12; sect. 3, Fr. 5, p. 34.

³ Pausan. ii. 33, 4; Diodor. xvii. 108.

⁴ This material fact, of the question publicly put to Harpalus in the assembly by some one at the request of Demosthenês, appears in the Fragments of Hyperidês, pp. 5, 7, 9, ed. Babington—*καθήμενος κάτω ὑπὸ τῇ κατατομῇ, ἐκέλευσε . . . τὸν χορευτὴν ἐρωτῆσαι τὸν Ἀρπαλον ὅπως εἶη τὰ χρήματα τὰ ἀνοισθησόμενα εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν· ὃ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι ἐπτακόσια, &c.*

The term *κατατομή* (see Mr. Babington's note) "designates a broad passage occurring at intervals between the concentrically arranged benches of seats in a theatre, and running parallel with them."

this sum to the people, on the authority of Harpalus, dwelling with some emphasis upon its magnitude. But when the money came to be counted in the acropolis, it was discovered that there was in reality no more than 350 talents. Now it is said that Demosthenês did not at once communicate to the people this prodigious deficiency in the real sum as compared with the announcement of Harpalus, repeated in the public assembly by himself. The impression prevailed, for how long a time we do not know, that 720 Harpalian talents had actually been lodged in the acropolis; and when the truth became at length known, great surprise and outcry were excited.¹ It was assumed that the missing half of the sum set forth must have been employed in corruption; and suspicions prevailed against almost all the orators, Demosthenês and Hyperidês both included.

In this state of doubt, Demosthenês moved that the Senate of Areopagus should investigate the matter and report who were the presumed delinquents² fit to be indicted before the Dikastery; he declared in the speech accompanying his motion that the real delinquents, whoever they might be, deserved to be capitally punished. The Areopagites delayed their report for six months, though Demosthenês is said to have called for it with some impatience. Search was made in the houses of the leading orators, excepting only one who was recently married.³ At length the report appeared, enumerating several names of citizens chargeable with the appropriation of this money, and specifying how much had been taken by each. Among these names were Demosthenês himself, charged with 20 talents—Demadês charged with 6000 golden staters—and other citizens, with different sums attached to their names.⁴

¹ Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846. In the life of Demosthenês given by Photius (Cod. 265, p. 494) it is stated that only 308 talents were found.

² That this motion was made by Demosthenês himself, is a point strongly pressed by his accuser Deinarchus—adv. Demosth. s. 5, 62, 84, &c.: compare also the Fragm. of Hyperidês, p. 59, ed. Babington.

Deinarchus, in his loose rhetoric, tries to put the case as if Demosthenês had proposed to recognise the sentence of the Areopagus as final and peremptory, and as if he stood therefore condemned upon the authority invoked by himself. But this is refuted sufficiently by the mere fact that the trial was instituted afterwards; besides that it is repugnant to the judicial practice of Athens.

³ Plutarch, Demosth. 26. We learn from Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. s. 46) that the report of the Areopagites was not delivered until after an interval of six months. About their delay and the impatience of Demosthenês, see Fragm. Hyperidês, p. 12–33, ed. Babington.

⁴ Deinarchus, adv. Demosth. s. 92. See the Fragm. of Hyperidês in Mr. Babington, p. 18.

Upon this report, ten¹ public accusers were appointed to prosecute the indictment against the persons specified, before the Dikastery. Among the accusers was Hyperidês, whose name had not been comprised in the Areopagitic report. Demosthenês was brought to trial first of all the persons accused, before a numerous Dikastery of 1500 citizens,² who confirmed the report of the Areopagites, found him guilty, and condemned him to pay fifty talents to the state. Not being able to discharge this large fine, he was put in prison; but after some days he found means to escape, and fled to Trœzen in Peloponnesus, where he passed some months as a dispirited and sorrowing exile, until the death of Alexander.³ What was done with the other citizens included in the Areopagitic report, we do not know. It appears that Demadês⁴—who was among those comprised, and who is especially attacked, along with Demosthenês, by both Hyperidês and Deinarchus—did not appear to take his trial, and therefore must have been driven into exile; yet if so, he must have speedily returned, since he seems to have been at Athens when Alexander died. Philoklês and Aristogeiton were also brought to trial as being included by the Areopagus in the list of delinquents; but how their trial ended, does not appear.⁵

This condemnation and banishment of Demosthenês—unquestionably the greatest orator, and one of the greatest citizens, in Athenian antiquity—is the most painful result of the debates respecting the exile Harpalus. Demosthenês himself denied the charge; but unfortunately we possess neither his defence, nor the facts alleged in evidence against him; so that our means of forming a positive conclusion are imperfect. At the same time, judging from the circumstances as far as we know them, there are several which go to show his innocence, and

¹ Deinarchus adv. Aristogeiton. s. 6. Stratoklês was one of the accusers.

² Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 108, 109. ³ Plutarch, Demosth. 26.

⁴ Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 104.

⁵ See the two orations composed by Deinarchus, against Philoklês and Aristogeiton.

In the second and third Epistles ascribed to Demosthenês (pp. 1470, 1483, 1485), he is made to state, that he alone had been condemned by the Dikastery, because his trial had come on first—that Aristogeiton and all the others tried were acquitted, though the charge against all was the same, and the evidence against all was the same also—viz. nothing more than the simple report of the Areopagus. As I agree with those who hold these epistles to be probably spurious, I cannot believe, on such authority alone, that all the other persons tried were acquitted—a fact highly improbable in itself.

none which tend to prove him guilty. If we are called upon to believe that he received money from Harpalus, we must know for what service the payment was made. Did Demosthenês take part with Harpalus, and advise the Athenians to espouse his cause? Did he even keep silence, and abstain from advising them to reject the propositions? Quite the reverse. Demosthenês was from the beginning a declared opponent of Harpalus, and of all measures for supporting his cause. Plutarch indeed tells an anecdote—that Demosthenês began by opposing Harpalus, but that presently he was fascinated by the beauty of a golden cup among the Harpalian treasures. Harpalus, perceiving his admiration, sent to him on the ensuing night the golden cup, together with twenty talents, which Demosthenês accepted. A few days afterwards, when the cause of Harpalus was again debated in the public assembly, the orator appeared with his throat enveloped in woollen wrappers, and affected to have lost his voice; upon which the people, detecting this simulated inability as dictated by the bribe which had been given, expressed their displeasure partly by sarcastic taunts, partly by indignant murmuring.¹ So stands the anecdote in Plutarch. But we have proof that it is untrue. Demosthenês may indeed have been disabled by sore-throat from speaking at some particular assembly; so far the story may be accurate. But that he desisted from opposing Harpalus (the real point of the allegation against him) is certainly not true; for we know, from his accusers Deinarchus and Hyperidês, that it was he who made the final motion for imprisoning Harpalus and sequestering the Harpalian treasure in trust for Alexander. In fact, Hyperidês himself denounces Demosthenês, as having, from subservience to Alexander, closed the door against Harpalus and his prospects.² Such direct and continued opposition is a conclusive proof that Demosthenês was neither paid nor bought by Harpalus. The only service which he rendered to the exile was, by refusing to deliver him to Antipater, and by not preventing his escape from imprisonment. Now in this refusal even Phokion concurred; and probably the best Athenians, of all parties, were desirous of favouring the escape of an exile

¹ Plutarch, Demosth. 25: compare also Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846; and Photius, Life of Demosth. Cod. 265, p. 494.

² See the fragment of Hyperidês in Mr. Babington's edition, pp. 37, 38 (a fragment already cited in a preceding note), insisting upon the prodigious mischief which Demosthenês had done by his decree for arresting (σύλληψις) Harpalus.

whom it would have been odious to hand over to a Macedonian executioner. In so far as it was a crime not to have prevented the escape of Harpalus, the crime was committed as much by Phokion as by Demosthenês; and indeed more, seeing that Phokion was one of the generals, exercising the most important administrative duties—while Demosthenês was only an orator and mover in the assembly. Moreover, Harpalus had no means of requiting the persons, whoever they were, to whom he owed his escape; for the same motion which decreed his arrest, decreed also the sequestration of his money, and thus removed it from his own control.¹

The charge therefore made against Demosthenês by his two accusers,—that he received money *from* Harpalus,—is one which all the facts known to us tend to refute. But this is not quite the whole case. Had Demosthenês the means of embezzling the money, after it had passed out of the control of Harpalus? To this question also we may reply in the negative, so far as Athenian practice enables us to judge.

Demosthenês had moved, and the people had voted, that these treasures should be lodged, in trust for Alexander, in the acropolis; a place where all the Athenian public money was habitually kept—in the back chamber of the Parthenon. When placed in that chamber, these new treasures would come under the custody of the officers of the Athenian exchequer; and would be just as much out of the reach of Demosthenês as the rest of the public money. What more could Phokion himself have done to preserve the Harpalian fund intact, than to put it in the recognised place of surety? Then, as to the intermediate process, of taking the money from Harpalus up to the acropolis, there is no proof,—and in my judgement no

¹ In the Life of Demosthenês apud Photium (Cod. 265), the service alleged to have been rendered by him to Harpalus, and for which he was charged with having received 1000 Darics, is put as I have stated it in the text—Demosthenês first spoke publicly against receiving Harpalus, but presently Δαρεικοὺς χιλίους (ᾧς φασί) λαβὼν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ λέγοντας μετετάξατο (then follow the particular acts whereby this alleged change of sentiment was manifested, which particular acts are described as follows)—καὶ βουλευμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων Ἀντιπάτρῳ προδοῦναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀντίειπεν, τὰ τε Ἀρπάλεια χρήματα εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἔγραψεν ἀποθέσθαι, μηδὲ τῷ δήμῳ τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν ἀποσημηνάμενος.

That Demosthenês should first oppose the reception of Harpalus—and then afterwards oppose the surrender of Harpalus to Antipater's requisition—is here represented as a change of politics, requiring the hypothesis of a bribe to explain it. But it is in reality no change at all. The two proceedings are perfectly consistent with each other, and both of them defensible.

probability,—that Demosthenês was at all concerned in it. Even to count, verify, and weigh, a sum of above £80,000—not in bank notes or bills of exchange, but subdivided in numerous and heavy coins (staters, darics, tetradrachms), likely to be not even Attic, but Asiatic—must have been a tedious duty requiring to be performed by competent reckoners, and foreign to the habits of Demosthenês. The officers of the Athenian treasury must have gone through this labour, providing the slaves or mules requisite for carrying so heavy a burthen up to the acropolis. Now we have ample evidence, from the remaining Inscriptions, that the details of transferring and verifying the public property, at Athens, were performed habitually with laborious accuracy. Least of all would such accuracy be found wanting in the case of the large Harpalian treasure, where the very passing of the decree implied great fear of Alexander. If Harpalus, on being publicly questioned in the assembly—What was the sum to be carried up into the acropolis,—answered by stating the amount which he had originally brought, and not that which he had remaining—Demosthenês might surely repeat that statement immediately after him, without being understood thereby to bind himself down as guarantee for its accuracy. An adverse pleader, like Hyperidês, might indeed turn a point in his speech¹—“*You* told the assembly that there were 700 talents, and now *you* produce no more than half”—but the imputation wrapped up in these words against the probity of Demosthenês, is utterly groundless. Lastly, when the true amount was ascertained, to make report thereof was the duty of the officers of the treasury. Demosthenês could learn it only from them; and it might

¹ *Fragm. Hyperidês*, p. 7, ed. Babington—ἐν τῷ δῆμῳ ἑπτακόσια φήσας εἶναι τάλαντα, νῦν τὰ ἡμίση ἀναφέρεις;

In p. 26 of the same Fragments, we find Hyperidês reproaching Demosthenês for not having kept effective custody over the person of Harpalus; for not having proposed any decree providing a special custody; for not having made known beforehand, or prosecuted afterwards, the negligence of the ordinary gaolers. This is to make Demosthenês responsible for the performance of *all* the administrative duties of the city; for the good conduct of the treasurers and the gaolers.

We must recollect that Hyperidês had been the loudest advocate of Harpalus, and had done all he could to induce the Athenians to adopt the cause of that exile against Alexander. One of the charges (already cited from his speech) against Demosthenês, is, that Demosthenês prevented this from being accomplished. Yet here is another charge from the same speaker, to the effect that Demosthenês did not keep Harpalus under effective custody for the sword of the Macedonian executioner!

The line of accusation taken by Hyperidês is full of shameful inconsistencies.

certainly be proper in him, though in no sense an imperative duty, to inform himself on the point, seeing that he had unconsciously helped to give publicity to a false statement. The true statement was given; but we neither know by whom, nor how soon.¹

Reviewing the facts known to us, therefore, we find them all tending to refute the charge against Demosthenês. This conclusion will certainly be strengthened by reading the accusatory speech composed by Deinarchus; which is mere virulent invective, barren of facts and evidentiary matter, and running over all the life of Demosthenês for the preceding twenty years. That the speech of Hyperidês also was of the like desultory character, the remaining fragments indicate. Even the report made by the Areopagus contained no recital of facts—no justificatory matter—nothing except a specification of names with the sums for which each of them was chargeable.² It appears to have been made *ex-parte*, as far as we can judge—that is, made without hearing these persons in their own defence, unless they happened to be themselves Areopagites. Yet this report is held forth both by Hyperidês and Deinarchus as being in itself conclusive proof which the Dikasts could not reject. When Demosthenês demanded, as every defendant naturally would, that the charge against him should be proved by some positive evidence, Hyperidês sets aside the demand as nothing better than cavil and special pleading.³

¹ In the Life of Demosthenês (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846), the charge of corruption against him is made to rest chiefly on the fact, that he did not make this communication to the people—καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνακομισθέντων μεμνηκὼς μήτε τῶν φυλασσόντων ἀμέλειαν, &c. The biographer apud Photium seems to state it as if Demosthenês did not communicate the amount, *at the time* when he proposed the decree of sequestration. This last statement we are enabled to contradict, from the testimony of Hyperidês.

² Hyperid. Fragm. p. 18, ed. Babington. τὰς γὰρ ἀποφάσεις πάσας τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων Ἀρπάλου, πάσας ὁμοίως ἢ βουλὴ πεποιήται, καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς κατὰ πάντων· καὶ οὐδεμίᾳ προσγέγραφε, δι' ὅτι ἕκαστον ἀποφαίνει· ἀλλ' ἐπικεφάλαιον γράψασα, ὅποσον ἕκαστος εἴληφε χρυσίον, τοῦτ' οὖν ὀφειλέτω. . . .

³ Hyperid. Fragm. p. 20, ed. Babingt. ἐγὼ δ' ὅτι μὲν ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον, ἱκανὸν οἶμαι εἶναι σημεῖον τοῖς δικασταῖς, τὸ τὴν βουλήν σου καταγνῶναι (see Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 46, and the beginning of the second Demosthenic epistle).

Hyperid. p. 16, ed. Babingt. Καὶ συκοφαντεῖς τὴν βουλήν, προκλήσεις προτιθεῖς, καὶ ἐρωτῶν ἐν ταῖς προκλήσεσιν, πόθεν ἔλαβες τὸ χρυσίον, καὶ τίς ἦν σοὶ ὁ δούς, καὶ πῶς; τελευταῖον δ' ἴσως ἐρωτῇσεις, καὶ εἰ ἐχρήσω τῷ χρυσίῳ, ὥσπερ τραπεζιτικὸν λόγον παρὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἀπαιτῶν.

This monstrous sentence creates a strong presumption in favour of the

One further consideration remains to be noticed. Only nine months after the verdict of the Dikastery against Demosthenês, Alexander died. Presently the Athenians and other Greeks rose against Antipater in the struggle called the Lamian war. Demosthenês was then recalled; received from his countrymen an enthusiastic welcome, such as had never been accorded to any returning exile since the days of Alkibiadês; took a leading part in the management of the war; and perished, on its disastrous termination, along with his accuser Hyperidês.

Such speedy revolution of opinion about Demosthenês, countenances the conclusion which seems to me suggested by the other circumstances of the case—that the verdict against him was not judicial, but political; growing out of the embarrassing necessities of the time.

There can be no doubt that Harpalus, to whom a declaration of active support from the Athenians was matter of life and death, distributed various bribes to all consenting recipients, who could promote his views,—and probably even to some who simply refrained from opposing them; to all, in short, except pronounced opponents. If we were to judge from probabilities alone, we should say that Hyperidês himself, as one of the chief supporters, would also be among the largest recipients.¹ Here was abundant bribery—notorious in the mass, though perhaps untraceable in the detail—all consummated during the flush of promise which marked the early discussions of the Harpalian case. When the tide of sentiment turned—when fear of Macedonian force became the overwhelming sentiment—when Harpalus and his treasures were impounded in trust for Alexander—all these numerous receivers of bribes were already compromised and alarmed. They themselves probably, in order to divert suspicion, were among the loudest in demanding investigation and punishment against delinquents. Moreover, the city was responsible for 700 talents to Alexander, while no more than 350 were forthcoming.² It was indispensable that some definite individuals should be pronounced guilty and punished, partly in order to

defendant,—and a still stronger presumption against the accuser. Compare Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 6, 7.

The biographer apud Photium states that Hyperidês and four other orators procured (*κατεσκεύασαν*) the condemnation of Demosthenês by the Areopagus.

¹ The biographer of Hyperidês (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 48) tells us that he was the only orator who kept himself unbribed; the comic writer Timoklês names Hyperidês along with Demosthenês and others as recipients (ap. Athenæ. viii. p. 342).

² See this point urged by Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 69, 70.

put down the reciprocal criminations circulating through the city, partly in order to appease the displeasure of Alexander about the pecuniary deficiency. But how to find out who were the guilty? There was no official Prosecutor-general; the number of persons suspected would place the matter beyond the reach of private accusations; perhaps the course recommended by Demosthenês himself was the best, to consign this preliminary investigation to the Areopagites.

Six months elapsed before these Areopagites made their report. Now it is impossible to suppose that all this time could have been spent in the investigation of facts—and if it had been, the report when published would have contained some trace of these facts, instead of embodying a mere list of names and sums. The probability is, that their time was passed quite as much in party-discussions as in investigating facts; that dissentient parties were long in coming to an agreement whom they should sacrifice; and that when they did agree, it was a political rather than a judicial sentence, singling out Demosthenês as a victim highly acceptable to Alexander, and embodying Demadês also, by way of compromise, in the same list of delinquents—two opposite politicians, both at the moment obnoxious. I have already observed that Demosthenês was at that time unpopular with both the reigning parties; with the philo-Macedonians, from long date, and not without sufficient reason; with the anti-Macedonians, because he had stood prominent in opposing Harpalus. His accusers count upon the hatred of the former against him, as a matter of course; they recommend him to the hatred of the latter, as a base creature of Alexander. The Dikasts doubtless included men of both parties; and as a collective body, they might probably feel, that to ratify the list presented by the Areopagus was the only way of finally closing a subject replete with danger and discord.

Such seems the probable history of the Harpalian transactions. It leaves Demosthenês innocent of corrupt profit, not less than Phokion; but to the Athenian politicians generally, it is noway creditable; while it exhibits the judicial conscience of Athens as under pressure of dangers from without, worked upon by party-intrigues within.¹

¹ We read in Pausanias (ii. 33, 4) that the Macedonian admiral Philoxenus, having afterwards seized one of the slaves of Harpalus, learnt from him the names of those Athenians whom his master had corrupted; and that Demosthenês was *not* among them. As far as this statement goes, it serves to exculpate Demosthenês. Yet I cannot assign so much importance

During the half-year and more which elapsed between the arrival of Harpalus at Athens and the trial of Demosthenês, one event at least of considerable moment occurred in Greece. Alexander sent Nikanor to the great Olympic festival held in this year, with a formal letter or rescript, directing every Grecian city to recall all its citizens that were in exile, except such as were under the taint of impiety. The rescript, which was publicly read at the festival by the herald who had gained the prize for loudness of voice, was heard with the utmost enthusiasm by 20,000 exiles, who had mustered there from intimations that such a step was intended. It ran thus : " King Alexander to the exiles out of the Grecian cities. We have not been authors of your banishment, but we will be authors of your restoration to your native cities. We have written to Antipater about this matter, directing him to apply force to such cities as will not recall you of their own accord."¹

It is plain that many exiles had been pouring out their complaints and accusations before Alexander, and had found him a willing auditor. But we do not know by what representations this rescript had been procured. It would seem that Antipater had orders further, to restrain or modify the confederacies of the Achæan and Arcadian cities ;² and to enforce not merely recall of the exiles, but restitution of their properties.³

That the imperial rescript was dictated by mistrust of the tone of sentiment in the Grecian cities generally, and intended to fill each city with devoted partisans of Alexander—we cannot doubt. It was on his part a high-handed and sweeping exercise of sovereignty—setting aside the conditions under which he had been named leader of Greece—disdaining even to inquire into particular cases, and to attempt a distinction between just and unjust sentences—overruling in the mass the political and judicial authorities in every city. It proclaimed with bitter emphasis the servitude of the Hellenic world. Exiles restored under the coercive order of Alexander were sure to look to Macedonia for support, to despise their own home authorities, and to fill their respective cities with enfeebling discord. Most of the cities, not daring to resist, appear to have yielded a reluctant obedience ; but both the

to it as Bishop Thirlwall seems to do. His narrative of the Harpalian transactions is able and discriminating (*Hist.* vol. vii. ch. 56, p. 170 *seq.*).

¹ Diodor. xix. 8.

² See the Fragments of Hyperidês, p. 36, ed. Babington.

³ Curtius, x. 2, 6.

Athenians and Ætolians are said to have refused to execute the order.¹ It is one evidence of the disgust raised by the rescript at Athens, that Demosthenês is severely reproached by Deinarchus, because, as chief of the Athenian Theôry or sacred legation to the Olympic festival, he was seen there publicly consorting and in familiar converse with Nikanor.²

In the winter or early spring of 323 B.C. several Grecian cities sent envoys into Asia to remonstrate with Alexander against the measure; we may presume that the Athenians were among them, but we do not know whether the remonstrance produced any effect.³ There appears to have been considerable discontent in Greece during this winter and spring (323 B.C.). The disbanded soldiers out of Asia still maintained a camp at Tænarus; where Leosthenês, an energetic Athenian of anti-Macedonian sentiments, accepted the command of them, and even attracted fresh mercenary soldiers from Asia, under concert with various confederates at Athens, and with the Ætolians.⁴ Of the money, said to be 5000 talents, brought by Harpalus out of Asia, the greater part had not been taken by Harpalus to Athens, but apparently left with his officers for the maintenance of the troops who had accompanied him over.

Such was the general position of affairs when Alexander died at Babylon in June 323 B.C. This astounding news, for which no one could have been prepared, must have become diffused throughout Greece during the month of July. It opened the most favourable prospects to all lovers of freedom and sufferers by Macedonian dominion. The imperial military force resembled the gigantic Polyphemus after his eye had

¹ Curtius, x. 2, 6. The statement of Diodorus (xviii. 8)—that the rescript was popular and acceptable to all Greeks, except the Athenians and Ætolians—cannot be credited. It was popular, doubtless, with the exiles themselves, and their immediate friends.

² Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 81: compare Hyperid. Fragm. p. 36, ed. Babington.

³ Diodor. xvii. 113. There seem to have been cases in which Alexander interfered with the sentences of the Athenian Dikastery against Athenian citizens: see the case of a man liberated from a judicial fine at his instance. Pseudo-Demosthenês, Epistol. 3, p. 1480.

⁴ Diodor. xvii. 111; compare xviii. 21. Pausanias (i. 25, 5; viii. 52, 2) affirms that Leosthenês brought over 50,000 of these mercenaries from Asia into Peloponnesus, during the lifetime of Alexander, and against Alexander's will. The number here given seems incredible; but it is probable enough that he induced some to come across.—Justin (xiii. 5) mentions that armed resistance was prepared by the Athenians and Ætolians against Alexander himself during the latter months of his life, in reference to the mandate enjoining recall of the exiles. He seems to overstate the magnitude of their doings, before the death of Alexander.

been blinded by Odysseus :¹ Alexander had left no competent heir, nor did any one imagine that his vast empire could be kept together in effective unity by other hands. Antipater in Macedonia was threatened with the defection of various subject neighbours.²

No sooner was the death of Alexander indisputably certified, than the anti-Macedonian leaders in Athens vehemently instigated the people to declare themselves first champions of Hellenic freedom, and to organise a confederacy throughout Greece for that object. Demosthenés was then in exile ; but Leosthenés, Hyperidés and other orators of the same party, found themselves able to kindle in their countrymen a warlike feeling and determination, in spite of decided opposition on the part of Phokion and his partisans.³ The rich men for the most part took the side of Phokion, but the mass of the citizens were fired by the animating recollection of their ancestors and by the hopes of reconquering Grecian freedom. A vote was passed, publicly proclaiming their resolution to that effect. It was decreed that 200 quadriremes and 40 triremes should be equipped ; that all Athenians under 40 years of age should be in military requisition ; and that envoys should be sent round to the various Grecian cities, earnestly invoking their alliance in the work of self-emancipation.⁴ Phokion, though a pronounced opponent of such warlike projects, still remained at Athens, and still, apparently, continued in his functions as one of the generals.⁵ But Pytheas, Kallimèdon,

¹ A striking comparison made by the orator Demadés (Plutarch, *Aphthegm.* p. 181).

² See Frontinus, *Stratagem.* ii. 11, 4.

³ Plutarch, *Phokion*, 23. In the Fragments of Dexippus, there appear short extracts of two speeches, seemingly composed by that author in his history of these transactions ; one which he ascribes to Hyperidés instigating the war, the other to some unknown speaker, supposed by C. Müller to be Phokion, against it (*Fragm. Hist. Græc.* vol. iii. p. 668).

⁴ Diodor. xviii. 10. Diodorus states that the Athenians sent the Harpalian treasures to the aid of Leosthenés. He seems to fancy that Harpalus had brought to Athens all the 5000 talents which he had carried away from Asia ; but it is certain, that no more than 700 or 720 talents were declared by Harpalus in the Athenian assembly—and of these only half were really forthcoming. Moreover, Diodorus is not consistent with himself, when he says afterwards (xviii. 19) that Thimbron, who killed Harpalus in Krete, got possession of the Harpalian treasures and mercenaries, and carried them over to Kyrênê in Africa.

⁵ It is to this season, apparently, that the anecdote (if true) must be referred.—The Athenians were eager to invade Boeotia unseasonably ; Phokion, as general of eighty years old, kept them back, by calling out the citizens of sixty years old and upwards for service, and offering to march himself at their head (Plutarch, *Reip. Ger. Præcept.* p. 818).

and others of his friends, fled to Antipater, whom they strenuously assisted in trying to check the intended movement throughout Greece.

Leosthenês, aided by some money and arms from Athens, put himself at the head of the mercenaries assembled at Tænarus, and passed across the Gulf into Ætolia. Here he was joined by the Ætoliens and Akarnanians, who eagerly entered into the league with Athens for expelling the Macedonians from Greece. Proceeding onward towards Thermopylæ and Thessaly, he met with favour and encouragement almost everywhere. The cause of Grecian freedom was espoused by the Phokians, Lokrians, Dorians, Ænians, Athamânes, and Dolopes; by most of the Malians, Cætans, Thessalians, and Achæans of Phthiôtis; by the inhabitants of Leukas, and by some of the Molossians. Promises were also held out of co-operation from various Illyrian and Thracian tribes. In Peloponnesus, the Argeians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Trœzenians, Eleians, and Messenians, enrolled themselves in the league, as well as the Karystians in Eubœa.¹ These adhesions were partly procured by Hyperidês and other Athenian envoys, who visited the several cities; while Pytheas and other envoys were going round in like manner to advocate the cause of Antipater. The two sides were thus publicly argued by able pleaders before different public assemblies. In these debates, the advantage was generally on the side of the Athenian orators, whose efforts moreover were powerfully seconded by the voluntary aid of Demosthenês, then living as an exile in Peloponnesus.

To Demosthenês the death of Alexander, and the new prospect of organising an anti-Macedonian confederacy with some tolerable chance of success, came more welcome than to any one else. He gladly embraced the opportunity of joining and assisting the Athenian envoys, who felt the full value of his energetic eloquence, in the various Peloponnesian towns. So effective was the service which he thus rendered to his country, that the Athenians not only passed a vote to enable him to return, but sent a trireme to fetch him to Peiræus. Great was the joy and enthusiasm on his arrival. The archons, the priests, and the entire body of citizens, came down to the harbour to welcome his landing, and escorted him to the city. Full of impassioned emotion, Demosthenês poured forth his gratitude for having been allowed to see such a day, and to enjoy a triumph greater even than that which had been

¹ Diodor. xviii. 11; Pausanias, i. 25, 4.

conferred on Alkibiadēs on returning from exile ; since it had been granted spontaneously, and not extorted by force. His fine could not be remitted consistently with Athenian custom ; but the people passed a vote granting to him fifty talents as super-intendent of the periodical sacrifice to Zeus Soter ; and his execution of this duty was held equivalent to a liquidation of the fine.¹

What part Demosthenēs took in the plans or details of the war, we are not permitted to know. Vigorous operations were now carried on, under the military command of Leosthenēs. The confederacy against Antipater included a larger assemblage of Hellenic states than that which had resisted Xerxēs in 480 B.C. Nevertheless, the name of Sparta does not appear in the list. It was a melancholy drawback to the chances of Greece, in this her last struggle for emancipation, that the force of Sparta had been altogether crushed in the gallant but ill-concerted effort of Agis against Antipater seven years before, and had not since recovered. The great stronghold of Macedonian interest, in the interior of Greece, was Bœotia. Platæa, Orchomenus, and the other ancient enemies of Thebes, having received from Alexander the domain once belonging to Thebes herself, were well aware that this arrangement could only be upheld by the continued pressure of Macedonian supremacy in Greece. It seems probable also that there were Macedonian garrisons in the Kadmeia—in Corinth—and in Megalopolis ; moreover, that the Arcadian and Achæan cities had been macedonised by the measures taken against them under Alexander's orders in the preceding summer ;² for we find no mention made of these cities in the coming contest. The Athenians equipped a considerable land-force to join Leosthenēs at Thermopylæ ; a citizen force of 5000 infantry and 500 cavalry, with 2000 mercenaries besides. But the resolute opposition of the Bœotian cities hindered them from advancing beyond Mount Kithæron, until Leosthenēs himself, marching from Thermopylæ to join them with a part of his army, attacked the Bœotian troops, gained a complete victory, and opened the passage. He now proceeded with the full Hellenic muster, including Ætolians and Athenians, into Thessaly to meet Antipater, who was advancing from Mace-

¹ Plutarch, Demosth. 27.

² See the Fragments of Hyperidēs, p. 36, ed. Babington. *καὶ περὶ τοῦ τοῖς κοινούσι συλλόγουσι Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκάδων.* . . . We do not know what was done to these district confederacies, but it seems that some considerable change was made in them, at the time when Alexander's decree for restoring the exiles was promulgated.

donia into Greece at the head of the force immediately at his disposal—13,000 infantry and 600 cavalry—and with a fleet of 110 ships of war co-operating on the coast.¹

Antipater was probably not prepared for this rapid and imposing assemblage of the combined Greeks at Thermopylæ, nor for the energetic movements of Leosthenês. Still less was he prepared for the defection of the Thessalian cavalry, who, having always formed an important element in the Macedonian army, now lent their strength to the Greeks. He despatched urgent messages to the Macedonian commanders in Asia—Kraterus, Leonnatus, Philotas, &c., soliciting reinforcements; but in the meantime he thought it expedient to accept the challenge of Leosthenês. In the battle which ensued, however, he was completely defeated, and even cut off from the possibility of retreating into Macedonia. No better resource was left to him than the fortified town of Lamia (near to the river Spercheius, beyond the southern border of Thessaly), where he calculated on holding out until relief came from Asia. Leosthenês immediately commenced the siege of Lamia, and pressed it with the utmost energy, making several attempts to storm the town. But its fortifications were strong, with a garrison ample and efficient—so that he was repulsed with considerable loss. Unfortunately he possessed no battering train nor engineers, such as had formed so powerful an element in the military successes of Philip and Alexander. He therefore found himself compelled to turn the siege into a blockade, and to adopt systematic measures for intercepting the supply of provisions. In this he had every chance of succeeding, and of capturing the person of Antipater. Hellenic prospects looked bright and encouraging; nothing was heard in Athens and the other cities except congratulations and thanksgivings.² Phokion, on hearing the confident language of those around him, remarked—"The stadium (or short course) has been done brilliantly; but I fear we shall not have strength to hold out for the long course."³ At this critical moment, Leosthenês, in inspecting the blockading trenches, was wounded on the head by a large stone, projected from one of the catapults on the city-walls, and expired in two days.⁴ A funeral oration in his honour, as well as in that of the other combatants against Antipater, was pronounced at Athens by Hyperidês.⁵

¹ Diodor. xviii. 13.

² Plutarch, Phokion, 23, 24.

³ Plutarch, Phokion, c. 23; Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcept. p. 803.

⁴ Diodor. xviii. 12, 13.

⁵ A fine fragment of the *Λόγος Ἐπιτάφιος* by Hyperidês is preserved in

The death of this eminent general, in the full tide of success, was a hard blow struck by fortune at the cause of Grecian freedom. For the last generation, Athens had produced several excellent orators, and one who combined splendid oratory with wise and patriotic counsels. But during all that time, none of her citizens, before Leosthenês, had displayed military genius and ardour along with Pan-Hellenic purposes. His death appears to have saved Antipater from defeat and captivity. The difficulty was very great, of keeping together a miscellaneous army of Greeks, who, after the battle, easily persuaded themselves that the war was finished, and desired to go home—perhaps under promise of returning. Even during the lifetime of Leosthenês, the Ætolians, the most powerful contingent of the army, had obtained leave to go home, from some domestic urgency, real or pretended.¹ When he was slain, there was no second in command; nor, even if there had been, could the personal influence of one officer be transferred to another. Reference was made to Athens, where, after some debate, Antipater was chosen commander, after the proposition to name Phokion had been made and rejected.² But during this interval, there was no authority to direct military operations, or even to keep the army together. Hence the precious moments for rendering the blockade really stringent, were lost, and Antipater was enabled to maintain himself until the arrival of Leonnatus from Asia to his aid. How dangerous the position of Antipater was, we may judge from the fact, that he solicited peace, but was required by the besiegers to surrender at discretion³—with which condition he refused to comply.

Antipater appears to have been a brave and competent officer. But before he could reduce Lamia, Leonnatus with a Macedonian army had crossed the Hellespont from Asia, and arrived at the frontiers of Thessaly. So many of the Grecian contingents had left the camp, that Antipater was not strong enough at once to continue the blockade and to combat the relieving army. Accordingly, he raised the blockade, and moved off by rapid marches to attack Leonnatus apart from Antipater. He accomplished this operation with vigour and success. Through the superior efficiency of the Thessalian Stobæus, Tit. 124, vol. iii. p. 618. It is gratifying to learn that a large additional portion of this oration has been recently brought from Egypt in a papyrus, and has been published by Mr. Churchill Babington.

¹ Diodor. xviii. 13-15.

² Plutarch, Phokion, 24.

³ Diodor. xviii. 11; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.

cavalry under Menon, he gained an important advantage in a cavalry battle over Leonnatus, who was himself slain;¹ and the Macedonian phalanx, having its flanks and rear thus exposed, retired from the plain to more difficult ground, leaving the Greeks masters of the field with the dead bodies. On the very next day, Antipater came up, bringing the troops from Lamia, and took command of the defeated army. He did not however think it expedient to renew the combat, but withdrew his army from Thessaly into Macedonia, keeping in his march the high ground, out of the reach of cavalry.²

During the same time generally as these operations in Thessaly, it appears that war was carried on actively by sea. We hear of a descent by Mikion with a Macedonian fleet at Rhamnus on the eastern coast of Attica, repulsed by Phokion; also of a Macedonian fleet, of 240 sail, under Kleitus, engaging in two battles with the Athenian fleet under Eetion, near the islands called Echinades, at the mouth of the Achelöus, on the western Ætolian coast. The Athenians were defeated in both actions, and great efforts were made at Athens to build new vessels for the purpose of filling up the losses sustained.³ Our information is not sufficient to reveal the purposes or details of these proceedings. But it seems probable that the Macedonian fleet were attacking Ætolia through Ceniadæ, the citizens of which town had recently been expelled by the Ætolians;⁴ and perhaps this may have been the reason why the Ætolian contingent was withdrawn from Thessaly.

In spite of such untoward events at sea, the cause of Pan-Hellenic liberty seemed on the whole prosperous. Though the capital opportunity had been missed, of taking Antipater captive in Lamia, still he had been expelled from Greece, and was unable, by means of his own forces in Macedonia, to regain his footing. The Grecian contingents had behaved with bravery and unanimity in prosecution of the common purpose; and what had been already achieved was quite sufficient to justify the rising, as a fair risk, promising reasonable hopes of success. Nevertheless Greek citizens were not like trained Macedonian soldiers. After a term of service not much prolonged, they wanted to go back to their families and properties, hardly less after a victory than after a defeat. Hence the army of Antipater in Thessaly became much thinned,⁵ though still remaining large enough to keep back the

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 25; Diodor. xviii. 14, 15: compare Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 1.

² Diodor. xviii. 15.

³ Diodor. xviii. 15.

⁴ Diodor. xviii. 8.

⁵ Diodor. xviii. 17.

Macedonian forces of Antipater, even augmented as they had been by Leonnatus—and to compel him to await the still more powerful reinforcement destined to follow under Kraterus.

In explaining the relations between these three Macedonian commanders—Antipater, Leonnatus, and Kraterus—it is necessary to go back to June 323 B.C., the period of Alexander's death, and to review the condition into which his vast and mighty empire had fallen. I shall do this briefly, and only so far as it bears on the last struggles and final subjugation of the Grecian world.

On the unexpected death of Alexander, the camp at Babylon with its large force became a scene of discord. He left no offspring, except a child named Heraklês, by his mistress Barsinê. Roxana, one of his wives, was indeed pregnant; and amidst the uncertainties of the moment, the first disposition of many was to await the birth of her child. She herself, anxious to shut out rivalry, caused Statira, the queen whom Alexander had last married, to be entrapped and assassinated along with her sister.¹ There was however at Babylon a brother of Alexander, named Aridæus (son of Philip by a Thessalian mistress), already of full age though feeble in intelligence, towards whom a still larger party leaned. In Macedonia, there were Olympias, Alexander's mother—Kleopatra, his sister, widow of the Epirotic Alexander—and Kynanê,² another sister, widow of Amyntas (cousin of Alexander the Great, and put to death by him); all of them disposed to take advantage of their relationship to the deceased conqueror, in the scramble now opened for power.

After a violent dispute between the cavalry and the infantry at Babylon, Aridæus was proclaimed king under the name of Philip Aridæus. Perdikkas was named as his guardian and chief minister; among the other chief officers, the various satrapies and fractions of the empire were distributed. Egypt and Libya were assigned to Ptolemy; Syria to Laomedon; Kilikia to Philôtas; Pamphylia, Lykia, and the greater Phrygia, to Antigonos; Karia, to Asander; Lydia, to Menander; the Hellespontine Phrygia, to Leonnatus; Kappadokia and Paphlagonia, to the Kardian Eumenês; Media, to Pithon. The eastern satrapies were left in the hands of the actual holders.

In Europe, the distributors gave Thrace with the Chersonese to Lysimachus; the countries west of Thrace, including (along

¹ Plutarch, *Alexand.* 77.

² Arrian, *De Rebus post Alexandrum*, vi. ap. Photium, *Cod.* 92.

with Illyrians, Triballi, Agrianes, and Epirots) Macedonia and Greece, to Antipater and Kraterus.¹ We thus find the Grecian cities handed over to new masters, as fragments of the vast intestate estate left by Alexander. The empty form of convening and consulting a synod of deputies at Corinth, was no longer thought necessary.

All the above-named officers were considered as local lieutenants, administering portions of an empire one and indivisible under Aridæus. The principal officers who enjoyed central authority, bearing on the entire empire, were, Perdikkas, chiliarch of the horse (the post occupied by Hephæstion until his death), a sort of vizir,² and Seleukus, commander of the Horse Guards. No one at this moment talked of dividing the empire. But it soon appeared that Perdikkas, profiting by the weakness of Aridæus, had determined to leave to him nothing more than the imperial name, and to engross for himself the real authority. Still, however, in his disputes with the other chiefs, he represented the imperial family, and the integrity of the empire, contending against severalty and local independence. In this task (besides his brother Alketas), his ablest and most effective auxiliary was Eumenês of Kardia, secretary of Alexander for several years until his death. It was one of the earliest proceedings of Perdikkas to wrest Kappadokia from the local chief Ariarathês (who had contrived to hold it all through the reign of Alexander), and to transfer it to Eumenês, to whom it had been allotted in the general scheme of division.³

At the moment of Alexander's death, Kraterus was in Kilikia, at the head of an army of veteran Macedonian soldiers. He had been directed to conduct them home into Macedonia, with orders to remain there himself in place of Antipater, who was to come over to Asia with fresh reinforcements. Kraterus had with him a paper of written instructions from Alexander, embodying projects on the most gigantic scale; for western conquest—transportation of inhabitants by wholesale from Europe into Asia and Asia into Europe—erection of magnificent religious edifices in various parts of Greece and Macedonia, &c. This list was submitted by Perdikkas to the officers and soldiers around him, who dismissed the projects as too vast for any one but Alexander to think of.⁴ Kraterus and

¹ Arrian, *De Rebus post Alexand.* *ut supra*; Diodor. xviii. 3, 4; Curtius, x. 10; Dexippus, *Fragmenta ap. Photium*, Cod. 82, ap. *Fragm. Hist. Græc.* vol. iii. p. 667, ed. Didot (*De Rebus post Alexandrum*).

² Arrian and Dexippus—*De Reb. post Alex. ut supra*: compare Diodor. xviii. 48.

³ Diodor. xviii. 16,

⁴ Diodor. xviii. 4.

Antipater had each a concurrent claim to Greece and Macedonia, and the distributors of the empire had allotted these countries to them jointly, not venturing to exclude either. Amidst the conflicting pretensions of these great Macedonian officers, Leonnatus also cherished hopes of the same prize. He was satrap of the Asiatic territory bordering upon the Hellespont, and had received propositions from Kleopatra, at Pella, inviting him to marry her and assume the government of Macedonia. About the same time, urgent messages were also sent to him (through Hekataeus despot of Kardia) from Antipater, immediately after the defeat preceding the siege of Lamia, entreating his co-operation against the Greeks. Leonnatus accordingly came, intending to assist Antipater against the Greeks, but also to dispossess him of the government of Macedonia and marry Kleopatra.¹ This scheme remained unexecuted, because (as has been already related) Leonnatus was slain in his first encounter with the Greeks. To them, his death was a grave misfortune; to Antipater, it was an advantage which more than countervailed the defeat, since it relieved him from a dangerous rival.

It was not till the ensuing summer that Kraterus found leisure to conduct his army into Macedonia. By this junction, Antipater, to whom he ceded the command, found himself at the head of a powerful army—40,000 heavy infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 3000 archers and slingers. He again marched into Thessaly against the Greeks under Antiphilus; and the two armies came in sight on the Thessalian plains near Krannon. The Grecian army consisted of 25,000 infantry, and 3500 cavalry—the latter, Thessalians under Menon, of admirable efficiency. The soldiers in general were brave, but insubordinate; while the contingents of many cities had gone home without returning, in spite of urgent remonstrances from the commander. Hoping to be rejoined by these absentees, Antiphilus and Menon tried at first to defer fighting; but Antipater forced them to a battle. Though Menon with his Thessalian cavalry defeated and dispersed the Macedonian cavalry, the Grecian infantry were unable to resist the superior number of Antipater's infantry and the heavy pressure of the phalanx. They were beaten back and gave way, yet retiring in tolerable order, the Macedonian phalanx being incompetent for pursuit, to some difficult neighbouring ground, where they were soon joined by their victorious cavalry. The loss of the Greeks is said to have been 500 men; that of the Macedonians, 120.²

¹ Plutarch, Eumenês, 3.

² Diodor. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, 26.

The defeat of Krannon (August 322 B.C.) was noway decisive or ruinous, nor would it probably have crushed the spirit of Leosthenês, had he been alive and in command. The coming up of the absentee contingents might still have enabled the Greeks to make head. But Antiphilus and Menon, after holding council, declined to await and accelerate that junction. They thought themselves under the necessity of sending to open negotiations for peace with Antipater; who however returned for answer, that he would not recognise or treat with any Grecian confederacy, and that he would receive no propositions except from each city severally. Upon this the Grecian commanders at once resolved to continue the war, and to invoke reinforcements from their countrymen. But their own manifestation of timidity had destroyed the chance that remained of such reinforcements arriving. While Antipater commenced a vigorous and successful course of action against the Thessalian cities separately, the Greeks became more and more dispirited and alarmed. City after city sent its envoys to entreat peace from Antipater, who granted lenient terms to each, reserving only the Athenians and Ætoliens. In a few days, the combined Grecian army was dispersed; Antiphilus with the Athenians returned into Attica; Antipater followed them southward as far as Bœotia, taking up his quarters at the Macedonian post on the Kadmeia, once the Hellenic Thebes—within two days' march of Athens.¹

Against the overwhelming force thus on the frontiers of Attica, the Athenians had no means of defence. The principal anti-Macedonian orators, especially Demosthenês and Hype-ridês, retired from the city at once, seeking sanctuary in the temples of Kalauria and Ægina. Phokion and Demadês, as the envoys most acceptable to Antipater, were sent to Kadmeia as bearers of the submission of the city, and petitioners for lenient terms. Demadês is said to have been at this time disfranchised and disqualified from public speaking—having been indicted and found guilty thrice (some say seven times) under the *Graphê Paranomôn*; but the Athenians passed a special vote of relief, to enable him to resume his functions of citizen. Neither Phokion nor Demadês, however, could prevail upon Antipater to acquiesce in anything short of the surrender of Athens at discretion; the same terms as Leosthenês had required from Antipater himself at Lamia. Kraterus was even bent upon marching forward into Attica, to dictate terms under the walls of Athens; and it was not without difficulty that

¹ Diodor. xviii. 17; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 26.

Phokion obtained the abandonment of this intention; after which he returned to Athens with the answer. The people having no choice except to throw themselves on the mercy of Antipater,¹ Phokion and Demadês came back to Thebes to learn his determination. This time, they were accompanied by the philosopher Xenokratês—the successor of Plato and Speusippus, as presiding teacher in the school of the Academy. Though not a citizen of Athens, Xenokratês had long resided there; and it was supposed that his dignified character and intellectual eminence might be efficacious in mitigating the wrath of the conqueror. Aristotle had quitted Athens for Chalkis before this time; otherwise he, the personal friend of Antipater, would have been probably selected for this painful mission. In point of fact, Xenokratês did no good, being harshly received, and almost put to silence, by Antipater. One reason of this may be, that he had been to a certain extent the rival of Aristotle; and it must be added, to his honour, that he maintained a higher and more independent tone than either of the other envoys.²

According to the terms dictated by Antipater, the Athenians were required to pay a sum equal to the whole cost of the war; to surrender Demosthenês, Hyperidês, and seemingly at least two other anti-Macedonian orators; to receive a Macedonian garrison in Munychia; to abandon their democratical constitution, and disfranchise all their poorer citizens. Most of these poor men were to be transported from their homes, and to receive new lands on a foreign shore. The Athenian colonists in Samos were to be dispossessed and the island retransferred to the Samian exiles and natives.

It is said that Phokion and Demadês heard these terms with satisfaction, as lenient and reasonable. Xenokratês entered against them the strongest protest which the occasion admitted,³ when he said—"If Antipater looks upon us as slaves, the terms are moderate; if as freemen, they are severe." To

¹ Democharês, the nephew of Demosthenês, who had held a bold language and taken active part against Antipater throughout the Lamian war, is said to have delivered a public harangue recommending resistance even at this last moment. At least such was the story connected with his statue, erected a few years afterwards at Athens, representing him in the costume of an orator, but with a sword in hand—Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 847: compare Polybius, xii. 13.

² Plutarch, Phokion, 27; Diodor. xviii. 18.

³ Plutarch, Phokion, 27. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι πρέσβεις ἡγάπησαν ὡς φιλανθρώπους τὰς διαλύσεις, πλὴν τοῦ Ξενοκράτους, &c. Pausanias even states (vii. 10, 1) that Antipater was disposed to grant more lenient terms, but was dissuaded from doing so by Demadês.

Phokion's entreaty, that the introduction of the garrison might be dispensed with, Antipater replied in the negative, intimating that the garrison would be not less serviceable to Phokion himself than to the Macedonians; while Kallimedon also, an Athenian exile there present, repelled the proposition with scorn. Respecting the island of Samos, Antipater was prevailed upon to allow a special reference to the imperial authority.

If Phokion thought these terms lenient, we must imagine that he expected a sentence of destruction against Athens, such as Alexander had pronounced and executed against Thebes. Under no other comparison can they appear lenient. Out of 21,000 qualified citizens of Athens, all those who did not possess property to the amount of 2000 drachmæ were condemned to disfranchisement and deportation. The number below this prescribed qualification, who came under the penalty, was 12,000, or three-fifths of the whole. They were set aside as turbulent, noisy democrats; the 9000 richest citizens, the "party of order," were left in exclusive possession, not only of the citizenship, but of the city. The condemned 12,000 were deported out of Attica, some to Thrace, some to the Illyrian or Italian coast, some to Libya or the Kyrenaic territory. Besides the multitude banished simply on the score of comparative poverty, the marked anti-Macedonian politicians were banished also, including Agnonidês, the friend of Demosthenês, and one of his earnest advocates when accused respecting the Harpalian treasures.¹ At the request of Phokion, Antipater consented to render the deportation less sweeping than he had originally intended, so far as to permit some exiles, Agnonidês among the rest, to remain within the limits of Peloponnesus.² We shall see him presently contemplating a still more wholesale deportation of the Ætolian people.

¹ See Fragments of Hyperidês adv. Demosth. p. 61-65, ed. Babington.

² Diodor. xviii. 18. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες πλείους τῶν μυρίων (instead of *μισμυρίων*, which seems a mistake) καὶ δισχιλίων μετεστάθησαν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος· οἱ δὲ τὴν ὀρισμένην τήμῃσιν ἔχοντες περὶ ἑνακισχιλίου, ἀπεδείχθησαν κύριοι τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς Σόλωνος νόμους ἐπολιτεύοντο. Plutarch states the disfranchised as above 12,000.

Plutarch, Phokion, 28, 29. "Ὅμως δ' οὖν ὁ Φωκίων καὶ φυγῆς ἀπῆλλαξε πολλοὺς δεηθεὶς τοῦ Ἀντιπάτρου· καὶ φεύγουσι διεπράξατο, μὴ καθάπερ οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν μεθισταμένων ὑπὲρ τὰ Κεραύνια ὕρῃ καὶ τὸν Ταίναρον ἐκπεσεῖν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἀλλ' ἐν Πελοποννήσῃ κατοικεῖν, ὧν ἦν καὶ Ἀγνωνίδης ὁ συκοφάντης.

Diodorus and Plutarch (c. 29) mention that Antipater assigned residences in Thrace for the expatriated. Those who went beyond the Keraunian mountains must have gone either to the Illyrian coast, Apollonia or Epidamnus—or to the Gulf of Tarentum. Those who went beyond

It is deeply to be lamented that this important revolution, not only cutting down Athens to less than one-half of her citizen population, but involving a deportation fraught with individual hardship and suffering, is communicated to us only in two or three sentences of Plutarch and Diodorus, without any details from contemporary observers. It is called by Diodorus a return to the Solonian constitution ; but the comparison disgraces the name of that admirable lawgiver, whose changes, taken as a whole, were prodigiously liberal and enfranchising, compared with what he found established. The deportation ordained by Antipater must indeed have brought upon the poor citizens of Athens a state of suffering in foreign lands analogous to that which Solon describes as having preceded his *Seisachtheia*, or measure for the relief of debtors.¹ What rules the nine thousand remaining citizens adopted for their new constitution, we do not know. Whatever they did, must now have been subject to the consent of Antipater and the Macedonian garrison, which entered Munychia, under the command of Menyllus, on the twentieth day of the month Boedromion (September), rather more than a month after the battle of Krannon. The day of its entry presented a sorrowful contrast. It was the day on which, during the annual ceremony of the mysteries of Eleusinian *Dēmêtêr*, the multitudinous festal procession of citizens escorted the God *Iacchus* from Athens to Eleusis.²

One of the earliest measures of the nine thousand was to condemn to death, at the motion of Demadês, the distinguished anti-Macedonian orators who had already fled—Demosthenês, Hyperidês, Aristonikus, and Himeræus, brother of the citizen afterwards celebrated as Demetrius the Phalerean. The three last having taken refuge in Ægina, and Demosthenês in Kalauria, all of them were out of the reach of an Athenian sentence, but not beyond that of the Macedonian sword. At this miserable season, Greece was full of similar exiles, the anti-Macedonian leaders out of all the cities which had taken part in the Lamian war. The officers of Antipater, called in the language of the time the Exile-Hunters,³ were everywhere on the look-out to seize these proscribed men ; many of the Tænarus would probably be sent to Libya : see Thucydidês, vii. 19, 10 ; vii. 50, 2.

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 28. ἐκπεπολιορκημένοις ἐψέκσαν : compare Solon, Fragment 28, ed. Gaisford.

² Plutarch, Phokion, 28.

³ Plutarch, Demosth. 28. Ἀρχίας ὁ κληθεὶς Φυγαδοθήρας. Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846.

orators, from other cities as well as from Athens, were slain ; and there was no refuge except the mountains of Ætolia for any of them.¹ One of these officers, a Thurian named Archias, who had once been a tragic actor, passed over with a company of Thracian soldiers to Ægina, where he seized the three Athenian orators—Hyperidês, Aristonikus, and Himeræus—dragging them out of the sanctuary of the Æakeion or chapel of Æakus. They were all sent as prisoners to Antipater, who had by this time marched forward with his army to Corinth and Kleonæ in Peloponnesus. All were there put to death, by his order. It is even said, and on respectable authority, that the tongue of Hyperidês was cut out before he was slain ; according to another statement, he himself bit it out—being put to the torture, and resolving to make revelation of secrets impossible. Respecting the details of his death, there were several different stories.²

Having conducted these prisoners to Antipater, Archias proceeded with his Thracians to Kalauria in search of Demosthenês. The temple of Poseidon there situated, in which the orator had taken sanctuary, was held in such high veneration that Archias, hesitating to drag him out by force, tried to persuade him to come forth voluntarily, under promise that he should suffer no harm. But Demosthenês, well aware of the fate which awaited him, swallowed poison in the temple, and when the dose was beginning to take effect, came out of the sacred ground, expiring immediately after he had passed the boundary. The accompanying circumstances were recounted in several different ways.³ Eratosthenês (to whose authority I lean) affirmed that Demosthenês carried the poison in a ring round his arm ; others said that it was suspended in

¹ Polybius, ix. 29, 30. This is stated, as matter of traditional pride, by an Ætolian speaker more than a century afterwards. In the speech of his Akarnanian opponent, there is nothing to contradict it—while the fact is in itself highly probable.

See Westermann, *Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland*, ch. 71, note 4.

² Plutarch, *Demosthen.* 28 ; Plutarch, *Vit. X. Oratt.* p. 849 ; Photius, p. 496.

³ Plutarch, *Demosth.* 30. τῶν δ' ἄλλων, ὅσοι γεγράφασι τι περὶ αὐτοῦ, πάμπολλοι δ' εἰσὶ, τὰς διαφορὰς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπεξελθεῖν, &c.

The taunts on Archias's profession, as an actor, and as an indifferent actor, which Plutarch puts into the mouth of Demosthenês (c. 29), appear to me not worthy either of the man or of the occasion ; nor are they sufficiently avouched to induce me to transcribe them. Whatever bitterness of spirit Demosthenês might choose to manifest, at such a moment, would surely be vented on the chief enemy, Antipater ; not upon the mere instrument.

a linen bag round his neck ; according to a third story, it was contained in a writing-quill, which he was seen to bite and suck, while composing a last letter to Antipater. Amidst these contradictory details, we can only affirm as certain, that the poison which he had provided beforehand preserved him from the sword of Antipater, and perhaps from having his tongue cut out. The most remarkable assertion was that of Democharês, nephew of Demosthenês, made in his harangues at Athens a few years afterwards. Democharês asserted that his uncle had not taken poison, but had been softly withdrawn from the world by a special providence of the gods, just at the moment essential to rescue him from the cruelty of the Macedonians. It is not less to be noted, as an illustration of the vein of sentiment afterwards prevalent, that Archias the Exile-Hunter was affirmed to have perished in the utmost dishonour and wretchedness.¹

The violent deaths of these illustrious orators, the disfranchisement and deportation of the Athenian Demos, the suppression of the public Dikasteries, the occupation of Athens by a Macedonian garrison, and of Greece generally by Macedonian Exile-Hunters—are events belonging to one and the same calamitous tragedy, and marking the extinction of the autonomous Hellenic world.

Of Hyperidês as a citizen we know only the general fact, that he maintained from first to last, and with oratorical ability inferior only to Demosthenês, a strenuous opposition to Macedonian dominion over Greece ; though his persecution of Demosthenês respecting the Harpalian treasure appears (as far as it comes before us) discreditable.

Of Demosthenês, we know more—enough to form a judgment of him both as citizen and statesman. At the time of his death he was about sixty-two years of age, and we have before us his first Philippic, delivered thirty years before (352–351 B.C.). We are thus sure, that even at that early day, he took a sagacious and provident measure of the danger which threatened Grecian liberty from the energy and encroachments of Philip. He impressed upon his countrymen this coming danger, at a time when the older and more influential politicians either could not or would not see it ; he called aloud upon his fellow-citizens for personal service and pecuniary contributions, enforcing the call by all the artifices of consummate oratory, when such distasteful propositions only

¹ Plutarch, Demosth. 30 ; Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 846 ; Photius, p. 494 ; Arrian, De Rebus post Alexand. vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.

entailed unpopularity upon himself. At the period when Demosthenês first addressed these earnest appeals to his countrymen, long before the fall of Olynthus, the power of Philip, though formidable, might have been kept perfectly well within the limits of Macedonia and Thrace; and would probably have been so kept, had Demosthenês possessed in 351 B.C. as much public influence as he had acquired ten years afterwards, in 341 B.C.

Throughout the whole career of Demosthenês as a public adviser, down to the battle of Chæroneia, we trace the same combination of earnest patriotism with wise and long-sighted policy. During the three years' war which ended with the battle of Chæroneia, the Athenians in the main followed his counsel; and disastrous as were the ultimate military results of that war, for which Demosthenês could not be responsible—its earlier periods were creditable and successful, its general scheme was the best that the case admitted, and its diplomatic management universally triumphant. But what invests the purposes and policy of Demosthenês with peculiar grandeur, is, that they were not simply Athenian, but in an eminent degree Pan-Hellenic also. It was not Athens alone that he sought to defend against Philip, but the whole Hellenic world. In this he towers above the greatest of his predecessors for half a century before his birth—Periklês, Archidamus, Agesilaus, Epaminondas; whose policy was Athenian, Spartan, Theban, rather than Hellenic. He carries us back to the time of the invasion of Xerxês and the generation immediately succeeding it, when the struggles and sufferings of the Athenians against Persia were consecrated by complete identity of interest with collective Greece. The sentiments to which Demosthenês appeals throughout his numerous orations, are those of the noblest and largest patriotism; trying to inflame the ancient Grecian sentiment, of an autonomous Hellenic world, as the indispensable condition of a dignified and desirable existence¹—but inculcating at the same time that these blessings could only be preserved by toil, self-sacrifice, devotion of fortune, and willingness to brave hard and steady personal service.

From the destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335 B.C., to the Lamian war after his death, the policy of Athens neither was nor could be conducted by Demosthenês. But condemned as he was to comparative inefficacy, he yet rendered material

¹ Demosthenês, *De Coronâ*, p. 324. οὔτοι—τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὸ μηδένα ἔχειν δεσπότην αὐτῶν, ἢ τοῖς προτέροις Ἕλλησιν ὅροι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν καὶ κανόνες, ἀνατετραφότες, &c.

service to Athens, in the Harpalian affair of 324 B.C. If, instead of opposing the alliance of the city with Harpalus, he had supported it as warmly as Hyperidês—the exaggerated promises of the exile might probably have prevailed, and war would have been declared against Alexander. In respect to the charge of having been corrupted by Harpalus, I have already shown reasons for believing him innocent. The Lamian war, the closing scene of his activity, was not of his original suggestion, since he was in exile at its commencement. But he threw himself into it with unreserved ardour, and was greatly instrumental in procuring the large number of adhesions which it obtained from so many Grecian states. In spite of its disastrous result, it was, like the battle of Chæroneia, a glorious effort for the recovery of Grecian liberty, undertaken under circumstances which promised a fair chance of success. There was no excessive rashness in calculating on distractions in the empire left by Alexander—on mutual hostility among the principal officers—and on the probability of having only to make head against Antipater and Macedonia, with little or no reinforcement from Asia. Disastrous as the enterprise ultimately proved, yet the risk was one fairly worth incurring, with so noble an object at stake; and could the war have been protracted another year, its termination would probably have been very different. We shall see this presently when we come to follow Asiatic events. After a catastrophe so ruinous, extinguishing free speech in Greece, and dispersing the Athenian Demos to distant lands, Demosthenês himself could hardly have desired, at the age of sixty-two, to prolong his existence as a fugitive beyond sea.

Of the speeches which he composed for private litigants, occasionally also for himself, before the Dikastery—and of the numerous stimulating and admonitory harangues, on the public affairs of the moment, which he had addressed to his assembled countrymen, a few remain for the admiration of posterity. These harangues serve to us, not only as evidence of his unrivalled excellence as an orator, but as one of the chief sources from which we are enabled to appreciate the last phase of free Grecian life, as an acting and working reality.

CHAPTER XCVI

FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE CLOSE OF THE HISTORY OF
FREE HELLAS AND HELLENISM

THE death of Demosthenês, with its tragical circumstances recounted in my last chapter, is on the whole less melancholy than the prolonged life of Phokion, as agent of Macedonian supremacy in a city half-depopulated, where he had been born a free citizen, and which he had so long helped to administer as a free community. The dishonour of Phokion's position must have been aggravated by the distress in Athens, arising both out of the violent deportation of one-half of its free citizens, and out of the compulsory return of the Athenian settlers from Samos ; which island was now taken from Athens, after she had occupied it forty-three years, and restored to the Samian people and to their recalled exiles, by a rescript of Perdikkas in the name of Aridæus.¹ Occupying this obnoxious elevation, Phokion exercised authority with his usual probity and mildness. Exerting himself to guard the citizens from being annoyed by disorders on the part of the garrison of Munychia, he kept up friendly intercourse with its commander Menyllus, though refusing all presents both from him and from Antipater. He was anxious to bestow the gift of citizenship upon the philosopher Xenokratês, who was only a metic, or resident non-freeman ; but Xenokratês declined the offer, remarking, that he would accept no place in a constitution against which he had protested as envoy.² This mark of courageous independence, not a little remarkable while the Macedonians were masters of the city, was a tacit reproach to the pliant submission of Phokion.

Throughout Peloponnesus, Antipater purged and remodelled the cities, Argos, Megalopolis, and others, as he had done at Athens ; installing in each an oligarchy of his own partisans—sometimes with a Macedonian garrison—and putting to death,

¹ Diodor. xviii. 18 ; Diogen. Laert. x. 1, 1. I have endeavoured to show, in a previous portion of this History (vol. x. ch. lxxix.), that Diodorus is correct in giving forty-three years, as the duration of the Athenian Kleruchies in Samos ; although both Wesseling and Mr. Clinton impugn his statement. The Athenian occupation of Samos *began* immediately after the conquest of the island by Timotheus, in 366–365 B.C. ; but additional batches of colonists were sent thither in later years.

² Plutarch, Phokion, 29, 30.

deporting, or expelling, hostile, or intractable, or democratical citizens.¹ Having completed the subjugation of Peloponnesus, he passed across the Corinthian Gulf to attack the Ætolians, now the only Greeks remaining unsubdued. It was the purpose of Antipater, not merely to conquer this warlike and rude people, but to transport them in mass across into Asia, and march them up to the interior deserts of the empire.² His army was too powerful to be resisted on even ground, so that all the more accessible towns and villages fell into his hands. But the Ætolians defended themselves bravely, withdrew their families into the high towns and mountain tops of their very rugged country, and caused serious loss to the Macedonian invaders. Nevertheless, Kraterus, who had carried on war of the same kind with Alexander in Sogdiana, manifested so much skill in seizing the points of communication, that he intercepted all their supplies and reduced them to extreme distress, amidst the winter which had now supervened. The Ætolians, in spite of bravery and endurance, must soon have been compelled to surrender from cold and hunger, had not the unexpected arrival of Antigonus from Asia communicated such news to Antipater and Kraterus, as induced them to prepare for marching back to Macedonia, with a view to the crossing of the Hellespont and operating in Asia. They concluded a pacification with the Ætolians—postponing till a future period their design of deporting that people—and withdrew into Macedonia; where Antipater cemented his alliance with Kraterus by giving to him his daughter Phila in marriage.³

Another daughter of Antipater, named Nikæa, had been sent over to Asia not long before, to become the wife of Perdikkas. That general, acting as guardian or prime minister to the kings of Alexander's family (who are now spoken of in the plural number, since Roxana had given birth to a

¹ Diodor. xviii. 55, 56, 57, 68, 69. *φανερὸν δ' ὅντος, ὅτι Κάσσανδρος τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων ἀνθίσταται, διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν αὐτῶν πατρικαῖς φρουραῖς φυλάττεσθαι, τὰς δ' ὅπ' ὀλιγαρχιῶν διοικεῖσθαι, κυριευομένας ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀντιπάτρου φίλων καὶ ξένων.*

That citizens were not only banished, but deported, by Antipater from various other cities besides Athens, we may see from the edict issued by Polysperchon shortly after the death of Antipater (Diod. xviii. 56)—*καὶ τοὺς μεταστάντας ἢ φυγόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων στρατηγῶν (i. e. Antipater and Kraterus), ἀφ' ὧν χρόνων Ἀλέξανδρος εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν διέβη, κατὰγομεν, &c.*

² Diodor. xviii. 25. *διεγνωκότες ὕστερον αὐτοὺς καταπολεμῆσαι, καὶ μεταστῆσαι πανοικίους ἅπαντας εἰς τὴν ἐρημίαν καὶ πορρωτάτω τῆς Ἀσίας κειμένην χώραν.*

³ Diodor. xviii. 18-25.

posthumous son called Alexander, and made king jointly with Philip Aridæus), had at first sought close combination with Antipater, demanding his daughter in marriage. But new views were presently opened to him by the intrigues of the princesses at Pella—Olympias, with her daughter Kleopatra, the widow of the Molossian Alexander—who had always been at variance with Antipater, even throughout the life of Alexander—and Kynanê (daughter of Philip by an Illyrian mother, and widow of Amyntas, first cousin of Alexander, but slain by Alexander's order) with her daughter Eurydikê. It has been already mentioned that Kleopatra had offered herself in marriage to Leonnatus, inviting him to come over and occupy the throne of Macedonia: he had obeyed the call, but had been slain in his first battle against the Greeks, thus relieving Antipater from a dangerous rival. The first project of Olympias being thus frustrated, she had sent to Perdikkas proposing to him a marriage with Kleopatra. Perdikkas had already pledged himself to the daughter of Antipater; nevertheless he now debated whether his ambition would not be better served by breaking his pledge, and accepting the new proposition. To this step he was advised by Eumenês, his ablest friend and coadjutor, steadily attached to the interest of the regal family, and withal personally hated by Antipater. But Alketas, brother of Perdikkas, represented that it would be hazardous to provoke openly and immediately the wrath of Antipater. Accordingly Perdikkas resolved to accept Nikæa for the moment, but to send her away after no long time, and take Kleopatra; to whom secret assurances from him were conveyed by Eumenês. Kynanê also (daughter of Philip and widow of his nephew Amyntas), a warlike and ambitious woman, had brought into Asia her daughter Eurydikê for the purpose of espousing the king Philip Aridæus. Being averse to this marriage, and probably instigated by Olympias also, Perdikkas and Alketas put Kynanê to death. But the indignation excited among the soldiers by this deed was so furious as to menace their safety, and they were forced to permit the marriage of the king with Eurydikê.¹

¹ Diodor. xviii. 23; Arrian, *De Rebus post Alex.* vi. ap. Phot. Cod. 92. Diodorus alludes to the murder of Kynanê, or Kynna, in another place (xix. 52).

Compare Polyænus, viii. 60—who mentions the murder of Kynanê by Alketas, but gives a somewhat different explanation of her purpose in passing into Asia.

About Kynanê, see Duris, *Fragm.* 24, in *Fragment. Hist. Græc.* vol. ii. p. 475; Athenæ. xiii. p. 560.

All these intrigues were going on through the summer of 322 B.C., while the Lamian war was still effectively prosecuted by the Greeks. About the autumn of the year, Antigonus (called Monophthalmus), the satrap of Phrygia, detected these secret intrigues of Perdikkas, who, for that and other reasons, began to look on him as an enemy, and to plot against his life. Apprised of his danger, Antigonus made his escape from Asia into Europe to acquaint Antipater and Kraterus with the hostile manoeuvres of Perdikkas ; upon which news, the two generals, immediately abandoning the Ætolian war, withdrew their army from Greece for the more important object of counteracting Perdikkas in Asia.

To us, these contests of the Macedonian officers belong only so far as they affect the Greeks. And we see, by the events just noticed, how unpropitious to the Greeks were the turns of fortune, throughout the Lamian war: the grave of Grecian liberty, not for the actual combatants only, but for their posterity also.¹ Until the battle of Krannon and the surrender of Athens, everything fell out so as to relieve Antipater from embarrassment, and impart to him double force. The intrigues of the princesses at Pella, who were well known to hate him, first raised up Leonnatus, next Perdikkas, against him. Had Leonnatus lived, the arm of Antipater would have been at least weakened, if not paralysed ; had Perdikkas declared himself earlier, the forces of Antipater must have been withdrawn to oppose him, and the battle of Krannon would probably have had a different issue. As soon as Perdikkas became hostile to Antipater, it was his policy to sustain and seek alliance with the Greeks, as we shall find him presently doing with the Ætolians.² Through causes thus purely accidental, Antipater obtained an interval of a few months, during which his hands were not only free, but armed with new and unexpected strength from Leonnatus and Kraterus, to close the Lamian war. The disastrous issue of that war was therefore in great part the effect of casualties, among which we must include the death of Leosthenês himself. Such issue

¹ The fine lines of Lucan (Phars. vii. 640) on the effects of the battle of Pharsalia, may be cited here :—

“ Majus ab hac acie, quam quod sua sæcula ferrent,
Vulnus habent populi : plus est quam vita salusque
Quod perit : in totum mundi prosternimur ævum.
Vincitur his gladiis omnis, quæ serviet, ætas.
Proxima quid soboles, aut quid meruere nepotes,
In regnum nasci ? ” &c.

² Diodor. xviii. 38. 'Αντιπάτρου δ' εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν διαβεβηκότος, Αἰτωλοὶ κατὰ τὰς πρὸς Περδίκκην συνθήκας ἐστράτευσαν εἰς τὴν Θερραλίαν, &c.

is not to be regarded as proving that the project was desperate or ill-conceived on the part of its promoters, who had full right to reckon, among the probabilities of their case, the effects of discord between the Macedonian chiefs.

In the spring of 321 B.C., Antipater and Kraterus, having concerted operations with Ptolemy governor of Egypt, crossed into Asia and began their conflict with Perdikkas; who himself, having the kings along with him, marched against Egypt to attack Ptolemy; leaving his brother Alketas, in conjunction with Eumenês as general, to maintain his cause in Kappadokia and Asia Minor. Alketas, discouraged by the adverse feeling of the Macedonians generally, threw up the enterprise as hopeless. But Eumenês, though embarrassed and menaced in every way by the treacherous jealousy of his own Macedonian officers, and by the discontent of the soldiers against him as a Greek—and though compelled to conceal from these soldiers the fact that Kraterus, who was popular among them, commanded on the opposite side—displayed nevertheless so much ability that he gained an important victory,¹ in which both Neoptolemus and Kraterus perished. Neoptolemus was killed by Eumenês with his own hand, after a personal conflict desperate in the extreme and long doubtful, and at the cost of a severe wound to himself.² After the victory, he found Kraterus still alive, though expiring from his wound. Deeply afflicted at the sight, he did his utmost to restore the dying man; and when this proved to be impossible, caused his dead body to be honourably shrouded and transmitted into Macedonia for burial.

This new proof of the military ability and vigour of Eumenês, together with the death of two such important officers as Kraterus and Neoptolemus, proved ruinous to the victor himself, without serving the cause in which he fought. Perdikkas his chief did not live to hear of it. That general was so overbearing and tyrannical in his demeanour towards the other officers—and withal so unsuccessful in his first operations against Ptolemy on the Pelusiatic branch of the Nile—that his own army

¹ Plutarch, Eumenês, 7; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenês, c. 4. Eumenês had trained a body of Asiatic and Thracian cavalry to fight in close combat with the short pike and sword of the Macedonian Companions—relinquishing the javelin, the missiles, and the alternation of charging and retiring, usual to Asiatics.

Diodorus (xviii. 30, 31, 32) gives an account at some length of this battle. He as well as Plutarch may probably have borrowed from Hieronymus of Kardia.

² Arrian, ap. Photium, Cod. 92; Justin, xiii. 8; Diodor. xviii. 33.

mutinied and slew him.¹ His troops joined Ptolemy, whose conciliatory behaviour gained their good-will. Only two days after this revolution, a messenger from Eumenês reached the camp, announcing his victory and the death of Kraterus. Had this intelligence been received by Perdikkas himself at the head of his army, the course of subsequent events might have been sensibly altered. Eumenês would have occupied the most commanding position in Asia, as general of the kings of the Alexandrine family, to whom both his interests and his feelings attached him. But the news arriving, at the moment when it did, caused throughout the army only the most violent exasperation against him; not simply as ally of the odious Perdikkas, but as cause of death to the esteemed Kraterus. He, together with Alketas and fifty officers, was voted by the soldiers a public enemy. No measures were kept with him henceforward by Macedonian officers or soldiers. At the same time several officers attached to Perdikkas in the camp, and also Atalanta his sister, were slain.²

By the death of Perdikkas, and the defection of his soldiers, complete preponderance was thrown into the hands of Antipater, Ptolemy, and Antigonus. Antipater was invited to join the army, now consisting of the forces both of Ptolemy and Perdikkas united. He was there invested with the guardianship of the person of the kings, and with the sort of ministerial supremacy previously held by Perdikkas. He was however exposed to much difficulty, and even to great personal danger, from the intrigues of the princess Eurydikê, who displayed a masculine boldness in publicly haranguing the soldiers—and from the discontents of the army, who claimed presents, formerly promised to them by Alexander, which there were no funds to liquidate at the moment. At Triparadisus in Syria, Antipater made a second distribution of the satrapies of the empire; somewhat modified, yet coinciding in the main with that which had been drawn up shortly after the death of Alexander. To Ptolemy was assured Egypt and Libya—to Antigonus, the Greater Phrygia, Lykia, and Pamphylia—as each had had before.³

Antigonus was placed in command of the principal Macedonian army in Asia, to crush Eumenês and the other chief adherents of Perdikkas; most of whom had been condemned

¹ Diodor. xviii. 36.

² Plutarch, Eumenês, 8; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenês, 4; Diodor. xviii. 36, 37.

³ Diodor. xviii. 39. Arrian, ap. Photium.

to death by a vote of the Macedonian army. After a certain interval, Antipater himself, accompanied by the kings, returned to Macedonia, having eluded by artifice a renewed demand on the part of his soldiers for the promised presents. The war of Antigonos, first against Eumenês in Kappadokia, next against Alketas and the other partisans of Perdikkas in Pisidia, lasted for many months, but was at length successfully finished.¹ Eumenês, beset by the constant treachery and insubordination of the Macedonians, was defeated and driven out of the field. He took refuge with a handful of men in the impregnable and well-stored fortress of Nora in Kappadokia, where he held out a long blockade, apparently more than a year, against Antigonos.²

Before the prolonged blockade of Nora had been brought to a close, Antipater, being of very advanced age, fell into sickness, and presently died. One of his latest acts was to put to death the Athenian orator Demadês, who had been sent to Macedonia as envoy to solicit the removal of the Macedonian garrison at Munychia. Antipater had promised, or given hopes, that if the oligarchy which he had constituted at Athens maintained unshaken adherence to Macedonia, he would withdraw the garrison. The Athenians endeavoured to prevail on Phokion to go to Macedonia as solicitor for the fulfilment of this promise; but he steadily refused. Demadês, who willingly undertook the mission, reached Macedonia at a moment very untoward for himself. The papers of the deceased Perdikkas had come into possession of his opponents; and among them had been found a letter written to him by Demadês, inviting him to cross over and rescue Greece from her dependence "on an old and rotten warp"—meaning Antipater. This letter gave great offence to Antipater—the rather, as Demadês is said to have been his habitual pensioner—and still greater offence to his son Kassander; who caused Demadês with his son to be seized—first killed the son in the immediate presence and even embrace of the father—and then slew the father himself, with bitter invective against his ingratitude.³ All the accounts which

¹ Arrian, *De Rebus post Alexandr.* lib. ix. 10, ap. Photium, Cod. 92; Diodor. xviii. 39, 40, 46; Plutarch, Eumenês, 3, 4.

² Plutarch, Eumenês, 10, 11; Cornel. Nepos, Eumenês, c. 5; Diodor. xviii. 41.

³ Plutarch, Phokion, 30; Diodor. xviii. 48; Plutarch, Demosth. 31; Arrian, *De Reb. post Alex.* vi. ap. Photium, Cod. 92.

In the life of Phokion, Plutarch has written inadvertently *Antigonos* instead of *Perdikkas*.

It is not easy to see, however, how Deinarchus can have been the

we read depict Demadês, in general terms, as a prodigal spend-thrift and a venal and corrupt politician. We have no ground for questioning this statement: at the same time we have no specific facts to prove it.

Antipater by his last directions appointed Polysperchon, one of Alexander's veteran officers, to be chief administrator, with full powers on behalf of the imperial dynasty; while he assigned to his own son Kassander only the second place, as Chiliarch or general of the body-guard.¹ He thought that this disposition of power would be more generally acceptable throughout the empire, as Polysperchon was older and of longer military service than any other among Alexander's generals. Moreover, Antipater was especially afraid of letting dominion fall into the hands of the princesses;² all of whom—Olympias, Kleopatra, and Eurydikê—were energetic characters; and the first of the three (who had retired to Epirus from enmity towards Antipater) furious and implacable.

But the views of Antipater were disappointed from the beginning, because Kassander would not submit to the second place, nor tolerate Polysperchon as his superior. Immediately after the death of Antipater, but before it became publicly known, Kassander despatched Nikanor with pretended orders from Antipater to supersede Menyllus in the government of Munychia. To this order Menyllus yielded. But when after a few days the Athenian public came to learn the real truth, they were displeased with Phokion for having permitted the change to be made—assuming that he knew the real state of the facts, and might have kept out the new commander.³ Kassander, while securing this important post in the hands of a confirmed partisan, affected to acquiesce in the authority of Polysperchon, and to occupy himself with a hunting-party in the country. He at the same time sent confidential adherents to the Hellespont and other places in furtherance of his schemes; and especially to contract alliance with Antigonos in Asia and with Ptolemy in Egypt. His envoys being generally well received, he himself soon quitted Macedonia suddenly, and went to concert measures with Antigonos in Asia.⁴ It

accuser of Demadês on such a matter—as Arrian and Plutarch state. Arrian seems to put the death of Demadês too early, from his anxiety to bring it into immediate juxtaposition with the death of Demosthenês, whose condemnation Demadês had proposed in the Athenian assembly.

¹ Diod. xviii. 48.

² Diod. xix. 11.

³ Plutarch, Phokion, 31. Diodorus (xviii. 64) says also that Nikanor was nominated by Kassander.

⁴ Diodor. xviii. 54.

suited the policy of Ptolemy, and still more that of Antigonos, to aid him against Polysperchon and the imperial dynasty. On the death of Antipater, Antigonos had resolved to make himself the real sovereign of the Asiatic Alexandrine empire, possessing as he did the most powerful military force within it.

Even before this time the imperial dynasty had been a name rather than a reality; yet still a respected name. But now, the preference shown to Polysperchon by the deceased Antipater, and the secession of Kassander, placed all the great real powers in active hostility against the dynasty. Polysperchon and his friends were not blind to the difficulties of their position. The principal officers in Macedonia having been convened to deliberate, it was resolved to invite Olympias out of Epirus, that she might assume the tutelage of her grandson Alexander (son of Roxana)—to place the Asiatic interests of the dynasty in the hands of Eumenês, appointing him to the supreme command¹—and to combat Kassander in Europe, by assuring to themselves the general good-will and support of the Greeks. This last object was to be obtained by granting to the Greeks general enfranchisement, and by subverting the Antipatrian oligarchies and military governments now paramount throughout the cities.

The last hope of maintaining the unity of Alexander's empire in Asia, against the counter-interests of the great Macedonian officers, who were steadily tending to divide and appropriate it—now lay in the fidelity and military skill of Eumenês. At his disposal Polysperchon placed the imperial treasures and soldiers in Asia; especially the brave, but faithless and disorderly, Argyraspides. Olympias also addressed to him a pathetic letter, asking his counsel as the only friend and saviour to whom the imperial family could now look. Eumenês replied by assuring them of his devoted adherence to their cause. But he at the same time advised Olympias not to come out of Epirus into Macedonia; or if she did come, at all events to abstain from vindictive and cruel proceedings. Both these recommendations, honourable as well to his prudence as to his humanity, were disregarded by the old queen. She came into Macedonia to take the management of affairs; and although her imposing title, of mother to the great conqueror, raised a strong favourable feeling, yet her multiplied executions of the Antipatrian partisans excited fatal enmity against a dynasty already tottering. Nevertheless Eumenês, though his advice had been disregarded, devoted himself in Asia with

¹ Diodor. xviii. 49-58.

unshaken fidelity to the Alexandrine family, resisting the most tempting invitations to take part with Antigonos against them.¹ His example contributed much to keep alive the same active sentiments in those around him; indeed, without him, the imperial family would have had no sincere or commanding representative in Asia. His gallant struggles, first in Kilikia and Phenicia, next (when driven from the coast), in Susiana, Persis, Media, and Parætakênê—continued for two years against the greatly preponderant forces of Ptolemy, Antigonos, and Seleukus, and against the never-ceasing treachery of his own officers and troops.² They do not belong to Grecian history. They are however among the most memorable exploits of antiquity. While, even in a military point of view, they are hardly inferior to the combinations of Alexander himself—they evince, besides, a flexibility and aptitude such as Alexander neither possessed nor required, for overcoming the thousand difficulties raised by traitors and mutineers around him. To the last, Eumenês remained unsubdued. He was betrayed to Antigonos by the base and venal treachery of his own soldiers, the Macedonian Argyraspides.³

¹ Plutarch, Eumenês, 11, 12; Cornelius Nepos, Eumenês, c. 6; Diodor. xviii. 58–62.

Diodor. xvii. 58. *ἦκε δὲ καὶ παρ' Ὀλυμπιάδος αὐτῷ γράμματα, δεομένης καὶ λιπαρούσης βοηθεῖν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι καὶ ἑαυτῇ· μόνον γὰρ ἐκείνον πιστότατον ἀπολελείφθαι τῶν φίλων, καὶ δυνάμενον διορθώσασθαι τὴν ἐρημίαν τῆς βασιλικῆς οἰκίας.*

Cornelius Nepos, Eumenês, 6. “Ad hunc (Eumenem) Olympias, quum literas et nuntios misisset in Asiam, consultum, utrum repetitum Macedoniam veniret (nam tum in Epiro habitabat) et eas res occuparet—huic ille primum suavit ne se moveret, et expectaret quoad Alexandri filius regnum adipisceretur. Sin aliquâ cupiditate raperetur in Macedoniam, omnium injuriarum oblivisceretur, et in neminem acerbior uteretur imperio. Horum illa nihil fecit. Nam et in Macedoniam profecta est, et ibi crudelissime se gessit.” Compare Justin, xiv. 6; Diodor. xix. 11.

The details respecting Eumenês may be considered probably as depending on unusually good authority. His friend Hieronymus of Kardia had written a copious history of his own time; which, though now lost, was accessible both to Diodorus and Plutarch. Hieronymus was serving with Eumenês, and was taken prisoner along with him by Antigonos; who spared him and treated him well, while Eumenês was put to death (Diodor. xix. 44). Plutarch had also read letters of Eumenês (Plut. Eum. 11).

² Diodor. xviii. 63–72; xix. 11, 17, 32, 44.

³ Plutarch (Eumenês, 16–18), Cornelius Nepos (10–13), and Justin (xiv. 3, 4) describe in considerable detail the touching circumstances attending the tradition and capture of Eumenês. On this point Diodorus is more brief; but he recounts at much length the preceding military operations between Eumenês and Antigonos (xix. 17, 32, 44).

The original source of these particulars must probably be, the history of

For the interests of the imperial dynasty (the extinction of which we shall presently follow), it is perhaps to be regretted that they did not abandon Asia at once, at the death of Antipater, and concentrate their attention on Macedonia alone, summoning over Eumenês to aid them. To keep together in unity the vast aggregate of Asia was manifestly impracticable, even with his consummate ability. Indeed we read that Olympias wished for his presence in Europe, not trusting any one but him as protector of the child Alexander.¹ In Macedonia, apart from Asia, Eumenês, if the violent temper of Olympias had permitted him, might have upheld the dynasty; which, having at that time a decided interest in conciliating the Greeks, might probably have sanctioned his sympathies in favour of free Hellenic community.²

On learning the death of Antipater, most of the Greek cities had sent envoys to Pella.³ To all the governments of these cities, composed as they were of his creatures, it was a matter of the utmost moment to know what course the new Macedonian authority would adopt. Polysperchon, persuaded that they would all adhere to Kassander, and that his only chance of combating that rival was by enlisting popular sympathy and interests in Greece, or at least by subverting these Antipatrian oligarchies—drew up in conjunction with his counsellors a proclamation which he issued in the name of the dynasty.

After reciting the steady good-will of Philip and Alexander towards Greece, he affirmed that this feeling had been interrupted by the untoward Lamian war, originating with some ill-judged Greeks, and ending in the infliction of many severe calamities upon the various cities. But all these severities (he continued) had proceeded from the generals (Antipater and Kraterus): the kings were now determined to redress them. It was accordingly proclaimed that the political constitution of each city should be restored, as it had stood in the times of Philip and Alexander; that before the thirtieth of the month Xanthikus, all those who had been condemned to banishment, or deported, by the generals, should be recalled and received back; that their properties should be restored, and past sentences against them rescinded; that they should live in amnesty as to the past, and good feeling as to the future, with the Hieronymus of Kardia, himself present, who has been copied, more or less accurately, by others.

¹ Plutarch, Eumenês, 13; Diodor. xviii. 58.

² Plutarch, Eumenês, 3.

³ Diodor. xviii. 55. *εὐθὺς οὖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων παρόντας πρεσβευτὰς προσκαλεσάμενοι, &c.*

remaining citizens. From this act of recall were excluded, the exiles of Amphissa, Trikka, Pharkadon, and Herakleia, together with a certain number of Megalopolitans, implicated in one particular conspiracy. In the particular case of those cities, the governments of which had been denounced as hostile by Philip or Alexander, special reference and consultation was opened with Pella, for some modification to meet the circumstances. As to Athens, it was decreed that Samos should be restored to her, but not Orôpus; in all other respects she was placed on the same footing as in the days of Philip and Alexander. "All the Greeks (concluded this proclamation) shall pass decrees, forbidding every one either to bear arms or otherwise act in hostility against us—on pain of exile and confiscation of goods, for himself and his family. On this and on all other matters, we have ordered Polysperchon to take proper measures. Obey him—as we have before written to you to do; for we shall not omit to notice those who on any point disregard our proclamation."¹

Such was the new edict issued by the kings, or rather by Polysperchon in their names. It directed the removal of all the garrisons, and the subversion of all the oligarchies, established by Antipater after the Lamian war. It ordered the recall of the host of exiles then expelled. It revived the state of things prevalent before the death of Alexander—which indeed itself had been, for the most part, an aggregate of macedonising oligarchies interspersed with Macedonian garrisons. To the existing Antipatrian oligarchies, however, it was a deathblow; and so it must have been understood by the Grecian envoys—including probably deputations from the exiles, as well as envoys from the civic governments—to whom Polysperchon delivered it at Pella. Not content with the general edict, Polysperchon addressed special letters to Argos and various other cities, commanding that the Antipatrian leading men should be banished with confiscation of property, and in some cases put to death;² the names being probably furnished to him by the exiles. Lastly, as it was clear that

¹ Diodor. xviii. 56. In this chapter the proclamation is given *verbatim*. For the exceptions made in respect to Amphissa, Trikka, Herakleia, &c., we do not know the grounds.

Reference is made to prior edicts of the kings—*ὑμεῖς οὖν, καθάπερ ὑμῖν καὶ πρότερον ἐγράψαμεν, ἀκούετε τούτου* (Πολυσπέρχοντος). These words must allude to written answers given to particular cities, in reply to special applications. No general proclamation, earlier than this, can have been issued since the death of Antipater.

² Diod. xviii. 57.

such stringent measures could not be executed without force,—the rather as these oligarchies would be upheld by Kassander from without—Polysperchon resolved to conduct a large military force into Greece; sending thither first, however, a considerable detachment, for immediate operations, under his son, Alexander.

To Athens, as well as to other cities, Polysperchon addressed special letters, promising restoration of the democracy and recall of the exiles. At Athens, such change was a greater revolution than elsewhere, because the multitude of exiles and persons deported had been the greatest. To the existing nine thousand Athenian citizens, it was doubtless odious and alarming; while to Phokion with the other leading Antipatrians, it threatened not only loss of power, but probably nothing less than the alternative of flight or death.¹ The state of interests at Athens, however, was now singularly novel and complicated. There were the Antipatrians and the nine thousand qualified citizens. There were the exiles, who, under the new edict, speedily began re-entering the city, and reclaiming their citizenship as well as their properties. Polysperchon and his son were known to be soon coming with a powerful force. Lastly, there was Nikanor, who held Munychia with a garrison, neither for Polysperchon, nor for the Athenians, but for Kassander; the latter being himself also expected with a force from Asia. Here then were several parties; each distinct in views and interests from the rest—some decidedly hostile to each other.

The first contest arose between the Athenians and Nikanor respecting Munychia; which they required him to evacuate, pursuant to the recent proclamation. Nikanor on his side returned an evasive answer, promising compliance as soon as circumstances permitted, but in the mean time entreating the Athenians to continue in alliance with Kassander, as they had been with his father Antipater.² He seems to have indulged hopes of prevailing on them to declare in his favour—and not without plausible grounds, since the Antipatrian leaders and a large proportion of the nine thousand citizens could not but dread the execution of Polysperchon's edict. And he had also what was of still greater moment—the secret connivance and support of Phokion: who put himself in intimate relation with

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 32. The opinion of Plutarch, however, that Polysperchon intended this measure as a mere trick to ruin Phokion, is only correct so far—that Polysperchon wished to put down the Antipatrian oligarchies everywhere, and that Phokion was the leading person of that oligarchy at Athens.

² Diodor. xviii. 64.

Nikanor, as he had before done with Menyllus¹—and who had greater reason than any one else to dread the edict of Polysperchon. At a public assembly held in Peiræus to discuss the subject, Nikanor even ventured to present himself in person in the company and under the introduction of Phokion, who was anxious that the Athenians should entertain the proposition of alliance with Kassander. But with the people, the prominent wish was to get rid altogether of the foreign garrison, and to procure the evacuation of Munychia—for which object, of course, the returned exiles would be even more anxious than the nine thousand. Accordingly, the assembly refused to hear any propositions from Nikanor; while Derkyllus with others even proposed to seize his person. It was Phokion who ensured to him the means of escaping; even in spite of serious wrath from his fellow-citizens, to whom he pleaded, that he had made himself guarantee for Nikanor's personal safety.²

Foreseeing the gravity of the impending contest, Nikanor had been secretly introducing fresh soldiers into Munychia. And when he found that he could not obtain any declared support from the Athenians, he laid a scheme for surprising and occupying the town and harbour of Peiræus, of which Munychia formed the adjoining eminence and harbour on the southern side of the little peninsula. Notwithstanding all his precautions, it became known to various Athenians that he was tampering with persons in Peiræus, and collecting troops in the neighbouring isle of Salamis. So much anxiety was expressed in the Athenian assembly for the safety of Peiræus, that a decree was passed, enjoining all citizens to hold themselves in arms for its protection, under Phokion as general. Nevertheless Phokion, disregarding such a decree, took no precautions, affirming that he would himself be answerable for Nikanor. Presently that officer, making an unexpected attack from Munychia and Salamis, took Peiræus by surprise, placed both the town and harbour under military occupation, and cut off its communication with Athens by a ditch and palisade. On this palpable aggression, the Athenians rushed to arms. But Phokion as general damped their ardour, and even declined to head them in an attack for the recovery of Peiræus before Nikanor should have had time to strengthen himself in it. He went however, with Konon (son of Timotheus), to remonstrate with Nikanor, and to renew the demand that he should evacuate, under the recent proclamation, all the posts which he held in garrison. But Nikanor would give no other answer,

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 31.

² Plutarch, Phokion, 32.

except that he held his commission from Kassander, to whom they must address their application.¹ He thus again tried to bring Athens into communication with Kassander.

The occupation of Peiræus in addition to Munychia was a serious calamity to the Athenians, making them worse off than they had been even under Antipater. Peiræus, rich, active, and commercial, containing the Athenian arsenal, docks, and muniments of war, was in many respects more valuable than Athens itself; for all purposes of war, far more valuable. Kassander had now an excellent place of arms and base, which Munychia alone would not have afforded, for his operations in Greece against Polysperchon; upon whom therefore the loss fell hardly less severely than upon the Athenians. Now Phokion, in his function as general, had been forewarned of the danger, might have guarded against it, and ought to have done so. This was a grave dereliction of duty, and admits of hardly any other explanation except that of treasonable connivance. It seems that Phokion, foreseeing his own ruin and that of his friends in the triumph of Polysperchon and the return of the exiles, was desirous of favouring the seizure of Peiræus by Nikanor, as a means of constraining Athens to adopt the alliance with Kassander; which alliance indeed would probably have been brought about, had Kassander reached Peiræus by sea sooner than the first troops of Polysperchon by land. Phokion was here guilty, at the very least, of culpable neglect, and probably of still more culpable treason, on an occasion seriously injuring both Polysperchon and the Athenians; a fact which we must not forget, when we come to read presently the bitter animosity exhibited against him.²

The news, that Nikanor had possessed himself of Peiræus, produced a strong sensation. Presently arrived a letter addressed to him by Olympias herself, commanding him to surrender the place to the Athenians, upon whom she wished to confer entire autonomy. But Nikanor declined obedience

¹ Diodorus, xviii. 64; Plutarch, Phokion, 32; Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2.

² Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2. "Concidit autem maxime uno crimine: quod cum apud eum summum esset imperium populi, et Nicanorem, Cassandri præfectum, insidiari Piræo Atheniensium, a Dercyllo moneretur: idemque postuleret, ut provideret, ne comæatibus civitas privaretur—huic, audiente populo, Phokion negavit esse periculum, seque ejus rei obsidem fore pollicitus est. Neque ita multo post Nicanor Piræo est potitus. Ad quem recuperandum cum populus armatus concurrisset, ille non modo neminem ad arma vocavit, sed ne armatis quidem præesse voluit, sine quo Athenæ omnino esse non possunt."

to her order, still waiting for support from Kassander. The arrival of Alexander (Polysperchon's son) with a body of troops, encouraged the Athenians to believe that he was come to assist in carrying Peiræus by force, for the purpose of restoring it to them. Their hopes however were again disappointed. Though encamped near Peiræus, Alexander made no demand for the Athenian forces to co-operate with him in attacking it; but entered into open parley with Nikanor, whom he endeavoured to persuade or corrupt into surrendering the place.¹ When this negotiation failed, he resolved to wait for the arrival of his father, who was already on his march towards Attica with the main army. His own force unassisted was probably not sufficient to attack Peiræus; nor did he choose to invoke assistance from the Athenians, to whom he would then have been compelled to make over the place when taken, which they so ardently desired. The Athenians were thus as far from their object as ever; moreover, by this delay the opportunity of attacking the place was altogether thrown away; for Kassander with his armament reached it before Polysperchon.

It was Phokion and his immediate colleagues who induced Alexander to adopt this insidious policy; to decline reconquering Peiræus for the Athenians, and to appropriate it for himself. To Phokion, the reconstitution of autonomous Athens, with its democracy and restored exiles, and without any foreign controlling force—was an assured sentence of banishment, if not of death. Not having been able to obtain protection from the foreign force of Nikanor and Kassander, he and his friends resolved to throw themselves upon that of Alexander and Polysperchon. They went to meet Alexander as he entered Attica—represented the impolicy of his relinquishing so important a military position as Peiræus, while the war was yet unfinished—and offered to co-operate with him for this purpose, by proper management of the Athenian public. Alexander was pleased with these suggestions, accepted Phokion with the others as his leading adherents at Athens, and looked upon Peiræus as a capture to be secured for himself.² Numerous returning Athenian exiles accompanied Alexander's army. It seems that Phokion was desirous of admitting the troops, along with the

¹ Diodor. xviii. 65; Plutarch, Phokion, 33.

² Diodor. xviii. 65. Τῶν γὰρ Ἀντιπάτρῳ γεγονότων φίλων τινὲς (ὕπῃρχον) καὶ οἱ περὶ Φωκίωνα φοβούμενοι τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων τιμωρίας, ὑπήντησαν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, καὶ διδάξαντες τὸ συμφέρον, ἔπεισαν αὐτὸν ἰδίᾳ κατέχειν τὰ φρούρια, καὶ μὴ παραδίδῃν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, μέχρις ἂν ὁ Κάσσανδρος καταπολεμηθῇ.

exiles, as friends and allies within the walls of Athens, so as to make Alexander master of the city—but that this project was impracticable, in consequence of the mistrust created among the Athenians by the parleys of Alexander with Nikanor.¹

The strategic function of Phokion, however, so often conferred and re-conferred upon him—and his power of doing either good or evil—now approached its close. As soon as the returning exiles found themselves in sufficient numbers, they called for a revision of the list of state-officers, and for the re-establishment of the democratical forms. They passed a vote to depose those who had held office under the Antipatrian oligarchy, and who still continued to hold it down to the actual moment. Among these Phokion stood first: along with him were his son-in-law Chariklēs, the Phalerean Demetrius, Kallimedon, Nikoklēs, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Philoklēs. These persons were not only deposed, but condemned, some to death, some to banishment and confiscation of property. Demetrius, Chariklēs, and Kallimedon sought safety by leaving Attica; but Phokion and the rest merely went to Alexander's camp, throwing themselves upon his protection on the faith of the recent understanding.² Alexander not only received them courteously, but gave them letters to his father Polysperchon, requesting safety and protection for them, as men who had embraced his cause, and who were still eager to do all in their power to support him.³ Armed with these letters, Phokion and his companions went through Bœotia and Phokis to meet Polysperchon on his march southward. They were

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Diod. xviii. 65, 66. This seems to me the probable sequence of facts, combining Plutarch with Diodorus. Plutarch takes no notice of the negotiation opened by Phokion with Alexander, and the understanding established between them; which is stated in the clearest manner by Diodorus, and appears to me a material circumstance. On the other hand, Plutarch mentions (though Diodorus does not) that Alexander was anxious to seize Athens itself, and was very near succeeding. Plutarch seems to conceive that it was the exiles who were disposed to let him in; but if that had been the case, he probably would have been let in when the exiles became preponderant. It was Phokion, I conceive, who was desirous, for his own personal safety, of admitting the foreign troops.

² Diodor. xviii. 65; Plutarch, Phokion, 35.

³ Diodor. xviii. 66. Προσδεχθέντες δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ (Alexander) φιλοφρόνως, γράμματα ἔλαβον πρὸς τὸν πατέρα Πολυσπέρχοντα, ὅπως μηδὲν πάθωσιν οἱ περὶ Φωκίωνα τὰ κείνου πεφρονηκότες, καὶ νῦν ἐπαγγελλόμενοι πάντα συμπράξειν.

This application of Phokion to Alexander, and the letters obtained to Polysperchon, are not mentioned by Plutarch, though they are important circumstances in following the last days of Phokion's life.

accompanied by Deinarchus and by a Platæan named Solon, both of them passing for friends of Polysperchon.¹

The Athenian democracy, just reconstituted, which had passed the recent condemnatory votes, was disquieted at the news that Alexander had espoused the cause of Phokion and had recommended the like policy to his father. It was possible that Polysperchon might seek, with his powerful army, both to occupy Athens and to capture Peiræus, and might avail himself of Phokion (like Antipater after the Lamian war) as a convenient instrument of government. It seems plain that this was the project of Alexander, and that he counted on Phokion as a ready auxiliary in both. Now the restored democrats, though owing their restoration to Polysperchon, were much less compliant towards him than Phokion had been. Not only they would not admit him into the city, but they would not even acquiesce in his separate occupation of Munychia and Peiræus. On the proposition of Agnonidês and Archestratus, they sent a deputation to Polysperchon accusing Phokion and his comrades of high treason; yet at the same time claiming for Athens the full and undiminished benefit of the late regal proclamation—autonomy and democracy, with restoration of Peiræus and Munychia free and ungarrisoned.²

The deputation reached Polysperchon at Pharyges in Phokis, as early as Phokion's company, which had been detained for some days at Elateia by the sickness of Deinarchus. That delay was unfortunate for Phokion. Had he seen Polysperchon, and presented the letter of Alexander, before the Athenian accusers arrived, he might probably have obtained a more favourable reception. But as the arrival of the two parties was nearly simultaneous, Polysperchon heard both of them at the same audience, before King Philip Aridæus in his throne with the gilt ceiling above it. When Agnonidês,—chief of the Athenian deputation, and formerly friend and advocate of Demosthenês in the Harpalian cause—found himself face to face with Phokion and his friends, their reciprocal invectives at first produced nothing but confusion; until Agnonidês himself exclaimed—"Pack us all into one cage and send us back to Athens to receive judgement from the Athenians." The king laughed at this observation, but the bystanders around insisted upon more orderly proceedings, and Agnonidês then set forth the two demands of the Athenians—condemnation of Phokion and his friends, partly as accomplices of Antipater, partly as having betrayed Peiræus

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 33.

² Diodor. xviii. 66.

to Nikanor—and the full benefit of the late regal proclamation to Athens.¹ Now, on the last of these two heads, Polysperchon was noway disposed to yield—nor to hand over Peiræus to the Athenians as soon as he should take it. On this matter, accordingly, he replied by refusal or evasion. But he was all the more disposed to satisfy the Athenians on the other matter—the surrender of Phokion; especially as the sentiment now prevalent at Athens evinced clearly that Phokion could not be again useful to him as an instrument. Thus disposed to sacrifice Phokion, Polysperchon heard his defence with impatience, interrupted him several times, and so disgusted him, that he at length struck the ground with his stick, and held his peace. Hegemon, another of the accused, was yet more harshly treated. When he appealed to Polysperchon himself, as having been personally cognisant of his (the speaker's) good dispositions towards the Athenian people (he had been probably sent to Pella, as envoy for redress of grievances under the Antipatrian oligarchy), Polysperchon exclaimed—"Do not utter falsehoods against me before the king." Moreover, king Philip himself was so incensed, as to start from his throne and snatch his spear; with which he would have run Hegemon through,—imitating the worst impulses of his illustrious brother—had he not been held back by Polysperchon. The sentence could not be doubtful. Phokion and his companions were delivered over as prisoners to the Athenian deputation, together with a letter from the king, intimating that in his conviction they were traitors, but that he left them to be judged by the Athenians, now restored to freedom and autonomy.²

The Macedonian Kleitus was instructed to convey them to Athens as prisoners under a guard. Mournful was the spectacle as they entered the city; being carried along the Kerameikus

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 33; Cornel. Nepos, Phokion, 3. "Hic (Phokion), ab Agnonide accusatus, quod Piræum Nicanori prodidisset, ex consilii sententiâ, in custodiam conjectus, Athenas deductus est, ut ibi de eo legibus fieret iudicium."

Plutarch says that Polysperchon, before he gave this hearing to both parties, ordered *the Corinthian Deinarchus* to be tortured and to be put to death. Now the person so named cannot be Deinarchus, the logographer—of whom we have some specimens remaining, and who was alive even as late as 292 B.C.—though he too was a Corinthian. Either, therefore, there were two Corinthians, both bearing this same name (as Westermann supposes—Gesch. der Beredsamkeit, sect. 72), or the statement of Plutarch must allude to an order given, but not carried into effect—which latter seems to me most probable.

² Plutarch, Phokion, 33, 34; Diodor. xviii. 66.

in carts, through sympathising friends and an embittered multitude, until they reached the theatre, wherein the assembly was to be convened. That assembly was composed of every one who chose to enter, and is said to have contained many foreigners and slaves. But it would have been fortunate for Phokion had such really been the case; for foreigners and slaves had no cause of antipathy towards him. The assembly was mainly composed of Phokion's keenest enemies, the citizens just returned from exile or deportation; among whom may doubtless have been intermixed more or less of non-qualified persons, since the lists had probably not yet been verified. When the assembly was about to be opened, the friends of Phokion moved, that on occasion of so important a trial, foreigners and slaves should be sent away. This was in every sense an impolitic proceeding; for the restored exiles, chiefly poor men, took it as an insult to themselves, and became only the more embittered, exclaiming against the oligarchs who were trying to exclude them.

It is not easy to conceive stronger grounds of exasperation than those which inflamed the bosoms of these returned exiles. We must recollect that at the close of the Lamian war, the Athenian democracy had been forcibly subverted. Demosthenês and its principal leaders had been slain, some of them with antecedent cruelties; the poorer multitude, in number more than half of the qualified citizens, had been banished or deported into distant regions. To all the public shame and calamity, there was thus superadded a vast mass of individual suffering and impoverishment, the mischiefs of which were very imperfectly healed, even by that unexpected contingency which had again thrown open to them their native city. Accordingly, when these men returned from different regions, each hearing from the rest new tales of past hardship, they felt the bitterest hatred against the authors of the Antipatrian revolution; and among these authors Phokion stood distinctly marked. For although he had neither originated nor advised these severities, yet he and his friends, as administering the Antipatrian government at Athens, must have been agents in carrying them out, and had rendered themselves distinctly liable to the fearful penalties pronounced by the psephism of Demophantus,¹ consecrated by an oath taken by Athenians generally, against any one who should hold an official post after the government was subverted.

When these restored citizens thus saw Phokion brought

¹ Andokidês de Mysteriis, sect. 96, 97; Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. s. 127.

before them, for the first time after their return, the common feeling of antipathy against him burst out in furious manifestations. Agnonidês the principal accuser, supported by Epikurus¹ and Demophilus, found their denunciations welcomed and even anticipated, when they arraigned Phokion as a criminal who had lent his hand to the subversion of the constitution,—to the sufferings of his deported fellow-citizens,—and to the holding of Athens in subjection under a foreign potentate; in addition to which, the betrayal of Peiræus to Nikanor² constituted a new crime; fastening on the people the yoke of Kassander, when autonomy had been promised to them by the recent imperial edict. After the accusation was concluded, Phokion was called on for his defence; but he found it impossible to obtain a hearing. Attempting several times to speak, he was as often interrupted by angry shouts; several of his friends were cried down in like manner; until at length he gave up the case in despair; and exclaimed, “For myself, Athenians, I plead guilty; I pronounce against myself the sentence of death for my political conduct: but why are you to sentence these men near me, who are not guilty?” “Because they are your friends, Phokion”—was the exclamation of those around. Phokion then said no more; while Agnonidês proposed a decree, to the effect, that the assembled people should decide by show of hands, whether the persons now arraigned were guilty or not; and that if declared guilty, they should be put to death. Some persons present cried out, that the penalty of torture ought to precede death; but this savage proposition, utterly at variance with Athenian law in respect to citizens, was repudiated not less by Agnonidês than by the Macedonian officer Kleitus. The decree was then passed; after which the show of hands was called for. Nearly every hand in the assembly was held up in condemnation; each man even rose from his seat to make the effect more imposing; and some went so far as to put on wreaths in token of triumph. To many of them doubtless, the gratification of this intense and unanimous vindictive impulse,—in their view not merely legitimate, but patriotic,—must have been among the happiest moments of life.³

After sentence, the five condemned persons, Phokion,

¹ Not the eminent philosopher so named.

² Cornel. Nepos, Phok. 4. “Plurimi vero ita exacerentur propter proditionis suspicionem Piræi, maximeque quod adversus populi commoda in senectute steterat.”

³ Diodor. xviii. 66, 67; Plutarch, Phokion, 34, 35; Cornelius Nepos, Phokion, 2, 3.

Nikoklês, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Pythoklês, were consigned to the supreme magistrates of Police, called The Eleven, and led to prison for the purpose of having the customary dose of poison administered. Hostile bystanders ran alongside, taunting and reviling them. It is even said that one man planted himself in the front, and spat upon Phokion; who turned to the public officers and exclaimed—"Will no one check this indecent fellow?" This was the only emotion which he manifested; in other respects, his tranquillity and self-possession were resolutely maintained, during this soul-subduing march from the theatre to the prison, amidst the wailings of his friends, the broken spirit of his four comrades, and the fiercest demonstrations of antipathy from his fellow-citizens generally. One ray of comfort presented itself as he entered the prison. It was the nineteenth of the month Munychion, the day on which the Athenian Horsemen or Knights (the richest class in the city, men for the most part of oligarchical sentiments) celebrated their festal procession with wreaths on their heads in honour of Zeus. Several of these horsemen halted in passing, took off their wreaths, and wept as they looked through the gratings of the prison.

Being asked whether he had anything to tell his son Phokus, Phokion replied—"I tell him emphatically, not to hold evil memory of the Athenians." The draught of hemlock was then administered to all five—to Phokion last. Having been condemned for treason, they were not buried in Attica; nor were Phokion's friends allowed to light a funeral pile for the burning of his body; which was carried out of Attica into the Megarid, by a hired agent named Konopion, and there burnt by fire obtained at Megara. The wife of Phokion, with her maids, poured libations and marked the spot by a small mound of earth; she also collected the bones and brought them back to Athens in her bosom, during the secrecy of night. She buried them near her own domestic hearth, with this address—"Beloved Hestia, I confide to thee these relics of a good man. Restore them to his own family vault, as soon as the Athenians shall come to their senses."¹

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 36, 37. Two other anecdotes are recounted by Plutarch, which seem to be of doubtful authenticity. Nikoklês entreated that he might be allowed to swallow his potion before Phokion; upon which the latter replied—"Your request, Nikoklês, is sad and mournful; but as I have never yet refused you anything throughout my life, I grant this also."

After the first four had drunk, all except Phokion, no more hemlock was left; upon which the gaoler said that he would not prepare any more, unless

After a short time (we are told by Plutarch) the Athenians did thus come to their senses. They discovered that Phokion had been a faithful and excellent public servant, repented of their severity towards him, celebrated his funeral obsequies at the public expense, erected a statue in his honour, and put to death Agnonidês by public judicial sentence; while Epikurus and Demophilus fled from the city and were slain by Phokion's son.¹

These facts are ostensibly correct; but Plutarch omits to notice the real explanation of them. Within two or three months after the death of Phokion, Kassander, already in possession of Peiræus and Munychia, became also master of Athens; the oligarchical or Phokionic party again acquired predominance; Demetrius the Phalerean was recalled from exile, and placed to administer the city under Kassander, as Phokion had administered it under Antipater.

No wonder, that under such circumstances, the memory of Phokion should be honoured. But this is a very different thing from spontaneous change of popular opinion respecting him. I see no reason why such change of opinion should have occurred, nor do I believe that it did occur. The Demos of Athens, banished and deported in mass, had the best ground twelve drachmæ of money were given to him to buy the material. Some hesitation took place, until Phokion asked one of his friends to supply the money, sarcastically remarking, that it was hard if a man could not even die *gratis* at Athens.

As to the first of these anecdotes—if we read, in Plato's *Phædon* (152-155), the details of the death of Sokratês,—we shall see that death by hemlock was not caused instantaneously, but in a gradual and painless manner; the person who had swallowed the potion being desired to walk about for some time, until his legs grew heavy, and then to lie down in bed, after which he gradually chilled and became insensible, first in the extremities, next in the vital centres. Under these circumstances, the question—which of the persons condemned should swallow the first of the five potions—could be of very little moment.

Then, as to the alleged niggardly stock of hemlock in the Athenian prison—what would have been the alternative, if Phokion's friend had not furnished the twelve drachmæ? Would he have remained in confinement, without being put to death? Certainly not; for he was under capital sentence. Would he have been put to death by the sword or some other unexpensive instrument? This is at variance with the analogy of Athenian practice. If there be any truth in the story, we must suppose that the Eleven had allotted to this gaoler a stock of hemlock (or the price thereof) really adequate to five potions, but that he by accident or awkwardness had wasted a part of it, so that it would have been necessary for him to supply the deficiency out of his own pocket. From this embarrassment he was rescued by Phokion and his friend; and Phokion's sarcasm touches upon the strangeness of a man being called upon to pay for his own execution.

¹ Plutarch, *Phokion*, 38.

for hating Phokion, and were not likely to become ashamed of the feeling. Though he was personally mild and incorruptible, they derived no benefit from these virtues. To them it was of little moment that he should steadily refuse all presents from Antipater, when he did Antipater's work gratuitously. Considered as a judicial trial, the last scene of Phokion before the people in the theatre is nothing better than a cruel imposture; considered as a manifestation of public opinion already settled, it is one for which the facts of the past supplied ample warrant.

We cannot indeed read without painful sympathy the narrative of an old man above eighty,—personally brave, mild, and superior to all pecuniary temptation, so far as his positive administration was concerned,—perishing under an intense and crushing storm of popular execration. But when we look at the whole case—when we survey, not merely the details of Phokion's administration, but the grand public objects which those details subserved, and towards which he conducted his fellow-citizens—we shall see that this judgement is fully merited. In Phokion's patriotism—for so doubtless he himself sincerely conceived it—no account was taken of Athenian independence; of the autonomy or self-management of the Hellenic world; of the conditions, in reference to foreign kings, under which alone such autonomy could exist. He had neither the Pan-Hellenic sentiment of Aristeidês, Kallikratidas, and Demosthenês—nor the narrower Athenian sentiment, like the devotion of Agesilaus to Sparta, and of Epaminondas to Thebes. To Phokion it was indifferent whether Greece was an aggregate of autonomous cities, with Athens as first or second among them—or one of the satrapies under the Macedonian kings. Now this was among the most fatal defects of a Grecian public man. The sentiment in which Phokion was wanting, lay at the bottom of all those splendid achievements which have given to Greece a substantive and pre-eminent place in the history of the world. Had Themistoklês, Aristeidês, and Leonidas resembled him, Greece would have passed quietly under the dominion of Persia. The brilliant, though chequered, century and more of independent politics which succeeded the repulse of Xerxês would never have occurred. It was precisely during the fifty years of Phokion's political and military influence, that the Greeks were degraded from a state of freedom, and Athens from ascendancy as well as freedom, into absolute servitude. In so far as this great public misfortune can be imputed to any one

man—to no one was it more ascribable than to Phokion. He was stratêgus during most of the long series of years when Philip's power was growing; it was his duty to look ahead for the safety of his countrymen, and to combat the yet immature giant. He heard the warnings of Demosthenês, and he possessed exactly those qualities which were wanting to Demosthenês—military energy and aptitude. Had he lent his influence to inform the short-sightedness, to stimulate the inertia, to direct the armed efforts, of his countrymen, the kings of Macedon might have been kept within their own limits, and the future history of Greece might have been altogether different. Unfortunately, he took the opposite side. He acted with Æschinês and the philippisers; without receiving money from Philip, he did gratuitously all that Philip desired—by nullifying and sneering down the efforts of Demosthenês and the other active politicians. After the battle of Chæroneia, Phokion received from Philip first, and from Alexander afterwards, marks of esteem not shown towards any other Athenian. This was both the fruit and the proof of his past political action—anti-Hellenic as well as Anti-Athenian. Having done much, in the earlier part of his life, to promote the subjugation of Greece under the Macedonian kings, he contributed somewhat, during the latter half, to lighten the severity of their dominion; and it is the most honourable point in his character that he always refrained from abusing their marked favour towards himself, for purposes either of personal gain or of oppression over his fellow-citizens. Alexander not only wrote letters to him, even during the plenitude of imperial power, in terms of respectful friendship, but tendered to him the largest presents—at one time the sum of 100 talents, at another time the choice of four towns on the coast of Asia Minor, as Xerxês gave to Themistoklês. He even expressed his displeasure when Phokion, refusing everything, consented only to request the liberation of three Grecian prisoners confined at Sardis.¹

The Lamian war, and its consequences, were Phokion's ruin. He continued at Athens, throughout that war, freely declaring his opinion against it; for it is to be remarked, that in spite of his known macedonising politics, the people neither banished nor degraded him, but contented themselves with following the counsels of others. On the disastrous termination of the war, Phokion undertook the thankless and dishonourable function of satrap under Antipater at Athens, with the

¹ Plutarch, Phokion, 18; Plutarch, Apophthegm. p. 188.

Macedonian garrison at Munychia to back him. He became the subordinate agent of a conqueror who not only slaughtered the chief Athenian orators, but disfranchised and deported the Demos in mass. Having accepted partnership and responsibility in these proceedings, Phokion was no longer safe except under the protection of a foreign prince. After the liberal proclamation issued in the name of the Macedonian kings, permitting the return of the banished Demos, he sought safety for himself, first by that treasonable connivance which enabled Nikanor to seize the Peiræus, next by courting Polysperchon the enemy of Nikanor. A voluntary expatriation (along with his friend the Phalerean Demetrius) would have been less dangerous, and less discreditable than these manœuvres, which still further darkened the close of his life, without averting from him, after all, the necessity of facing the restored Demos. The intense and unanimous wrath of the people against him is an instructive, though a distressing spectacle. It was directed, not against the man or the administrator—for in both characters Phokion had been blameless, except as to the last collusion with Nikanor in the seizure of the Peiræus—but against his public policy. It was the last protest of extinct Grecian freedom, speaking as it were from the tomb in a voice of thunder, against that fatal system of mistrust, inertia, self-seeking, and corruption, which had betrayed the once autonomous Athens to a foreign conqueror.

I have already mentioned that Polysperchon with his army was in Phokis when Phokion was brought before him, on his march towards Peloponnesus. Perhaps he may have been detained by negotiation with the Ætolians, who embraced his alliance.¹ At any rate, he was tardy in his march, for before he reached Attica, Kassander arrived at Peiræus to join Nikanor with a fleet of thirty-five ships and 4000 soldiers obtained from Antigonos. On learning this fact, Polysperchon hastened his march also, and presented himself under the walls of Athens and Peiræus with a large force of 20,000 Macedonians, 4000 Greek allies, 1000 cavalry, and sixty-five elephants; animals which were now seen for the first time in European Greece. He at first besieged Kassander in Peiræus, but finding it difficult to procure subsistence in Attica for so numerous an army, he marched with the larger portion into Peloponnesus, leaving his son Alexander with a division to make head against Kassander. Either approaching in person

¹ Diodor. xix. 35.

the various Peloponnesian towns—or addressing them by means of envoys—he enjoined the subversion of the Antipatrian oligarchies, and the restoration of liberty and free speech to the mass of the citizens.¹ In most of the towns, this revolution was accomplished; but in Megalopolis, the oligarchy held out; not only forcing Polysperchon to besiege the city, but even defending it against him successfully. He made two or three attempts to storm it, by moveable towers, by undermining the walls, and even by the aid of elephants; but he was repulsed in all of them,² and obliged to relinquish the siege with considerable loss of reputation. His admiral Kleitus was soon afterwards defeated in the Propontis, with the loss of his whole fleet, by Nikanor (whom Kassander had sent from Peiræus) and Antigonos.³

After these two defeats, Polysperchon seems to have evacuated Peloponnesus, and to have carried his forces across the Corinthian Gulf into Epirus, to join Olympias. His party was greatly weakened all over Greece, and that of Kassander proportionally strengthened. The first effect of this was, the surrender of Athens. The Athenians in the city, including all or many of the restored exiles, could no longer endure that complete severance from the sea, to which the occupation of Peiræus and Munychia by Kassander had reduced them. Athens without a port was hardly tenable; in fact, Peiræus was considered by its great constructor, Themistoklēs, as more indispensable to the Athenians than Athens itself.⁴ The subsistence of the people was derived in large proportion from imported corn, received through Peiræus; where also the trade and industrial operations were carried on, most of the revenue collected, and the arsenals, docks, ships, &c., of the state kept up. It became evident that Nikanor, by seizing on the Peiræus, had rendered Athens disarmed and helpless; so that the irreparable mischief done by Phokion, in conniving at that seizure, was felt more and more every day. Hence the Athenians, unable to capture the port themselves, and hopeless of obtaining it through Polysperchon, felt constrained to listen to the partisans of Kassander, who proposed that terms should be made with him. It was agreed that they should become friends and allies of Kassander; that they should have full enjoyment of their city, with the port Peiræus, their ships, and revenues; that the exiles and deported citizens should be readmitted; that the political franchise should for the future be

¹ Diodor. xviii. 69.

² Diodor. xviii. 72.

³ Diodor. xviii. 70, 71.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 93.

enjoyed by all citizens who possessed 1000 drachmæ of property and upwards ; that Kassander should hold Munychia with a governor and garrison, until the war against Polysperchon was brought to a close ; and that he should also name some one Athenian citizen, in whose hands the supreme government of the city should be vested. Kassander named Demetrius the Phalerean (*i. e.* an Athenian of the Dême Phalerum), one of the colleagues of Phokion ; who had gone into voluntary exile since the death of Antipater, but had recently returned.¹

This convention restored substantially at Athens the Antipatrian government ; yet without the severities which had marked its original establishment—and with some modifications in various ways. It made Kassander virtually master of the city (as Antipater had been before him), by means of his governing nominee, upheld by the garrison, and by the fortification of Munychia : which had now been greatly enlarged and strengthened,² holding a practical command over Peiræus, though that port was nominally relinquished to the Athenians. But there was no slaughter of orators, no expulsion of citizens ; moreover, even the minimum of 1000 drachmæ, fixed for the political franchise, though excluding the multitude, must have been felt as an improvement compared with the higher limit of 2000 drachmæ prescribed by Antipater. Kassander was not, like his father, at the head of an overwhelming force, master of Greece. He had Polysperchon in the field against him with a rival army and an established ascendancy in many of the Grecian cities ; it was therefore his interest to abstain from measures of obvious harshness towards the Athenian people.

Towards this end his choice of the Phalerean Demetrius appears to have been judicious. That citizen continued to administer Athens, as satrap or despot under Kassander, for ten years. He was an accomplished literary man, friend both of the philosopher Theophrastus, who had succeeded to the school of Aristotle—and of the rhetor Deinarchus. He is described also as a person of expensive and luxurious habits ; towards which he devoted the most of the Athenian public revenue, 1200 talents in amount, if Duris is to be believed. His administration is said to have been discreet and moderate. We know little of its details, but we are told that he made sumptuary laws, especially restricting the cost and ostentation

¹ Diodor. xviii. 74.

² See the notice of Munychia, as it stood ten years afterwards (Diodor. xx. 45).

of funerals.¹ He himself extolled his own decennial period as one of abundance and flourishing commerce at Athens.² But we learn from others, and the fact is highly probable, that it was a period of distress and humiliation, both at Athens and in other Grecian towns; and that Athenians, as well as others, welcomed new projects of colonisation (such as that of Ophellas from Kyrênê) not simply from prospects of advantage, but also as an escape from existing evils.³

What forms of nominal democracy were kept up during this interval, we cannot discover. The popular judicature must have been continued for private suits and accusations, since Deinarchus is said to have been in large practice as a logographer, or composer of discourses for others.⁴ But the fact that three hundred and sixty statues were erected in honour of Demetrius while his administration was still going on, demonstrates the gross flattery of his partisans, the subjection of the people, and the practical abolition of all free-spoken censure or pronounced opposition. We learn that, in some one of the ten years of his administration, a census was taken of the inhabitants of Attica; and that there were numbered, 21,000 citizens, 10,000 metics, and 400,000 slaves.⁵ Of this important enumeration

¹ Cicero, De Legg. ii. 26, 66; Strabo, ix. p. 398; Pausanias, i. 25, 6. *τύραννόν τε Ἀθηναίους ἐπραξε γενέσθαι Δημήτριον*, &c. Duris ap. Athenæum, xii. 542, Fragm. 27, vol. iii. p. 477, Frag. Hist. Græc.

The Phalerean Demetrius composed, among numerous historical, philosophical, and literary works, a narrative of his own decennial administration (Diogenês Laert. v. 5, 9; Strabo, ib.)—*περὶ τῆς δεκαετίας*.

The statement of 1200 talents, as the annual revenue handled by Demetrius, deserves little credit.

² See the Fragment of Democharês, 2; Fragment. Historic. Græc. ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 448, ap. Polyb. xii. 13. Democharês, nephew of the orator Demosthenês, was the political opponent of Demetrius Phalereus, whom he reproached with these boasts about commercial prosperity, when the liberty and dignity of the city were overthrown. To such boasts of Demetrius Phalereus probably belongs the statement cited from him by Strabo (iii. p. 147) about the laborious works in the Attic mines at Laureium.

³ Diodor. xx. 40. *ὥσθ' ὑπελάμβανον μὴ μόνον ἐγκρατεῖς ἔσσεσθαι πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπαλλαγῆσθαι*.

⁴ Dionys. Halic. Judicium de Dinarcho, pp. 633, 634; Plutarch, Demetrius, 10. *λόγῳ μὲν ὀλιγαρχικῆς, ἔργῳ δὲ μοναρχικῆς, καταστάσεως γενομένης διὰ τὴν τοῦ Φαληρέως δύναμιν*, &c.

⁵ Ktesiklês ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 272. Mr. Fynes Clinton (following Wesseling) supplies the defect in the text of Athenæus, so as to assign the census to the 115th Olympiad. This conjecture may be right, yet the reasons for it are not conclusive. The census may have been either in the 116th, or in the 117th Olympiad; we have no means of determining which. The administration of Phalerean Demetrius covers the ten years between 317 and 307 B.C. (Fast. Hell. Append. p. 388).

Mr. Clinton (ad ann. 317 B.C. Fast. Hell.) observes respecting the

we know the bare fact, without its special purpose, or even its precise date. Perhaps some of those citizens, who had been banished or deported at the close of the Lamian war, may have returned and continued to reside at Athens. But there still seems to have remained, during all the continuance of the Kassandrian oligarchy, a body of adverse Athenian exiles, watching for an opportunity of overthrowing it, and seeking aid for that purpose from the Ætolians and others.¹

census—"The 21,000 Athenians express those who had votes in the public assembly, or all the males above the age of twenty years; the 10,000 *μέτοικοι* described also the males of full age. When the women and children are computed, the total free population will be about 127,660; and 400,000 slaves, added to this total, will give about 527,660 for the total population of Attica." See also the Appendix to F. H. p. 390 *seq.*

This census is a very interesting fact; but our information respecting it is miserably scanty, and Mr. Clinton's interpretation of the different numbers is open to some remark. He cannot be right, I think, in saying—"The 21,000 Athenians express those who had votes in the assembly, or all the males above the age of twenty years." For we are expressly told, that under the administration of Demetrius Phalereus, all persons who did not possess 1000 drachmæ were excluded from the political franchise; and therefore a large number of males above the age of twenty years would have no vote in the assembly. Since the two categories are not coincident, then, to which shall we apply the number 21,000? To those who had votes? Or to the total number of free citizens, voting or not voting, above the age of twenty? The public assembly, during the administration of Demetrius Phalereus, appears to have been of little moment or efficacy; so that a distinct record, of the number of persons entitled to vote in it, is not likely to have been sought.

Then again, Mr. Clinton interprets the three numbers given, upon two principles totally distinct. The two first numbers (citizens and metics), he considers to designate only males of full age; the third number, of *οἰκέται*, he considers to include both sexes and all ages.

This is a conjecture which I think very doubtful, in the absence of further knowledge. It implies that the enumerators take account of the *slave* women and children—but that they take no account of the *free* women and children, wives and families of the citizens and metics. The number of the free women and children are wholly unrecorded, on Mr. Clinton's supposition. Now if, for the purposes of the census, it was necessary to enumerate the *slave* women and children—it surely would be not less necessary to enumerate the *free* women and children.

The word *οἰκέται* sometimes means, not slaves only, but the inmates of a family generally—free as well as slave. If such be its meaning here (which however there is not evidence enough to affirm), we eliminate the difficulty of supposing the slave women and children to be enumerated—and the free women and children *not* to be enumerated.

We should be able to reason more confidently, if we knew the purpose for which the census had been taken—whether with a view to military or political measures—to finance and taxation—or to the question of subsistence and importation of foreign corn (see Mr. Clinton's Fast. H. ad ann. 444 B.C., about another census taken in reference to imported corn).

¹ See Dionys. Halic. Judic. de Dinarcho, p. 658 Reisk.

The acquisition of Athens by Kassander, followed up by his capture of Panaktum and Salamis, and seconded by his moderation towards the Athenians, procured for him considerable support in Peloponnesus, whither he proceeded with his army.¹ Many of the cities, intimidated or persuaded, joined him and deserted Polysperchon; while the Spartans, now feeling for the first time their defenceless condition, thought it prudent to surround their city with walls.² This fact, among many others contemporaneous, testifies emphatically, how the characteristic sentiments of the Hellenic autonomous world were now dying out everywhere. The maintenance of Sparta as an unwallèd city, was one of the deepest and most cherished of the Lykurgæan traditions; a standing proof of the fearless bearing and self-confidence of the Spartans against dangers from without. The erection of the walls showed their own conviction, but too well borne out by the real circumstances around them, that the pressure of the foreigner had become so overwhelming as not to leave them even safety at home.

The warfare between Kassander and Polysperchon became now embittered by a feud among the members of the Macedonian imperial family. King Philip Aridæus and his wife Eurydikê, alarmed and indignant at the restoration of Olympias which Polysperchon was projecting, solicited aid from Kassander, and tried to place the force of Macedonia at his disposal. In this however they failed. Olympias, assisted not only by Polysperchon, but by the Epirotic prince Æakidês, made her entry into Macedonia out of Epirus, apparently in the autumn of 317 B.C. She brought with her Roxana and her child—the widow and son of Alexander the Great. The Macedonian soldiers, assembled by Philip Aridæus and Eurydikê to resist her, were so overawed by her name and the recollection of Alexander, that they refused to fight, and thus ensured to her an easy victory. Philip and Eurydikê became her prisoners; the former she caused to be slain; to the latter she offered only an option between the sword, the halter, and poison. The old queen next proceeded to satiate her revenge against the family of Antipater. One hundred leading Macedonians, friends of Kassander, were put to death, together with his brother Nikanor;³ while the sepulchre of his deceased brother Iollas, accused of having poisoned Alexander the Great, was broken up.

¹ Diodor. xviii. 75.

² Justin, xiv. 5; Diodor. xviii. 75; Pausan. vii. 8, 3; Pausan. i. 25, 5.

³ Diodor. xix. 11; Justin, x. 14, 4; Pausanias, i. 11, 4.

During the winter, Olympias remained thus completely predominant in Macedonia; where her position seemed strong, since her allies the Ætolians were masters of the pass at Thermopylæ, while Kassander was kept employed in Peloponnesus by the force under Alexander, son of Polysperchon. But Kassander, disengaging himself from these embarrassments, and eluding Thermopylæ by a maritime transit to Thessaly, seized the Perrhæbian passes before they had been put under guard, and entered Macedonia without resistance. Olympias, having no army competent to meet him in the field, was forced to shut herself up in the maritime fortress of Pydna, with Roxana, the child Alexander, and Thessalonikê daughter of her late husband Philip son of Amyntas.¹ Here Kassander blocked her up for several months by sea as well as by land, and succeeded in defeating all the efforts of Polysperchon and Æakidês to relieve her. In the spring of the ensuing year (316 B.C.), she was forced by intolerable famine to surrender. Kassander promised her nothing more than personal safety, requiring from her the surrender of the two great fortresses, Pella and Amphipolis, which made him master of Macedonia. Presently, however, the relatives of those numerous victims, who had perished by order of Olympias, were encouraged by Kassander to demand her life in retribution. They found little difficulty in obtaining a verdict of condemnation against her from what was called a Macedonian assembly. Nevertheless, such was the sentiment of awe and reverence connected with her name, that no one except these injured men themselves could be found to execute the sentence. She died with a courage worthy of her rank and domineering character. Kassander took Thessalonikê to wife—confined Roxana with the child Alexander in the fortress of Amphipolis—where (after a certain interval) he caused both of them to be slain.²

While Kassander was thus master of Macedonia—and while the imperial family were disappearing from the scene in that country—the defeat and death of Eumenês (which happened nearly at the same time as the capture of Olympias³) removed the last faithful partisan of that family in Asia. But at the same time, it left in the hands of Antigonos such overwhelming

¹ Diodor. xix. 36.

² Diodor. xix. 50, 51; Justin, xiv. 5; Pausan. i. 25, 5; ix. 7, 1.

³ Even immediately before the death of Olympias, Aristonous, governor of Amphipolis in her interest, considered Eumenês to be still alive (Diodor. xix. 50).

preponderance throughout Asia, that he aspired to become vicar and master of the entire Alexandrine empire, as well as to avenge upon Kassander the extirpation of the regal family. His power appeared indeed so formidable, that Kassander of Macedonia, Lysimachus of Thrace, Ptolemy of Egypt, and Seleukus of Babylonia, entered into a convention, which gradually ripened into an active alliance, against him.

During the struggles between these powerful princes, Greece appears simply as a group of subject-cities, held, garrisoned, grasped at, or coveted, by all of them. Polysperchon, abandoning all hopes in Macedonia after the death of Olympias, had been forced to take refuge among the Ætolians, leaving his son Alexander to make the best struggle that he could in Peloponnesus; so that Kassander was now decidedly preponderant throughout the Hellenic regions. After fixing himself on the throne of Macedonia, he perpetuated his own name by founding, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Pallênê and near the site where Potidæa had stood, the new city of Kassandreia; into which he congregated a large number of inhabitants from the neighbourhood, and especially the remnant of the citizens of Olynthus and Potidæa,—towns taken and destroyed by Philip more than thirty years before.¹ He next marched into Peloponnesus with his army against Alexander son of Polysperchon. Passing through Bœotia, he undertook the task of restoring the city of Thebes, which had been destroyed twenty years previously by Alexander the Great, and had ever since existed only as a military post on the ancient citadel called Kadmeia. The other Bœotian towns, to whom the old Theban territory had been assigned, were persuaded or constrained to relinquish it; and Kassander invited from all parts of Greece the Theban exiles or their descendants. From sympathy with these exiles, and also with the ancient celebrity of the city, many Greeks, even from Italy and Sicily, contributed to the restoration. The Athenians, now administered by Demetrius Phalereus under Kassander's supremacy, were particularly forward in the work; the Messenians and Megalopolitans, whose ancestors had owed so much to the Theban Epaminondas, lent strenuous aid. Thebes was re-established in the original area which it had occupied before Alexander's siege; and was held by a Kassandrian garrison in the Kadmeia, destined for the mastery of Bœotia and Greece.²

¹ Diodor. xix. 52; Pausanias, v. 23, 2.

² Diodor. xix. 52, 54, 78; Pausan. ix. 7, 2-5. This seems an explanation of Kassander's proceeding, more probable than that given by

After some stay at Thebes, Kassander advanced towards Peloponnesus. Alexander (son of Polysperchon) having fortified the Isthmus, he was forced to embark his troops with his elephants at Megara, and cross over the Saronic Gulf to Epidaurus. He dispossessed Alexander of Argos, of Messenia, and even of his position on the Isthmus, where he left a powerful detachment, and then returned to Macedonia.¹ His increasing power raised both apprehension and hatred in the bosom of Antigonos, who endeavoured to come to terms with him, but in vain.² Kassander preferred the alliance with Ptolemy, Seleukus, and Lysimachus—against Antigonos, who was now master of nearly the whole of Asia, inspiring common dread to all of them.³ Accordingly, from Asia to Peloponnesus, with arms and money, Antigonos despatched the Milesian Aristodêmus to strengthen Alexander against Kassander; whom he further denounced as an enemy of the Macedonian name, because he had slain Olympias, imprisoned the other members of the regal family, and re-established the Olynthian exiles. He caused the absent Kassander to be condemned by what was called a Macedonian assembly, upon these and other charges.

Antigonos further proclaimed, by the voice of this assembly, that all the Greeks should be free, self-governing, and exempt from garrisons or military occupation.⁴ It was expected that these brilliant promises would enlist partisans in Greece against Kassander; accordingly Ptolemy, ruler of Egypt, one of the enemies of Antigonos, thought fit to issue similar proclamations a few months afterwards, tendering to the Greeks the same boon from himself.⁵ These promises, neither executed, nor intended to be executed, by either of the kings, appear to have produced little or no effect upon the Greeks.

The arrival of Aristodêmus in Peloponnesus had re-animated the party of Alexander (son of Polysperchon), against whom Kassander was again obliged to bring his full forces from Macedonia. Though successful against Alexander at Argos, Orchomenus and other places, Kassander was not able to crush him, and presently thought it prudent to gain him over. He offered to him the separate government of Peloponnesus, though in subordination to himself: Alexander accepted the offer, becoming Kassander's ally⁶—and carried on war, jointly Pausanias; who tells us that Kassander hated the memory of Alexander the Great, and wished to undo the consequences of his acts. That he did so hate Alexander, is however extremely credible: see Plutarch, *Alexand.* 74.

¹ Diodor. xix. 54.

² Diodor. xix. 56.

³ Diodor. xix. 57.

⁴ Diodor. xix. 61.

⁵ Diodor. xix. 62.

⁶ Diodor. xix. 63, 64.

with him, against Aristodêmus, with varying success, until he was presently assassinated by some private enemies. Nevertheless his widow Kratesipolis, a woman of courage and energy, still maintained herself in considerable force at Sikyon.¹ Kassander's most obstinate enemies were the Ætolians, of whom we now first hear formal mention as a substantive confederacy.² These Ætolians became the allies of Antigonos as they had been before of Polysperchon, extending their predatory ravages even as far as Attica. Protected against foreign garrisons, partly by their rude and fierce habits, partly by their mountainous territory, they were almost the only Greeks who could still be called free. Kassander tried to keep them in check through their neighbours the Akarnanians, whom he induced to adopt a more concentrated habit of residence, consolidating their numerous petty townships into a few considerable towns,—Stratus, Sauria, and Agrinium—convenient posts for Macedonian garrisons. He also made himself master of Leukas, Apollonia, and Epidamnus, defeating the Illyrian king Glaukias, so that his dominion now extended across from the Thermaic to the Adriatic Gulf.³ His general Philippus, gained two important victories over the Ætolians and Epirots, forcing the former to relinquish some of their most accessible towns.⁴

The power of Antigonos in Asia underwent a material diminution, by the successful and permanent establishment which Seleukus now acquired in Babylonia; from which event the era of the succeeding Seleukidæ takes its origin. In Greece, however, Antigonos gained ground on Kassander. He sent thither his nephew Ptolemy with a large force to liberate the Greeks, or in other words, to expel the Kassandrian garrisons; while he at the same time distracted Kassander's attention by threatening to cross the Hellespont and invade Macedonia. This Ptolemy (not the Egyptian) expelled the soldiers of Kassander from Eubœa, Bœotia, and Phokis. Chalkis in Eubœa was at this time the chief military station of Kassander; Thebes (which he had recently re-established) was in alliance with him; but the remaining Bœotian towns were hostile to him. Ptolemy, having taken Chalkis—the citizens of which he

¹ Diodor. xix. 62, 67.

² Diodor. xix. 66. Ἀριστοδῆμος, ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἡκαιολογησάμενος, προετρέψατο τὰ πλῆθη βοηθεῖν τοῖς Ἀντιγόνου πράγμασιν, &c.

³ Diodor. xix. 67, 68; Justin, xv. 2. See Brandstätter, Geschichte des Ætolischen Volkes und Bundes, p. 178 (Berlin, 1844).

⁴ Diodor. xix. 74.

conciliated by leaving them without any garrison—together with Oropus, Eretria, and Karystus—entered Attica, and presented himself before Athens. So much disposition to treat with him was manifested in the city, that Demetrius the Phalerean was obliged to gain time by pretending to open negotiations with Antigonos, while Ptolemy withdrew from Attica. Nearly at the same epoch, Apollonia, Epidamnus, and Leukas, found means, assisted by an armament from Korkyra, to drive out Kassander's garrisons, and to escape from his dominion.¹ The affairs of Antigonos were now prospering in Greece, but they were much thrown back by the discontent and treachery of his admiral Telesphorus, who seized Elis and even plundered the sacred treasures of Olympia. Ptolemy presently put him down, and restored these treasures to the god.²

In the ensuing year, a convention was concluded between Antigonos on one side—and Kassander, Ptolemy (the Egyptian) and Lysimachus, on the other, whereby the supreme command in Macedonia was guaranteed to Kassander, until the maturity of Alexander son of Roxana; Thrace being at the same time assured to Lysimachus, Egypt to Ptolemy, and the whole of Asia to Antigonos. It was at the same time covenanted by all, that the Hellenic cities should be free.³ Towards the execution of this last clause, however, nothing was actually done. Nor does it appear that the treaty had any other effect, except to inspire Kassander with increased jealousy about Roxana and her child; both of whom (as has been already stated) he caused to be secretly assassinated soon afterwards, by the governor Glaukias, in the fortress of Amphipolis, where they had been confined.⁴ The forces of Antigonos, under his general Ptolemy, still remained in Greece. But this general presently (310 B.C.) revolted from Antigonos, and placed them in co-operation with Kassander; while Ptolemy of Egypt, accusing Antigonos of having contravened the treaty by garrisoning various Grecian cities, renewed the war and the triple alliance against him.⁵

Polysperchon,—who had hitherto maintained a local dominion over various parts of Peloponnesus, with a military force distributed in Messênê and other towns⁶—was now encouraged by Antigonos to espouse the cause of Hêrakilês (son of Alexander by Barsinê), and to place him on the throne of Macedonia in opposition to Kassander. This young prince Hêrakilês, now seventeen years of age, was sent to Greece from Pergamus in

¹ Diodor. xix. 77, 78, 89.

² Diodor. xix. 87.

³ Diodor. xix. 105.

⁴ Diodor. xix. 105.

⁵ Diodor. xx. 19.

⁶ Messênê was garrisoned by Polysperchon (Diodor. xix. 64).

Asia, and his pretensions to the throne were assisted not only by a considerable party in Macedonia itself, but also by the Ætolians. Polysperchon invaded Macedonia, with favourable prospects of establishing the young prince; yet he thought it advantageous to accept treacherous propositions from Kassander, who offered to him partnership in the sovereignty of Macedonia, with an independent army and dominion in Peloponnesus. Polysperchon, tempted by these offers, assassinated the young prince Hêrâklês, and withdrew his army towards Peloponnesus. But he found such unexpected opposition, in his march through Bœotia, from Bœotians and Peloponnesians, that he was forced to take up his winter quarters in Lokris¹ (309 B.C.). From this time forward, as far as we can make out, he commanded in Southern Greece as subordinate ally or partner of Kassander;² whose Macedonian dominion, thus confirmed, seems to have included Akarnania and Amphilochia on the Ambrakian Gulf, together with the town of Ambrakia itself, and a supremacy over many of the Epirots.

The assassination of Hêrâklês was speedily followed by that of Kleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great, and daughter of Philip and Olympias. She had been for some time at Sardis, nominally at liberty, yet under watch by the governor, who received his orders from Antigonos; she was now preparing to quit that place, for the purpose of joining Ptolemy in Egypt, and of becoming his wife. She had been invoked as auxiliary, or courted in marriage, by several of the great Macedonian chiefs, without any result. Now, however, Antigonos, afraid of the influence which her name might throw into the scale of his rival Ptolemy, caused her to be secretly murdered as she was preparing for her departure; throwing the blame of the deed on some of her women, whom he punished with death. All the relatives of Alexander the Great (except Thessaly, wife of Kassander, daughter of Philip by a Thessalian mistress) had now successively perished, and all by the orders of one or other among his principal officers. The imperial family, with the prestige of its name, thus came to an end.

Ptolemy of Egypt now set sail for Greece with a powerful armament. He acquired possession of the important cities—Sikyon and Corinth—which were handed over to him by

¹ Diodor. xx. 28; Trogus Pompeius—Proleg./hr ad Justin, xv.; Justin, xv. 2.

² Diodor. xx. 100–103; Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 6. King Pyrrhus was of προγονῶν αἰεὶ δεδουλευκότων Μακεδόσι—at least this was the reproach of Lysimachus (Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 12).

³ Diodor. xx. 37: compare Justin, xiii. 6iv.; xiv. 1.

Kratesipolis, widow of Alexander son of Polysperchon. He then made known by proclamation his purpose as a liberator, inviting aid from the Peloponnesian cities themselves against the garrisons of Kassander. From some he received encouraging answers and promises; but none of them made any movement, or seconded him by armed demonstrations. He thought it prudent therefore to conclude a truce with Kassander and retire from Greece, leaving however secure garrisons in Sikyon and Corinth.¹ The Grecian cities had now become tame and passive. Feeling their own incapacity of self-defence, and averse to auxiliary efforts, which brought upon them enmity without any prospect of advantage—they awaited only the turns of foreign interference and the behests of the potentates around them.

The Grecian ascendancy of Kassander, however, was in the following year exposed to a graver shock than it had ever yet encountered—by the sudden invasion of Demetrius called Poliorketês, son of Antigonos. This young prince, sailing from Ephesus with a formidable armament, contrived to conceal his purposes so closely, that he actually entered the harbour of Peiræus (on the 26th of the month Thargelion—May) without expectation, or resistance from any one; his fleet being mistaken for the fleet of the Egyptian Ptolemy. The Phalerean Demetrius, taken unawares, and attempting too late to guard the harbour, found himself compelled to leave it in possession of the enemy, and to retire within the walls of Athens; while Dionysius, the Kassandrian governor, maintained himself with his garrison in Munychia, yet without any army competent to meet the invaders in the field. This accomplished Phalerean, who had administered for ten years as the viceroy and with the force of Kassander, now felt his position and influence at Athens overthrown, and even his personal safety endangered. He with other Athenians went as envoys on the ensuing day to ascertain what terms would be granted. The young prince ostentatiously proclaimed, that it was the intention of his father Antigonos and himself to restore and guarantee to the Athenians unqualified freedom and autonomy. Hence the Phalerean Demetrius foresaw that his internal opponents, condemned as they had been to compulsory silence during the last ten years, would now proclaim themselves with irresistible violence, so that there was no safety for him except in retreat. He accordingly asked and obtained permission from the invader to retire to Thebes, from whence he passed over soon after to Ptolemy

¹ Diodor. xx. 37.

in Egypt. The Athenians in the city declared in favour of Demetrius Poliorketês ; who however refused to enter the walls until he should have besieged and captured Munychia, as well as Megara, with their Kassandrian garrisons. In a short time he accomplished both these objects. Indeed energy, skill, and effective use of engines, in besieging fortified places, were among the most conspicuous features in his character ; procuring for him the surname whereby he is known to history. He proclaimed the Megarians free, levelling to the ground the fortifications of Munychia, as an earnest to the Athenians that they should be relieved for the future from all foreign garrison.¹

After these successes, Demetrius Poliorketês made his triumphant entry into Athens. He announced to the people, in formal assembly, that they were now again a free democracy, liberated from all dominion either of soldiers from abroad or oligarchs at home. He also promised them a further boon from his father Antigonos and himself—150,000 medimni of corn for distribution, and ship-timber in quantity sufficient for constructing 100 triremes. Both these announcements were received with grateful exultation. The feelings of the people were testified not merely in votes of thanks and admiration towards the young conqueror, but also in effusions of unmeasured and exorbitant flattery. Stratoklês (who has already been before us as one of the accusers of Demosthenês in the Harpalian affair) with others exhausted their invention in devising new varieties of compliment and adulation. Antigonos and Demetrius were proclaimed to be not only kings, but gods and saviours : a high priest of these saviours was to be annually chosen, after whom each successive year was to be named (instead of being named after the first of the nine Archons, as had hitherto been the custom), and the dates of decrees and contracts commemorated ; the month Munychion was re-named as Demetrian—two new tribes, to be called Antigonis and Demetrias, were constituted in addition to the preceding ten :—the annual Senate was appointed to consist of 600 members instead of 500 ; the portraits and exploits of Antigonos and Demetrius were to be woven, along with those of Zeus and Athênê, into the splendid and voluminous robe periodically carried in procession, as an offering at the Panathenaic festival ; the spot of ground where Demetrius had alighted from his chariot, was consecrated with an altar erected

¹ Philochor. *Fragm.* 144, ed. Didot ; Diodor. xx. 45, 46 ; Plutarch, *Demetrius*, 8, 9. The occupation of Peiræus by Demetrius Poliorketês is related somewhat differently by Polyænus, iv. 7, 6.

in honour of Demetrius Kataebates or the Descender. Several other similar votes were passed, recognising, and worshipping as gods, the saviours Antigonus and Demetrius. Nay, we are told that temples or altars were voted to Phila-Aphroditê, in honour of Phila wife of Demetrius; and a like compliment was paid to his two mistresses, Leæna and Lamia. Altars are said to have been also dedicated to Adeimantus and others, his convivial companions or flatterers.¹ At the same time the numerous statues, which had been erected in honour of the Phalerean Demetrius during his decennial government, were overthrown, and some of them even turned to ignoble purposes, in order to cast greater scorn upon the past ruler.² The demonstrations of servile flattery at Athens, towards Demetrius Poliorketês, were in fact so extravagantly overdone, that he himself is said to have been disgusted with them, and to have expressed contempt for these degenerate Athenians of his own time.³

In reviewing such degrading proceedings, we must recollect that thirty-one years had now elapsed since the battle of Chæroneia, and that during all this time the Athenians had been under the practical ascendancy, and constantly augmenting pressure, of foreign potentates. The sentiment of this dependence on Macedonia had been continually strengthened by all the subsequent events—by the capture and destruction of Thebes, and the subsequent overwhelming conquests of Alexander—by the deplorable conclusion of the Lamian war, the slaughter of the free-spoken orators, the death of the energetic military leaders, and the deportation of Athenian citizens—lastly, by the continued presence of a Macedonian garrison in Peiræus or Munychia. By Phokion, Demetrius Phalereus, and the other leading statesmen of this long period, submission to Macedonia had been inculcated as a virtue, while the recollection of the dignity and grandeur of old autonomous Athens had been effaced or denounced as a mischievous dream. The fifteen years between the close of the Lamian war and the arrival of Demetrius Poliorketês (322–307 B.C.), had witnessed no free play, nor public discussion and expression, of conflicting opinions; the short period during which Phokion was condemned must be excepted, but that lasted only long enough

¹ Plutarch, Demetrius, 9–11; Diodor. xx. 47; Democharês ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 253.

² Diogen. Laert. v. 77. Among the numerous literary works (all lost) of the Phalerean Demetrius, one was entitled *Ἀθηναίων καταδρομή* (ib. v. 82).

³ Democharês ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 253.

to give room for the outburst of a preconceived but suppressed antipathy.

During these thirty years, of which the last half had been an aggravation of the first, a new generation of Athenians had grown up, accustomed to an altered phase of political existence. How few of those who received Demetrius Poliorketês, had taken part in the battle of Chæroneia, or listened to the stirring exhortations of Demosthenês in the war which preceded that disaster!¹ Of the citizens who yet retained courage and patriotism to struggle again for their freedom after the death of Alexander, how many must have perished with Leosthenês in the Lamian war! The Athenians of 307 B.C. had come to conceive their own city, and Hellas generally, as dependent first on Kassander, next on the possible intervention of his equally overweening rivals, Ptolemy, Antigonos, Lysimachus, &c. If they shook off the yoke of one potentate, it could only be by the protectorate of another. The sentiment of political self-reliance and autonomy had fled; the conception of a citizen military force, furnished by confederate and co-operating cities, had been superseded by the spectacle of vast standing armies, organised by the heirs of Alexander and of his traditions.

Two centuries before (510 B.C.), when the Lacedæmonians expelled the despot Hippias and his mercenaries from Athens, there sprang up at once among the Athenian people a forward and devoted patriotism, which made them willing to brave, and competent to avert, all dangers in defence of their newly-acquired liberty.² At that time, the enemies by whom they were threatened, were Lacedæmonians, Thebans, Æginetans, Chalkidians, and the like (for the Persian force did not present itself until after some interval, and attacked not Athens alone, but Greece collectively). These hostile forces, though superior in number and apparent value to those of Athens, were yet not so disproportionate as to engender hopelessness and despair. Very different were the facts in 307 B.C., when Demetrius Poliorketês removed the Kassandrian mercenaries with their fortress Munychia, and proclaimed Athens free. To maintain that freedom by their own strength—in opposition to the evident superiority of organised force residing in the potentates around, one or more of whom had nearly all Greece under

¹ Tacitus, *Annal.* i. 3. “Juniores post Actiacam victoriam, seniores plerique inter bella civium, nati : quotusquisque reliquus, qui rempublicam vidisset?”

² Herodotus, v. 78.

military occupation,—was an enterprise too hopeless to have been attempted even by men such as the combatants of Marathon or the contemporaries of Periklês. “Who would be free, themselves must strike the blow!” but the Athenians had not force enough to strike it; and the liberty proclaimed by Demetrius Poliorketês was a boon dependent upon him for its extent and even for its continuance. The Athenian assembly of that day was held under his army as masters of Attica, as it had been held a few months before under the controlling force of the Phalerean Demetrius together with the Kassandrian governor of Munychia; and the most fulsome votes of adulation proposed in honour of Demetrius Poliorketês by his partisans, though perhaps disapproved by many, would hardly find a single pronounced opponent.

One man, however, there was, who ventured to oppose several of the votes—the nephew of Demosthenês—Democharês, who deserves to be commemorated as the last known spokesman of free Athenian citizenship. We know only that such were his general politics, and that his opposition to the obsequious rhetor Stratoklês ended in banishment, four years afterwards.¹ He appears to have discharged the functions of general during this period—to have been active in strengthening the fortifications and military equipment of the city—and to have been employed in occasional missions.²

The altered politics of Athens were manifested by impeachment against Demetrius Phalereus and other leading partisans of the late Kassandrian government. He and many others had already gone into voluntary exile; when their trials came on, they were not forthcoming, and all were condemned to death. But all those who remained, and presented themselves for trial, were acquitted;³ so little was there of reactionary violence on this occasion. Stratoklês also proposed a decree, commemorating the orator Lykurgus (who had been dead about seventeen years) by a statue, an honorary inscription, and a grant of maintenance in the Prytaneum to his eldest surviving descendant.⁴ Among those who accompanied the Phalerean Demetrius into exile was the rhetor or logographer Deinarchus.

¹ Plutarch, *Demetr.* 24.

² Polybius, xii. 13; *Decretum* apud Plutarch. *Vit. X. Oratt.* p. 851.

³ Philochori *Fragm.* 144, ed. Didot, ap. Dionys. Hal. p. 636.

⁴ Plutarch, *Vit. X. Oratt.* p. 842–852. Lykurgus at his death (about 324 B.C.) left three sons, who are said, shortly after his death, to have been denounced by Menesæchmus, indicted by Thrasyklês, and put in prison (“handed over to the Eleven”). But Demoklês, a disciple of Theophrastus, stood forward on their behalf; and Demosthenês, then in banishment at

The friendship of this obnoxious Phalerean, and of Kassander also, towards the philosopher Theophrastus, seems to have been one main cause which occasioned the enactment of a restrictive law against the liberty of philosophising. It was decreed, on the proposition of a citizen named Sophoklès, that no philosopher should be allowed to open a school or teach, except under special sanction obtained from a vote of the Senate and people. Such was the disgust and apprehension occasioned by the new restriction, that all the philosophers with one accord left Athens. This spirited protest, against authoritative restriction on the liberty of philosophy and teaching, found responsive sympathy among the Athenians. The celebrity of the schools and professors was in fact the only characteristic mark of dignity still remaining to them—when their power had become extinct, and when even their independence and free constitution had degenerated into a mere name. It was moreover the great temptation for young men, coming from all parts of Greece, to visit Athens. Accordingly, a year had hardly passed, when Philon—impeaching Sophoklès the author of the law, under the *Graphè Paranomôn*—prevailed on the *Dikastery* to find him guilty, and condemn him to a

Troëzen, wrote emphatic remonstrances to the Athenians against such unworthy treatment of the sons of a distinguished patriot. Accordingly the Athenians soon repented and released them.

This is what we find stated in Plutarch, *Vit. X. Oratt.* p. 842. The third of the so-called Demosthenic Epistles purports to be the letter written on this subject by Demosthenès.

The harsh treatment of the sons of Lykurgus (whatever it may have amounted to, and whatever may have been its ground) certainly did not last long; for in the next page of the very same Plutarchian life (p. 843), an account is given of the family of Lykurgus, which was ancient and sacerdotal; and it is there stated that his sons after his death fully sustained the dignified position of the family.

On what ground they were accused, we cannot make out. According to the Demosthenic epistle (which epistles I have before stated that I do not believe to be authentic), it was upon some allegation, which, if valid at all, ought to have been urged against Lykurgus himself during his life (pp. 1477, 1478); but Lykurgus had been always honourably acquitted, and always held thoroughly estimable, up to the day of his death (p. 1475).

Hyperidès exerted his eloquence on behalf of the sons of Lykurgus. A fragment, of considerable interest, from his oration, has been preserved by Apsinès (ap. Walz. *Rhetor. Græc.* ix. p. 545). *Ἐπερίδης ὑπὲρ Λυκούργου λέγων—Τίνα φήσουσιν οἱ παριόντες αὐτοῦ τὸν τάφον; οὗτος ἐβίω μὲν σωφρόνως, ταχθεὶς δ' ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει τῶν χρημάτων εὔρε πόρους, ἠκοδόμησε δὲ τὸ θέατρον, τὸ ὠδεῖον, τὰ νεώρια, τριήρεις ἐποίησατο καὶ λιμένας· τοῦτον ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν ἠτίμωσε, καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ἔδωκεν αὐτοῦ.*

This fragment of Hyperidès was pointed out to my notice by Mr. Churchill Babington, the editor of the recently-discovered portions of Hyperidès.

fine of five talents. The restrictive law being thus repealed, the philosophers returned.¹ It is remarkable that Democharês stood forward as one of its advocates; defending Sophoklês against the accuser Philon. From scanty notices remaining of the speech of Democharês, we gather that, while censuring the opinions no less than the characters of Plato and Aristotle, he denounced yet more bitterly their pupils, as being for the most part ambitious, violent, and treacherous men. He cited by name several among them, who had subverted the freedom of their respective cities, and committed gross outrages against their fellow-citizens.²

Athenian envoys were despatched to Antigonus in Asia, to testify the gratitude of the people, and communicate the recent complimentary votes. Antigonus not only received them graciously, but sent to Athens, according to the promise made by his son, a large present of 150,000 medimni of wheat, with timber sufficient for 100 ships. He at the same time directed Demetrius to convene at Athens a synod of deputies from the allied Grecian cities, where resolutions might be taken for the common interests of Greece.³ It was his interest at this moment to raise up a temporary self-sustaining authority in Greece, for the purpose of upholding the alliance with himself, during the absence of Demetrius; whom he was compelled to summon into Asia with his army—requiring his services for the war against Ptolemy in Syria and Cyprus.

The following three years were spent by Demetrius—1. In victorious operations near Cyprus, defeating Ptolemy and

¹ Diogen. Laert. v. 38. It is perhaps to this return of the philosophers that the *φρυγδων κάθοδος* mentioned by Philochorus, as foreshadowed by the omen in the Acropolis, alludes (Philochorus, Frag. 145, ed. Didot, ap. Dionys. Hal. p. 637).

² See the few fragments of Democharês collected in *Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum*, ed. Didot, vol. ii. p. 445, with the notes of Carl Müller.

See likewise Athenæus, xiii. 610, with the fragment from the comic writer Alexis. It is there stated that Lysimachus also, king of Thrace, had banished the philosophers from his dominions.

Democharês might find (besides the persons named in Athenæ. v. 215, xi. 508) other authentic examples of pupils of Plato and Isokratês who had been atrocious and sanguinary tyrants in their native cities—see the case of Klearchus of Herakleia, Memnon ap. Photium, Cod. 224, cap. 1. Chion and Leonidês, the two young citizens who slew Klearchus, and who perished in endeavouring to liberate their country—were also pupils of Plato (Justin, xvi. 5). In fact, aspiring youths, of all varieties of purpose, were likely to seek this mode of improvement. Alexander the Great, too, the very impersonation of subduing force, had been the pupil of Aristotle.

³ Diodor. xx. 46.

making himself master of that island ; after which Antigonus and Demetrius assumed the title of kings, and the example was followed by Ptolemy, in Egypt—by Lysimachus, in Thrace—and by Seleukus, in Babylonia, Mesopotamia, and Syria¹—thus abolishing even the titular remembrance of Alexander's family. 2. In an unsuccessful invasion of Egypt by land and sea, repulsed with great loss. 3. In the siege of Rhodes. The brave and intelligent citizens of this island resisted for more than a year the most strenuous attacks and the most formidable siege-equipments of Demetrius Poliorketês. All their efforts however would have been vain had they not been assisted by large reinforcements and supplies from Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Kassander. Such are the conditions under which alone even the most resolute and intelligent Greeks can now retain their circumscribed sphere of autonomy. The siege was at length terminated by a compromise ; the Rhodians submitted to enroll themselves as allies of Demetrius, yet under proviso not to act against Ptolemy.² Towards the latter they carried their grateful devotion so far, as to erect a temple to him, called the Ptolemæum, and to worship him (under the sanction of the oracle of Ammon) as a god.³ Amidst the rocks and shoals through which Grecian cities were now condemned to steer, menaced on every side by kings more powerful than themselves, and afterwards by the giant-republic of Rome—the Rhodians conducted their political affairs with greater prudence and dignity than any other Grecian city.

Shortly after the departure of Demetrius from Greece to Cyprus, Kassander and Polysperchon renewed the war in Peloponnesus and its neighbourhood.⁴ We make out no particulars respecting this war. The Ætolians were in hostility with Athens, and committed annoying depredations.⁵ The fleet of Athens, repaired or increased by the timber received from Antigonus, was made to furnish thirty quadriremes to assist Demetrius in Cyprus, and was employed in certain operations near the island of Amorgos, wherein it suffered defeat.⁶ But we can discover little respecting the course of the

¹ Diodor. xx. 53 ; Plutarch, Demetr. 18.

² Diodor. xx. 99. Probably this proviso extended also to Lysimachus and Kassander (both of whom had assisted Rhodes) as well as to Ptolemy—though Diodorus does not expressly say so.

³ Diodor. xx. 100.

⁴ Diodor. xx. 100.

⁵ That the Ætolians were just now most vexatious enemies to Athens, may be seen by the Ithyphallic ode addressed to Demetrius Poliorketês (Athenæus, vi. p. 253).

⁶ Diodor. xx. 50 ; Plutarch, Demetr. 11. In reference to this defeat

war, except that Kassander gained ground upon the Athenians, and that about the beginning of 303 B.C. he was blockading, or threatening to blockade, Athens. The Athenians invoked the aid of Demetrius Poliorketês, who, having recently concluded an accommodation with the Rhodians, came again across from Asia, with a powerful fleet and army, to Aulis in Bœotia.¹ He was received at Athens with demonstrations of honour equal or superior to those which had marked his previous visit. He seems to have passed a year and a half, partly at Athens, partly in military operations carried successfully over many parts of Greece. He compelled the Bœotians to evacuate the Eubœan city of Chalkis, and to relinquish their alliance with Kassander. He drove that prince out of Attica—expelled his garrisons from the two frontier fortresses of Attica,—Phylê and Panaktum—and pursued him as far as Thermopylæ. He captured, or obtained by bribing the garrisons, the important towns of Corinth, Argos, and Sikyon; mastering also Ægium, Bura, all the Arcadian towns (except Mantinea), and various other towns in Peloponnesus.² He celebrated, as president, the great festival of the Heræa at Argos; on which occasion he married Dēidameia, sister of Pyrrhus, the young king of Epirus. He prevailed on the Sikyonians to transfer to a short distance the site of their city, conferring upon the new city the name of Demetrias.³ At a Grecian synod, convened in Corinth under his own letters of invitation, he received by acclamation the appointment of leader or Emperor of the Greeks, as it had been conferred on Philip and Alexander. He even extended his attacks as far as Leukas and Korkyra. The greater part of Greece seems to have been either occupied by his garrisons, or enlisted among his subordinates.

So much was Kassander intimidated by these successes, that he sent envoys to Asia, soliciting peace from Antigonos; who, however, elate and full of arrogance, refused to listen to any near Amorgos, Stratoklês (the complaisant orator who moved the votes of flattery towards Demetrius and Antigonos) is said to have announced it first as a victory, to the great joy of the people. Presently evidences of the defeat arrived, and the people were angry with Stratoklês. "What harm has happened to you?—(replied he)—have you not had two days of pleasure and satisfaction?" This is at any rate a very good story.

¹ Diodor. xx. 100; Plutarch, Demetr. 23.

² Diodor. xx. 102, 103; Plutarch, Demetr. 23–25.

³ Diodor. xx. 102; Plutarch, Demetr. 25; Pausanias, ii. 7, 1. The city was withdrawn partially from the sea, and approximated closely to the acropolis. The new city remained permanently; but the new name Demetrias gave place to the old name Sikyon.

terms short of surrender at discretion. Kassander, thus driven to despair, renewed his applications to Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleukus. All these princes felt equally menaced by the power and dispositions of Antigonos—and all resolved upon an energetic combination to put him down.¹

After uninterrupted prosperity in Greece, throughout the summer of 302 B.C., Demetrius returned from Leukas to Athens, about the month of September, near the time of the Eleusinian mysteries.² He was welcomed by festive processions, hymns, pæans, choric dances, and bacchanalian odes of joyous congratulation. One of these hymns is preserved, sung by a chorus of Ithyphalli—masked revellers, with their heads and arms encircled by wreaths,—clothed in white tunics, and in feminine garments reaching almost to the feet.³

This song is curious, as indicating the hopes and fears prevalent among Athenians of that day, and as affording a measure of their self-appreciation. It is moreover among the latest Grecian documents that we possess, bearing on actual and present reality. The poet, addressing Demetrius as a god, boasts that two of the greatest and best-beloved of all divine beings are visiting Attica at the same moment—Dēmêtêr (coming for the season of her mysteries), and Demetrius, son of Poseidon and Aphroditê. "To thee we pray (the hymn proceeds); for other gods are either afar off—or have no ears—or do not exist—or care nothing about us; but *thee* we see before us, not in wood or marble, but in real presence. First of all things, establish peace; for thou hast the power—and chastise that Sphinx who domineers, not merely over Thebes, but over all Greece—the Ætolian, who (like the old Sphinx) rushes from his station on the rock to snatch and carry away our persons, and against whom we cannot fight. At all times, the Ætolians robbed their neighbours; but now, they rob far as well as near."⁴

¹ Diodor. xx. 106.

² That he returned from Leukas about the time of these mysteries, is attested both by Democharês and by the Ithyphallic ode in Athenæus, vi. p. 253. See also Duris ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 535.

³ Semus ap. Athenæum, xiv. p. 622.

⁴ Athenæus, vi. p. 253.

Ἄλλοι μὲν ἡ μακρὰν γὰρ ἀπέχουσιν θεοί,
ἡ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὤτα,
ἡ οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἡ οὐ προσέχουσιν ἡμῖν οὐδὲ ἔν'
σὲ δὲ παρόνθ' ὁρώμεν,
οὐ ξύλινον, οὐδὲ λίθινον, ἀλλ' ἀληθινόν.
Εὐχόμεσθα δὲ σοί·
πρῶτον μὲν εἰρήνην ποίησον, φίλτατε,
κύριος γὰρ εἰ σὺ.

Effusions such as these, while displaying unmeasured idolatry and subservience towards Demetrius, are yet more remarkable, as betraying a loss of force, a senility, and a consciousness of defenceless and degraded position, such as we are astonished to find publicly proclaimed at Athens. It is not only against the foreign potentates that the Athenians avow themselves incapable of self-defence, but even against the incursions of the Ætolians,—Greeks like themselves, though warlike, rude, and restless.¹ When such were the feelings of a people, once the most daring, confident, and organising—and still the most intelligent—in Greece, we may see that the history of the Greeks as a separate nation or race is reaching its close—and that from henceforward they must become merged in one or other of the stronger currents that surround them.

After his past successes, Demetrius passed some months in enjoyment and luxury at Athens. He was lodged in the Parthenon, being considered as the guest of the Goddess Athênê. But his dissolute habits provoked the louder comments, from being indulged in such a domicile; while the violences which he offered to beautiful youths of good family led to various scenes truly tragical. The subservient manifestations of the Athenians towards him, however, continued unabated. It is even affirmed, that, in order to compensate for something which he had taken amiss, they passed a formal decree, on the proposition of Stratoklês, declaring that everything which Demetrius might command was holy in regard to the gods and just in regard to men.² The banishment of Democharês is said to have been brought on by his sarcastic comments upon this decree.³ In the month Munychion

Τὴν δ' οὐχὶ Θηβῶν, ἀλλ' ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος,
Σφίγγα περικρατοῦσαν,
Αἰτωλὸς ὅστις ἐπὶ πέτρας καθήμενος,
ὥσπερ ἡ παλαιά,
τὰ σώμαθ' ἡμῶν πάντ' ἀναρπάσας φέρει,
κοῦκ ἔχω μάχεσθαι·
Αἰτωλικὸν γὰρ ἀρπάσαι τὰ τῶν πέλας,
νυνὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ πόρρω—
μάλιστα μὲν δὴ κόλασον αὐτόν· εἰ δὲ μή,
Οἰδίπουν τιν' εὔρε,
τὴν Σφίγγα ταύτην ὅστις ἡ κατακρημνιεῖ,
ἢ σπίνον ποιήσει.

¹ Compare Pausanias, vii. 7, 4.

² Plutarch, Demetr. 24.

³ Such is the statement of Plutarch (Demetr. 24); but it seems not in harmony with the recital of the honorary decree, passed in 272 B.C., after the death of Democharês, commemorating his merits by a statue, &c. (Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 850). It is there recited that Democharês rendered services to Athens (fortifying and arming the city, concluding peace and alliance with the Bœotians, &c.) ἐπὶ τοῦ τετραετοῦς πολέμου,

(April) Demetrius mustered his forces and his Grecian allies for a march into Thessaly against Kassander; but before his departure, he was anxious to be initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries. It was however not the regular time for this ceremony; the Lesser Mysteries being celebrated in February, the Greater in September. The Athenians overruled the difficulty by passing a special vote, enabling him to be initiated at once, and to receive, in immediate succession, the preparatory and the final initiation, between which ceremonies a year of interval was habitually required. Accordingly he placed himself disarmed in the hands of the priests, and received both first and second initiation in the month of April, immediately before his departure from Athens.¹

Demetrius conducted into Thessaly an army of 56,000 men; of whom 25,000 were Grecian allies—so extensive was his sway at this moment over the Grecian cities.² But after two or three months of hostilities, partially successful, against Kassander, he was summoned into Asia by Antigonos to assist in meeting the formidable army of the allies—Ptolemy,

ἀνθ' ὧν ἐξέπεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον. Οἱ καταλύσαντες τὸν δῆμον cannot mean either Demetrius Poliorketês, or Stratoklês. Moreover, we cannot determine when the "four years' war," or the alliance with the Bœotians, occurred. Neither the discussion of Mr. Clinton (*Fast. H.* 302 B.C., and *Append. p.* 380), nor the different hypothesis of Droysen, are satisfactory on this point—see Carl Müller's discussion on the Fragments of Democharês, *Fragm. Hist. Gr. v. ii. p.* 446.

¹ Diodor. xx. 110. *παραδοὺς οὖν αὐτὸν ἀνοπλον τοῖς ἱερεῦσι, καὶ πρὸ τῆς ὀρισμένης ἡμέρας μνηθεῖς, ἀνέχευεν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν.*

The account of this transaction in the text is taken from Diodorus, and is a simple one; a vote was passed granting special licence to Demetrius, to receive the mysteries at once, though it was not the appointed season.

Plutarch (*Demetr.* 26) superadds other circumstances, several of which have the appearance of jest rather than reality. Pythodôrus the Daduch or Torch-bearer of the Mysteries stood alone in his protest against any celebration of the ceremony out of time: this is doubtless very credible. Then (according to Plutarch) the Athenians passed decrees, on the proposition of Stratoklês, that the month Munychion should be called Anthesterion. This having been done, the Lesser Mysteries were celebrated, in which Demetrius was initiated. Next, the Athenians passed another decree, to the effect, that the month Munychion should be called Boëdromion—after which, the Greater Mysteries (which belonged to the latter month) were forthwith celebrated. The comic writer Philippidês said of Stratoklês, that he had compressed the whole year into one single month.

This statement of Plutarch has very much the air of a caricature, by Philippidês or some other witty man, of the simple decree mentioned by Diodorus—a special licence to Demetrius to be initiated out of season. Compare another passage of Philippidês against Stratoklês (*Plutarch, Demetr.* 12).

² Diodor. xx. 110.

Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander. Before retiring from Greece, Demetrius concluded a truce with Kassander, whereby it was stipulated that the Grecian cities, both in Europe and Asia, should be permanently autonomous and free from garrison or control. This stipulation served only as an honourable pretext for leaving Greece; Demetrius had little expectation that it would be observed.¹ In the ensuing spring was fought the decisive battle of Ipsus in Phrygia (B.C. 300) by Antigonus and Demetrius, against Ptolemy, Seleukus, and Lysimachus; with a large army and many elephants on both sides. Antigonus was completely defeated and slain, at the age of more than eighty years. His Asiatic dominion was broken up, chiefly to the profit of Seleukus, whose dynasty became from henceforward ascendent, from the coast of Syria eastward to the Caspian Gates and Parthia; sometimes, though imperfectly, farther eastward, nearly to the Indus.²

The effects of the battle of Ipsus were speedily felt in Greece. The Athenians passed a decree proclaiming themselves neutral, and excluding both the belligerent parties from Attica. Demetrius, retiring with the remnant of his defeated army, and embarking at Ephesus to sail to Athens, was met on the voyage by Athenian envoys, who respectfully acquainted him that he would not be admitted. At the same time, his wife D  idameia, whom he had left at Athens, was sent away by the Athenians under an honourable escort to Megara, while some ships of war which he had left in the Peir  us were also restored to him. Demetrius, indignant at this unexpected defection of a city which had recently leaped upon him such fulsome adulation, was still further mortified³ by the loss of most of his other possessions in Greece.³ His garrisons were for the most

¹ Diodor. xx. 111. It must have been probably during this campaign that Demetrius began or projected the foundation of the important city of Demetrias on the Gulf of Magnesia, which afterwards became one of the great strongholds of the Macedonian ascendancy in Greece (Strabo, ix. p. 436-443, in which latter passage, the reference to Hieronymus of Kardia seems to prove that that historian gave a full description of Demetrias and its foundation). See about Demetrias, Mannert, Geogr. Griech. v. vii. p. 591.

² Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hell. B.C. 301) places the battle of Ipsus in August 301 B.C.; which appears to me some months earlier than the reality. It is clear from Diodorus (and indeed from Mr. Clinton's own admission) that winter-quarters in Asia intervened between the departure of Demetrius from Athens in or soon after April 301 B.C., and the battle of Ipsus. Moreover Demetrius, immediately after leaving Athens, carried on many operations against Kassander in Thessaly, before crossing over to Asia to join Antigonus (Diodor. xx. 110, 111).

³ Plutarch, Demetr. 31.

part expelled, and the cities passed into Kassandrian keeping or dominion. His fortunes were indeed partially restored by concluding a peace with Seleukus, who married his daughter. This alliance withdrew Demetrius to Syria, while Greece appears to have fallen more and more under the Kassandrian parties. It was one of these partisans, Lacharès, who, seconded by Kassander's soldiers, acquired a despotism at Athens such as had been possessed by the Phalerean Demetrius, but employed in a manner far more cruel and oppressive. Various exiles, driven out by his tyranny, invited Demetrius Poliorketês, who passed over again from Asia into Greece, recovered portions of Peloponnesus, and laid siege to Athens. He blocked up the city by sea and land, so that the pressure of famine presently became intolerable. Lacharès having made his escape, the people opened their gates to Demetrius, not without great fear of the treatment awaiting them. But he behaved with forbearance, and even with generosity. He spared them all, supplied them with a large donation of corn, and contented himself with taking military occupation of the city, naming his own friends as magistrates. He put garrisons, however, not only into Peiræus and Munychia, but also into the hill called Museum, a part of the walled circle of Athens itself¹ (B.C. 298).

While Demetrius was thus strengthening himself in Greece, he lost all his footing both in Cyprus, Syria, and Kilikia, which passed into the hands of Ptolemy and Seleukus. New prospects however were opened to him in Macedonia by the death of Kassander (his brother-in-law, brother of his wife Phila) and the family feuds supervening thereupon. Philippos, eldest son of Kassander, succeeded his father, but died of sickness after something more than a year. Between the two remaining sons, Antipater and Alexander, a sanguinary hostility broke out. Antipater slew his mother Thessalonikê, and threatened the life of his brother, who in his turn invited aid both from Demetrius and from the Epirotic king Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus being ready first, marched into Macedonia, and expelled Antipater; receiving as his recompense the territory called Tymphæa (between Epirus and Macedonia), together with

¹ Plutarch, Demetr. 34, 35; Pausan. i. 25, 5. Pausanias states (i. 26, 2) that a gallant Athenian named Olympiodorus (we do not know when) encouraged his fellow-citizens to attack the Museum, Munychia, and Peiræus; and expelled the Macedonians from all of them. If this be correct, Munychia and Peiræus must have been afterwards reconquered by the Macedonians; for they were garrisoned (as well as Salamis and Sunium) by Antigonus Gonatas (Pausanias, ii. 8, 5; Plutarch, Aratus, 34).

Akarnania, Amphilochia, and the town of Ambrakia, which became henceforward his chief city and residence.¹ Antipater sought shelter in Thrace with his father-in-law Lysimachus; by whose order, however, he was presently slain. Demetrius, occupied with other matters, was more tardy in obeying the summons; but, on entering into Macedonia, he found himself strong enough to dispossess and kill Alexander (who had indeed invited him, but is said to have laid a train for assassinating him), and seized the Macedonian crown; not without the assent of a considerable party, to whom the name and the deeds of Kassander and his sons were alike odious.²

Demetrius became thus master of Macedonia, together with the greater part of Greece, including Athens, Megara, and much of Peloponnesus. He undertook an expedition into Bœotia, for the purpose of conquering Thebes; in which attempt he succeeded, not without a double siege of that city, which made an obstinate resistance. He left as viceroy in Bœotia the historian, Hieronymus of Kardia,³ once the attached friend and fellow-citizen of Eumenês. But Greece as a whole was managed by Antigonos (afterwards called Antigonos Gonatas) son of Demetrius, who maintained his supremacy unshaken during all his father's lifetime; even though Demetrius was deprived of Macedonia by the temporary combination of Lysimachus with Pyrrhus, and afterwards remained (until his death in 283 B.C.) a captive in the hands of Seleukus. After a brief possession of the crown of Macedonia successively by Seleukus, Ptolemy Keraunos, Meleager, Antipater, and Sosthenês—Antigonos Gonatas regained it in 277 B.C. His descendants the Antigonid kings maintained it until the battle of Pydna in 168 B.C.; when Perseus, the last of them, was overthrown, and his kingdom incorporated with the Roman conquests.⁴

Of Greece during this period we can give no account, except that the greater number of its cities were in dependence upon Demetrius and his son Antigonos; either under occupation by Macedonian garrisons, or ruled by local despots who leaned on foreign mercenaries and Macedonian support. The spirit of the Greeks was broken, and their habits of combined sentiment and action had disappeared.

¹ Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 6.

² Plutarch, Demetr. 36; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 264 *seq.*; Pausan. ix. 7, 3; Justin, xvi. 1, 2.

³ Plutarch, Demetr. 39.

⁴ See Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, Append. 4, p. 236-239.

The invasion of the Gauls indeed awakened them into a temporary union for the defence of Thermopylæ in 279 B.C. So intolerable was the cruelty and spoliation of those barbarian invaders, that the cities as well as Antigonos were driven by fear to the efforts necessary for repelling them.¹ A gallant army of Hellenic confederates was mustered. In the mountains of Ætolia and in the neighbourhood of Delphi, most of the Gallic horde with their king Brennus perished. But this burst of spirit did not interrupt the continuance of the Macedonian dominion in Greece, which Antigonos Gonatas continued to hold throughout most of a long reign. He greatly extended the system begun by his predecessors, of isolating each Grecian city from alliances with other cities in its neighbourhood—planting in most of them local despots—and compressing the most important by means of garrisons.² Among all Greeks, the Spartans and the Ætolians stood most free from foreign occupation, and were the least crippled in their power of self-action. The Achæan league too developed itself afterwards as a renovated sprout from the ruined tree of Grecian liberty,³ though never attaining to anything better than a feeble and puny life, nor capable of sustaining itself without foreign aid.⁴

With this after-growth, or half-revival, I shall not meddle. It forms the Greece of Polybius, which that author treats, in my opinion justly, as having no history of its own,⁵ but as an appendage attached to some foreign centre and principal among its neighbours—Macedonia, Egypt, Syria, Rome. Each of these neighbours acted upon the destinies of Greece more powerfully than the Greeks themselves. The Greeks to whom these volumes have been devoted—those of Homer, Archilochus, Solon, Æschylus, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xeno-

¹ Pausanias, i. 4, 1; x. 19, 12. Τοῖς δὲ γε Ἑλλήσι κατεπεπτώκει μὲν ἐς ἅπαν τὰ φρονήματα, τὸ δὲ ἰσχυρὸν τοῦ δειμάτος προήγεν ἐς ἀνάγκην τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀμύνειν· ἑώρων δὲ τόν τε ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀγῶνα, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας γεννησόμενον, καθὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ Μήδου ποτὲ . . . ὡς οὖν ἀπολωλέναι δέον ἢ ἐπικρατεστέρους εἶναι, κατ' ἄνδρα τε ἰδίᾳ καὶ αἱ πόλεις διέκειντο ἐν κοινῷ. (On the approach of the invading Gauls.)

² Polyb. ii. 40, 41. πλείστους γὰρ δὴ μονάρχους οὗτος (Antigonos Gonatas) ἐμφυτεύσαι δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν. Justin, xxvi. 1.

³ Pausanias, vii. 17, 2. Ἄτε ἐκ δένδρου λελωβημένου, ἀνεβλάστησεν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸ Ἀχαικόν.

⁴ Plutarch, Aratus, 47. ἐθισθέντες γὰρ ἄλλοτρίαις σώζεσθαι χερσίν, καὶ τοῖς Μακεδόνων ὅπλοις αὐτοὺς ὑπεσταλκοίτες (the Achæans), &c. Compare also c. 12, 13, 15, in reference to the earlier applications to Ptolemy king of Egypt.

⁵ Polybius, i. 3, 4; ii. 37.

phon, and Demosthenês—present as their most marked characteristic a loose aggregation of autonomous tribes or communities, acting and reacting freely among themselves, with little or no pressure from foreigners. The main interest of the narrative has consisted in the spontaneous grouping of the different Hellenic fractions—in the self-prompted co-operations and conflicts—the abortive attempts to bring about something like an effective federal organisation, or to maintain two permanent rival confederacies—the energetic ambition, and heroic endurance, of men to whom Hellas was the entire political world. The freedom of Hellas, the life and soul of this history from its commencement, disappeared completely during the first years of Alexander's reign. After following to their tombs the generation of Greeks contemporary with him, men like Demosthenês and Phokion, born in a state of freedom—I have pursued the history into that gulf of Grecian nullity which marks the succeeding century; exhibiting sad evidence of the degrading servility, and suppliant king-worship, into which the countrymen of Aristeidês and Periklês had been driven, by their own conscious weakness under overwhelming pressure from without.

I cannot better complete that picture than by showing what the leading democratical citizen became, under the altered atmosphere which now bedimmed his city. Democharês, the nephew of Demosthenês, has been mentioned as one of the few distinguished Athenians in this last generation. He was more than once chosen to the highest public offices; ¹ he was conspicuous for his free speech, both as an orator and as an historian, in the face of powerful enemies; he remained throughout a long life faithfully attached to the democratical constitution, and was banished for a time by its opponents. In the year 280 B.C., he prevailed on the Athenians to erect a public monument, with a commemorative inscription, to his uncle Demosthenês. Seven or eight years afterwards, Democharês himself died, aged nearly eighty. His son Lachês proposed and obtained a public decree, that a statue should be erected, with an annexed inscription, to his honour. We read in the decree a recital of the distinguished public services, whereby Democharês merited this compliment from his countrymen. All that the proposer of the decree, his son and fellow-citizen, can find to recite, as ennobling the last half of the father's public life (since his return from exile), is as follows:—1. He contracted the public expenses, and introduced

¹ Polybius, xii. 13.

a more frugal management. 2. He undertook an embassy to King Lysimachus, from whom he obtained two presents for the people, one of thirty talents, the other of one hundred talents. 3. He proposed the vote for sending envoys to King Ptolemy in Egypt, from whom fifty talents were obtained for the people. 4. He went as envoy to Antipater, received from him twenty talents, and delivered them to the people at the Eleusinian festival.¹

When such begging missions are the deeds for which Athens both employed and recompensed her most eminent citizens, an historian accustomed to the Grecian world as described by Herodotus, Thucydidês, and Xenophon, feels that the life has departed from his subject, and with sadness and humiliation brings his narrative to a close.

CHAPTER XCVII

SICILIAN AND ITALIAN GREEKS—AGATHOKLES

IT has been convenient, throughout all this work, to keep the history of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks distinct from that of the Central and Asiatic. We parted last from the Sicilian Greeks,² at the death of their champion the Corinthian Timoleon (337 B.C.), by whose energetic exploits, and generous political policy, they had been almost regenerated—rescued from foreign enemies, protected against intestine discord, and invigorated by a large reinforcement of new colonists. For the twenty years next succeeding the death of Timoleon, the history of Syracuse and Sicily is an absolute blank; which is deeply to be regretted, since the position of these cities included so much novelty—so many subjects for debate, for peremptory settlement, or for amicable compromise—that the annals of their proceedings must have been peculiarly interesting. Twenty years after the death of Timoleon, we find the

¹ See the decree in Plutarch, Vit. X. Oratt. p. 850. The Antipater here mentioned is the son of Kassander, not the father. There is no necessity for admitting the conjecture of Mr. Clinton (Fast. Hell. App. p. 380) that the name ought to be *Antigonos*, and not *Antipater*; although it may perhaps be true that Democharês was on favourable terms with Antigonos Gonatas (Diog. Laert. vii. 14).

Compare Carl Müller ad Democharis Fragm. apud Fragm. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 446, ed. Didot.

² See vol. xi. ch. lxxxv.

government of Syracuse described as an oligarchy ; implying that the constitution established by Timoleon must have been changed either by violence or by consent. The oligarchy is stated as consisting of 600 chief men, among whom Sosti-stratus and Herakleidês appear as leaders.¹ We hear generally that the Syracusans had been engaged in wars, and that Sosti-stratus either first originated, or first firmly established, his oligarchy, after an expedition undertaken to the coast of Italy, to assist the citizens of Kroton against their interior neighbours and assailants the Bruttians.

Not merely Kroton, but other Grecian cities also on the coast of Italy, appear to have been exposed to causes of danger and decline, similar to those which were operating upon so many other portions of the Hellenic world. Their non-Hellenic neighbours in the interior were growing too powerful and too aggressive to leave them in peace or security. The Messapians, the Lucanians, the Bruttians, and other native Italian tribes, were acquiring that increased strength which became ultimately all concentrated under the mighty republic of Rome. I have in my preceding chapters recounted the acts of the two Syracusan despots, the elder and younger Dionysius, on this Italian coast.² Though the elder gained some advantage over the Lucanians, yet the interference of both contributed only to enfeeble and humiliate the Italiot Greeks. Not long before the battle of Chæroneia (340-338 B.C.), the Tarentines found themselves so hard pressed by the Messapians, that they sent to Sparta, their mother-city, to entreat assistance. The Spartan king Archidamus son of Agesilaus, perhaps ashamed of the nullity of his country since the close of the Sacred War, complied with their prayer, and sailed at the head of a mercenary force to Italy. How long his operations there lasted, we do not know ; but they ended by his being defeated and killed, near the time of the battle of Chæroneia³ (338 B.C.).

About six years after this event, the Tarentines, being still pressed by the same formidable neighbours, invoked the aid of the Epirotic Alexander, king of the Molossians, and brother of Olympias. These Epirots now, during the general decline of Grecian force, rise into an importance which they had never

¹ Diodor. xix. 3. It appears that Diodorus had recounted in his eighteenth Book the previous circumstances of these two leaders ; but this part of his narrative is lost : see Wesseling's note.

² See vol. xi. chaps. lxxiii. lxxv.

³ Diodor. xvi. 88 ; Plutarch, Camill. 19 ; Pausan. iii. 10, 5. Plutarch even says that the two battles occurred on the same *day*.

before enjoyed.¹ Philip of Macedon, having married Olympias, not only secured his brother-in-law on the Molossian throne, but strengthened his authority over subjects not habitually obedient. It was through Macedonian interference that the Molossian Alexander first obtained (though subject to Macedonian ascendancy) the important city of Ambrakia; which thus passed out of a free Hellenic community into the capital and seaport of the Epirotic kings. Alexander further cemented his union with Macedonia by marrying his own niece Kleopatra, daughter of Philip and Olympias. In fact, during the lives of Philip and Alexander the Great, the Epirotic kingdom appears a sort of adjunct to the Macedonian; governed by Olympias either jointly with her brother the Molossian Alexander—or as regent after his death.²

It was about the year after the battle of Issus that the Molossian Alexander undertook his expedition from Italy;³ doubtless instigated in part by emulation of the Asiatic glories of his nephew and namesake. Though he found enemies more formidable than the Persians at Issus, yet his success was at first considerable. He gained victories over the Messapians, the

¹ The Molossian King Neoptolemus was father both of Alexander (the Epirotic) and of Olympias. But as to the genealogy of the preceding kings, nothing certain can be made out: see Merleker, *Darstellung des Landes und der Bewohner von Epeiros*, Königsberg, 1844, p. 2-6.

² A curious proof how fully Olympias was queen of Epirus is preserved in the oration of Hyperidēs in defence of Euxenippus, recently published by Mr. Babington, p. 12. The Athenians, in obedience to an oracular mandate from the Dodonæan Zeus, had sent to Dodona a solemn embassy for sacrifice, and had dressed and adorned the statue of *Diônê* there situated. Olympias addressed a despatch to the Athenians, reproving them for this as a trespass upon her dominions—*ὑπὲρ τούτων ὑμῖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἦλθε παρ' Ὀλυμπιάδος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς, ὡς ἡ χώρα εἶη ἡ Μολοσσία αὐτῆς, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἱερόν ἐστιν· οὐκ οὐκ προσήκειν ἡμῖν τῶν ἐκεῖ οὐδὲ ἐν κινεῖν*. Olympias took a high and insolent tone in this letter (*τὰς τραγωδίας αὐτῆς καὶ τὰς κατηγορίας, &c.*).

The date of this oration is at some period during the life of Alexander the Great—but cannot be more precisely ascertained. After the death of Alexander, Olympias passed much time in Epirus, where she thought herself more secure from the enmity of Antipater (Diodor. xviii. 49).

Dodona had been one of the most ancient places of pilgrimage for the Hellenic race—especially for the Athenians. The order here addressed to them,—that they should abstain from religious manifestations at this sanctuary—is a remarkable proof of the growing encroachments on free Hellenism; the more so, as Olympias sent offerings to temples at Athens when she chose and without asking permission—we learn this from the same fragment of Hyperidēs.

³ Livy (viii. 3-24) places the date of this expedition of the Molossian Alexander eight years earlier; but it is universally recognised that this is a mistake.

Lucanians, and the Samnites; he conquered the Lucanian town of Consentia, and the Bruttian town of Tereina; he established an alliance with the Pœdiculi, and exchanged friendly messages with the Romans. As far as we can make out from scanty data, he seems to have calculated on establishing a comprehensive dominion in the south of Italy, over all its population—over Greek cities, Lucanians, and Bruttians. He demanded and obtained three hundred of the chief Lucanian and Messapian families, whom he sent over as hostages to Epirus. Several exiles of these nations joined him as partisans. He further endeavoured to transfer the congress of the Greco-Italian cities, which had been usually held at the Tarentine colony of Herakleia, to Thurii; intending probably to procure for himself a compliant synod like that serving the purpose of his Macedonian nephew at Corinth. But the tide of his fortune at length turned. The Tarentines became disgusted and alarmed; his Lucanian partisans proved faithless; the stormy weather in the Calabrian Apennines broke up the communication between his different detachments, and exposed them to be cut off in detail. He himself perished, by the hands of a Lucanian exile, in crossing the river Acheron, and near the town of Pandosia. This was held to be a memorable attestation of the prophetic veracity of the oracle; since he had received advice from Dodona to beware of Pandosia and Acheron; two names which he well knew, and therefore avoided, in Epirus—but which he had not before known to exist in Italy.¹

The Greco-Italian cities had thus dwindled down into a prize to be contended for between the Epirotic kings and the native Italian powers—as they again became, still more conspicuously, fifty years afterwards, during the war between Pyrrhus and the Romans. They were now left to seek foreign aid, where they could obtain it, and to become the prey of adventurers. It is in this capacity that we hear of them as receiving assistance from Syracuse, and that the formidable name of Agathoklês first comes before us—seemingly about 320 B.C.² The Syracusan force, sent to Italy to assist the Krotoniates against their enemies the Bruttians, was commanded by a general named Antander, whose brother Agathoklês served with him in a subordinate command.

To pass over the birth and childhood of Agathoklês—respecting which romantic anecdotes are told, as about most eminent men—it appears that his father, a Rhegine exile

¹ Livy, viii. 17–24; Justin, xii. 2; Strabo, vi. p. 280.

² Diodor. xix. 3.

named Karkinus, came from Therma (in the Carthaginian portion of Sicily) to settle at Syracuse, at the time when Timoleon invited and received new Grecian settlers to the citizenship of the latter city. Karkinus was in comparative poverty, following the trade of a potter ; which his son Agathoklēs learnt also, being about eighteen years of age when domiciliated with his father at Syracuse.¹ Though starting from this humble beginning, and even notorious for the profligacy and rapacity of his youthful habits, Agathoklēs soon attained a conspicuous position, partly from his own superior personal qualities, partly from the favour of a wealthy Syracusan named Damas. The young potter was handsome, tall, and of gigantic strength ; he performed with distinction the military service required from him as a citizen, wearing a panoply so heavy, that no other soldier could fight with it ; he was moreover ready, audacious, and emphatic in public harangue. Damas became much attached to him, and not only supplied him profusely with money, but also, when placed in command of a Syracusan army against the Agrigentines, nominated him one of the subordinate officers. In this capacity Agathoklēs acquired great reputation for courage in battle, ability in command, and fluency of speech. Presently Damas died of sickness, leaving a widow without children. Agathoklēs married the widow, and thus raised himself to a high fortune and position in Syracuse.²

Of the oligarchy which now prevailed at Syracuse, we have no particulars, nor do we know how it had come to be substituted for the more popular forms established by Timoleon. We hear only generally that the oligarchical leaders, Sosistratus and Herakleidēs, were unprincipled and sanguinary men.³ By this government an expedition was despatched from Syracuse to the Italian coast, to assist the inhabitants of Kroton against their aggressive neighbours the Bruttians. Antander, brother of Agathoklēs, was one of the generals commanding this armament, and Agathoklēs himself served in it as a subordinate officer. We neither know the date, the duration, nor the issue, of this expedition. But it afforded a fresh opportunity to Agathoklēs to display his adventurous bravery and military genius, which procured for him high encomium. He was

¹ Timæus apud Polybium, xiii. 15 ; Diodor. xix. 2.

² Diodor. xix. 3 ; Justin, xxii. 1. Justin states the earliest military exploits of Agathoklēs to have been against the Ætnæans, not against the Agrigentines.

³ Diodor. xix. 3, 4. Diodorus had written more about this oligarchy in a part of his eighteenth book ; which part is not preserved : see Wesseling's note.

supposed by some, on his return to Syracuse, to be entitled to the first prize for valour ; but Sosistratus and the other oligarchical leaders withheld it from him and preferred another. So deeply was Agathoklês incensed by this refusal, that he publicly inveighed against them among the people, as men aspiring to despotism. His opposition being unsuccessful, and drawing upon him the enmity of the government, he retired to the coast of Italy.

Here he levied a military band of Grecian exiles and Campanian mercenaries, which he maintained by various enterprises for or against the Grecian cities. He attacked Kroton, but was repulsed with loss ; he took service with the Tarentines, fought for some time against their enemies, but at length became suspected and dismissed. Next, he joined himself with the inhabitants of Rhegium, assisting in the defence of the town against a Syracusan aggression. He even made two attempts to obtain admission by force into Syracuse, and to seize the government.¹ Though repulsed in both of them, he nevertheless contrived to maintain a footing in Sicily, was appointed general at the town of Morgantium, and captured Leontini, within a short distance north of Syracuse. Some time afterwards, a revolution took place at Syracuse, whereby Sosistratus and the oligarchy were dispossessed and exiled with many of their partisans.

Under the new government, Agathoklês obtained his recall, and soon gained increased ascendancy. The dispossessed exiles contrived to raise forces, and to carry on a formidable war against Syracuse from without ; they even obtained assistance from the Carthaginians, so as to establish themselves at Gela, on the southern confines of the Syracusan territory. In the military operations thus rendered necessary, Agathoklês took a forward part, distinguishing himself among the ablest and most enterprising officers. He tried, with 1000 soldiers, to surprise Gela by night ; but finding the enemy on their guard, he was repulsed with loss and severely wounded ; yet by an able manœuvre he brought off all his remaining detachment. Though thus energetic against the public enemy, however, he at the same time inspired both hatred and alarm for his dangerous designs, to the Syracusans within. The

¹ Diodor. xix. 4 ; Justin, xxii. 1. "Bis occupare imperium Syracusarum voluit ; bis in exilium actus est."

In the same manner, the Syracusan exile Hermokratês had attempted to extort by force his return, at the head of 3000 men, and by means of partisans within ; he failed and was slain—B.C. 408 (Diodor. xiii. 75).

Corinthian Akestoridês, who had been named general of the city—probably from recollection of the distinguished services formerly rendered by the Corinthian Timoleon—becoming persuaded that the presence of Agathoklês was full of peril to the city, ordered him to depart, and provided men to assassinate him on the road during the night. But Agathoklês, suspecting their design, disguised himself in the garb of a beggar, appointing another man to travel in the manner which would be naturally expected from himself. This substitute was slain in the dark by the assassins, while Agathoklês escaped by favour of his disguise. He and his partisans appear to have found shelter with the Carthaginians in Sicily.¹

Not long afterwards, another change took place in the government of Syracuse, whereby the oligarchical exiles were recalled, and peace made with the Carthaginians. It appears that a senate of 600 was again installed as the chief political body; probably not the same men as before, and with some democratical modifications. At the same time, negotiations were opened, through the mediation of the Carthaginian commander Hamilkar, between the Syracusans and Agathoklês. The mischiefs of intestine conflict, amidst the numerous discordant parties in the city, pressed hard upon every one, and hopes were entertained that all might be brought to agree in terminating them. Agathoklês affected to enter cordially into these projects of amnesty and reconciliation. The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, who had so recently aided Sosistratus and the Syracusan oligarchy, now did his best to promote the recall of Agathoklês, and even made himself responsible for the good and pacific behaviour of that exile. Agathoklês, and the other exiles along with him, were accordingly restored. A public assembly was convened in the temple of Demeter, in the presence of Hamilkar; where Agathoklês swore by the most awful oaths, with his hands touching the altar and statue of the goddess, that he would behave as a good citizen of Syracuse, uphold faithfully the existing

¹ Diodor. xix. 5, 6. A similar stratagem is recounted of the Karian Datamês (Cornelius Nepos, Datamês, 9).

That Agathoklês, on leaving Syracuse, went to the Carthaginians, appears to be implied in the words of Diodorus, c. 6—*τοὺς αὐτῷ πρότερον συμπορευθέντας πρὸς Καρχηδονίους* (see Wesseling's note on the translation of *πρὸς*). This fact is noticed merely incidentally, in the confused narrative of Diodorus; but it brings him to a certain extent into harmony with Justin (xx. 2), who insists much on the combination between Agathoklês and the Carthaginians, as one of the main helps whereby he was enabled to seize the supreme power.

government, and carry out the engagements of the Carthaginian mediators—abstaining from encroachments on the rights and possessions of Carthage in Sicily. His oaths and promises were delivered with so much apparent sincerity, accompanied by emphatic harangues, that the people were persuaded to name him general and guardian of the peace, for the purpose of realising the prevailing aspirations towards harmony. Such appointment was recommended (it seems) by Hamilkar.¹

All this train of artifice had been concerted by Agathoklēs with Hamilkar, for the purpose of enabling the former to seize the supreme power. As general of the city, Agathoklēs had the direction of the military force. Under pretence of marching against some refractory exiles at Erbita in the interior, he got together 3000 soldiers strenuously devoted to him—mercenaries and citizens of desperate character—to which Hamilkar added a reinforcement of Africans. As if about to march forth, he mustered his troops at daybreak in the Timoleonion (chapel or precinct consecrated to Timoleon), while Peisarchus and Deklēs, two chiefs of the senate already assembled, were invited with forty others to transact with him some closing business. Having these men in his power, Agathoklēs suddenly turned upon them, and denounced them to the soldiers as guilty of conspiring his death. Then, receiving from the soldiers a response full of ardour, he ordered them immediately to proceed to a general massacre of the senate and their leading partisans, with full permission of licentious plunder in the houses of these victims, the richest men in Syracuse. The soldiers rushed into the streets with ferocious joy to execute this order. They slew not only the senators, but many others also, unarmed and unprepared; each man selecting victims personally obnoxious to him. They broke open the doors of the rich, or climbed over the roofs,

¹ The account here given is the best which I can make out from Diodorus (xix. 5), Justin (xxii. 2),—Polyænus (v. 3, 8). The first two allude to the solemn oath taken by Agathoklēs—*παραχθὲς εἰς τὸ τῆς Δήμητρος ἱερὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, ὥμοσε μηδὲν ἐναντιωθήσεσθαι τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ*—"Tunc Hamilcari expositis ignibus Cereris tactisque in obsequia Pœnorum jurat." "Jurare in obsequia Pœnorum" can hardly be taken to mean that Syracuse was to become subject to Carthage; there was nothing antecedent to justify such a proceeding, nor does anything follow in the sequel which implies it.

Compare also the speech which Justin puts into the mouth of Bomilkar when executed for treason by the Carthaginians—"objectans illis (Carthaginiensibus) in Hamilcarem patrum suum tacita suffragia, quod Agathoclem socium illis facere, quam hostem, maluerit" (xxii. 7). This points to previous collusion between Hamilkar and Agathoklēs.

massacred the proprietors within, and ravished the females. They chased the unsuspecting fugitives through the streets, not sparing even those who took refuge in the temples. Many of these unfortunate sufferers rushed for safety to the gates, but found them closed and guarded by special order of Agathoklês ; so that they were obliged to let themselves down from the walls, in which many perished miserably. For two days Syracuse was thus a prey to the sanguinary, rapacious, and lustful impulses of the soldiery ; four thousand citizens had been already slain, and many more were seized as prisoners. The political purposes of Agathoklês, as well as the passions of the soldiers, being then sated, he arrested the massacre. He concluded this bloody feat by killing such of his prisoners as were most obnoxious to him, and banishing the rest. The total number of expelled or fugitive Syracusans is stated at 6000 ; who found a hospitable shelter and home at Agrigentum. One act of lenity is mentioned, and ought not to be omitted amidst this scene of horror. Deinokratês, one among the prisoners, was liberated by Agathoklês from motives of former friendship : he too, probably, went into voluntary exile.¹

After a massacre thus perpetrated in the midst of profound peace, and in the full confidence of a solemn act of mutual reconciliation immediately preceding—surpassing the worst deeds of the elder Dionysius, and indeed (we might almost say) of all other Grecian despots—Agathoklês convened what he called an assembly of the people. Such of the citizens as were either oligarchical, or wealthy, or in any way unfriendly to him, had been already either slain or expelled ; so that the assembly probably included few besides his own soldiers. Agathoklês—addressing them in terms of congratulation on the recent glorious exploit, whereby they had purged the city of its oligarchical tyrants—proclaimed that the Syracusan people had now reconquered their full liberty. He affected to be weary of the toils of command, and anxious only for a life of quiet equality as one among the many ; in token of which he threw off his general's cloak and put on a common civil garment. But those whom he addressed, fresh from the recent massacre and plunder, felt that their whole security depended upon the maintenance of his supremacy, and loudly protested that they would not accept his resignation. Agathoklês, with pretended reluctance, told them, that if they insisted, he would comply, but upon the peremptory condition of enjoying a

¹ Diodor. xix. 8, 9 ; Justin, xxii. 2.

single-handed authority, without any colleagues or counsellors for whose misdeeds he was to be responsible. The assembly replied by conferring upon him, with unanimous acclamations, the post of general with unlimited power, or despot.¹

Thus was constituted a new despot of Syracuse about fifty years after the decease of the elder Dionysius, and twenty-two years after Timoleon had rooted out the Dionysian dynasty, establishing on its ruins a free polity. On accepting the post, Agathoklès took pains to proclaim that he would tolerate no further massacre or plunder, and that his government would for the future be mild and beneficent. He particularly studied to conciliate the poorer citizens, to whom he promised abolition of debts and a new distribution of lands. How far he carried out this project systematically, we do not know; but he conferred positive donations on many of the poor—which he had abundant means of doing, out of the properties of the numerous exiles recently expelled. He was full of promises to every one, displaying courteous and popular manners, and abstaining from all ostentation of guards, or ceremonial attendants, or a diadem. He at the same time applied himself vigorously to strengthen his military and naval force, his magazines of arms and stores, and his revenues. He speedily extended his authority over all the territorial domain of Syracuse, with her subject towns, and carried his arms successfully over many other parts of Sicily.²

The Carthaginian general Hamilkar, whose complicity or connivance had helped Agathoklès to this blood-stained elevation, appears to have permitted him without opposition to extend his dominion over a large portion of Sicily, and even to plunder the towns in alliance with Carthage itself. Complaints having been made to Carthage, this officer was superseded, and another general (also named Hamilkar) was sent in his place. We are unable to trace in detail the proceedings of Agathoklès during the first years of his despotism; but he went on enlarging his sway over the neighbouring cities, while the Syracusan exiles, whom he had expelled, found a home partly at Agrigentum (under Deinokratès), partly at Messênê. About the year 314 B.C., we hear that he made an attempt on Messênê, which he was on the point of seizing, had he not been stopped by the interference of the Carthaginians (perhaps the newly-appointed Hamilkar), who now at length protested against his violation of the convention; meaning (as we must presume, for we know of no other convention) the oath which

¹ Diodor. xix. 9.

² Diodor. xix. 9; Justin, xxii. 2.

had been sworn by Agathoklēs at Syracuse under the guarantee of the Carthaginians.¹ Though thus disappointed at Messênê, Agathoklēs seized Abakænum—where he slew the leading citizens opposed to him,—and carried on his aggressions elsewhere so effectively, that the leaders at Agrigentum, instigated by the Syracusan exiles there harboured, became convinced of the danger of leaving such encroachments unresisted.² The people of Agrigentum came to the resolution of taking up arms on behalf of the liberties of Sicily, and allied themselves with Gela and Messênê for the purpose.

But the fearful example of Agathoklēs himself rendered them so apprehensive of the dangers from any military leader, at once native and energetic, that they resolved to invite a foreigner. Some Syracusan exiles were sent to Sparta, to choose and invoke some Spartan of eminence and ability, as Archidamus had recently been called to Tarentum—and even more, as Timoleon had been brought from Corinth, with results so signally beneficent. The old Spartan king Kleomenēs (of the Eurysthenid race) had a son Akrotatus, then unpopular at home,³ and well disposed towards foreign warfare. This prince, without even consulting the Ephors, listened at once to the envoys, and left Peloponnesus with a small squadron, intending to cross by Korkyra and the coast of Italy to Agrigentum. Unfavourable winds drove him as far north as Apollonia, and delayed his arrival at Tarentum; in which city, originally a Spartan colony, he met with a cordial reception, and obtained a vote of twenty vessels to assist his enterprise of liberating Syracuse from Agathoklēs. He reached Agrigentum with favourable hopes, was received with all the honours due to

¹ Diodor. xix. 65. καθ' ὃν δὴ χρόνον ἦκον ἐκ Καρχηδόνος πρέσβεις, οἱ τῷ μὲν Ἀγαθοκλεῖ περὶ τῶν πραχθέντων ἐπετίμησαν, ὥς παραβαίνοντι τὰς συνθήκας· τοῖς δὲ Μεσσηνίοις εἰρήνην παρεσκεύασαν, καὶ τὸ φρούριον ἀναγκάσαντες ἀποκαταστήσαι τὸν τύραννον, ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Διβύην.

I do not know what *συνθήκαι* can be here meant, except that oath described by Justin under the words "in obsequia Poenorum jurat" (xxii. 2).

² Diodor. xix. 70. μὴ περιορᾶν Ἀγαθοκλέα συσκευαζόμενον τὰς πόλεις.

³ Diodor. xix. 70. After the defeat of Agis by Antipater, the severe Lacedæmonian laws against those who fled from battle had been suspended for the occasion; as had been done before, after the defeat of Leuktra. Akrotatus had been the *only* person (μόνος) who opposed this suspension; whereby he incurred the most violent odium generally, but most especially from the citizens who profited by the suspension. These men carried their hatred so far, that they even attacked, beat him, and conspired against his life (οὔτοι γὰρ συστραφέντες πληγὰς τε ἐνεφόρησαν αὐτῷ καὶ διετέλουν ἐπιβουλεύοντες).

This is a curious indication of Spartan manners.

a Spartan prince, and undertook the command. Bitterly did he disappoint his party. He was incompetent as a general; he dissipated in presents or luxuries the money intended for the campaign, emulating Asiatic despots; his conduct was arrogant, tyrannical, and even sanguinary. The disgust which he inspired was brought to a height, when he caused Sosistratus, the leader of the Syracusan exiles, to be assassinated at a banquet. Immediately the exiles rose in a body to avenge this murder; while Akrotatus, deposed by the Agrigentines, only found safety in flight.¹

To this young Spartan prince, had he possessed a noble heart and energetic qualities, there was here presented a career of equal grandeur with that of Timoleon—against an enemy able indeed and formidable, yet not so superior in force as to render success impossible. It is melancholy to see Akrotatus, from simple worthlessness of character, throwing away such an opportunity; at a time when Sicily was the only soil on which a glorious Hellenic career was still open—when no similar exploits were practicable by any Hellenic leader in Central Greece, from the overwhelming superiority of force possessed by the surrounding kings.

The misconduct of Akrotatus broke up all hopes of active operations against Agathoklês. Peace was presently concluded with the latter by the Agrigentines and their allies, under the mediation of the Carthaginian general Hamilkar. By the terms of this convention, all the Greek cities in Sicily were declared autonomous, yet under the hegemony of Agathoklês; excepting only Himera, Selinus, and Herakleia, which were actually, and were declared still to continue, under Carthage. Messênê was the only Grecian city standing aloof from this convention; as such, therefore, still remaining open to the Syracusan exiles. The terms were so favourable to Agathoklês, that they were much disapproved at Carthage.² Agathoklês, recognised as chief and having no enemy in the field, employed himself actively in strengthening his hold on the other cities, and in enlarging his military means at home. He sent a force against Messênê, to require the expulsion of the Syracusan exiles from that city, and to procure at the same time the recall of the Messenian exiles, partisans of his own, and companions

¹ Diodor. xix. 71.

² Diodor. xix. 71, 72, 102. When the convention specifies Herakleia, Selinus, and Himera, as being under the Carthaginians, this is to be understood as in addition to the primitive Carthaginian settlements of Solus, Panormus, Lilybæum, &c., about which no question could arise.

of his army. His generals extorted these two points from the Messenians. Agathoklês, having thus broken the force of Messênê, secured to himself the town still more completely, by sending for those Messenian citizens who had chiefly opposed him, and putting them all to death, as well as his leading opponents at Tauromenium. The number thus massacred was not less than six hundred.¹

It only remained for Agathoklês to seize Agrigentum. Thither he accordingly marched. But Deinokratês and the Syracusan exiles, expelled from Messênê, had made themselves heard at Carthage, insisting on the perils to that city from the encroachments of Agathoklês. The Carthaginians alarmed sent a fleet of sixty sail, whereby alone Agrigentum, already under siege by Agathoklês, was preserved. The recent convention was now broken on all sides, and Agathoklês kept no further measures with the Carthaginians. He ravaged all their Sicilian territory, and destroyed some of their forts; while the Carthaginians on their side made a sudden descent with their fleet on the harbour of Syracuse. They could achieve nothing more, however, than the capture of one Athenian merchant-vessel, out of two there riding. They disgraced their acquisition by the cruel act (not uncommon in Carthaginian warfare) of cutting off the hands of the captive crew; for which, in a few days, retaliation was exercised upon the crews of some of their own ships, taken by the cruisers of Agathoklês.²

The defence of Agrigentum now rested principally on the Carthaginians in Sicily, who took up a position on the hill called Eknomus—in the territory of Gela, a little to the west of the Agrigentine border. Here Agathoklês approached to offer them battle—having been emboldened by two important successes obtained over Deinokratês and the Syracusan exiles, near Kentoripa and Gallaria.³ So superior was his force, however, that the Carthaginians thought it prudent to remain in their camp; and Agathoklês returned in triumph to Syracuse, where he adorned the temples with his recently acquired spoils. The balance of force was soon altered by the despatch of a large armament from Carthage under Hamilkar, consisting of 130 ships of war, with numerous other transport ships, carrying many soldiers—2000 native Carthaginians, partly men of

¹ Diodor. xix. 72: compare a different narrative—Polyænus, v. 15.

² Diodor. xix. 103. It must be noticed, however, that even Julius Cæsar, in his wars in Gaul, sometimes cut off the hands of his Gallic prisoners taken in arms, whom he called rebels (Bell. Gall. viii. 44).

³ Diodor. xix. 103, 104.

rank—10,000 Africans—1000 Campanian heavy-armed and 1000 Balearic slingers. The fleet underwent in its passage so terrific a storm, that many of the vessels sunk with all on board, and it arrived with very diminished numbers in Sicily. The loss fell upon the native Carthaginian soldiers with peculiar severity; insomuch that when the news reached Carthage, a public mourning was proclaimed, and the city walls were hung with black serge.

Those who reached Sicily, however, were quite sufficient to place Hamilkar in an imposing superiority of number as compared with Agathoklês. He encamped on or near Eknomus, summoned all the reinforcements that his Sicilian allies could furnish, and collected additional mercenaries; so that he was soon at the head of 40,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry.¹ At the same time, a Carthaginian armed squadron, detached to the strait of Messênê, fell in with twenty armed ships belonging to Agathoklês, and captured them all with their crews. The Sicilian cities were held to Agathoklês principally by terror, and were likely to turn against him, if the Carthaginians exhibited sufficient strength to protect them. This the despot knew and dreaded; especially respecting Gela, which was not far from the Carthaginian camp. Had he announced himself openly as intending to place a garrison in Gela, he feared that the citizens might forestall him by calling in Hamilkar. Accordingly he detached thither, on various pretences, several small parties of soldiers, who presently found themselves united in a number sufficient to seize the town. Agathoklês then marched into Gela with his main force. Distrusting the adherence of the citizens, he let loose his soldiers upon them, massacred four thousand persons, and compelled the remainder, as a condition of sparing their lives, to bring in to him all their money and valuables. Having by this atrocity both struck universal terror and enriched himself, he advanced onward towards the Carthaginian camp, and occupied a hill called Phalarion opposite to it.² The two camps were separated by a level plain or valley nearly five miles broad, through which ran the river Himera.³

For some days of the hottest season (the dog-days), both armies remained stationary, neither of them choosing to make the attack. At length Agathoklês gained what he thought a favourable opportunity. A detachment from the Carthaginian camp sallied forth in pursuit of some Grecian plunderers; Agathoklês posted some men in ambush, who fell upon this

¹ Diodor. xix. 106.

² Diodor. xix. 107, 108.

³ Diodor. xix. 108, 109.

detachment unawares, threw it into disorder, and pursued it back to the camp. Following up this partial success, Agathoklès brought forward his whole force, crossed the river Himera, and began a general attack. This advance not being expected, the Grecian assailants seemed at first on the point of succeeding. They filled up a portion of the ditch, tore up the stockade, and were forcing their way into the camp. They were however repulsed by redoubled efforts, and new troops coming up, on the part of the defenders; mainly, too, by the very effective action of the 1000 Balearic slingers in Hamilkar's army, who hurled stones weighing a pound each, against which the Grecian armour was an inadequate defence. Still Agathoklès, noway discouraged, caused the attack to be renewed on several points at once, and with apparent success, when a reinforcement landed from Carthage—the expectation of which may perhaps have induced Hamilkar to refrain from any general attack. These new troops joined in the battle, coming upon the rear of the Greeks; who were intimidated and disordered by such unforeseen assailants, while the Carthaginians in their front, animated to more energetic effort, first repulsed them from the camp, and then pressed them vigorously back. After holding their ground for some time against their double enemy, the Greeks at length fled in disorder back to their own camp, recrossing the river Himera. The interval was between four and five miles of nearly level ground, over which they were actively pursued and severely handled by the Carthaginian cavalry, 5000 in number. Moreover, in crossing the river, many of them drank eagerly, from thirst, fatigue, and the heat of the weather; the saltness of the water proved so destructive to them, that numerous dead bodies are said to have been found unwounded on the banks.¹ At length they obtained shelter in their own camp, after a loss of 7000 men; while the loss of the victors is estimated at 500.

Agathoklès, after this great disaster, did not attempt to maintain his camp, but set it on fire, and returned to Gela; which was well fortified and provisioned, capable of a long defence. Here he intended to maintain himself against Hamilkar, at least until the Syracusan harvest (probably already begun) should be completed. But Hamilkar, having ascertained the strength of Gela, thought it prudent to refrain from a siege, and employed himself in operations for the purpose of strengthening his party in Sicily. His great victory at the Himera had produced the strongest effect upon many of the

¹ Diodor. xix. 109.

Sicilian cities, who were held to Agathoklês by no other bonds except those of fear. Hamilkar issued conciliatory proclamations, inviting them all to become his allies, and marching his troops towards the most convenient points. Presently Kamarina, Leontini, Katana, Tauromenium, Messênê, Abakænum, with several other smaller towns and forts, sent to tender themselves as allies; and the conduct of Hamilkar towards all was so mild and equitable, as to give universal satisfaction. Agathoklês appears to have been thus dispossessed of most part of the island, retaining little besides Gela and Syracuse. Even the harbour of Syracuse was watched by a Carthaginian fleet, placed to intercept foreign supplies. Returning to Syracuse after Hamilkar had renounced all attempts on Gela, Agathoklês collected the corn from the neighbourhood, and put the fortifications in the best state of defence. He had every reason to feel assured that the Carthaginians, encouraged by their recent success, and reinforced by allies from the whole island, would soon press the siege of Syracuse with all their energy; while for himself, hated by all, there was no hope of extraneous support, and little hope of a successful defence.¹

In this apparently desperate situation, he conceived the idea of a novelty alike daring, ingenious, and effective; surrounded indeed with difficulties in the execution, but promising, if successfully executed, to change altogether the prospects of the war. He resolved to carry a force across from Syracuse to Africa, and attack the Carthaginians on their own soil. No Greek, so far as we know, had ever conceived the like scheme before; no one certainly had ever executed it. In the memory of man, the African territory of Carthage had never been visited by hostile foot. It was known that the Carthaginians would be not only unprepared to meet an attack at home, but unable even to imagine it as practicable. It was known that their territory was rich, and their African subjects harshly treated, discontented, and likely to seize the first opportunity for revolting. The landing of any hostile force near Carthage would strike such a blow, as at least to cause the recall of the Carthaginian armament in Sicily, and thus relieve Syracuse; perhaps the consequences of it might be yet greater.

How to execute the scheme was the grand difficulty—for the Carthaginians were superior not merely on land, but also at sea. Agathoklês had no chance except by keeping his purpose secret, and even unsuspected. He fitted out an

¹ Diodor. xix. 110.

armament, announced as about to sail forth from Syracuse on a secret expedition, against some unknown town on the Sicilian coast. He selected for this purpose his best troops, especially his horsemen, few of whom had been slain at the battle of the Himera: he could not transport horses, but he put the horsemen aboard with their saddles and bridles, entertaining full assurance that he could procure horses in Africa. In selecting soldiers for his expedition, he was careful to take one member from many different families, to serve as hostage for the fidelity of those left behind. He liberated, and enrolled among his soldiers, many of the strongest and most resolute slaves. To provide the requisite funds, his expedients were manifold; he borrowed from merchants, seized the money belonging to orphans, stripped the women of their precious ornaments, and even plundered the richest temples. By all these proceedings, the hatred as well as fear towards him was aggravated, especially among the more opulent families. Agathoklēs publicly proclaimed, that the siege of Syracuse, which the Carthaginians were now commencing, would be long and terrible—that he and his soldiers were accustomed to hardships and could endure them, but that those who felt themselves unequal to the effort might retire with their properties while it was yet time. Many of the wealthier families—to a number stated as 1600 persons—profited by this permission; but as they were leaving the city, Agathoklēs set his mercenaries upon them, slew them all, and appropriated their possessions to himself.¹ By such tricks and enormities, he provided funds enough for an armament of sixty ships, well filled with soldiers. Not one of these soldiers knew where they were going; there was a general talk about the madness of Agathoklēs; nevertheless such was their confidence in his bravery and military resource, that they obeyed his orders without asking questions. To act as viceroy of Syracuse during his own absence, Agathoklēs named Antander his brother, aided by an Ætolian officer named Erymnon.²

The armament was equipped and ready, without any suspicion on the part of the Carthaginian fleet blockading the harbour. It happened one day that the approach of some corn-ships seduced this fleet into a pursuit; the mouth of the harbour being thus left unguarded, Agathoklēs took the opportunity of striking with his armament into the open sea. As soon as the Carthaginian fleet saw him sailing forth, they neglected the corn-ships, and prepared for battle, which they

¹ Diodor. xx. 4, 5; Justin, xxii. 4. Compare Polyænus, v. 3-5.

² Diodor. xx. 4-16.

presumed that he was come to offer. To their surprise, he stood out to sea as fast as he could; they then pushed out in pursuit of him, but he had already got a considerable advance and strove to keep it. Towards nightfall however they neared him so much, that he was only saved by the darkness. During the night he made considerable way; but on the next day there occurred an eclipse of the sun so nearly total, that it became perfectly dark, and the stars were visible. The mariners were so terrified at this phenomenon, that all the artifice and ascendancy of Agathoklès were required to inspire them with new courage. At length, after six days and nights, they approached the coast of Africa. The Carthaginian ships had pursued them at a venture, in the direction towards Africa; and they appeared in sight just as Agathoklès was nearing the land. Strenuous efforts were employed by the mariners on both sides to touch land first; Agathoklès secured that advantage, and was enabled to put himself into such a posture of defence that he repulsed the attack of the Carthaginian ships, and secured the disembarkation of his own soldiers, at a point called the Latomiæ or Stone-quarries.¹

After establishing his position ashore, and refreshing his soldiers, the first proceeding of Agathoklès was to burn his vessels; a proceeding which seemed to carry an air of desperate boldness. Yet in truth the ships were now useless—for, if he was unsuccessful on land they were not enough to enable him to return in the face of the Carthaginian fleet; they were even worse than useless, since, if he retained them, it was requisite that he should leave a portion of his army to guard them, and thus enfeeble his means of action for the really important achievements on land. Convening his soldiers in assembly near the ships, he first offered a sacrifice to Dêmêtêr and Persëphonê—the patron goddesses of Sicily, and of Syracuse in particular. He then apprised his soldiers, that during the recent crossing and danger from the Carthaginian pursuers, he had addressed a vow to these goddesses—engaging to make a burnt-offering of his ships in their honour, if they would preserve him safe across to Africa. The goddesses had granted this boon; they had further, by favourably responding to the sacrifice just offered, promised full success to his African projects; it became therefore incumbent on him to fulfil his vow with exactness. Torches being now brought, Agathoklès

¹ Diodor. xx. 6. Procopius, Bell. Vand. i. 15. It is here stated, that for nine days' march eastward from Carthage, as far as Juka, the land is παντελῶς ἀλίμενος.

took one in his hand, and mounted on the stern of the admiral's ship, directing each of the trierarchs to do the like on his own ship. All were set on fire simultaneously, amidst the sound of trumpets, and the mingled prayers and shouts of the soldiers.¹

Though Agathoklēs had succeeded in animating his soldiers with a factitious excitement, for the accomplishment of this purpose, yet so soon as they saw the conflagration decided and irrevocable—thus cutting off all their communication with home—their spirits fell, and they began to despair of their prospects. Without allowing them time to dwell upon the novelty of the situation, Agathoklēs conducted them at once against the nearest Carthaginian town, called Megalē-Polis.² His march lay for the most part through a rich territory in the highest cultivation. The passing glance which we thus obtain into the condition of the territory near Carthage is of peculiar interest; more especially when contrasted with the desolation of the same coast, now and for centuries past. The corn-land, the plantations both of vines and olives, the extensive and well-stocked gardens, the size and equipment of the farm-buildings, the large outlay for artificial irrigation, the agreeable country-houses belonging to wealthy Carthaginians, &c., all excited the astonishment, and stimulated the cupidity, of Agathoklēs and his soldiers. Moreover, the towns were not only very numerous, but all open and unfortified, except Carthage itself and a few others on the coast.³ The Carthaginians, besides having little fear of invasion by sea, were disposed to mistrust their subject

¹ This striking scene is described by Diodorus, xx. 7 (compare Justin, xxii. 6), probably enough copied from Kallias, the companion and panegyrist of Agathoklēs: see Diodor. xxi. Fragm. p. 281.

² Megalē-Polis is nowhere else mentioned—nor is it noticed by Forbiger in his list of towns in the Carthaginian territory (Handbuch der Alten Geographie, sect. 109).

Dr. Barth (Wanderungen auf den Küsten Ländern des Mittelmeeres, vol. i. p. 131-133) supposes that Agathoklēs landed at an indentation of the coast on the western face of that projecting tongue of land which terminates in Cape Bon (Promontorium Mercurii), forming the eastern boundary of the Gulf of Carthage. There are stone quarries here, of the greatest extent as well as antiquity. Dr. Barth places Megalē-Polis not far off from this spot, on the same western face of the projecting land, and near the spot afterwards called Misua.

A map, which I have placed in the Appendix, will convey to the reader some idea of the Carthaginian territory.

³ Justin, xxii. 5. "Huc accedere, quod urbes castellaque Africæ non muris cinctæ, non in montibus positæ sint: sed in planis campis sine ullis munimentis jaceant: quas omnes metu excidii facile ad belli societatem perlici posse."

cities, which they ruled habitually with harshness and oppression.¹ The Liby-Phenicians appear to have been unused to arms—a race of timid cultivators and traffickers, accustomed to subjection and practised in the deceit necessary for lightening it.² Agathoklês, having marched through this land of abundance, assaulted Megalê-Polis without delay. The inhabitants, unprepared for attack, distracted with surprise and terror, made little resistance. Agathoklês easily took the town, abandoning both the persons of the inhabitants and all the rich property within, to his soldiers; who enriched themselves with a prodigious booty both from town and country—furniture, cattle, and slaves. From hence he advanced farther southward to the town called Tunês (the modern Tunis, at the distance of only fourteen miles south-west of Carthage itself), which he took by storm in like manner. He fortified Tunês as a permanent position; but he kept his main force united in camp, knowing well that he should presently have an imposing army against him in the field, and severe battles to fight.³

¹ Seven centuries and more after these events, we read that the Vandal king Genseric conquered Africa from the Romans—and that he demolished the fortifications of all the other towns except Carthage alone—from the like feeling of mistrust. This demolition materially facilitated the conquest of the Vandal kingdom by Belisarius, two generations afterwards (Procopius, *Bell. Vandal.* i. 5; i. 15).

² Livy (xxix. 25), in recounting the landing of Scipio in the Carthaginian territory in the latter years of the second Punic war, says, “*Emporia ut peterent, gubernatoribus edixit. Fertilissimus ager, eoque abundans omnium copiâ rerum est regio, et imbelles (quod plerumque in uberi agro evenit) barbari sunt: priusque quam Carthagine subveniretur, opprimi videbantur posse.*”

About the harshness of the Carthaginian rule over their African subjects, see Diodor. xi. 77; Polyb. i. 72. In reference to the above passage of Polybius, however, we ought to keep in mind—That in describing this harshness, he speaks with *express and exclusive reference* to the conduct of the Carthaginians towards their subjects during the first Punic war (against Rome), when the Carthaginians themselves were hard pressed by the Romans and required everything that they could lay hands upon for self-defence. This passage of Polybius has been sometimes cited as if it attested the *ordinary* character and measure of Carthaginian dominion; which is contrary to the intention of the author.

³ Diodor. xx. 8. Compare Polybius, i. 29, where he describes the first invasion of the Carthaginian territory by the Roman consul Regulus. Tunês was 120 stadia or about fourteen miles south-east of Carthage (Polyb. i. 67). The Tab. Peut. reckons it only ten miles. It was made the central place for hostile operations against Carthage, both by Regulus in the first Punic war (Polyb. i. 30),—by Matho and Spendius, in the rebellion of the mercenary soldiers and native Africans against Carthage, which followed on the close of the first Punic war (Polyb. i. 73)—and by the revolted Libyans in 396 B.C. (Diodor. xiv. 77).

The Carthaginian fleet had pursued Agathoklês during his crossing from Syracuse, in perfect ignorance of his plans. When he landed in Africa, on their own territory, and even burnt his fleet, they at first flattered themselves with the belief that they held him prisoner. But as soon as they saw him commence his march in military array against Megalê-Polis, they divined his real purposes, and were filled with apprehension. Carrying off the brazen prow ornaments of his burnt and abandoned ships, they made sail for Carthage, sending forward a swift vessel to communicate first what had occurred. Before this vessel arrived, however, the landing of Agathoklês had been already made known at Carthage, where it excited the utmost surprise and consternation; since no one supposed that he could have accomplished such an adventure without having previously destroyed the Carthaginian army and fleet in Sicily. From this extreme dismay they were presently relieved by the arrival of the messengers from their fleet; whereby they learnt the real state of affairs in Sicily. They now made the best preparations in their power to resist Agathoklês. Hanno and Bomilkar, two men of leading families, were named generals conjointly.

They were bitter political rivals,—but this very rivalry was by some construed as an advantage, since each would serve as a check upon the other, and as a guarantee to the state; or, what is more probable, each had a party sufficiently strong to prevent the separate election of the other.¹ These two generals, unable to wait for distant succours, led out the native forces of the city, stated at 40,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, derived altogether from citizens and residents—with 2000 war-chariots. They took post on an eminence (somewhere between Tunês and Carthage) not far from Agathoklês; Bomilkar commanding on the left, where the ground was so difficult that he was unable to extend his front, and was obliged to admit an unusual depth of files; while Hanno was on the right, having in his front rank the Sacred Band of Carthage, a corps of 2500 distinguished citizens, better armed and braver than the rest. So much did the Carthaginians outnumber the invaders—and so confident were they of victory—that they carried with them 20,000 pairs of handcuffs for their anticipated prisoners.²

Diodorus places Tunês at the distance of 2000 stadia from Carthage, which must undoubtedly be a mistake. He calls it *White Tunês*; an epithet drawn from the chalk cliffs adjoining.

¹ Diodor. xx. 10.

² Diodor. xx. 10–13. See, respecting the Sacred Band of Carthage

Agathoklès placed himself on the left, with 1000 chosen hoplites round him to combat the Sacred Band ; the command of his right he gave to his son Archagathus. His troops—Syracusans, miscellaneous mercenary Greeks, Campanians or Samnites, Tuscans, and Gauls—scarcely equalled in numbers one-half of the enemy. Some of the ships' crews were even without arms—a deficiency which Agathoklès could supply only in appearance, by giving to them the leather cases or wrappers of shields, stretched out upon sticks. The outstretched wrappers thus exhibited looked from a distance like shields ; so that these men, stationed in the rear, had the appearance of a reserve of hoplites. As the soldiers however were still discouraged, Agathoklès tried to hearten them up by another device yet more singular, for which indeed he must have made deliberate provision beforehand. In various parts of the camp, he let fly a number of owls, which perched upon the shields and helmets of the soldiers. These birds, the favourite of Athênê, were supposed and generally asserted to promise victory ; the minds of the soldiers are reported to have been much reassured by the sight.

The Carthaginian war-chariots and cavalry, which charged first, made little or no impression ; but the infantry of their right pressed the Greeks seriously. Especially Hanno, with the Sacred Band around him, behaved with the utmost bravery and forwardness, and seemed to be gaining advantage, when he was unfortunately slain. His death not only discouraged his own troops, but became fatal to the army, by giving opportunity for treason to his colleague Bomilkar. This man had long secretly meditated the project of rendering himself despot of Carthage. As a means of attaining that end, he deliberately sought to bring reverses upon her ; and no sooner had he heard of Hanno's death, than he gave orders for his own wing to retreat. The Sacred Band, though fighting with unshaken valour, were left unsupported, attacked in rear as well as front, and compelled to give way along with the rest. The whole (which was nearly cut to pieces by Timoleon at the battle of the Krimesus), Diodor. xvi. 80, 81 ; also this History, vol. xi. chap. lxxxv.

The amount of native or citizen-force given here by Diodorus (40,000 foot and 1000 horse) seems very great. Our data for appreciating it however are lamentably scanty ; and we ought to expect a large total. The population of Carthage is said to have been 700,000 souls ; even when it was besieged by the Romans in the third Punic war, and when its power was prodigiously lessened (Strabo, xvii. p. 833). Its military magazines, even in that reduced condition, were enormous,—as they stood immediately previous to their being given up to the Romans, under the treacherous delusions held out by Rome.

Carthaginian army was defeated and driven back to Carthage. Their camp fell into the hands of Agathoklès, who found among their baggage the very handcuffs which they had brought for fettering their expected captives.¹

This victory made Agathoklès for the time master of the open country. He transmitted the news to Sicily, by a boat of thirty oars, constructed expressly for the purpose—since he had no ships of his own remaining. Having fortified Tunès, and established it as his central position, he commenced operations along the eastern coast (Zeugitana and Byzakium, as the northern and southern portions of it were afterwards denominated by the Romans) against the towns dependent on Carthage.²

In that city, meanwhile, all was terror and despondency in consequence of the recent defeat. It was well known that the African subjects generally entertained nothing but fear and hatred towards the reigning city. Neither the native Libyans or Africans,—nor the mixed race called Liby-Phenicians, who inhabited the towns³—could be depended on if their services were really needed. The distress of the Carthaginians took the form of religious fears and repentance. They looked back with remorse on the impiety of their past lives, and on their omissions of duty towards the gods. To the Tyrian Hêraklès, they had been slack in transmitting the dues and presents required by their religion; a backwardness which they now endeavoured to make up by sending envoys to Tyre, with prayers and supplications, with rich presents, and especially with models in gold and silver of their sacred temples and shrines. Towards Kronus, or Moloch, they also felt that they had conducted themselves sinfully. The worship acceptable to that god required the sacrifice of young children, born of free and opulent parents, and even the choice child of the family. But it was now found out, on investigation, that many parents had recently put a fraud upon the god, by surreptitiously buying poor children, feeding them well, and then sacrificing them as their own. This discovery seemed at once to explain why Kronus had become offended, and what had brought upon them the recent defeat. They made an emphatic atonement, by selecting 200 children from the most illustrious families in Carthage, and offering them up to Kronus at a great public sacrifice; besides which, 300 parents, finding themselves

¹ Diodor. xx. 12. The loss of the Carthaginians was differently given—some authors stated it at 1000 men—others at 6000. The loss in the army of Agathoklès was stated at 200 men.

² Diodor. xx. 17.

³ Diodor. xx. 55.

denounced for similar omissions in the past, displayed their repentance by voluntarily immolating their own children for the public safety. The statue of Kronus,—placed with outstretched hands to receive the victim tendered to him, with fire immediately underneath,—was fed at that solemnity certainly with 200, and probably with 500, living children.¹ By this monstrous holocaust the full religious duty being discharged, and forgiveness obtained from the god, the mental distress of the Carthaginians was healed.

Having thus relieved their consciences on the score of religious obligation, the Carthaginians despatched envoys to Hamilkar in Sicily, acquainting him with the recent calamity, desiring him to send a reinforcement, and transmitting to him the brazen prow ornaments taken from the ships of Agathoklès. They at the same time equipped a fresh army, with which they marched forth to attack Tunes. Agathoklès had fortified that town, and established a strong camp before it; but he had withdrawn his main force to prosecute operations against the maritime towns on the eastern coast of the territory of Carthage. Among these towns, he first attacked Neapolis with success, granting to the inhabitants favourable terms. He then

¹ Diodor. xx. 14. *ἡτιῶντο δὲ καὶ τὸν Κρόνον αὐτοῖς ἐναντιοῦσθαι, καθόσον ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν χρόνοις θύοντες τούτῳ τῷ θεῷ τῶν υἱῶν τοὺς κρατίστους, ὕστερον ὠνούμενοι λάθρα παῖδας καὶ θρέψαντες ἐπεμπον ἐπὶ τὴν θυσίαν· καὶ ζητήσεως γενομένης, εὐρέθησάν τινες τῶν καθιερουργημένων ὑποβολιμαῖοι γεγονότες· τούτων δὲ λαβόντες ἔννοϊαν, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους πρὸς τοῖς τεύχεσιν ὀρώντες στρατοπεδεύοντας, ἐδεισιδαιμόνουν ὡς καταλελυκότες τὰς πατρῶους τῶν θεῶν τιμὰς· διορθώσασθαι δὲ τὰς ἀγνοίας σπεύδοντες, διακοσίους μὲν τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων παίδων προκρίναντες ἔθυσαν δημοσίᾳ· ἄλλοι δ' ἐν διαβολαῖς ὄντες, ἑκουσίως ἑαυτοὺς ἔδοσαν, οὐκ ἐλάττους ὄντες τριακοσίῳ· ἦν δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀνδριὰς Κρόνου χαλκοῦς, ἐκτετακὼς τὰς χεῖρας ὑπτίλας ἐγκεκλιμένας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, ὥστε τὸν ἐπιτεθέντα τῶν παίδων ἀποκυλίσθαι καὶ πίπτειν εἰς τι χάσμα πλήρες πυρός.* Compare Festus ap. Lactantium, Inst. Div. i. 21; Justin, xviii. 6, 12.

In this remarkable passage (the more remarkable because so little information concerning Carthaginian antiquity has reached us), one clause is not perfectly clear, respecting the three hundred who are said to have voluntarily *given themselves up*. Diodorus means (I apprehend) as Eusebius understood it, that these were fathers who gave up *their children* (not themselves) to be sacrificed. The victims here mentioned as sacrificed to Kronus were children, not adults (compare Diodor. xiii. 86); nothing is here said about adult victims. Wesseling in his note adheres to the literal meaning of the words, dissenting from Eusebius: but I think that the literal meaning is less in harmony with the general tenor of the paragraph. Instances of self-devotion, by persons torn with remorse, are indeed mentioned: see the case of Imilkon, Diodor xiv 76; Justin, xix. 3.

We read in the Fragment of Ennius—"Poeni sunt soliti suos sacrificare puellios:" see the chapter iv. of Münter's work, *Religion der Karthager*, on this subject.

advanced farther southwards towards Adrumetum, of which he commenced the siege, with the assistance of a neighbouring Libyan prince named Elymas, who now joined him. While Agathoklēs was engaged in the siege of Adrumetum, the Carthaginians attacked his position at Tunês, drove his soldiers out of the fortified camp into the town, and began to batter the defences of the town itself. Apprised of this danger while besieging Adrumetum, but nevertheless reluctant to raise the siege,—Agathoklēs left his main army before it, stole away with only a few soldiers and some camp-followers, and conducting them to an elevated spot—half-way between Adrumetum and Tunês, yet visible from both—he caused them to kindle at night upon this eminence a prodigious number of fires.¹ The effect of these fires, seen from Adrumetum on one side and from the army before Tunês on the other, was, to produce the utmost terror at both places. The Carthaginians besieging Tunês fancied that Agathoklēs with his whole army was coming to attack them, and forthwith abandoned the siege in disorder, leaving their engines behind. The defenders of Adrumetum, interpreting these fires as evidence of a large reinforcement on its way to join the besieging army, were so discouraged that they surrendered the town on capitulation.²

¹ Diodor. xx. 17. *λάθρα προσῆλθεν ἐπὶ τινὰ τόπον ὀρεινόν, ὅθεν δρᾶσθαι δυνατὸν ἦν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀδρυμητίνων καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων τῶν Τύνητα πολιορκούντων· νυκτὸς δὲ συντάξας τοῖς στρατιώταις ἐπὶ πολλὸν τόπον πυρὰ καλεῖν, δόξαν ἐποίησε, τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις, ὡς μετὰ μεγάλης δυνάμεως ἐπ' αὐτοὺς πορευόμενος, τοῖς δὲ πολιορκουμένοις, ὡς ἄλλης δυνάμεως ἄρᾳς τοῖς πολεμοῖς εἰς συμμαχίαν παραγεγεννημένης.*

² Diodor. xx. 17. The incident here recounted by Diodorus is curious, but quite distinct and intelligible. He had good authorities before him in his history of Agathoklēs. If true, it affords an evidence for determining, within some limits, the site of the ancient Adrumetum, which Mannert and Shaw place at Herkla—while Forbiger and Dr. Barth put it near the site of the modern port called Susa, still more to the southward, and at a prodigious distance from Tunis. Other authors have placed it at Hamamat, more to the northward than Herkla, and nearer to Tunis.

Of these three sites, Hamamat is the only one which will consist with the narrative of Diodorus. Both the others are too distant. Hamamat is about forty-eight English miles from Tunis (see Barth, p. 184, with his note). This is as great a distance (if not too great) as can possibly be admitted; both Herkla and Susa are very much more distant, and therefore out of the question.

Nevertheless, the other evidence known to us tends apparently to place Adrumetum at Susa, and not at Hamamat (see Barth, p. 142-154; Forbiger, Handb. Geog. p. 845). It is therefore probable that the narrative of Diodorus is not true, or must apply to some other place on the coast (possibly Neapolis, the modern Nabel) taken by Agathoklēs, and not to Adrumetum.

By this same stratagem—if the narrative can be trusted—Agathoklēs both relieved Tunē, and acquired possession of Adrumetum. Pushing his conquest yet farther south, he besieged and took Thapsus, with several other towns on the coast to a considerable distance southward.¹ He also occupied and fortified the important position called Aspis, on the south-east of the headland Cape Bon, and not far distant from it; a point convenient for maritime communication with Sicily.²

By a series of such acquisitions, comprising in all not less than 200 dependencies of Carthage, Agathoklēs became master along the eastern coast.³ He next endeavoured to subdue the towns in the interior, into which he advanced as far as several days' march. But he was recalled by intelligence from his soldiers at Tunē, that the Carthaginians had marched out again to attack them, and had already retaken some of his conquests. Returning suddenly by forced marches, he came upon them by surprise, and drove in their advanced parties with considerable loss; while he also gained an important

¹ Diodor. xx. 17.

² Strabo, xvii. p. 834. Solinus (c. 30) talks of Aspis as founded by the *Siculi*; Aspis (called by the Romans Clypea), being on the eastern side of Cape Bon, as more convenient for communication with Sicily than either Carthage, or Tunis, or any part of the Gulf of Carthage, which was on the western side of Cape Bon. To get round that headland is, even at the present day, a difficult and uncertain enterprise for navigators: see the remarks of Dr. Barth, founded partly on his own personal experience (*Wanderungen auf den Küstenländern des Mittelmeeres*, i. p. 196). A ship coming from Sicily to Aspis was not under the necessity of getting round the headland.

In the case of Agathoklēs, there was a further reason for establishing his maritime position at Aspis. The Carthaginian fleet was superior to him at sea; accordingly they could easily interrupt his maritime communication from Sicily with Tunis, or with any point in the Gulf of Carthage. But it was not so easy for them to watch the coast at Aspis; for in order to do this, they must get from the Gulf round Cape Bon.

³ Diodor. xx. 17. The Roman consul Regulus, when he invaded Africa during the first Punic war, is said to have acquired, either by capture or voluntary adhesion, two hundred dependent cities of Carthage (Appian, *Punica*, c. 3). Respecting the prodigious number of towns in Northern Africa, see the very learned and instructive work of Mövers, *Die Phönikier*, vol. ii. p. 454 *seqq.* Even at the commencement of the third Punic war, when Carthage was so much reduced in power, she had still three hundred cities in Libya (Strabo, xvii. p. 833). It must be confessed that the name cities or towns (πόλεις) was used by some authors very vaguely. Thus Poseidonius ridiculed the affirmation of Polybius (Strabo, iii. p. 162), that Tiberius Gracchus had destroyed three hundred πόλεις of the Celtiberians; Strabo censures others who spoke of one thousand πόλεις of the Iberians. Such a number could only be made good by including large κῶμαι.

victory over the Libyan prince Elymas, who had rejoined the Carthaginians, but was now defeated and slain.¹ The Carthaginians, however, though thus again humbled and discouraged, still maintained the field, strongly entrenched, between Carthage and Tunês.

Meanwhile the affairs of Agathoklês at Syracuse had taken a turn unexpectedly favourable. He had left that city blocked up partially by sea and with a victorious enemy encamped near it; so that supplies found admission with difficulty. In this condition, Hamilkar, commander of the Carthaginian army, received from Carthage the messengers announcing their recent defeat in Africa; yet also bringing the brazen prow ornaments taken from the ships of Agathoklês. He ordered the envoys to conceal the real truth, and to spread abroad news that Agathoklês had been destroyed with his armament; in proof of which he produced the prow ornaments,—an undoubted evidence that the ships had really been destroyed. Sending envoys with these evidences into Syracuse, to be exhibited to Antander and the other authorities, Hamilkar demanded from them the surrender of the city, under promise of safety and favourable terms; at the same time marching his army close up to it, with the view of making an attack. Antander with others, believing the information and despairing of successful resistance, were disposed to comply; but Erymnôn the Ætolian insisted on holding out until they had fuller certainty. This resolution Antander adopted. At the same time, mistrusting those citizens of Syracuse who were relatives or friends of the exiles without, he ordered them all to leave the city immediately with their wives and families. No less than 8000 persons were expelled under this mandate. They were consigned to the mercy of Hamilkar, and his army without; who not only suffered them to pass, but treated them with kindness. Syracuse was now a scene of aggravated wretchedness and despondency; not less from this late calamitous expulsion, than from the grief of those who believed that their relatives in Africa had perished with Agathoklês. Hamilkar had brought up his battering-engines, and was preparing to assault the town, when Nearchus, the messenger from Agathoklês, arrived from Africa after a voyage of five days, having under favour of darkness escaped, though only just escaped, the blockading squadron. From him the Syracusan government learnt the real truth, and the victorious position of Agathoklês. There was no further talk of capitulation; Hamilkar—having tried a

¹ Diodor. xx. 17, 18.

partial assault, which was vigorously repulsed,—withdrew his army, and detached from it a reinforcement of 5000 men to the aid of his countrymen in Africa.¹

During some months, he seems to have employed himself in partial operations for extending the Carthaginian dominion throughout Sicily. But at length he concerted measures with the Syracusan exile Deinokratês, who was at the head of a numerous body of his exiled countrymen, for a renewed attack upon Syracuse. His fleet already blockaded the harbour, and he now with his army, stated as 120,000 men, destroyed the neighbouring lands, hoping to starve out the inhabitants. Approaching close to the walls of the city, he occupied the Olympieion, or temple of Zeus Olympius, near the river Anapus and the interior coast of the Great Harbour. From hence—probably under the conduct of Deinokratês and the other exiles, well acquainted with the ground—he undertook by a night-march to ascend the circuitous and difficult mountain track, for the purpose of surprising the fort called Euryalus, at the highest point of Epipolæ, and the western apex of the Syracusan lines of fortification. This was the same enterprise, at the same hour, and with the same main purpose, as that of Demosthenês during the Athenian siege, after he had brought the second armament from Athens to the relief of Nikias.² Even Demosthenês, though conducting his march with greater precaution than Hamilkar, and successful in surprising the fort of Euryalus, had been driven down again with disastrous loss. Moreover, since his time, this fort Euryalus, instead of being left detached, had been embodied by the elder Dionysius as an integral portion of the fortifications of the city. It formed the apex or point of junction for the two converging walls—one skirting the northern cliff, the other the southern cliff, of Epipolæ.³ The surprise intended by Hamilkar—difficult in the extreme, if at all practicable—seems to have been unskillfully conducted. It was attempted with a confused multitude, incapable of that steady order requisite for night-movements. His troops, losing their way in the darkness, straggled, and even mistook each other for enemies; while the Syracusan guards from Euryalus, alarmed by the noise, attacked them

¹ Diodor. xx. 15, 16.

² See vol. vii. ch. lx. of this History; together with the second Plan of Syracuse, at the end of that volume.

³ For a description of the fortifications added to Syracuse by the elder Dionysius, see vol. x. ch. lxxxii. of this History; also Plan III. at the end of vol. xi.

vigorously and put them to the rout. Their loss, in trying to escape down the steep declivity, was prodigious; and Hamilkar himself, making brave efforts to rally them, became prisoner to the Syracusans. What lent peculiar interest to this incident, in the eyes of a pious Greek, was that it served to illustrate and confirm the truth of prophecy. Hamilkar had been assured by a prophet that he would sup that night in Syracuse; and this assurance had in part emboldened him to the attack, since he naturally calculated on entering the city as a conqueror.¹ He did indeed take his evening meal in Syracuse, literally fulfilling the augury. Immediately after it, he was handed over to the relatives of the slain, who first paraded him through the city in chains, then inflicted on him the worst tortures, and lastly killed him. His head was cut off and sent to Africa.²

The loss and humiliation sustained in this repulse—together with the death of Hamilkar, and the discord ensuing between the exiles under Deinokratês and the Carthaginian soldiers—completely broke up the besieging army. At the same time, the Agrigentines, profiting by the depression both of Carthaginians and exiles, stood forward publicly, proclaiming themselves as champions of the cause of antonomous city government throughout Sicily, under their own presidency, against both the Carthaginians on one side, and the despot Agathoklês on the other. They chose for their general a citizen named Xenodokus, who set himself with vigour to the task of expelling everywhere the mercenary garrisons which held the cities in subjection. He began first with Gela, the city immediately adjoining Agrigentum, found a party of the citizens disposed to aid him, and, in conjunction with them, overthrew the Agathoklean garrison. The Geloans, thus liberated, seconded cordially his efforts to extend the like benefits to others. The popular banner proclaimed by Agrigentum proved so welcome, that many cities eagerly invited her aid to shake off the yoke of the soldiery in their respective citadels, and regain their free governments.³ Enna, Erbessus, Echetla,⁴ Leontini, and Kamarina, were all thus

¹ Diodor. xx. 29, 30. Cicero (Divinat. i. 24) notices this prophecy and its manner of fulfilment; but he gives a somewhat different version of the events preceding the capture of Hamilkar.

² Diodor. xx. 30. τὸν δ' οὖν Ἀμίλκαν οἱ τῶν ἀπολωλότων συγγενεῖς δεδεμένον ἀγαγόντες διὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ δειναῖς αἰκίαις κατ' αὐτοῦ χρησάμενοι, μετὰ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕβρεως ἀνείλον.

³ Diodor. xx. 31. διαβοηθείσης δὲ τῆς τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων ἐπιβολῆς κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν νῆσον, ἐνέπεσεν ὁρμὴ ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

⁴ Enna is nearly in the centre of Sicily; Erbessus is not far to the north-

relieved from the dominion of Agathoklês ; while other cities were in like manner emancipated from the sway of the Carthaginians ; and joined the Agrigentine confederacy. The Agathoklean government at Syracuse was not strong enough to resist such spirited manifestations. Syracuse still continued to be blocked up by the Carthaginian fleet ; though the blockade was less efficacious, and supplies were now introduced more abundantly than before.¹

The ascendancy of Agathoklês was thus rather on the wane in Sicily ; but in Africa, he had become more powerful than ever—not without perilous hazards which brought him occasionally to the brink of ruin. On receiving from Syracuse the head of the captive Hamilkar, he rode forth close to the camp of the Carthaginians, and held it up to their view in triumph ; they made respectful prostration before it, but the sight was astounding and mournful to them.² While they were thus in despondency, however, a strange vicissitude was on the point of putting their enemy into their hands. A violent mutiny broke out in the camp of Agathoklês at Tunês, arising out of a drunken altercation between his son Archagathus and an Ætolian officer named Lykiskus ; which ended in the murder of the latter by the former. The comrades of Lykiskus rose in arms with fury to avenge him, calling for the head of Archagathus. They found sympathy with the whole army ; who seized the opportunity of demanding their arrears of outstanding pay, chose new generals, and took regular possession of Tunês with its defensive works. The Carthaginians, informed of this outbreak, immediately sent envoys to treat with the mutineers, offering to them large presents and double pay in the service of Carthage. Their offer was at first so favourably entertained, that the envoys returned with confident hopes of success ; when Agathoklês, as a last resource, clothed himself in mean garb, and threw himself on the mercy of the soldiers. He addressed them in a pathetic appeal, imploring them not to desert him, and even drew his sword to kill himself before their faces. With such art did he manage this scene, that the feelings of the soldiers underwent a sudden and complete revolution. They not only became reconciled to him, but even greeted him with enthusiasm, calling on him to resume the

east of Agrigentum ; Echetla is placed by Polybius (i. 15) midway between the domain of Syracuse and that of Carthage.

¹ Diodor. xx. 32.

² Diodor. xx. 33. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, περιαλγείς γενόμενοι, καὶ βαρβαρικῶς προσκυνήσαντες, &c.

dress and functions of general, and promising unabated obedience for the future.¹ Agathoklês gladly obeyed the call, and took advantage of their renewed ardour to attack forthwith the Carthaginians; who, expecting nothing less, were defeated with considerable loss.²

In spite of this check, the Carthaginians presently sent a considerable force into the interior, for the purpose of reconquering or regaining the disaffected Numidian tribes. They met with good success in this enterprise; but the Numidians were in the main faithless and indifferent to both the belligerents, seeking only to turn the war to their own profit. Agathoklês, leaving his son in command at Tunês, followed the Carthaginians into the interior with a large portion of his army. The Carthaginian generals were cautious, and kept themselves in strong position. Nevertheless Agathoklês felt confident enough to assail them in their camp; and after great effort, with severe loss on his own side, he gained an indecisive victory. This advantage however was countervailed by the fact, that during the action the Numidians assailed his camp, slew all the defenders, and carried off nearly all the slaves and baggage. The loss on the Carthaginian side fell most severely upon the Greek soldiers in their pay; most of them exiles under Klinon, and some Syracusan exiles. These men behaved with signal gallantry, and were nearly all slain, either during the battle or after the battle, by Agathoklês.³

It had now become manifest, however, to this daring invader, that the force of resistance possessed by Carthage was more than he could overcome—that though humbling and impoverishing her for the moment, he could not bring the war to a triumphant close; since the city itself, occupying the isthmus of a peninsula from sea to sea, and surrounded with the strongest fortifications, could not be besieged except by means far superior to his.⁴ We have already seen, that though he had gained

¹ Compare the description in Tacitus, Hist. ii. 29, of the mutiny in the Vitellian army commanded by Fabius Valens, at Ticinum.

“Postquam immissis lictoribus, Valens coercere seditionem cœptabat, ipsum invadunt (milites), saxa jaciunt, fugientem sequuntur.—Valens, servili veste, apud decurionem equitum tegebatur.” (Presently the feeling changes, by the adroit management of Alphenus Varus, prefect of the camp)—then, “silentio, patientiâ, postremo precibus et lacrymis, veniam quærebant. Ut vero deformis et flens, et præter spem incolumis Valens processit, gaudium, miseratio, favor: versi in lætitiâ (ut est vulgus utroque immodicum) laudantes gratantesque circumdatum aquilis signisque, in tribunal ferunt.”

² Diodor. xx. 34.

³ Diodor. xx. 39.

⁴ Diodor. xx. 59. ‘Ο δὲ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἦν κίνδυνος, ἀπρὸς τοῦ τῆς πόλεως οὐσῆς διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν τευχῶν καὶ τῆς θαλάττης ὀχυρότητα.

victories and seized rich plunder, he had not been able to provide even regular pay for his soldiers, whose fidelity was consequently precarious. Nor could he expect reinforcements from Sicily; where his power was on the whole declining, though Syracuse itself was in less danger than before. He therefore resolved to invoke aid from Ophellas at Kyrênê, and despatched Orthon as envoy for that purpose.¹

To Kyrênê and what was afterwards called its Pentapolis (*i.e.* the five neighbouring Grecian towns, Kyrênê, its port Apollonia, Barka, Teucheira, and Hesperides), an earlier chapter of this History has already been devoted.² Unfortunately information respecting them, for a century and more anterior to Alexander the Great, is almost wholly wanting. Established among a Libyan population, many of whom were domiciliated with the Greeks as fellow-residents, these Kyreneans had imbibed many Libyan habits in war, in peace, and in religion; of which their fine breed of horses, employed both for the festival chariot-matches and in battle, was one example. The Libyan tribes, useful as neighbours, servants, and customers,³ were frequently also troublesome as enemies. In 413 B.C. we hear accidentally that Hesperides was besieged by Libyan tribes, and rescued by some Peloponnesian hoplites on their way to Syracuse during the Athenian siege.⁴ About 401 B.C. (shortly after the close of the Peloponnesian war), the same city was again so hard pressed by the same enemies, that she threw open her citizenship to any Greek new-comer who would aid in repelling them. This invitation was accepted by several of the Messenians, just then expelled from Peloponnesus, and proscribed by the Spartans; they went to Africa, but, becoming involved in intestine warfare among the citizens of Kyrênê, a large proportion of them perished.⁵ Except these scanty notices, we hear nothing about the Greco-Libyan Pentapolis in relation to Grecian affairs, before the time of Alexander. It would appear that the trade with the native African tribes, between the Gulfs called the Greater and Lesser Syrtis was divided between Kyrênê (meaning the Kyrenaic Pentapolis) and Carthage—at a boundary point called the Altars of the Philæni, ennobled by a commemorative legend; immediately east of these Altars was Automolæ,

¹ Diodor. xx. 40.

² See vol. iv. ch. xxvii.

³ See Isokratês, Or. iv. (Philipp.) s. 6, where he speaks of Kyrênê as a spot judiciously chosen for colonisation; the natives near it being not dangerous, but suited for obedient neighbours and slaves.

⁴ Thucyd. vii. 50.

⁵ Pausan. iv. 26; Diodor. xiv. 34.

the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.¹ We cannot doubt that the relations, commercial and otherwise, between Kyrênê and Carthage, the two great emporia on the coast of Africa, were constant and often lucrative—though not always friendly.

In the year 331 B.C., when the victorious Alexander overran Egypt, the inhabitants of Kyrênê sent to tender presents and submission to him, and became enrolled among his subjects.² We hear nothing more about them until the last year of Alexander's life (324 B.C. to 323 B.C.). About that time, the exiles from Kyrênê and Barka, probably enough emboldened by the rescript of Alexander (proclaimed at the Olympic festival of 324 B.C., and directing that all Grecian exiles, except those guilty of sacrilege, should be recalled forthwith), determined to accomplish their return by force. To this end they invited from Krete an officer named Thimbron; who, having slain Harpalus after his flight from Athens (recounted in a previous chapter), had quartered himself in Krete, with the treasure, the ships, and the 6000 mercenaries, brought over from Asia by that satrap.³ Thimbron willingly carried over his army to their assistance, intending to conquer for himself a principality in Libya. He landed near Kyrênê, defeated the Kyrenean forces with great slaughter, and made himself master of Apollonia, the fortified port of that city, distant from it nearly ten miles. The towns of Barka and Hesperides sided with him; so that he was strong enough to force the Kyreneans to a disadvantageous treaty. They covenanted to pay 500 talents, —to surrender to him half of their war-chariots for his ulterior projects—and to leave him in possession of Apollonia. While he plundered the merchants in the harbour, he proclaimed his intention of subjugating the independent Libyan tribes, and probably of stretching his conquests to Carthage.⁴ His schemes were however frustrated by one of his own officers, a Kretan named Mnasiklês; who deserted to the Kyreneans, and encouraged them to set aside the recent convention. Thimbron, after seizing such citizens of Kyrênê as happened to be at Apollonia, attacked Kyrênê itself, but was repulsed; and the Kyreneans were then bold enough to invade the territory of

¹ Strabo, xvii. p. 836; Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. p. 126.

² Arrian, vii. 9, 12; Curtius, iv. 7, 9; Diodor. xvii. 49. It is said that the inhabitants of Kyrênê (exact date unknown) applied to Plato to make laws for them, but that he declined. See Thrice, *Histor. Cyrênês*, p. 191. We should be glad to have this statement better avouched.

³ Diodor. xvii. 108, xviii. 19; Arrian, *De Rebus post Alexandr. vi. apud Photium*, Cod. 92; Strabo, xvii. p. 837.

⁴ Diodor. xviii. 19.

Barka and Hesperides. To aid these two cities, Thimbron moved his quarters from Apollonia; but during his absence, Mnasiklēs contrived to surprise that valuable port; thus mastering at once his base of operations, the station for his fleet, and all the baggage of his soldiers. Thimbron's fleet could not be long maintained without a harbour. The seamen, landing here and there for victuals and water, were cut off by the native Libyans, while the vessels were dispersed by storms.¹

The Kyreneans, now full of hope, encountered Thimbron in the field, and defeated him. Yet though reduced to distress, he contrived to obtain possession of Teucheira; to which port he invoked as auxiliaries 2500 fresh soldiers, out of the loose mercenary bands dispersed near Cape Tænarus in Peloponnesus. This reinforcement again put him in a condition for battle. The Kyreneans on their side also thought it necessary to obtain succour, partly from the neighbouring Libyans, partly from Carthage. They got together a force stated as 30,000 men, with which they met him in the field. But on this occasion they were totally routed, with the loss of all their generals and much of their army. Thimbron was now in the full tide of success; he pressed both Kyrênê and the harbour so vigorously, that famine began to prevail, and sedition broke out among the citizens. The oligarchical men, expelled by the more popular party, sought shelter, some in the camp of Thimbron, some at the court of Ptolemy in Egypt.²

I have already mentioned, that in the partition after the decease of Alexander, Egypt had been assigned to Ptolemy. Seizing with eagerness the opportunity of annexing to it so valuable a possession as the Kyrenaic Pentapolis, this chief sent an adequate force under Ophellas to put down Thimbron and restore the exiles. His success was complete. All the cities in the Pentapolis were reduced; Thimbron, worsted and pursued as a fugitive, was seized in his flight by some Libyans, and brought prisoner to Teucheira; the citizens of which place (by permission of the Olynthian Epikydēs, governor for Ptolemy), first tortured him, and then conveyed him to Apollonia to be hanged. A final visit from Ptolemy himself regulated the affairs of the Pentapolis, which were incorporated with his dominions and placed under the government of Ophellas.³

It was thus that the rich and flourishing Kyrênê, an interesting

¹ Diodor. xvii. 20.

² Diodor. xviii. 21.

³ Arrian, *De Rebus post Alex.* vi. ap. Phot. Cod. 92; Diodor. xviii. 21; Justin, xiii. 6, 20.

portion of the once autonomous Hellenic world, passed like the rest under one of the Macedonian Diadochi. As the proof and guarantee of this new sovereignty, we find erected within the walls of the city, a strong and completely detached citadel, occupied by a Macedonian or Egyptian garrison (like Munychia at Athens), and forming the stronghold of the viceroy. Ten years afterwards (B.C. 312) the Kyreneans made an attempt to emancipate themselves, and besieged this citadel; but being again put down by an army and fleet which Ptolemy despatched under Agis from Egypt,¹ Kyrênê passed once more under the viceroyalty of Ophellas.²

To this viceroy Agathoklês now sent envoys, invoking his aid against Carthage. Ophellas was an officer of consideration and experience. He had served under Alexander, and had married an Athenian wife, Euthydikê,—a lineal descendant from Miltiadês the victor of Marathon, and belonging to a family still distinguished at Athens. In inviting Ophellas to undertake jointly the conquest of Carthage, the envoys proposed that he should himself hold it when conquered. Agathoklês (they said) wished only to overthrow the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily, being well aware that he could not hold that island in conjunction with an African dominion.

To Ophellas,³ such an invitation proved extremely seducing. He was already on the look-out for aggrandisement towards the west, and had sent an exploring nautical expedition along the northern coast of Africa, even to some distance round and beyond the Strait of Gibraltar.⁴ Moreover, to all military

¹ Diodor. xix. 79. Οἱ Κυρηναῖοι. . . . τὴν ἄκραν περιστρατοπέδευσαν, ὡς αὐτίκα μάλα τὴν φρουρὰν ἐκβαλοῦντες, &c.

² Justin (xxii. 7, 4) calls Ophellas "rex Cyrenarum;" but it is noway probable that he had become independent of Ptolemy—as Thrige (Hist. Cyrênês, p. 214) supposes. The expression in Plutarch (Demetrius, 14), 'Οφέλλα τῷ ἄρξαντι Κυρήνης, does not necessarily imply an independent authority.

³ Diodor. xx. 40.

⁴ From an incidental allusion in Strabo (xvii. p. 826), we learn this fact—that Ophellas had surveyed the whole coast of Northern Africa, to the Strait of Gibraltar, and round the old Phenician settlements on the western coast of modern Morocco. Some eminent critics (Grosskurd among them) reject the reading in Strabo—ἀπὸ τοῦ 'Οφέλα (or 'Οφέλλα) περιπλου, which is sustained by a very great preponderance of MSS. But I do not feel the force of their reasons; and the reading which they would substitute has nothing to recommend it. In my judgement, Ophellas, ruling in the Kyrênaiica and indulging aspirations towards conquest westward, was a man both likely to order, and competent to bring about, an examination of the North African coast. The knowledge of this fact may have induced Agathoklês to apply to him,

adventurers, both on sea and on land, the season was one of boundless speculative promise. They had before them not only the prodigious career of Alexander himself, but the successful encroachments of the great officers his successors. In the second distribution, made at Triparadeisus, of the Alexandrine empire, Antipater had assigned to Ptolemy not merely Egypt and Libya, but also an undefined amount of territory west of Libya, to be afterwards acquired ;¹ the conquest of which was known to have been among the projects of Alexander, had he lived longer. To this conquest Ophellas was now specially called, either as the viceroy or the independent equal of Ptolemy, by the invitation of Agathoklēs. Having learnt in the service of Alexander not to fear long marches, he embraced the proposition with eagerness. He undertook an expedition from Kyrênê on the largest scale. Through his wife's relatives, he was enabled to make known his projects at Athens, where, as well as in other parts of Greece, they found much favour. At this season, the Kassandrian oligarchies were paramount not only at Athens, but generally throughout Greece. Under the prevalent degradation and suffering, there was ample ground for discontent, and no liberty of expressing it ; many persons therefore were found disposed either to accept army-service with Ophellas, or to enroll themselves in a foreign colony under his auspices. To set out under the military protection of this powerful chief—to colonise the mighty Carthage, supposed to be already enfeebled by the victories of Agathoklēs—to appropriate the wealth, the fertile landed possessions, and the maritime position, of her citizens—was a prize well calculated to seduce men dissatisfied with their homes, and not well informed of the intervening difficulties.²

Under such hopes, many Grecian colonists joined Ophellas at Kyrênê, some even with wives and children. The total number is stated at 10,000. Ophellas conducted them forth at the head of a well-appointed army of 10,000 infantry, 600

¹ Arrian, *De Rebus post Alex.* 34, ap. Photium, *Cod.* 22. Αἴγυπτον μὲν γὰρ καὶ Λιβύην, καὶ τὴν ἐπέκεινα ταύτης τὴν πολλήν, καὶ ὃ, τι περ ἂν πρὸς τούτοις ὁ δριον ἐπικτήσῃται πρὸς δυομένου ἡλίου, Πτολεμαίου εἶναι.

² Diodor. *xx.* 40. πολλοὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων προθύμως ὑπήκουσαν εἰς τὴν στρατείαν οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, ἔσπευδον κοινωνῆσαι τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, ἐλπίζοντες τὴν τε κρατίστην τῆς Λιβύης κατακληροῦσθαι, καὶ τὸν ἐν Καρχηδόνι διαρπάσειν πλοῦτον.

As to the great encouragement held out to settlers, when a new colony was about to be founded by a powerful state, see Thucyd. *iii.* 93, about Herakleia Trachinia—πᾶς γὰρ τις, Λακεδαιμονίων οἰκίζόντων, θαρσαλέως φει, βαβαίαν νομίζων τὴν πόλιν.

cavalry, and 100 war-chariots ; each chariot carrying the driver and two fighting men. Marching with this miscellaneous body of soldiers and colonists, he reached in eighteen days the post of Automolæ,—the westernmost factory of Kyrênê.¹ From thence he proceeded westward along the shore between the two Syrtes, in many parts a sandy, trackless desert, without wood and almost without water (with the exception of particular points of fertility), and infested by serpents many and venomous. At one time, all his provisions were exhausted. He passed through the territory of the natives called Lotophagi, near the lesser Syrtis ; where the army had nothing to eat except the fruit of the lotus, which there abounded.² Ophellas met with no enemies ; but the sufferings of every kind endured by his soldiers—still more of course by the less hardy colonists and their families—were most distressing. After miseries endured for more than two months, he joined Agathoklēs in the Carthaginian territory ; with what abatement of number, we do not know, but his loss must have been considerable.³

Ophellas little knew the man whose invitation and alliance he had accepted. Agathoklēs at first received him with the warmest protestations of attachment, welcoming the new-comers with profuse hospitality, and supplying to them full means of refreshment and renovation after their past sufferings. Having thus gained the confidence and favourable sympathies of all, he proceeded to turn them to his own purposes. Convening suddenly the most devoted among his own soldiers, he denounced Ophellas as guilty of plotting against his life. They listened to him with the same feelings of credulous rage as the Macedonian soldiers exhibited when Alexander denounced Philotas before them. Agathoklēs then at once called them to arms, set upon Ophellas unawares, and slew him with his

¹ Diodor. xx. 41.

² Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iv. 3, p. 127, ed. Schneider.

The philosopher would hear this fact from some of the Athenians concerned in the expedition.

³ Diodor. xx. 42. See the striking description of the miseries of this same march, made by Cato and his Roman troops after the death of Pompey, in Lucan, Pharsalia, ix. 382-940:—

“Vadimus in campos steriles, exustaque mundi,
Quà nimius Titan, et raræ in fontibus undæ,
Siccaque letiferis squalent serpentibus arva,
Durum iter.”

The entire march of Ophellas must (I think) have lasted longer than two months ; probably Diodorus speaks only of the more distressing or middle portion of it when he says—κατὰ τὴν ὁδοιπορίαν πλεῖον ἢ δύο μῆνας κακοπαθήσαντες, &c. (xx. 42).

more immediate defenders. Among the soldiers of Ophellas, this act excited horror and indignation, no less than surprise ; but Agathoklès at length succeeded in bringing them to terms, partly by deceitful pretexts, partly by intimidation : for this unfortunate army, left without any commander or fixed purpose, had no resource except to enter into his service.¹ He thus found himself (like Antipater after the death of Leonnatus) master of a double army, and relieved from a troublesome rival. The colonists of Ophellas—more unfortunate still, since they could be of no service to Agathoklès—were put by him on board some merchant vessels, which he was sending to Syracuse with spoil. The weather becoming stormy, many of these vessels foundered at sea,—some were driven off and wrecked on the coast of Italy—and a few only reached Syracuse.² Thus miserably perished the Kyrenean expedition of Ophellas ; one of the most commanding and powerful schemes, for joint conquest and colonisation, that ever set out from any Grecian city.

It would have fared ill with Agathoklès, had the Carthaginians been at hand, and ready to attack him in the confusion immediately succeeding the death of Ophellas. It would also have fared yet worse with Carthage, had Agathoklès been in a position to attack her during the terrible sedition excited, nearly at the same time, within her walls by the general Bomilkar.³ This traitor (as has been already stated) had long cherished the design to render himself despot, and had been watching for a favourable opportunity. Having purposely caused the loss of the first battle—fought in conjunction with his brave colleague Hanno, against Agathoklès—he had since carried on the war with a view to his own project (which explains in part the continued reverses of the Carthaginians) ; he now thought that the time was come for openly raising his standard. Availing himself of a military muster in the quarter of the city called Neapolis, he first dismissed the general body of the soldiers, retaining near him only a trusty band of 500 citizens, and 4000 mercenaries. At the head of these, he then fell upon the unsuspecting city ; dividing them into five detachments, and slaughtering indiscriminately the unarmed citizens in the streets, as well as in the great market-place. At first the Carthaginians were astounded and paralysed. Gradually however they took courage, stood upon their defence against the assailants, combated them in the streets, and poured upon them missiles from the house-tops. After a prolonged conflict, the

¹ Diodor. xx. 42 ; Justin, xxii. 7.

² Diodor. xx. 44.

³ Diodor. xx. 43.

partisans of Bomilkar found themselves worsted, and were glad to avail themselves of the mediation of some elder citizens. They laid down their arms on promise of pardon. The promise was faithfully kept by the victors, except in regard to Bomilkar himself; who was hanged in the market-place, having first undergone severe tortures.¹

Though the Carthaginians had thus escaped from an extreme peril, yet the effects of so formidable a conspiracy weakened them for some time against their enemy without; while Agathoklès, on the other hand, reinforced by the army from Kyrênê, was stronger than ever. So elate did he feel, that he assumed the title of King;² following herein the example of the great Macedonian officers, Antigonus, Ptolemy, Seleukus, Lysimachus, and Kassander; the memory of Alexander being now discarded, as his heirs had been already put to death. Agathoklès, already master of nearly all the dependent towns east and south-east of Carthage, proceeded to carry his arms to the north-west of the city. He attacked Utica,—the second city next to Carthage in importance, and older indeed than Carthage itself—situated on the western or opposite shore of the Carthaginian Gulf, and visible from Carthage, though distant from it twenty-seven miles around the Gulf on land.³ The Uticans had hitherto remained faithful to Carthage, in spite of her reverses, and of defection elsewhere.⁴ Agathoklès marched into their territory with such unexpected rapidity (he had hitherto been on the

¹ Diodorus, xx. 44; Justin, xxii. 7. Compare the description given by Appian (Punic. 128) of the desperate defence made by the Carthaginians in the last siege of the city, against the assault of the Romans, from these house-tops and in the streets.

² There are yet remaining coins—'Αγαθοκλέους ασιλέως—the earliest Sicilian coins that bear the name of a prince (Humphreys, Ancient Coins and Medals, p. 50).

³ Strabo, xvii. p. 832; Polyb. i. 73.

⁴ Polybius (i. 82) expressly states that the inhabitants of Utica and of Hippu-Akra (a little farther to the west than Utica) remained faithful to Carthage throughout the hostilities carried on by Agathoklès. This enables us to correct the passage wherein Diodorus describes the attack of Agathoklès upon Utica (xx. 54)—ἐπὶ μὲν Ἰτυκαίους, ἐστράτευσεν ἀφεστηκότας, ἄφνω δὲ αὐτῶν τῇ πόλει προσπεσών, &c. The word ἀφεστηκότας here is perplexing. It must mean that the Uticans had revolted from Agathoklès; yet Diodorus has not before said a word about the Uticans, nor reported that they had either joined Agathoklès, or been conquered by him. Everything that Diodorus has reported hitherto about Agathoklès, relates to operations among the towns east or south-east of Carthage.

It appears to me that the passage ought to stand—ἐπὶ μὲν Ἰτυκαίους ἐστράτευσεν οὐκ ἀφεστηκότας, i. e. from Carthage; which introduces consistency into the narrative of Diodorus himself, while it brings him into harmony with Polybius.

south-east of Carthage, and he now suddenly moved to the north-west of that city), that he seized the persons of three hundred leading citizens, who had not yet taken the precaution of retiring within the city. Having vainly tried to prevail on the Uticans to surrender, he assailed their walls, attaching in front of his battering engines the three hundred Utican prisoners; so that the citizens, in hurling missiles of defence, were constrained to inflict death on their own comrades and relatives. They nevertheless resisted the assault with unshaken resolution; but Agathoklès found means to force an entrance through a weak part of the walls, and thus became master of the city. He made it a scene of indiscriminate slaughter, massacring the inhabitants, armed and unarmed, and hanging up the prisoners. He further captured the town of Hippu-Akra, about thirty miles north-west of Utica, which had also remained faithful to Carthage—and which now, after a brave defence, experienced the like pitiless treatment.¹ The Carthaginians, seemingly not yet recovered from their recent shock, did not interfere, even to rescue these two important places; so that Agathoklès, firmly established in Tunès as a centre of operations, extended his African dominion more widely than ever all round Carthage, both on the coast and in the interior; while he interrupted the supplies of Carthage itself, and reduced the inhabitants to great privations.² He even occupied and fortified strongly a place called Hippagreta, between Utica and Carthage; thus pushing his post within a short distance both east and west of her gates.³

In this prosperous condition of his African affairs, he thought the opportunity favourable for retrieving his diminished ascendancy in Sicily; to which island he accordingly crossed over, with 2000 men, leaving the command in Africa to his son Archagathus. That young man was at first successful, and seemed even in course of enlarging his father's conquests. His general Eumachus overran a wide range of interior Numidia,

¹ Diodor. xx. 54, 55. In attacking Hippu-Akra (otherwise called Hippo-Zarytus, near the Promontorium Pulchrum, the northernmost point of Africa), Agathoklès is said to have got the better in a naval battle—*ναυμαχία περιγεγόμενος*. This implies that he must have got a fleet superior to the Carthaginians even in their own gulf; perhaps ships seized at Utica.

² Diodor. xx. 59.

³ Appian distinctly mentions this place *Hippagreta* as having been fortified by Agathoklès—and distinctly describes it as being between Utica and Carthage (Punic. 110). It cannot therefore be the same place as Hippu-Akra (or Hippo-Zarytus); which was considerably farther from Carthage than Utica was.

capturing Tokæ, Phellinê, Meschelæ, Akris, and another town bearing the same name of Hippy-Akra—and enriching his soldiers with a considerable plunder. But in a second expedition, endeavouring to carry his arms yet farther into the interior, he was worsted in an attack upon a town called Miltinê, and compelled to retreat. We read that he marched through one mountainous region abounding in wild cats—and another, in which there were a great number of apes, who lived in the most tame and familiar manner in the houses with men—being greatly caressed, and even worshipped as gods.¹

The Carthaginians however had now regained internal harmony and power of action. Their senate and their generals were emulous, both in vigour and in provident combinations, against the common enemy. They sent forth 30,000 men, a larger force than they had yet had in the field; forming three distinct camps, under Hanno, Imilkon, and Adherbal, partly in the interior, partly on the coast. Archagathus, leaving a sufficient guard at Tûnes, marched to meet them, distributing his army in three divisions also; two, under himself and Æschrion, besides the corps under Eumachus in the mountainous region. He was however unsuccessful at all points. Hanno contriving to surprise the division of Æschrion, gained a complete victory, wherein Æschrion himself with more than 4000 men were slain. Imilkon was yet more fortunate in his operations against Eumachus, whom he entrapped by simulated flight into an ambuscade, and attacked at such advantage, that the Grecian army was routed and cut off from all retreat. A remnant of them defended themselves for some time on a neighbouring hill, but being without water, nearly all soon perished, from thirst, fatigue, and the sword of the conqueror.²

By such reverses, destroying two-thirds of the Agathoklean army, Archagathus was placed in serious peril. He was obliged to concentrate his force in Tunês, calling in nearly all his outlying detachments. At the same time, those Liby-Phenician cities, and rural Libyan tribes, who had before joined Agathoklês, now detached themselves from him when his power was evidently declining, and made their peace with Carthage. The victorious Carthaginian generals established

¹ Diodor. xx. 57, 58. It is vain to attempt to identify the places mentioned as visited and conquered by Eumachus. Our topographical knowledge is altogether insufficient. This second Hippy-Akra is supposed to be the same as Hippy-Regius; Tokæ may be Tucca Terebinthina, in the south-eastern region or Byzakium.

² Diodor. xx. 59, 60.

fortified camps round Turês, so as to restrain the excursions of Archagathus ; while with their fleet they blocked up his harbour. Presently provisions became short, and much dependency prevailed among the Grecian army. Archagathus transmitted this discouraging news to his father in Sicily, with urgent entreaties that he would come to the rescue.¹

The career of Agathoklês in Sicily, since his departure from Africa, had been chequered, and on the whole unproductive. Just before his arrival in the island,² his generals Leptinês and Demophilus had gained an important victory over the Agrigentine forces commanded by Xenodokus, who were disabled from keeping the field. This disaster was a fatal discouragement both to the Agrigentines, and to the cause which they had espoused as champions—free and autonomous city-government with equal confederacy for self-defence, under the presidency of Agrigentum.³ The outlying cities confederate with Agrigentum were left without military protection, and exposed to the attacks of Leptinês, animated and fortified by the recent arrival of his master Agathoklês. That despot landed at Selinus—subdued Herakleia, Therma, and Kephalaïdion, on or near the northern coast of Sicily—then crossed the interior of the island to Syracuse. In his march he assaulted Kentoripa, having some partisans within, but was repulsed with loss. At Apollonia,⁴ he was also unsuccessful in his first attempt ; but being stung with mortification, he resumed the assault next day, and at length, by great efforts, carried the town. To avenge his loss, which had been severe, he massacred most of the citizens, and abandoned the town to plunder.⁵

From hence he proceeded to Syracuse, which he now revisited after an absence of (apparently) more than two years in Africa. During all this interval, the Syracusan harbour had been watched by a Carthaginian fleet, obstructing the entry of provisions, and causing partial scarcity.⁶ But there was no blockading army on land ; nor had the dominion of Agathoklês, upheld as it was by his brother Antander and his

¹ Diodor. xx. 61.

² Diodor. xx. 56. Ἀγαθοκλῆς δέ, τῆς μάχης ἄρτι γεγενημένης, καταπλεύσας τῆς Σικελίας εἰς Σελινούντα, &c.

³ Diodor. xx. 56. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀκραγαντῖνοι ταύτῃ τῇ συμφορᾷ περιπεσόντες, διέλυσαν ἑαυτῶν μὲν τὴν καλλίστην ἐπιβολήν, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων τὰς τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐλπίδας.

⁴ Apollonia was a town in the interior of the island, somewhat to the north-east of Enna (Cicero, Verr. iii. 43).

⁵ Diodor. xx. 56.

⁶ Diodor. xx. 62.

mercenary force, been at all shaken. His arrival inspired his partisans and soldiers with new courage, while it spread terror throughout most parts of Sicily. To contend with the Carthaginian blockading squadron, he made efforts to procure maritime aid from the Tyrrhenian ports in Italy;¹ while on land, his forces were now preponderant—owing to the recent defeat, and broken spirit, of the Agrigentines. But his prospects were suddenly checked by the enterprising move of his old enemy—the Syracusan exile Deinokratês; who made profession of taking up that generous policy which the Agrigentines had tacitly let fall—announcing himself as the champion of autonomous city-government, and equal confederacy, throughout Sicily. Deinokratês received ready adhesion from most of the cities belonging to the Agrigentine confederacy—all of them who were alarmed by finding that the weakness or fears of their presiding city had left them unprotected against Agathoklês. He was soon at the head of a powerful army—20,000 foot, and 1500 horse. Moreover a large proportion of his army were not citizen militia, but practised soldiers; for the most part exiles, driven from their homes by the distractions and violences of the Agathoklean era.² For military purposes, both he and his soldiers were far more strenuous and effective than the Agrigentines under Xenodokus had been. He not only kept the field against Agathoklês, but several times offered him battle, which the despot did not feel confidence enough to accept. Agathoklês could do no more than maintain himself in Syracuse, while the Sicilian cities generally were put in security against his aggressions.

Amidst this unprosperous course of affairs in Sicily, Agathoklês received messengers from his son, reporting the defeats in Africa. Preparing immediately to revisit that country, he was fortunate enough to obtain a reinforcement of Tyrrhenian ships of war, which enabled him to overcome the Carthaginian blockading squadron at the mouth of the Syracusan harbour. A clear passage to Africa was thus secured for himself, together with ample supplies of imported provisions for the Syracusans.³ Though still unable to combat Deinokratês in the field, Agathoklês was emboldened by his recent naval victory to send forth Leptinês with a force to invade the Agrigentines—the jealous rivals, rather than the allies, of Deinokratês. The Agrigentine army—under the general Xenodokus, whom

¹ Diodor. xx. 61.

² Diodor. xx. 57. καὶ πάντων τούτων ἐν φυγαῖς καὶ μελέταις τοῦ πολεῖν συνεχῶς γεγονότων, &c. ³ Diodor. xx. 61, 62.

Leptinês had before defeated—consisted of citizen militia mustered on the occasion; while the Agathoklean mercenaries, conducted by Leptinês, had made arms a profession, and were used to fighting as well as to hardships.¹ Here, as elsewhere in Greece, we find the civic and patriotic energy trampled down by professional soldiery, and reduced to operate only as an obsequious instrument for administrative details.

Xenodokus, conscious of the inferiority of his Agrigentine force, was reluctant to hazard a battle. Driven to this imprudence by the taunts of his soldiers, he was defeated a second time by Leptinês, and became so apprehensive of the wrath of the Agrigentines, that he thought it expedient to retire to Gela. After a period of rejoicing, for his recent victories by land as well as by sea, Agathoklês passed over to Africa, where he found his son, with the army at Tunês in great despondency and privation, and almost mutiny for want of pay. They still amounted to 6000 Grecian mercenaries, 6000 Gauls, Samnites, and Tyrrhenians—1500 cavalry—and no less than 6000 (if the number be correct) Libyan war-chariots. There were also a numerous body of Libyan allies; faithless time-servers, watching for the turn of fortune. The Carthaginians, occupying strong camps in the vicinity of Tunês, and abundantly supplied, awaited patiently the destroying effects of privation and suffering on their enemies. So desperate was the position of Agathoklês, that he was compelled to go forth and fight. Having tried in vain to draw the Carthaginians down into the plain, he at length attacked them in the full strength of their entrenchments. But, in spite of the most strenuous efforts, his troops were repulsed with great slaughter, and driven back to their camp.²

The night succeeding this battle was a scene of disorder and panic in both camps; even in that of the victorious Carthaginians. The latter, according to the ordinances of their religion, eager to return their heartfelt thanks to the gods for this great victory, sacrificed to them as a choice offering the handsomest prisoners captured.³ During this process, the tent or tabernacle consecrated to the gods, close to the altar as well as to the general's tent, accidentally took fire. The

¹ Diodor. xx. 62.

² Diodor. xx. 64; Justin, xxii. 8.

³ Diodor. xx. 65. See an incident somewhat similar (Herod. vii. 180)—the Persians, in the invasion of Greece by Xerxês, sacrificed the handsomest Grecian prisoner whom they captured on board the first prize-ship that fell into their hands.

tents being formed by mere wooden posts, connected by a thatch of hay or straw both on roof and sides,—the fire spread rapidly, and the entire camp was burnt, together with many soldiers who tried to arrest the conflagration. So distracting was the terror occasioned by this catastrophe, that the whole Carthaginian army for the time dispersed; and Agathoklès, had he been prepared, might have destroyed them. But it happened that at the same hour, his own camp was thrown into utter confusion by a different accident, rendering his soldiers incapable of being brought into action.¹

His position at Tunès had now become desperate. His Libyan allies had all declared against him, after the recent defeat. He could neither continue to hold Tunès, nor carry away his troops to Sicily; for he had but few vessels, and the Carthaginians were masters at sea. Seeing no resource, he resolved to embark secretly with his younger son Herakleidès; abandoning Archagathus and the army to their fate. But Archagathus and the other officers, suspecting his purpose, were thoroughly resolved that the man who had brought them into destruction should not thus slip away and betray them. As Agathoklès was on the point of going aboard at night, he found himself watched, arrested, and held prisoner, by the indignant soldiery. The whole town now became a scene of disorder and tumult, aggravated by the rumour that the enemy were marching up to attack them. Amidst the general alarm, the guards who had been set over Agathoklès, thinking his services indispensable for defence, brought him out with his fetters still on. When the soldiers saw him in this condition, their sentiment towards him again reverted to pity and admiration, notwithstanding his projected desertion; moreover they hoped for his guidance to resist the impending attack. With one voice they called upon the guards to strike off his chains and set him free. Agathoklès was again at liberty. But, insensible to everything except his own personal safety, he presently stole away, leaped unperceived into a skiff, with a few attendants, but without either of his sons,—and was lucky enough to arrive, in spite of stormy November weather, on the coast of Sicily.²

So terrible was the fury of the soldiers, on discovering that

¹ Diodor. xx. 66, 67.

² Diodor. xx. 69; Justin, xxii. 8. . . . τὸ δὲ πλῆθος, ὡς εἶδεν, εἰς ἕλεον ἐτρέπη, καὶ πάντες ἐπεβόων ἀφεῖναι· ὁ δὲ λυθεὶς καὶ μετ' ὀλίγων ἑμβὰς εἰς τὸ πορθμεῖον, ἔλαθεν ἐκπλευσας κατὰ τὴν δύσιν τῆς Πηληιάδος, χειμῶνος ὕψους.

Agathoklês had accomplished his desertion, that they slew both his sons, Archagathus and Herakleidês. No resource was left but to elect new generals, and make the best terms they could with Carthage. They were still a formidable body, retaining in their hands various other towns besides Tunês; so that the Carthaginians, relieved from all fear of Agathoklês, thought it prudent to grant an easy capitulation. It was agreed that all the towns should be restored to the Carthaginians, on payment of 300 talents; that such soldiers as chose to enter into the African service of Carthage, should be received on full pay; but that such as preferred returning to Sicily should be transported thither, with permission to reside in the Carthaginian town of Solus (or Soluntum). On these terms the convention was concluded, and the army finally broken up. Some indeed among the Grecian garrisons, quartered in the outlying posts, being rash enough to dissent and hold out, were besieged and taken by the Carthaginian force. Their commanders were crucified, and the soldiers condemned to rural work as fettered slaves.¹

Thus miserably terminated the expedition of Agathoklês to Africa, after an interval of four years from the time of his landing. By the *vana mirantes*,² who looked out for curious coincidences (probably Timæus), it was remarked that his ultimate flight, with the slaughter of his two sons, occurred exactly on the same day of the year following his assassination of Ophellas.³ Ancient writers extol, with good reason, the bold and striking conception of transferring the war to Africa, at the very moment when he was himself besieged in Syracuse by a superior Carthaginian force. But while admitting the military resource, skill, and energy of Agathoklês, we must not forget that his success in Africa was materially furthered by the treasonable conduct of the Carthaginian general Bomilkar—an accidental coincidence in point of time. Nor is it to be overlooked, that Agathoklês missed the opportunity of turning his first success to account, at a moment when the Carthaginians would probably have purchased his evacuation of Africa by making large concessions to him in Sicily.⁴ He

¹ Diodor. xx. 69.

² Tacit. Annal. i. 9. "Multus hinc ipso de Augusto sermo, plerisque *vana mirantibus*—quod idem dies accepti quondam imperii princeps, et vitæ supremus—quod Nolæ in domo et cubiculo, in quo pater ejus Octavius, vitam finivisset," &c.

³ Diodor. xx. 70.

⁴ This is what Agathoklês might have done, but did not do. Nevertheless, Valerius Maximus (vii. 4, 1) represents him as actually having done

imprudently persisted in the war, though the complete conquest of Carthage was beyond his strength—and though it was still more beyond his strength to prosecute effective war, simultaneously and for a long time, in Sicily and in Africa. The African subjects of Carthage were not attached to her; but neither were they attached to him;—nor, on the long run, did they do him any serious good. Agathoklês is a man of force and fraud—consummate in the use of both. His whole life is a series of successful adventures, and strokes of bold ingenuity to extricate himself from difficulties; but there is wanting in him all predetermined general plan, or measured range of ambition, to which these single exploits might be made subservient.

After his passage from Africa, Agathoklês landed on the western corner of Sicily near the town of Egesta, which was then in alliance with him. He sent to Syracuse for a reinforcement. But he was hard pressed for money; he suspected, or pretended to suspect, the Egestæans of disaffection; accordingly, on receiving his new force, he employed it to commit revolting massacre and plunder in Egesta. The town is reported to have contained 10,000 citizens. Of these Agathoklês caused the poorer men to be for the most part murdered; the richer were cruelly tortured, and even their wives tortured and mutilated, to compel revelations of concealed wealth; the children of both sexes were transported to Italy, and there sold as slaves to the Bruttians. The original population being thus nearly extirpated, Agathoklês changed the name of the town to Dikæopolis, assigning it as a residence to such deserters as might join him.¹ This atrocity, more suitable to Africa² than Greece (where the mutilation of women is almost unheard of), was probably the way in which his savage pride obtained some kind of retaliatory satisfaction for the recent calamity and humiliation in Africa. Under the like sentiment, he perpetrated another deed of blood at Syracuse. Having learnt that the soldiers, whom he had deserted at Tunês, had after his departure put to death his two sons, he gave orders to Antander his brother (viceroy of Syracuse), to massacre all the relatives of those Syracusans it, and praises his sagacity on that ground. Here is an example how little careful these collectors of anecdotes sometimes are about their facts.

¹ Diodor. xx. 71. We do not know what happened afterwards with this town under its new population. But the old name Egesta was afterwards resumed.

² Compare the proceedings of the Greco-Libyan princess Pheretimé (of the Battiad family) at Barka (Herodot. iv. 202).

who had served him in the African expedition. This order was fulfilled by Antander (we are assured) accurately and to the letter. Neither age nor sex—grandsire or infant—wife or mother—were spared by the Agathoklean executioners. We may be sure that their properties were plundered at the same time; we hear of no mutilations.¹

Still Agathoklês tried to maintain his hold on the Sicilian towns which remained to him; but his cruelties as well as his reverses had produced a strong sentiment against him, and even his general Pasiphilus revolted to join Deinokratês. That exile was now at the head of an army stated at 20,000 men, the most formidable military force in Sicily; so that Agathoklês, feeling the inadequacy of his own means, sent to solicit peace, and to offer tempting conditions. He announced his readiness to evacuate Syracuse altogether, and to be content, if two maritime towns on the northern coast of the island—Therma and Kephaloïdion—were assigned to his mercenaries and himself. Under this proposition, Deinokratês, and the other Syracusan exiles, had the opportunity of entering Syracuse, and reconstituting the free city-government. Had Deinokratês been another Timoleon, the city might now have acquired and enjoyed another temporary sunshine of autonomy and prosperity; but his ambition was thoroughly selfish. As commander of this large army, he enjoyed a station of power and licence such as he was not likely to obtain under the reconstituted city-government of Syracuse. He therefore evaded the proposition of Agathoklês, requiring still larger concessions: until at length the Syracusan exiles in his own army (partly instigated by emissaries from Agathoklês himself) began to suspect his selfish projects, and to waver in their fidelity to him. Meanwhile Agathoklês, being repudiated by Deinokratês, addressed himself to the Carthaginians, and concluded a treaty with them, restoring or guaranteeing to them all the possessions that they had ever enjoyed in Sicily. In return for this concession, he received from them a sum of money, and a large supply of corn.²

Relieved from Carthaginian hostility, Agathoklês presently

¹ Diodor. xx. 72. Hippokratês and Epikydhês—those Syracusans who, about a century afterwards, induced Hieronymus of Syracuse to prefer the Carthaginian alliance to the Roman—had resided at Carthage for some time, and served in the army of Hannibal, because their grandfather had been banished from Syracuse as one concerned in killing Archagathus (Polyb. vii. 2).

² Diodor. xx. 78, 79. Some said that the sum of money paid by the Carthaginians was 300 talents. Timæus stated it at 150 talents.

ventured to march against the army of Deinokratês. The latter was indeed greatly superior in strength, but many of his soldiers were now lukewarm or disaffected, and Agathoklês had established among them correspondences upon which he could rely. At a great battle fought near Torgium, many of them went over on the field to Agathoklês, giving to him a complete victory. The army of Deinokratês was completely dispersed. Shortly afterwards a considerable body among them (4000 men, or 7000 men, according to different statements) surrendered to the victor on terms. As soon as they had delivered up their arms, Agathoklês, regardless of his covenant, caused them to be surrounded by his own army, and massacred.¹

It appears as if the recent victory had been the result of a secret and treacherous compact between Agathoklês and Deinokratês; and as if the prisoners massacred by Agathoklês were those of whom Deinokratês wished to rid himself as malcontents; for immediately after the battle, a reconciliation took place between the two. Agathoklês admitted the other as a sort of partner in his despotism; while Deinokratês not only brought into the partnership all the military means and strong posts which he had been two years in acquiring, but also betrayed to Agathoklês the revolted general Pasiphilus, with the town of Gela, occupied by the latter. It is noticed as singular, that Agathoklês, generally faithless and unscrupulous towards both friends and enemies, kept up the best understanding and confidence with Deinokratês to the end of his life.²

The despot had now regained full power at Syracuse, together with a great extent of dominion in Sicily. The remainder of his restless existence was spent in operations of hostility or plunder against more northerly enemies—the Liparæan isles³—the Italian cities and the Bruttians—the island of Korkyra. We are unable to follow his proceedings in detail. He was threatened with a formidable attack⁴ by the Spartan prince Kleonymus, who was invited by the Tarentines to aid them against the Lucanians and Romans. But Kleonymus found enough to occupy him elsewhere, without visiting Sicily. He

¹ Diodor. xx. 89.

² Diodor. xx. 90.

³ Diodor. xx. 101. This expedition of Agathoklês against the Liparæan isles seems to have been described in detail by his contemporary historian the Syracusan Kallias: see the Fragments of that author, in Didot's Fragment. Hist. Græc. vol. ii. p. 383, Fragm. 4.

⁴ Diodor. xx. 104.

collected a considerable force on the coast of Italy, undertook operations with success against the Lucanians, and even captured the town of Thurii. But the Romans, now pushing their intervention even to the Tarentine Gulf, drove him off and retook the town; moreover his own behaviour was so tyrannical and profligate, as to draw upon him universal hatred. Returning from Italy to Korkyra, Kleonymus made himself master of that important island, intending to employ it as a base of operations both against Greece and against Italy.¹ He failed however in various expeditions both in the Tarentine Gulf and the Adriatic. Demetrius Poliorketês and Kassander alike tried to conclude an alliance with him; but in vain.² At a subsequent period, Korkyra was besieged by Kassander with a large naval and military force; Kleonymus then retired (or perhaps had previously retired) to Sparta. Kassander, having reduced the island to great straits, was on the point of taking it, when it was relieved by Agathoklês with a powerful armament. That despot was engaged in operations on the coast of Italy against the Bruttians when his aid to Korkyra was solicited; he destroyed most part of the Macedonian fleet, and then seized the island for himself.³ On returning from this victorious expedition to the Italian coast, where he had left a detachment of his Ligurian and Tuscan mercenaries, he was informed that these mercenaries had been turbulent during his absence, in demanding the pay due to them from his grandson Archagathus. He caused them all to be slain, to the number of 2000.⁴

As far as we can trace the events of the last years of Agathoklês, we find him seizing the towns of Kroton and Hipponia in Italy, establishing an alliance with Demetrius Poliorketês,⁵ and giving his daughter Lanassa in marriage to the youthful Pyrrhus king of Epirus. At the age of seventy-

¹ Diodor. xx. 104; Livy, x. 2. A curious anecdote appears in the Pseudo-Aristotle, *De Mirabilibus* (78), respecting two native Italians, Aulus and Caius, who tried to poison Kleonymus at Tarentum, but were detected and put to death by the Tarentines.

That Agathoklês, in his operations on the coast of southern Italy, found himself in conflict with the Romans, and that their importance was now strongly felt—we may judge by the fact, that the Syracusan Kallias (contemporary and historian of Agathoklês) appears to have given details respecting the origin and history of Rome. See the *Fragments of Kallias*, ap. Didot. *Hist. Græc. Fragm.* vol. ii. p. 383; *Fragm.* 5—and Dionys. *Hal. Ant. Rom.* i. 72.

² Diodor. xx. 105.

³ Diodor. xxi. *Fragm.* 2, p. 265.

⁴ Diodor. xxi. *Fragm.* 3, p. 266.

⁵ Diodor. xxi. *Fragm.* 4, 8, 11, p. 266-273.

two, still in the plenitude of vigour as well as of power, he was projecting a fresh expedition against the Carthaginians in Africa, with two hundred of the largest ships of war, when his career was brought to a close by sickness and by domestic enemies.

He proclaimed as future successor to his dominion, his son, named Agathoklēs; but Archagathus his grandson (son of Archagathus who had perished in Africa), a young prince of more conspicuous qualities, had already been singled out for the most important command, and was now at the head of the army near Ætna. The old Agathoklēs, wishing to strengthen the hands of his intended successor, sent his favoured son Agathoklēs to Ætna, with written orders directing that Archagathus should yield up to him the command. Archagathus, noway disposed to obey, invited his uncle Agathoklēs to a banquet, and killed him; after which he contrived the poisoning of his grandfather the old despot himself. The instrument of his purpose was Mænon; a citizen of Egesta, enslaved at the time when Agathoklēs massacred most of the Egestean population. The beauty of his person procured him much favour with Agathoklēs; but he had never forgotten, and had always been anxious to avenge, the bloody outrage on his fellow-citizens. To accomplish this purpose, the opportunity was now opened to him, together with a promise of protection, through Archagathus. He accordingly poisoned Agathoklēs, as we are told, by means of a medicated quill, handed to him for cleaning his teeth after dinner.¹ Combining together the various accounts, it seems probable that Agathoklēs was at the time sick—that this sickness may have been the reason why he was so anxious to strengthen the position of his intended successor—and that his death was as much the effect of his malady as of the poison. Archagathus, after murdering his uncle, seems by means of his army to have made himself real master of the Syracusan power; while the old despot, defenceless on a sick bed, could do no more than provide for the safety of his Egyptian wife Theoxena and his two young children, by despatching them on shipboard with all his rich moveable treasures to Alexandria. Having secured this object, amidst extreme grief on the part of those around, he expired.²

¹ Diodor. xxi. Fragm. 12, p. 276-278. Neither Justin (xxiii. 2), nor Trogus before him (as it seems from the Prologue), alludes to poison. He represents Agathoklēs as having died by a violent distemper. He notices however the bloody family feud, and the murder of the uncle by the nephew.

² Justin (xxiii. 2) dwells pathetically on this last parting between

The great lines in the character of Agathoklês are well marked. He was of the stamp of Gelon and the elder Dionysius—a soldier of fortune, who raised himself from the meanest beginnings to the summit of political power—and who, in the acquisition as well as maintenance of that power, displayed an extent of energy, perseverance, and military resource, not surpassed by any one, even of the generals formed in Alexander's school. He was an adept in that art at which all aspiring men of his age aimed—the handling of mercenary soldiers for the extinction of political liberty and security at home, and for predatory aggrandisement abroad. I have already noticed the opinion delivered by Scipio Africanus—that the elder Dionysius and Agathoklês were the most daring, sagacious, and capable men of action within his knowledge.¹ Apart from this enterprising genius, employed in the service of unmeasured personal ambition, we know nothing of Agathoklês except his sanguinary, faithless, and nefarious dispositions; in which attributes also he stands pre-eminent, above all his known contemporaries, and above nearly all predecessors.² Notwithstanding his often-proved perfidy, he

Agathoklês and Theoxena. It is difficult to reconcile Justin's narrative with that of Diodorus; but on this point, as far as we can judge, I think him more credible than Diodorus.

¹ Polyb. xv. 35. See above in this History, vol. xi. ch. lxxxiii.

² Polybius (ix. 23) says that Agathoklês, though cruel in the extreme at the beginning of his career, and in the establishment of his power, yet became the mildest of men after his power was once established. The latter half of this statement is contradicted by all the particular facts which we know respecting Agathoklês.

As to Timæus the historian, indeed (who had been banished from Sicily by Agathoklês, and who wrote the history of the latter in five books), Polybius had good reason to censure him, as being unmeasured in his abuse of Agathoklês. For Timæus not only recounted of Agathoklês numerous acts of nefarious cruelty—acts of course essentially public, and therefore capable of being known—but also told much scandal about his private habits, and represented him (which is still more absurd) as a man vulgar and despicable in point of ability. See the Fragments of Timæus ap. *Hist. Græc.* ed. Didot, *Fragm.* 144–150.

All, or nearly all, the acts of Agathoklês, as described in the preceding pages, have been copied from Diodorus; who had as good authorities before him as Polybius possessed. Diodorus does not copy the history of Agathoklês from Timæus; on the contrary, he censures Timæus for his exaggerated acrimony and injustice towards Agathoklês, in terms not less forcible than those which Polybius employs (*Fragm.* xxi. p. 279). Diodorus cites Timæus by name, occasionally and in particular instances; but he evidently did not borrow from that author the main stream of his narrative. He seems to have had before him other authorities—among them some authors whose feelings would lead them to favour Agathoklês—the Syracusan Kallias—and Antander, brother of Agathoklês (*xxi.* p. 278–282).

seems to have had a geniality and apparent simplicity of manner (the same is recounted of Cæsar Borgia) which amused men and put them off their guard, throwing them perpetually into his trap.¹

Agathoklês, however, though among the worst of Greeks, was yet a Greek. During his government of thirty-two years, the course of events in Sicily continued under Hellenic agency, without the preponderant intervention of any foreign power. The power of Agathoklês indeed rested mainly on foreign mercenaries; but so had that of Dionysius and Gelon before him; and he, as well as they, kept up vigorously the old conflict against the Carthaginian power in the island. Grecian history in Sicily thus continues down to the death of Agathoklês; but it continues no longer. After his death, Hellenic power and interests become incapable of self-support, and sink into a secondary and subservient position, over-ridden or contended for by foreigners. Syracuse and the other cities passed from one despot to another, and were torn with discord arising out of the crowds of foreign mercenaries who had obtained footing among them. At the same time, the Carthaginians made increased efforts to push their conquests in the island, without finding any sufficient internal resistance; so that they would have taken Syracuse, and made Sicily their own, had not Pyrrhus king of Epirus (the son-in-law of Agathoklês) interposed to arrest their progress. From this time forward, the Greeks of Sicily become a prize to be contended for—first between the Carthaginians and Pyrrhus—next, between the Carthaginians and Romans²—until at length they dwindle into subjects of Rome; corn-growers for the Roman plebs, clients under the patronage of the Roman Marcelli, victims of the rapacity of Verres, and suppliants for the tutelary eloquence of Cicero. The historian of self-acting Hellas loses sight of them at the death of Agathoklês.

¹ Diodor. xx. 63.

² The poet Theokritus (xvi. 75-80) expatiates on the bravery of the Syracusan Hiero II., and on the great war-like power of the Syracusans under him (i. c. 260-240), which he represents as making the Carthaginians tremble for their possessions in Sicily. Personally, Hiero seems to have deserved this praise—and to have deserved yet more praise for his mild and prudent internal administration of Syracuse. But his military force was altogether secondary in the great struggle between Rome and Carthage for the mastery of Sicily.

CHAPTER XCVIII

OUTLYING HELLENIC CITIES

1. IN GAUL AND SPAIN

2. ON THE COAST OF THE EUXINE

To complete the picture of the Hellenic world while yet in its period of full life, in freedom and self-action, or even during its decline into the half-life of a dependent condition—we must say a few words respecting some of its members lying apart from the general history, yet of not inconsiderable importance. The Greeks of Massalia formed its western wing; the Pontic Greeks (those on the shores of the Euxine), its eastern; both of them the outermost radiations of Hellenism, where it was always militant against foreign elements, and often adulterated by them. It is indeed little that we have the means of saying; but that little must not be left unsaid.

In my twenty-seventh chapter, I briefly noticed the foundation and first proceedings of Massalia (the modern Marseilles), on the Mediterranean coast of Gaul or Liguria. This Ionic city, founded by the enterprising Phokæans of Asia Minor, a little before their own seaboard was subjugated by the Persians, had a life and career of its own, apart from those political events which determined the condition of its Hellenic sisters in Asia, Peloponnesus, Italy, or Sicily. The Massaliots maintained their own relations of commerce, friendship or hostility with their barbaric neighbours, the Ligurians, Gauls, and Iberians, without becoming involved in the larger political confederacies of the Hellenic world. They carried out from their mother-city established habits of adventurous coast-navigation and commercial activity. Their situation, distant from other Greeks and sustained by a force hardly sufficient even for defence, imposed upon them the necessity both of political harmony at home, and of prudence and persuasive agency in their mode of dealing with neighbours. That they were found equal to this necessity, appears sufficiently attested by the few general statements transmitted in respect to them; though their history in its details is unknown.

Their city was strong by position, situated upon a promontory washed on three sides by the sea, well fortified, and possessing a convenient harbour securely closed against

enemies.¹ The domain around it however appears not to have been large, nor did their population extend itself much into the interior. The land around was less adapted for corn than for the vine and the olive; wine was supplied by the Massaliots throughout Gaul.² It was on shipboard that their courage and skill was chiefly displayed; it was by maritime enterprise that their power, their wealth, and their colonial expansion were obtained. In an age when piracy was common, the Massaliot ships and seamen were effective in attack and defence not less than in transport and commercial interchange; while their numerous maritime successes were attested by many trophies adorning the temples.³ The city contained docks and arsenals admirably provided with provisions, stores, arms, and all the various muniments of naval war.⁴ Except the Phenicians and Carthaginians, these Massaliots were the only enterprising mariners in the Western Mediterranean; from the year 500 B.C. downward, after the energy of the Ionic Greeks had been crushed by inland potentates. The Iberian and Gallic tribes were essentially landmen, not occupying permanent stations on the coast, nor having any vocation for the sea; but the Ligurians, though chiefly mountaineers, were annoying neighbours to Massalia as well by their piracies at sea as from their depredations by land.⁵ To all these landmen, however, depredators as they were, the visit of the trader soon made itself felt as a want, both for import and export; and to this want the Massaliots, with their colonies, were the only ministers, along the Gulfs of Genoa and Lyons, from Luna (the frontier of Tuscany) to the Dianium (Cape della Nao) in Spain.⁶ It was not until the first century before the Christian era that they were outstripped in this career by Narbon, and a few other neighbours, exalted into Roman colonies.

Along the coast on both sides of their own city, the Massaliots planted colonies, each commended to the protection, and consecrated by the statue and peculiar rites, of their own

¹ Cæsar, *Bell. Gall.* ii. 1; Strabo, iv. p. 179.

² See Poseidonius ap. Athenæum, iv. p. 152.

³ Strabo, iv. p. 180.

⁴ Strabo (xii. p. 575) places Massalia in the same rank as Kyzikus, Rhodes, and Carthage; types of maritime cities highly and effectively organised.

⁵ Livy, xl. 18; Polybius, xxx. 4.

⁶ The oration composed by Demosthenês πρὸς Ζηρόθεμιν, relates to an affair wherein a ship, captain, and mate, all from Massalia, are found engaged in the carrying trade between Athens and Syracuse (Demosth. p. 882 seq.).

patron goddess, the Ephesian Artemis.¹ Towards the east were Tauroentium, Olbia, Antipolis, Nikæa, and the Portus Monæki; towards the west, on the coast of Spain, were Rhoda, Emporiæ, Alônê, Hemeroskopium, and Artemisium or Dianium. These colonies were established chiefly on outlying capes or sometimes islets, at once near and safe; they were intended more as shelter and accommodation for maritime traffic, and as depôts for trade with the interior,—than for the purpose of spreading inland, and including a numerous outlying population round the walls. The circumstances of Emporiæ were the most remarkable. That town was built originally on a little uninhabited islet off the coast of Iberia; after a certain interval it became extended to the adjoining mainland, and a body of native Iberians were admitted to joint residence within the new-walled circuit there established. This new circuit however was divided in half by an intervening wall, on one side of which dwelt the Iberians, on the other side the Greeks. One gate alone was permitted, for intercommunication, guarded night and day by appointed magistrates, one of whom was perpetually on the spot. Every night, one third of the Greek citizens kept guard on the walls, or at least held themselves prepared to do so. How long these strict and fatiguing precautions were found necessary, we do not know; but after a certain time they were relaxed and the intervening wall disappeared, so that Greeks and Iberians freely coalesced into one community.² It is not often that we are allowed to see so much in detail the early difficulties and dangers of a Grecian colony. Massalia itself was situated under nearly similar circumstances among the rude Ligurian Salyes; we hear of these Ligurians hiring themselves as labourers to dig on the fields of Massaliot proprietors.³ The various tribes of Ligurians, Gauls, and Iberians extended down to the coast, so that there was no safe road along it, nor any communication except by sea, until the conquests of the

¹ Brückner, *Histor. Massiliensium*, c. 7 (Göttingen).

² Livy, xxxiv. 8; Strabo, iii. p. 160. At Massalia, it is said that no armed stranger was ever allowed to enter the city, without depositing his arms at the gate (Justin, xliii. 4).

This precaution seems to have been adopted in other cities also: see *Æneas, Poliorket.* c. 30.

³ Strabo, iii. p. 165. A fact told to Poseidonius by a Massaliot proprietor who was his personal friend.

In the siege of Massalia by Cæsar, a detachment of Albici—mountaineers not far from the town, and old allies or dependents—were brought in to help in the defence (Cæsar, *Bell. G. i.* 34).

Romans in the second and first century before the Christian era.¹

The government of Massalia was oligarchical, carried on chiefly by a Senate or Great Council of Six Hundred (called *Timuchi*), elected for life—and by a small council of fifteen; chosen among this larger body to take turn in executive duties.² The public habits of the administrators are said to have been extremely vigilant and circumspect; the private habits of the citizens, frugal and temperate—a maximum being fixed by law for dowries and marriage-ceremonies.³ They were careful in their dealings with the native tribes, with whom they appear to have maintained relations generally friendly. The historian Ephorus (whose History closed about 340 B.C.) represented the Gauls as especially phil-Hellenic;⁴ an impression which he could hardly have derived from any but Massaliot informants. The Massaliots (who in the first century before Christ were *trilingues*, speaking Greek, Latin, and Gallic⁵) contributed to engraft upon these unlettered men a certain refinement and variety of wants, and to lay the foundation of that taste for letters which afterwards became largely diffused throughout the Roman Province of Gaul. At sea, and in traffic, the Phenicians and Carthaginians were their formidable rivals. This was among the causes which threw them betimes into alliance and active co-operation with Rome, under whose rule they obtained favourable treatment, when the blessing of freedom was no longer within their reach.

Enough is known about Massalia to show that the city was

¹ Strabo, iv. p. 180.

² Strabo, iv. p. 181; Cicero, *De Republ.* xxvii. *Fragm.* Vacancies in the senate seem to have been filled up from meritorious citizens generally—as far as we can judge by a brief allusion in Aristotle (*Polit.* vi. 7). From another passage in the same work, it seems that the narrow basis of the oligarchy must have given rise to dissensions (v. 6). Aristotle had included the *Μασσαλιωτῶν πολιτεία* in his lost work *Περὶ Πολιτειῶν*.

³ Strabo, *l. c.* However, one author from whom Athenæus borrowed (xii. p. 523), described the Massaliots as luxurious in their habits.

⁴ Strabo, iv. p. 199. *Ἐφορος δὲ ὑπερβάλλουσαν τῇ μεγέθει λέγει τὴν Κελτικὴν, ὥστε ἥσπερ νῦν Ἰβηρίας καλοῦμεν ἐκείνοις τὰ πλείστα προσνέμειν μέχρι Γαδεύρων, φιλέλληνός τε ἀποφαίνει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ πολλὰ ἰδίως λέγει περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔοικότα τοῖς νῦν.* Compare p. 181.

It is to be remembered that Ephorus was a native of the Asiatic Kymê, the immediate neighbour of Phokæa, which was the metropolis of Massalia. The Massaliots never forgot or broke off their connexion with Phokæa: see the statement of their intercession with the Romans on behalf of Phokæa (*Justin*, xxxvii. 1). Ephorus therefore had good means of learning whatever Massaliot citizens were disposed to communicate.

⁵ Varro, *Antiq. Fragm.* p. 350, ed. Bipont.

a genuine specimen of Hellenism and Hellenic influences—acting not by force or constraint, but simply by superior intelligence and activity—by power of ministering to wants which must otherwise have remained unsupplied—and by the assimilating effect of a lettered civilisation upon ruder neighbours. This is the more to be noticed as it contrasts strikingly with the Macedonian influences which have occupied so much of the present volume; force admirably organised and wielded by Alexander, yet still nothing but force. The loss of all details respecting the history of Massalia is greatly to be lamented; and hardly less, that of the writings of Pytheas, an intelligent Massaliotic navigator, who, at this early age (330–320 B.C.),¹ with an adventurous boldness even more than Phokæan, sailed through the Pillars of Hêraklês, and from thence northward along the coast of Spain, Gaul, Britain, Germany—perhaps yet farther. Probably no Greek except a Massaliot could have accomplished such a voyage; which in his case deserves the greater sympathy, as there was no other reward for the difficulties and dangers braved, except the gratification of an intelligent curiosity. It seems plain that the publication of his ‘Survey of the Earth’—much consulted by Eratosthenês, though the criticisms which have reached us through Polybius and Strabo dwell chiefly upon its mistakes, real or supposed—made an epoch in ancient geographical knowledge.

From the western wing of the Hellenic world, we pass to the eastern—the Euxine Sea. Of the Pentapolis on its western coast south of the Danube (Apollonia, Mesembria, Kallatis, Odessus, and probably Istrus)—and of Tyras near the mouth of the river so called (now Dniester)—we have little to record;

¹ See the *Fragmenta Pythææ* collected by Arfwedson, Upsal, 1824. He wrote two works—1. *Ἡς Περίοδος*. 2. *Περὶ Ὀκεανῶν*. His statements were greatly esteemed, and often followed, by Eratosthenês; partially followed by Hipparchus; harshly judged by Polybius, whom Strabo in the main follows. Even by those who judge him most severely, Pytheas is admitted to have been a good mathematician and astronomer (Strabo, iv. p. 201)—and to have travelled extensively in person. Like Herodotus, he must have been forced to report a great deal on hearsay; and all that he could do was to report the best hearsay information which reached him. It is evident that his writings made an epoch in geographical inquiries; though they doubtless contained numerous inaccuracies. See a fair estimate of Pytheas in Mannert, *Geog. der Gr. und Römer*, *Introd.* i. p. 73–86.

The Massaliotic Codex of Homer, possessed and consulted among others by the Alexandrine critics, affords presumption that the celebrity of Massalia as a place of Grecian literature and study (in which character it competed with Athens towards the commencement of the Roman empire) had its foundations laid at least in the third century before the Christian era.

though Istrus and Apollonia were among the towns whose political constitutions Aristotle thought worthy of his examination.¹ But Herakleia on the south coast, and Pantikapæum or Bosphorus between the Euxine and the Palus Mæotis (now Sea of Azof), are not thus unknown to history ; nor can Sinôpê (on the south coast) and Olbia (on the north-west) be altogether passed over. Though lying apart from the political headship of Athens or Sparta, all these cities were legitimate members of the Hellenic brotherhood. All supplied spectators and competitors for the Pan-Hellenic festivals—pupils to the rhetors and philosophers—purchasers, and sometimes even rivals, to the artists. All too were (like Massalia and Kyrênê) adulterated partially—Olbia and Bosphorus considerably—by admixture of a non-Hellenic element.

Of Sinôpê, and its three dependent colonies Kotyôra, Kerasus, and Trapezus, I have already said something,² in describing the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks. Like Massalia with its dependencies Antipolis, Nikæa, and others—Sinôpê enjoyed not merely practical independence, but considerable prosperity and local dignity, at the time when Xenophon and his companions marched through those regions. The citizens were on terms of equal alliance, mutually advantageous, with Korylas prince of Paphlagonia, on the borders of whose territory they dwelt. It is probable that they figured on the tribute list of the Persian king as a portion of Paphlagonia, and paid an annual sum ; but here ended their subjection. Their behaviour towards the Ten Thousand Greeks, pronounced enemies of the Persian king, was that of an independent city. Neither they, nor even the inland Paphlagonians, warlike and turbulent, were molested with Persian governors or military occupation.³ Alexander however numbered them among the subjects of Persia ; and it is a remarkable fact, that envoys from Sinôpê were found remaining with Darius almost to his last hour, after he had become a conquered fugitive, and had lost his armies, his capitals, and his treasures. These Sinopian envoys fell into the hands of Alexander ; who set them at liberty with the remark, that since they were not members of the Hellenic confederacy, but subjects of Persia—their presence as envoys near Darius was very excusable.⁴ The position of Sinôpê

¹ Aristotle, *Politic.* v. 2, 11 ; v. 5, 2.

² See vol. ix. ch. lxxi.

³ See the remarkable life of the Karian Datamês, by Cornelius Nepos, which gives some idea of the situation of Paphlagonia about 360–350 B.C. (cap. 7, 8). Compare Xenoph. *Hellenic.* iv. 1, 4.

⁴ Arrian, iii. 24, 8 ; Curtius, vi. 5, 6.

placed her out of the direct range of the hostilities carried on by Alexander's successors against each other; and the ancient Kappadokian princes of the Mithridatic family (professedly descendants of the Persian Achæmenidæ),¹ who ultimately ripened into the king of Pontus, had not become sufficiently powerful to swallow up her independence until the reign of Pharnakês, in the second century before Christ. Sinôpê then passed under his dominion; exchanging (like others) the condition of a free Grecian city for that of a subject of the barbaric kings of Pontus, with a citadel and mercenary garrison to keep her citizens in obedience. We know nothing however of the intermediate events.

Respecting the Pontic Herakleia, our ignorance is not so complete. That city—much nearer than Sinôpê to the mouth of the Thracian Bosphorus, and distant by sea from Byzantium only one long day's voyage of a rowboat—was established by Megarians and Bœotians on the coast of the Mariandyni. These natives were subdued, and reduced to a kind of serfdom; whereby they became slaves, yet with a proviso that they should never be sold out of the territory. Adjoining, on the westward, between Herakleia and Byzantium, were the Bithynian Thracians—villagers not merely independent, but warlike and fierce wreckers, who cruelly maltreated any Greeks stranded on their coast.² We are told in general terms that the government of Herakleia was oligarchical;³ perhaps in the hands of the descendants of the principal original colonists, who partitioned among themselves the territory with its Mariandynian serfs, and who formed a small but rich minority among the total population. We hear of them as powerful at sea, and as being able to man, through their numerous serfs, a considerable fleet, with which they invaded the territory of Leukon prince of the Kimmerian Bosphorus.⁴ They were also engaged in land-war with Mithridatês, a prince of the

¹ Polybius, v. 43.

² Xenoph. Anab. vi. 6, 2.

³ Aristot. Polit. v. 5, 2; v. 5, 5. Another passage in the same work, however (v. 4, 2), says, that in Herakleia, the democracy was subverted immediately after the foundation of the colony, through the popular leaders; who committed injustice against the rich. These rich men were banished, but collected strength enough to return and subvert the democracy by force. If this passage alludes to the same Herakleia (there were many towns of that name), the government must have been originally democratical. But the serfdom of the natives seems to imply an oligarchy.

⁴ Aristot. Polit. vii. 5, 7; Polyæn. vi. 9, 3, 4: compare Pseudo-Aristotle, Economic. ii. 9.

The reign of Leukon lasted from about 392–352 B.C. The event alluded to by Polyænus must have occurred at some time during this interval.

ancient Persian family established as district rulers in Northern Kappadokia.¹

Towards 380-370 B.C. the Herakleots became disturbed by violent party-contentions within the city. As far as we can divine from a few obscure hints, these contentions began among the oligarchy themselves;² some of whom opposed, and partially threw open, a close political monopoly—yet not without a struggle, in the course of which an energetic citizen named Klearchus was banished. Presently however the contest assumed larger dimensions; the plebs sought admission into the constitution, and are even said to have required abolition of debts with a redivision of the lands.³ A democratical constitution was established; but it was speedily menaced by conspiracies of the rich, to guard against which, the classification of the citizens was altered. Instead of three tribes, and four centuries, all were distributed anew into sixty-four centuries, the tribes being discontinued. It would appear that in the original four centuries, the rich men had been so enrolled as to form separate military divisions (probably their rustic serfs being armed along with them)—while the three tribes had contained all the rest of the people; so that the effect of thus multiplying the centuries was, to divest the rich of their separate military enrolment, and to disseminate them in many different regiments along with a greater number of poor.⁴

Still however the demands of the people were not fully granted, and dissension continued. Not merely the poorer citizens, but also the population of serfs—homogeneous, speaking the same language, and sympathising with each other, like Helots or Penestæ—when once agitated by the hope of liberty, were with difficulty appeased. The government, though greatly democratised, found itself unable to maintain tranquillity, and invoked assistance from without. Application was made first, to the Athenian Timotheus—next, to the Theban Epaminondas; but neither of them would interfere—nor was there, indeed, any motive to tempt them. At length application was made to the exiled citizen Klearchus.

¹ Justin, xvi. 4.

² Aristot. v. 5, 2; 5, 10.

³ Justin, xvi. 4.

⁴ Æneas, Poliorket. c. 11. I have given what seems the most probable explanation of a very obscure passage.

It is to be noted that the distribution of citizens into centuries (*ἐκατοστῖες*) prevailed also at Byzantium; see Inscript. No. 2060 ap. Boeck. Corp. Inscr. Græc. p. 130. A citizen of Olbia, upon whom the citizenship of Byzantium is conferred, is allowed to enroll himself in any one of the *ἐκατοστῖες* that he prefers.

This exile, now about forty years of age, intelligent, audacious and unprincipled, had passed four years at Athens partly in hearing the lessons of Plato and Isokratês—and had watched with emulous curiosity the brilliant fortune of the despot Dionysius at Syracuse, in whom both these philosophers took interest.¹ During his banishment, moreover, he had done what was common with Grecian exiles; he had taken service with the enemy of his native city, the neighbouring prince Mithridatês,² and probably enough against the city itself. As an officer, he distinguished himself much; acquiring renown with the prince and influence over the minds of soldiers. Hence his friends, and a party in Herakleia, became anxious to recall him, as moderator and protector under the grievous political discords prevailing. It was the oligarchical party who invited him to come back, at the head of a body of troops, as their auxiliary in keeping down the plebs. Klearchus accepted their invitation; but with the full purpose of making himself the Dionysius of Herakleia. Obtaining from Mithridatês a powerful body of mercenaries, under secret promise to hold the city only as his prefect, he marched thither with the proclaimed purpose of maintaining order, and upholding the government. As his mercenary soldiers were soon found troublesome companions, he obtained permission to construct a separate stronghold in the city, under colour of keeping

¹ Diodor. xv. 81. ἐξήλωσε μὲν τὴν Διονυσίου τοῦ Συρακουσίου διαγωγὴν, &c. Memnon, Fragm. c. 1; Isokratês, Epist. vii.

It is here that the fragments of Memnon, as abstracted by Photius (Cod. 224), begin. Photius had seen only eight books of Memnon's History of Herakleia (Books ix.-xvii. inclusive); neither the first eight books (see the end of his Excerpta from Memnon), nor those after the sixteenth, had come under his view. This is greatly to be regretted, as we are thus shut out from the knowledge of Heraklean affairs anterior to Klearchus.

It happens, not unfrequently, with Photius, that he does not possess an entire work, but only parts of it; this is a curious fact, in reference to the libraries of the ninth century A.D.

The Fragments of Memnon are collected out of Photius, together with those of Nymphis and other Herakleotic historians, and illustrated with useful notes and citations, in the edition of Orelli; as well as by K. Müller, in Didot's Fragm. Hist. Græc. tom. iii. p. 525. Memnon carried his history down to the time of Julius Cæsar, and appears to have lived shortly after the Christian era. Nymphis (whom he probably copied) was much older; having lived seemingly from about 300-230 B.C. (see the few Fragments remaining from him, in the same work, iii. p. 12). The work of the Herakleotic author Herodôrus seems to have been altogether upon legendary matter (see Fragm. in the same work, ii. p. 27). He was half a century earlier than Nymphis.

² Suidas, v. Κλέαρχος.

them apart in the stricter discipline of a barrack.¹ Having thus secured a strong position, he invited Mithridatês into the city, to receive the promised possession; but instead of performing this engagement, he detained the prince as prisoner, and only released him on payment of a considerable ransom. He next cheated, still more grossly, the oligarchy who had recalled him; denouncing their past misrule, declaring himself their mortal enemy, and espousing the pretensions as well as the antipathies of the plebs. The latter willingly seconded him in his measures—even extreme measures of cruelty and spoliation—against their political enemies. A large number of the rich were killed, imprisoned, or impoverished and banished; their slaves or serfs, too, were not only manumitted by order of the new despot, but also married to the wives and daughters of the exiles. The most tragical scenes arose out of these forced marriages; many of the women even killed themselves, some after having first killed their new husbands. Among the exiles, a party, driven to despair, procured assistance from without, and tried to obtain by force readmittance into the city; but they were totally defeated by Klearchus, who after this victory became more brutal and unrelenting than ever.²

He was now in irresistible power; despot of the whole city, plebs as well as oligarchy. Such he continued to be for twelve years; during which he displayed great warlike energy against exterior enemies, together with unabated cruelty towards the citizens. He further indulged in the most overweening insolence of personal demeanour, adopting an Oriental costume and ornaments, and proclaiming himself the son of Zeus—as Alexander the Great did after him. Amidst all these enormities, however, his literary tastes did not forsake him; he collected a library, at that time a very rare possession.³ Many were the conspiracies attempted by suffering citizens against this tyrant; but his vigilance baffled and punished all. At length two young men, Chion and Leonidês (they too having

¹ Polyænus, ii, 30, 1; Justin, xvi. 4. "A quibus revocatus in patriam, per quos in arce collocatus fuerat," &c.

Æneas (Poliorket. c. 12) cites this proceeding as an example of the mistake made by a political party, in calling in a greater number of mercenary auxiliaries than they could manage or keep in order.

² Justin, xvi. 4, 5; Theopompus ap. Athenæ. iii. p. 85. Fragg. 200, ed. Didot.

³ Memnon, c. 1. The seventh epistle of Isokratês, addressed to Timotheus son of Klearchus, recognises generally this character of the latter; with whose memory Isokratês disclaims all sympathy.

been among the hearers of Plato), found an opportunity to stab him at a Dionysiac festival. They, with those who seconded them, were slain by his guards, after a gallant resistance; but Klearchus himself died of the wound, in torture and mental remorse.¹

His death unfortunately brought no relief to the Herakleots. The two sons whom he left, Timotheus and Dionysius, were both minors; but his brother Satyrus, administering in their name, grasped the sceptre and continued the despotism, with cruelty not merely undiminished, but even aggravated and sharpened by the past assassination. Not inferior to his predecessor in energy and vigilance, Satyrus was in this respect different, that he was altogether rude and unlettered. Moreover he was rigidly scrupulous in preserving the crown for his brother's children, as soon as they should be of age. To ensure to them an undisturbed succession, he took every precaution to avoid begetting children of his own by his wife.² After a rule of seven years, Satyrus died of a lingering and painful distemper.

The government of Herakleia now devolved on Timotheus, who exhibited a contrast, alike marked and beneficent, with his father and uncle. Renouncing all their cruelty and constraint, he set at liberty every man whom he found in prison. He was strict in dispensing justice, but mild and even liberal in all his dealings towards the citizens. At the same time, he was a man of adventurous courage, carrying on successful war against foreign enemies, and making his power respected all around. With his younger brother Dionysius, he maintained perfect

¹ Memnon, c. 1; Justin, xvi. 5; Diodor. xvi. 36.

² Memnon, c. 2. ἐπὶ δὲ τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ τὸ πρῶτον ἡνέγκατο· τὴν γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοῖς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ παισὶν ἀνεπηρέαστον συντηρῶν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τῆς αὐτῶν κηδεμονίας λόγον ἐτίθετο, ὥς καὶ γυναικὶ συνῶν, καὶ τότε λίαν στεργόμενῃ, μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι παιδοποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μηχανῇ πάσῃ γονῆς στέρησιν ἑαυτῷ δικάσαι, ὥς ἂν μὴδ' ὕλως ὑπολίποι τινα ἐφερέοντα τοῖς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ παισίν.

In the Antigonid dynasty of Macedonia, we read that Demetrius, son of Antigonus Gonatas, died leaving his son Philip a boy. Antigonus called Doson, younger brother of Demetrius, assumed the regency on behalf of Philip; he married the widow of Demetrius, and had children by her; but he was so anxious to guard Philip's succession against all chance of being disturbed, that he refused to bring up his own children—'Ὁ δὲ παῖδων γενομένων ἐκ τῆς Χρυσίδος, οὐκ ἀνεθρέψατο, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ Φιλίππῳ περισώζων (Porphyry, *Fragm. ap. Didot, Fragm. Histor. Græc. vol. iii. p. 701*).

In the Greek and Roman world, the father was generally considered to have the right of determining whether he would or would not bring up a new-born child. The obligation was only supposed to commence when he accepted or sanctioned it, by taking up the child.

harmony, treating him as an equal and partner. Though thus using his power generously towards the Herakleots, he was, however, still a despot, and retained the characteristic marks of despotism—the strong citadel, fortified separately from the town, with a commanding mercenary force. After a reign of about nine years, he died, deeply mourned by every one.¹

Dionysius, who succeeded him, fell upon unsettled times, full both of hope and fear; opening chances of aggrandisement, yet with many new dangers and uncertainties. The sovereignty which he inherited doubtless included, not simply the city of Herakleia, but also foreign dependencies and possessions in its neighbourhood; for his three predecessors² had been all enterprising chiefs, commanding a considerable aggressive force. At the commencement of his reign, indeed, the ascendancy of Memnon and the Persian force in the north-western part of Asia Minor was at a higher pitch than ordinary; it appears too that Klearchus—and probably his successors also—had always taken care to keep on the best terms with the Persian court.³ But presently came the invasion of Alexander (334 B.C.), with the battle of the Granikus, which totally extinguished the Persian power in Asia Minor, and was followed, after no long interval, by the entire conquest of the Persian empire. The Persian control being now removed from Asia Minor—while Alexander with the great Macedonian force merely passed through it to the east, leaving viceroys behind him—new hopes of independence or aggrandisement began to arise among the native princes in Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Kappadokia. The Bithynian prince even contended successfully in the field against Kalas, who had been appointed by Alexander as satrap in Phrygia.⁴ The Herakleot Dionysius, on the other hand, enemy by position of these Bithynians, courted the new Macedonian potentates, playing his political game with much skill in every way. He kept his forces well in hand, and his dominions carefully guarded; he ruled in a mild and popular manner, so as to preserve among the Herakleots the same feelings of attachment which had been inspired

¹ Memnon, c. 3. The Epistle of Isokratês (vii.) addressed to Timotheus in recommendation of a friend, is in harmony with this general character, but gives no new information.

Diodorus reckons Timotheus as immediately succeeding Klearchus his father—considering Satyrus simply as regent (xvi. 36).

² We hear of Klearchus as having besieged Astakus (afterwards Nikomedia)—at the interior extremity of the north-eastern indentation of the Propontis, called the Gulf of Astakus (Polyænus, ii, 30, 3).

³ Memnon, c. 1.

⁴ Memnon, c. 20.

by his predecessor. While the citizens of the neighbouring Sinôpê (as has been already related) sent their envoys to Darius, Dionysius kept his eyes upon Alexander ; taking care to establish a footing at Pella, and being peculiarly assiduous in attentions to Alexander's sister, the princess Kleopatra.¹ He was the better qualified for this courtly service, as he was a man of elegant and ostentatious tastes, and had purchased from his namesake, the fallen Syracusan Dionysius, all the rich furniture of the Dionysian family, highly available for presents.²

By the favour of Antipater and the regency at Pella, the Herakleotic despot was enabled both to maintain and extend his dominions, until the return of Alexander to Susa and Babylon in 324 B.C. All other authority was now superseded by the personal will of the omnipotent conqueror ; who, mistrusting all his delegates—Antipater, the princesses, and the satraps—listened readily to complainants from all quarters, and took particular pride in espousing the pretensions of Grecian exiles. I have already recounted how, in June 324 B.C., Alexander promulgated at the Olympic festival a sweeping edict, directing that in every Grecian city the exiles should be restored—by force, if force was required. Among the various Grecian exiles, those from Herakleia were not backward in soliciting his support, to obtain their own restoration, as well as the expulsion of the despot. As they were entitled, along with others, to the benefit of the recent edict, the position of Dionysius became one of extreme danger. He now reaped the full benefit of his antecedent prudence, in having maintained both his popularity with the Herakleots at home, and his influence with Antipater, to whom the enforcement of the edict was entrusted. He was thus enabled to ward off the danger for a time ; and his good fortune rescued him from it altogether, by the death of Alexander in June 323 B.C. That event, coming as it did unexpectedly upon every one, filled Dionysius with such extravagant joy, that he fell into a swoon ; and he commemorated it by erecting a statue in honour of Euthymia, or the tranquillising goddess. His position however seemed again precarious, when the Herakleotic exiles renewed their solicitations to Perdikkas ; who favoured their cause, and might probably have restored them, if he had chosen to direct his march towards the Hellespont against Antipater and Kraterus, instead of undertaking the ill-advised expedition against Egypt, wherein he perished.³

¹ Memnon, c. 3.

² Memnon, c. 3. See in this History, vol. xi. ch. lxxxv.

³ Memnon, c. 4.

The tide of fortune now turned more than ever in favour of Dionysius. With Antipater and Kraterus, the preponderant potentates in his neighbourhood, he was on the best terms; and it happened at this juncture to suit the political views of Kraterus to dismiss his Persian wife Amastris (niece of the late Persian king Darius, and conferred upon Kraterus by Alexander when he himself married Statira), for the purpose of espousing Phila daughter of Antipater. Amastris was given in marriage to Dionysius; for him, a splendid exaltation—attesting the personal influence which he had previously acquired. His new wife, herself a woman of ability and energy, brought to him a large sum from the regal treasure, as well as the means of greatly extending his dominion round Herakleia. Noway corrupted by this good fortune, he still persevered both in his conciliating rule at home, and his prudent alliances abroad, making himself especially useful to Antigonus. That great chief, preponderant throughout most parts of Asia Minor, was establishing his ascendancy in Bithynia and the neighbourhood of the Propontis, by founding the city of Antigonía in the rich plain adjoining the Askanian Lake.¹ Dionysius lent effective maritime aid to Antigonus, in that war which ended by his conquest of Cyprus from the Egyptian Ptolemy (307 B.C.). To the other Ptolemy, nephew and general of Antigonus, Dionysius gave his daughter in marriage; and he even felt himself powerful enough to assume the title of king, after Antigonus, Lysimachus, and the Egyptian Ptolemy had done the like.² He died, after reigning thirty years with consummate political skill and uninterrupted prosperity—except that during the last few years he lost his health from excessive corpulence.³

Dionysius left three children under age—Klearchus, Oxathrês and a daughter—by his wife Amastris; whom he constituted regent, and who, partly through the cordial support of Antigonus, maintained the Herakleotic dominion unimpaired. Presently Lysimachus, king of Thrace and of the Thracian Chersonese (on the isthmus of which he had founded the city of Lysimacheia), coveted this as a valuable alliance, paid his court to Amastris, and married her. The Herakleotic queen thus enjoyed double protection, and was enabled to avoid taking part in the formidable conflict of Ipsus (300 B.C.); wherein the allies Lysimachus, Kassander, Ptolemy, and

¹ Strabo, xii. p. 565.

² Memnon, c. 4: compare Diodor. xx. 53.

³ Nymphis, Fragm. 16, ap. Athenæum, xii. p. 549; Ælian, V. H. x. 13.

Seleukus were victorious over Antigonus. The latter being slain, and his Asiatic power crushed, Lysimachus got possession of Antigonía, the recent foundation of his rival in Bithynia, and changed its name to Nikæa.¹ After a certain time, however, Lysimachus became desirous of marrying Arsinoë, daughter of the Egyptian Ptolemy; accordingly, Amastris divorced herself from him, and set up for herself separately as regent of Herakleia. Her two sons being now nearly of age, she founded and fortified, for her own residence, the neighbouring city of Amastris, about sixty miles eastward of Herakleia on the coast of the Euxine.² These young men, Klearchus and Oxathrês, assumed the government of Herakleia, and entered upon various warlike enterprises; of which we know only, that Klearchus accompanied Lysimachus in his expedition against the Getæ, sharing the fate of that prince, who was defeated and taken prisoner. Both afterwards obtained their release, and Klearchus returned to Herakleia; where he ruled in a cruel and oppressive manner, and even committed the enormity (in conjunction with his brother Oxathrês) of killing his mother Amastris. This crime was avenged by her former husband Lysimachus; who, coming to Herakleia under professions of friendship (B.C. 286), caused Klearchus and Oxathrês to be put to death, seized their treasure, and keeping separate possession of the citadel only, allowed the Herakleots to establish a popular government.³

Lysimachus, however, was soon persuaded by his wife Arsinoë to make over Herakleia to her, as it had been formerly possessed by Amastris; and Arsinoë sent thither a Kymæan officer named Herakleidês, who carried with him force sufficient to re-establish the former despotism, with its oppressions and cruelties. For other purposes too, not less mischievous, the influence of Arsinoë was all-powerful. She prevailed upon Lysimachus to kill his eldest son (by a former marriage) Agathoklês, a young prince of the most estimable and eminent qualities. Such an atrocity, exciting universal abhorrence among the subjects of Lysimachus, enabled his rival Seleukus to attack him with success. In a great battle fought between these two princes, Lysimachus was defeated and slain—by the hand and javelin of a citizen of Herakleia, named Malakon.⁴

¹ Strabo, xii. p. 565. So also Antioch, on the Orontes in Syria, the great foundation of Seleukus Nikator, was established on or near the site of another Antigonía, also previously founded by Antigonus Monophthalmus (Strabo, xv. p. 750).

² Strabo, xii. p. 544.

³ Memnon, c. 6.

⁴ Memnon, c. 7, 8.

This victory transferred the dominions of the vanquished prince to Seleukus. At Herakleia too, its effect was so powerful, that the citizens were enabled to shake off their despotism. They at first tried to make terms with the governor Herakleidês, offering him money as an inducement to withdraw. From him they obtained only an angry refusal ; yet his subordinate officers of mercenaries, and commanders of detached posts in the Herakleotic territory, mistrusting their own power of holding out, accepted an amicable compromise with the citizens, who tendered to them full liquidation of arrears of pay, together with the citizenship. The Herakleots were thus enabled to discard Herakleidês, and regain their popular government. They signalised their revolution by the impressive ceremony of demolishing their Bastile—the detached fort or stronghold within the city, which had served for eighty-four years as the characteristic symbol, and indispensable engine, of the antecedent despotism.¹ The city, now again a free commonwealth, was further reinforced by the junction of Nymphis (the historian) and other Herakleotic citizens, who had hitherto been in exile. These men were restored, and welcomed by their fellow-citizens in full friendship and harmony ; yet with express proviso, that no demand should be made for the restitution of their properties, long since confiscated.² To the victor Seleukus, however, and his officer Aphrodisius, the bold bearing of the newly-emancipated Herakleots proved offensive. They would probably have incurred great danger from him, had not his mind been first set upon the conquest of Macedonia, in the accomplishment of which he was murdered by Ptolemy Keraunus.

The Herakleots thus became again a commonwealth of free citizens, without any detached citadel or mercenary garrison ; yet they lost, seemingly through the growing force and aggressions of some inland dynasts, several of their outlying dependencies—Kierus, Tium, and Amastris. The two former they recovered some time afterwards by purchase, and they wished also to purchase back Amastris ; but Eumenês, who held it, hated them so much, that he repudiated their money, and handed over the place gratuitously to the Kappadokian chief Ariobarzanês.³ That their maritime power was

¹ Memnon, c. 9 ; Strabo, xii. p. 542.

² Memnon, c. 11.

³ Memnon, c. 16. The inhabitants of Byzantium also purchased for a considerable sum the important position called the *Ἱερὸν*, at the entrance of the Euxine on the Asiatic side (Polybius, iv. 50).

These are rare examples, in ancient history, of cities acquiring territory

at this time very great, we may see by the astonishing account given of their immense ships,—numerously manned, and furnished with many brave combatants on the deck—which fought with eminent distinction in the naval battle between Ptolemy Keraunus (murderer and successor of Seleukus) and Antigonus Gonatas.¹

It is not my purpose to follow lower down the destinies of Herakleia. It maintained its internal autonomy, with considerable maritime power, a dignified and prudent administration, and a partial, though sadly circumscribed, liberty of foreign action—until the successful war of the Romans against Mithridatês (B.C. 69). In Asia Minor, the Hellenic cities on the coast were partly enabled to postpone the epoch of their subjugation, by the great division of power which prevailed in the interior; for the potentates of Bithynia, Pergamus, Kappadokia, Pontus, Syria, were in almost perpetual discord—while all of them were menaced by the intrusion of the warlike and predatory Gauls, who extorted for themselves settlements in Galatia (B.C. 276). The kings, the enemies of civic freedom, were kept partially in check by these new and formidable neighbours,² who were themselves however hardly less formidable to the Grecian cities on the coast.³ Sinôpê, Herakleia, Byzantium,—and even Rhodes, in spite of the advantage of an insular position,—isolated relicts of what had once been an Hellenic aggregate, become from henceforward cribbed and confined by inland neighbours almost at their gates⁴—dependent on the barbaric potentates, between whom they were compelled to trim, making themselves useful in turn to all. It was however frequent with these barbaric princes to derive their wives, mistresses, ministers, negotiators, officers, engineers, literati, artists, actors, and intermediate agents both for ornament and recreation—from some Greek city. Among them all, more or less of Hellenic influence became thus insinuated; along with

or dependencies *by purchase*. Acquisitions were often made in this manner by the free German, Swiss, and Italian cities of mediæval Europe; but as to the Hellenic cities, I have not had occasion to record many such transactions in the course of this History.

¹ Memnon, c. 13: compare Polyb. xviii. 34.

² This is a remarkable observation made by Memnon, c. 19.

³ See the statement of Polybius, xxii. 24.

⁴ Contrast the independent and commanding position occupied by Byzantium in 399 B.C., acknowledging no superior except Sparta (Xenoph. Anab. vii. 1)—with its condition in the third century B.C.—harassed and pillaged almost to the gates of the town by the neighbouring Thracians and Gauls, and only purchasing immunity by continued money payments: see Polybius, iv. 45.

the Greek language which spread its roots everywhere—even among the Gauls or Galatians, the rudest and latest of the foreign immigrants.

Of the Grecian maritime towns in the Euxine south of the Danube—Apollonia, Mesembria, Odëssus, Kallatis, Tomi, and Istrus—five (seemingly without Tomi) formed a confederate Pentapolis.¹ About the year 312 B.C., we hear of them as under the power of Lysimachus king of Thrace, who kept a garrison in Kallatis—probably in the rest also. They made a struggle to shake off his yoke, obtained assistance from some of the neighbouring Thracians and Scythians, as well as from Antigonos. But Lysimachus, after a contest which seems to have lasted three or four years, overpowered both their allies and them, reducing them again into subjection.² Kallatis sustained a long siege, dismissing some of its ineffective residents ; who were received and sheltered by Eumelus prince of Bosphorus. It was in pushing his conquests yet farther northward, in the steppe between the rivers Danube and Dniester, that Lysimachus came into conflict with the powerful prince of the Getæ—Dromichætês ; by whom he was defeated and captured, but generously released.³ I have already mentioned that the empire of Lysimachus ended with his last defeat and death by Seleukus—(281 B.C.). By his death, the cities of the Pontic Pentapolis regained a temporary independence. But their barbaric neighbours became more and more formidable, being reinforced seemingly by immigration of fresh hordes from Asia ; thus the Sarmatians, who in Herodotus's time were on the east of the Tanais, appear, three centuries

¹ Strabo, vii. p. 319. Philip of Macedon defeated the Scythian prince Atheas or Ateas (about 340 B.C.) somewhere between Mount Hæmus and the Danube (Justin, ix. 2). But the relations of Ateas with the towns of Istrus and Apollonia, which are said to have brought Philip into the country, are very difficult to understand. It is most probable that these cities invited Philip as their defender.

In Inscription, No. 2056 c. (in Boeckh's Corp. Inscript. Græc. part xi. p. 79), the five cities constituting the Pentapolis are not clearly named. Boeckh supposes them to be Apollonia, Mesembria, Odëssus, Kallatis, and Tomi ; but Istrus seems more probable than Tomi. Odëssus was on the site of the modern Varna, where the Inscription was found ; greatly south of the modern town of Odessa, which is on the site of another town *Ordësus*.

An Inscription (2056) immediately preceding the above, also found at Odëssus, contains a vote of thanks and honours to a certain citizen of Antioch, who resided with—(name imperfect), king of the Scythians, and rendered great service to the Greeks by his influence.

² Diodor. xix. 73 ; xx. 25.

³ Strabo, vii. p. 302-305 ; Pausanias, i. 9, 5.

afterwards, even south of the Danube. By these tribes—Thracians, Getæ, Scythians, and Sarmatians—the Greek cities of this Pentapolis were successively pillaged. Though renewed indeed afterwards, from the necessity of some place of traffic, even for the pillagers themselves—they were but poorly renewed, with a large infusion of barbaric residents.¹ Such was the condition in which the exile Ovid found Tomi, near the beginning of the Christian era. The Tomitans were more than half barbaric, and their Greek not easily intelligible. The Sarmatian or Getic horse-bowmen, with their poisoned arrows, ever hovered near, galloped even up to the gates, and carried off the unwary cultivators into slavery. Even within a furlong of the town, there was no security either for person or property. The residents were clothed in skins of leather; while the women, ignorant both of spinning and weaving, were employed either in grinding corn or in carrying on their heads the pitchers of water.²

¹ Dion Chrysost. Orat. xxxvi. (Borysthenitica) p. 75, Reisk. *ἐἶλον δὲ καὶ ταύτην (Olbia) Γέται, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀριστεροῖς τοῦ Πόντου πόλεις, μέχρι Ἀπολλωνίας· ὅθεν δὴ καὶ σφόδρα ταπεινὰ τὰ πράγματα κατέστη τῶν ταύτην Ἑλλήνων· τῶν μὲν οὐκέτι συνοικισθεισῶν πόλεων τῶν δὲ φαύλως, καὶ τῶν πλείστων βαρβάρων εἰς αὐτὰς συρρέοντων.*

² The picture drawn by Ovid, of his situation as an exile at Tomi, can never fail to interest, from the mere beauty and felicity of his expression; but it is not less interesting, as a real description of Hellenism in its last phase, degraded and overborne by adverse fates. The truth of Ovid's picture is fully borne out by the analogy of Olbia, presently to be mentioned. His complaints run through the five books of the *Tristia*, and the four books of *Epistolæ ex Ponto* (*Trist.* v. 10, 15).

“Innumerae circa gentes fera bella minantur,
Quæ sibi non raptò vivere turpe putant.
Nil extra tutum est: tumulus defenditur ægre
Mœnibus exiguis ingenioque soli.
Cum minime credas, ut avis, densissimus hostis
Advolat, et prædam vix bene visus agit.
Sæpe intra muros clausis venientia portis
Per medias legimus noxia tela vias.
Est igitur rarus, rus qui colere audeat, isque
Hac arat infelix, hac tenet arma manu.
Vix ope castelli defendimur: et tamen intus
Mista facit Græcis barbara turba metum.
Quippe simul nobis habitat discrimine nullo
Barbarus, et tecti plus quoque parte tenet.
Quos ut non timeas, possis odisse, videndo
Pellibus et longâ corpora tecta comâ.
Hos quoque, qui geniti Graiâ creduntur ab urbe,
Pro patrio cultu Persica bracca tegit,” &c.

This is a specimen out of many others: compare *Trist.* iii. 10, 53; iv. 1, 67; *Epist. Pont.* iii. 1.

Ovid dwells especially upon the fact that there was more of barbaric than of Hellenic speech at Tomi—“Graiaque quod Getico victa loquela sono est” (*Trist.* v. 2, 68). Woollen clothing, and the practice of spinning and weaving by the free women of the family, were among the most

By these same barbarians, Olbia also (on the right bank of the Hypanis or Bug near its mouth) became robbed of that comfort and prosperity which it had enjoyed when visited by Herodotus. In his day, the Olbians lived on good terms with the Scythian tribes in their neighbourhood. They paid a stipulated tribute, giving presents besides to the prince and his immediate favourites; and on these conditions, their persons and properties were respected. The Scythian prince Skylês (son of an Hellenic mother from Istrus, who had familiarised him with Greek speech and letters) had built a fine house in the town, and spent in it a month, from attachment to Greek manners and religion, while his Scythian army lay near the gates without molesting any one.¹ It is true that this proceeding cost Skylês his life; for the Scythians would not tolerate their own prince in the practice of foreign religious rites, though they did not quarrel with the same rites when observed by the Greeks.² To their own customs the Scythians adhered tenaciously, and those customs were often sanguinary, ferocious, and brutish. Still they were warriors, rather than robbers—they abstained from habitual pillage, and maintained with the Greeks a reputation for honesty and fair dealing, which became proverbial with the early poets. Such were the Scythians as seen by Herodotus (probably about 440 to 430 B.C.); and the picture drawn by Ephorus a century afterwards (about 340 B.C.) appears to have been not materially different.³ But after that time it gradually altered. New tribes seem to have come in—the Sarmatians out of the East—the Gauls out of the West; from Thrace northward to the Tanais and the Palus

familiar circumstances of Grecian life; the absence of these feminine arts, and the use of skins or leather for clothing, were notable departures from Grecian habits (Ex Ponto, iii. 8):—

"Vellera dura ferunt pecudes; et Palladis uti
Arte Tomitanæ non didicere nurus.
Femina pro lanâ Cerealia munera frangit,
Suppositoque gravem vertice portat aquam."

¹ Herodot. iv. 16–18. The town was called *Olbia* by its inhabitants, but *Borysthenes* usually by foreigners; though it was not on the Borysthenes river (Dnieper), but on the right bank of the Hypanis (Bug).

² Herodot. iv. 76–80.

³ Strabo, vii. p. 302; Skymnus Chius, v. 112, who usually follows Ephorus.

The rhetor Dion tells us (Orat. xxxvi. init.) that he went to Olbia in order that he might *go through the Scythians to the Getae*. This shows that in his time (about A.D. 100) the Scythians must have been between the Bug and Dniester—the Getae nearer to the Danube—just as they had been four centuries earlier. But many new hordes were mingled with them.

Mæotis, the most different tribes became intermingled—Gauls, Thracians, Getæ, Scythians, Sarmatians, &c.¹ Olbia was in an open plain, with no defence except its walls and the adjoining river Hypanis, frozen over in the winter. The hybrid Helleno-Scythian race, formed by intermarriages of Greeks with Scythians—and the various Scythian tribes who had become partially sedentary cultivators of corn for exportation—had probably also acquired habits less warlike than the tribes of primitive barbaric type. At any rate, even if capable of defending themselves, they could not continue their production and commerce under repeated hostile incursions.

A valuable inscription remaining enables us to compare the Olbia (or Borysthenês) seen by Herodotus, with the same town in the second century B.C.² At this latter period, the city was diminished in population, impoverished in finances, exposed to constantly increasing exactions and menace from the passing barbaric hordes, and scarcely able to defend against them even the security of its walls. Sometimes there approached the barbaric chief Saitapharnês with his personal suite, sometimes his whole tribe or horde in mass, called Saii. Whenever they came, they required to be appeased by presents, greater than the treasury could supply, and borrowed only from the voluntary help of rich citizens; while even these presents did not always avert ill treatment or pillage. Already the citizens of Olbia had repelled various attacks, partly by taking into pay

¹ Strabo, vii. p. 296–304.

² This inscription—No. 2058—in Boeckh's *Inscr. Græc.* part xi. p. 121 *seq.*—is among the most interesting in that noble collection. It records a vote of public gratitude and honour to a citizen of Olbia named Protogenês, and recites the valuable services which he as well as his father had rendered to the city. It thus describes the numerous situations of difficulty and danger from which he had contributed to extricate them. A vivid picture is presented to us of the distress of the city. The introduction prefixed by Boeckh (p. 86–89) is also very instructive.

Olbia is often spoken of by the name of *Borysthenes*, which name was given to it by foreigners, but not recognised by the citizens. Nor was it even situated on the Borysthenes river; but on the right or western bank of the Hypanis (Bug) river; not far from the modern Oczakoff.

The date of the above Inscription is not specified, and has been differently determined by various critics. Niebuhr assigns it (*Untersuchungen über die Skythen, &c.*, in his *Kleine Schriften*, p. 387) to a time near the close of the second Punic war. Boeckh also believes that it is not much after that epoch. The terror inspired by the Gauls, even to other barbarians, appears to suit the second century B.C. better than it suits a later period.

The Inscription No. 2059 attests the great number of strangers resident at Olbia; strangers from eighteen different cities, of which the most remote is Miletus, the mother-city of Olbia.

a semi-Hellenic population in their neighbourhood (Mix-Hellenes, like the Liby-Phenicians in Africa); but the inroads became more alarming, and their means of defence less, through the uncertain fidelity of these Mix-Hellenes, as well as of their own slaves—the latter probably barbaric natives purchased from the interior.¹ In the midst of public poverty, it was necessary to enlarge and strengthen the fortifications; for they were threatened with the advent of the Gauls—who inspired such terror that the Scythians and other barbarians were likely to seek their own safety by extorting admission within the walls of Olbia. Moreover even corn was scarce, and extravagantly dear. There had been repeated failures in the produce of the lands around, famine was apprehended, and efforts were needed, greater than the treasury could sustain, to lay in a stock at the public expense. Among the many points of contrast with Herodotus, this is perhaps the most striking; for in his time, corn was the great produce and the principal export from Olbia; the growth had now been suspended, or was at least perpetually cut off, by increased devastation and insecurity.

After perpetual attacks, and even several captures, by barbaric neighbours—this unfortunate city, about fifty years before the Christian era, was at length so miserably sacked by the Getæ, as to become for a time abandoned.² Presently, however, the fugitives partially returned, to re-establish themselves on a reduced scale. For the very same barbarians who had persecuted and plundered them, still required an emporium with a certain amount of import and export, such as none but Greek settlers could provide; moreover it was from the coast near Olbia, and from the care of its inhabitants, that many of the neighbouring tribes derived their supply of salt.³ Hence arose a puny after-growth of Olbia—preserving the name, traditions, and part of the locality, of the deserted city—by the return of a portion of the colonists with an infusion of Scythian or Sarmatian residents; an infusion indeed so large, as seriously to dishellenise both the speech and the personal names in the town.⁴

¹ On one occasion, we know not when, the citizens of Olbia are said to have been attacked by one Zopyrion, and to have succeeded in resisting him only by emancipating their slaves, and granting the citizenship to foreigners (Macrobius, Saturnal. i. 11).

² Dion Chrys. (Or. xxxvi. p. 75)—ἀεὶ μὲν πολεμεῖται, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐδῶκε, &c.

³ Dion Chrysost. Orat. (xxxvi. Borysthenit.) pp. 75, 76, Reiske.

⁴ See Boeckh's Commentary on the language and the personal names of the Olbian Inscriptions, part xi. p. 108–116.

To this second edition of Olbia, the rhetor Dion Chrysostom paid a summer visit (about a century after the Christian era), of which he has left a brief but interesting account. Within the wide area once filled by the original Olbia—the former circumference of which was marked by crumbling walls and towers—the second town occupied a narrow corner ; with poor houses, low walls, and temples having no other ornament except the ancient statues mutilated by the plunderers. The citizens dwelt in perpetual insecurity, constantly under arms or on guard ; for the barbaric horsemen, in spite of sentinels posted to announce their approach, often carried off prisoners, cattle, or property, from the immediate neighbourhood of the gates. The picture drawn of Olbia by Dion confirms in a remarkable way that given of Tomi by Ovid. And what imparts to it a touching interest is, that the Greeks whom Dion saw contending with the difficulties, privations, and dangers of this inhospitable outpost, still retained the activity, the elegance, and the intellectual aspirations of their Ionic breed ; in this respect much superior to the Tomitans of Ovid. In particular, they were passionate admirers of Homer ; a considerable proportion of the Greeks of Olbia could repeat the *Iliad* from memory.¹ Achillês (localised under the surname of Pontarchês, on numerous islands and capes in the Euxine) was among the chief divine or heroic persons to whom they addressed their prayers.² Amidst Grecian life, degraded and verging towards its extinction, and stripped even of the purity of living speech—the thread of imaginative and traditional sentiment thus continues without suspension or abatement.

Respecting Bosphorus or Pantikapæum (for both names denote the same city, though the former name often comprehends the whole annexed dominion), founded by Milesian settlers³ on

¹ Dion, *Orat.* xxxvi. (Borysthenit.) p. 78, Reiske. . . . καὶ τὰλλα μὲν οὐκέτι σαφῶς ἐλληνίζοντες, διὰ τὸ ἐν μέσοις οἰκεῖν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ὅμως τὴν γε Ἰλιάδα ὁλίγου πάντες ἴσασιν ἀπὸ στόματος. I translate the words ὁλίγου πάντες with some allowance for rhetoric.

The representation given by Dion of the youthful citizen of Olbia—Kallistratus—with whom he conversed, is curious as a picture of Greek manners in this remote land ; a youth of eighteen years of age, with genuine Ionic features, and conspicuous for his beauty (εἶχε πολλοὺς ἐραστάς) ; a zealot for literature and philosophy, but especially for Homer ; clothed in the costume of the place, suited for riding—the long leather trowsers, and short black cloak ; constantly on horseback for defence of the town, and celebrated as a warrior even at that early age, having already killed or made prisoners several Sarmatians (p. 77).

² See Inscriptions, Nos. 2076, 2077, ap. Boeckh ; and Arrian's *Periplus of the Euxine*, ap. Geogr. Minor. p. 21, ed. Hudson.

³ Strabo, vii. p. 310.

the European side of the Kimmerian Bosphorus (near Kertch), we first hear, about the period when Xerxēs was repulsed from Greece (480-479 B.C.). It was the centre of a dominion including Phanagoria, Kepi, Hermonassa, and other Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the strait; and is said to have been governed by what seems to have been an oligarchy—called the Archæanaktidæ, for forty-two years¹ (480-438 B.C.).

After them we have a series of princes standing out individually by name, and succeeding each other in the same family. Spartokus I. was succeeded by Seleukus; next comes Spartokus II.; then Satyrus I. (407-393 B.C.); Leukon (393-353 B.C.); Spartokus III. (353-348 B.C.); Parisadēs I. (348-310 B.C.); Satyrus II., Prytanis, Eumelus (310-304 B.C.); Spartokus IV. (304-284 B.C.); Parisadēs II.² During the reigns of these princes, a connexion of some intimacy subsisted between Athens and Bosphorus; a connexion not political, since the Bosphoran princes had little interest in the contentions about Hellenic hegemony—but of private intercourse, commercial interchange, and reciprocal good offices. The eastern corner of the Tauric Chersonesus, between Pantikapæum and Theodosia, was well suited for the production of corn; while plenty of fish, as well as salt, was to be had in or near the Palus Mæotis. Corn, salted fish and meat, hides, and barbaric slaves in considerable numbers, were in demand among all the Greeks round the Ægean, and not least at Athens, where Scythian slaves were numerous;³ while oil and wine, with other products of more southern regions, were acceptable in Bosphorus and the other Pontic ports. This important traffic seems to have been mainly carried on in ships and by capital belonging to Athens and other Ægean maritime towns; and must have been

¹ Diodor. xii. 31.

² See Mr. Clinton's Appendix on the Kings of Bosphorus—Fast. Hellen. App. c. 13, p. 280, &c.; and Boeckh's Commentary on the same subject, Inscript. Græc. part xi. p. 91 *seq.*

³ Polybius (iv. 38) enumerates the principal articles of this Pontic trade; among the exports τὰ τε δέρματα καὶ τὸ τῶν εἰς τὰς δουλείας ἀγομένων σωμάτων πλήθος, &c., where Schweighhäuser has altered δέρματα to θρέμματα, seemingly on the authority of one MS. only. I doubt the propriety of this change, as well as the fact of any large exportation of live cattle from the Pontus; whereas the exportation of hides was considerable: see Strabo, xi. p. 493.

The Scythian public slaves or policemen of Athens are well known. Σκύθαινα also in the name of a female slave (Aristoph. Lysistr. 184). Σκύθης, for the name of a slave, occurs as early as Theognis, v. 826.

Some of the salted preparations from the Pontus were extravagantly dear; Cato complained of a κέραμιον Ποντικῶν τριλίχων as sold for 300 drachmæ (Polyb. xxxi. 24).

greatly under the protection and regulation of the Athenians, so long as their maritime empire subsisted. Enterprising citizens of Athens went to Bosphorus (as to Thrace and the Thracian Chersonesus) to push their fortunes; merchants from other cities found it advantageous to settle as resident strangers or metics at Athens, where they were more in contact with the protecting authority, and obtained readier access to the judicial tribunals. It was probably during the period preceding the great disaster at Syracuse in 413 B.C., that Athens first acquired her position as a mercantile centre for the trade with the Euxine; which we afterwards find her retaining, even with reduced power, in the time of Demosthenês.

How strong was the position enjoyed by Athens in Bosphorus, during her unimpaired empire, we may judge from the fact, that Nymphæum (south of Pantikapæum, between that town and Theodosia) was among her tributary towns, and paid a talent annually.¹ Not until the misfortunes of Athens in the closing years of the Peloponnesian war, did Nymphæum pass into the hands of the Bosphoranic princes; betrayed (according to Æschinês) by the maternal grandfather of Demosthenês, the Athenian Gylon; who however probably did nothing more than obey a necessity rendered unavoidable by the fallen condition of Athens.² We thus see that Nymphæum, in the midst of the Bosphoranic dominion, was not only a member of the Athenian empire, but also contained influential Athenian citizens, engaged in the corn-trade. Gylon was rewarded by a large grant of land at Kepi—probably other Athenians of Nymphæum were rewarded also—by the Bosphoranic prince; who did not grudge a good price for such an acquisition. We find also other instances,—both of Athenian citizens sent out to reside with the prince Satyrus,—and of Pontic Greeks who, already in correspondence and friendship with various individual Athenians, consign their sons to be initiated in the commerce, society, and refinements of Athens.³

¹ Harpokration and Photius, v. Νύμφαιον—from the *ψηφίσματα* collected by Kraterus. Compare Boeckh, in the second edition of *Staats-haushaltung der Athener*, vol. ii. p. 658.

² Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 78, c. 57. See my preceding volume, ch. lxxxvii.

³ Lysias, pro Mantitheo, Or. xvi. s. 4; Isokratês (Trapezitic.), Or. xvii. s. 5. The young man, whose case Isokratês sets forth, was sent to Athens by his father Sopæus, a rich Pontic Greek (s. 52) much in the confidence of Satyrus. Sopæus furnished his son with two ship-loads of corn, and with money besides—and then despatched him to Athens *ἅμα κατ' ἐμπορίαν καὶ κατὰ θεωρίαν*.

Such facts attest the correspondence and intercourse of that city, during her imperial greatness, with Bosphorus.

The Bosphoranic prince Satyrus was in the best relations with Athens, and even seems to have had authorised representatives there to enforce his requests, which met with very great attention.¹ He treated the Athenian merchants at Bosphorus with equity and even favour, granting to them a preference in the export of corn when there was not enough for all.² His son Leukon not only continued the preference to Athenian exporting ships, but also granted to them remission of the export duty (of one-thirtieth part), which he exacted from all other traders. Such an exemption is reckoned as equivalent to an annual present of 13,000 medimni of corn (the medimnus being about $1\frac{1}{3}$ bushel); the total quantity of corn brought from Bosphorus to Athens in a full year being 400,000 medimni.³ It is easy to see moreover that such a premium must have thrown nearly the whole exporting trade into the hands of Athenian merchants. The Athenians requited this favour by public votes of gratitude and honour, conferring upon Leukon the citizenship, together with immunity from all the regular burthens attaching to property at Athens. There was lying in that city money belonging to Leukon;⁴ who was therefore open (under the proposition of Leptinês) to that conditional summons for exchange of properties, technically termed Antidosis. In his time, moreover, the corn-trade of Bosphorus appears to have been further extended; for we learn that he established an export from Theodosia as well as from Pantikapæum. His successor Parisadês I. continuing to Athenian exporters of corn the same privilege of immunity from export duty, obtained from Athens still higher honours than Leukon; for we learn that his statue, together with those of two relatives, was erected in the agora, on the motion of Demosthenês.⁵ The

¹ Isokratês, Trapezit. s. 5, 6. Sopæus, father of this pleader, had incurred the suspicions of Satyrus in the Pontus, and had been arrested; upon which Satyrus sends to Athens to seize the property of the son, to order him home,—and if he refused, then to require the Athenians to deliver him up—*ἐπιστέλλει δὲ τοῖς ἐνθάδε ἐπιδημοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου τὰ τε χρήματα παρ' ἐμοῦ κομίσασθαι*, &c.

² Isokratês, Trapezit. s. 71. Demosthenês also recognises favours from Satyrus—*καὶ αὐτὸς* (Leukon) *καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι*, &c. (adv. Leptin. p. 467).

³ Demosth. adv. Leptin. p. 467.

⁴ Demosth. adv. Leptin. p. 469.

⁵ Demosth. adv. Phormion. p. 917; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 34. The name stands Berisadês as printed in the oration; but it is plain that Parisadês is the person designated. See Boeckh, *Introd. ad Inscr.* No. 2056, p. 92.

connexion of Bosphorus with Athens was durable as well as intimate; its corn-trade being of high importance to the subsistence of the people. Every Athenian exporter was bound by law to bring his cargo in the first instance to Athens. The freighting and navigating of ships for that purpose, together with the advance of money by rich capitalists (citizens and metics) upon interest and conditions enforced by the Athenian judicature, was a standing and profitable business. And we may appreciate the value of equitable treatment, not to say favour, from the kings of Bosphorus—when we contrast it with the fraudulent and extortionate behaviour of Kleomenês, satrap of Egypt, in reference to the export of Egyptian corn.¹

The political condition of the Greeks at Bosphorus was somewhat peculiar. The hereditary princes (above enumerated), who ruled them substantially as despots, assumed no other title (in respect to the Greeks) than that of Archon. They paid tribute to the powerful Scythian tribes who bounded them on the European side, and even thought it necessary to carry a ditch across the narrow isthmus, from some point near Theodosia northward to the Palus Mæotis, as a protection against incursions.² Their dominion did not extend farther west than Theodosia; this ditch was their extreme western boundary; and even for the land within it, they paid tribute. But on the Asiatic side of the strait, they were lords paramount for a considerable distance, over the feebler and less warlike tribes who pass under the common name of Mæotæ or Mæêtæ—the Sindi, Toreti, Dandarii, Thatês, &c. Inscriptions, yet remaining, of Parisadês I., record him as King of these various barbaric tribes, but as Archon of Bosphorus and Theodosia.³ His dominion on the Asiatic side of the Kimmerian Bosphorus, sustained by Grecian and Thracian mercenaries,

Deinarchus avers, that Demosthenês received an annual present of 1000 modii of corn from Bosphorus.

¹ Demosthen. adv. Dionysodor. p. 1285.

² Strabo, vii. pp. 310, 311.

³ See Inscript. Nos. 2117, 2118, 2119, in Boeckh's Collection, p. 156. In the Memorabilia of Xenophon (ii. 1, 10), Sokratês cites the Scythians as an example of ruling people, and the Mæotæ as an example of subjects. Probably this refers to the position of the Bosporanic Greeks, who paid tribute to the Scythians, but ruled over the Mæotæ. The name *Mæotæ* seems confined to tribes on the Asiatic side of the Palus Mæotis; while the Scythians were on the European side of that sea. Sokratês and the Athenians had good means of being informed about the situation of the Bosporani and their neighbours on both sides. See K. Neumann, *Die Hellenen im Skythenlande*, b. ii. p. 216.

was of considerable (though to us unknown) extent, reaching to somewhere near the borders of Caucasus.¹

Parisadês I. on his death left three sons—Satyrus, Prytanis, and Eumelus. Satyrus, as the eldest, succeeded; but Eumelus claimed the crown, sought aid without, and prevailed on various neighbours—among them a powerful Thracian king named Ariopharnês—to espouse his cause. At the head of an army said to consist of 20,000 horse and 22,000 foot, the two allies marched to attack the territories of Satyrus, who advanced to meet them, with 2000 Grecian mercenaries, and 2000 Thracians of his own, reinforced by a numerous body of Scythian allies—20,000 foot, and 10,000 horse, and carrying with him a plentiful supply of provisions in waggons. He gained a complete victory, compelling Eumelus and Ariopharnês to retreat and seek refuge in the regal residence of the latter, near the river Thapsis; a fortress built of timber, and surrounded with forest, river, marsh, and rock, so as to be very difficult of approach. Satyrus, having first plundered the country around, which supplied a rich booty of prisoners and cattle, proceeded to assail his enemies in their almost impracticable position. But though he, and Meniskus his general of mercenaries, made the most strenuous efforts, and even carried some of the outworks, they were repulsed from the fortress itself; and Satyrus, exposing himself forwardly to extricate Meniskus, received a wound of which he shortly died—after a reign of nine months. Meniskus, raising the siege, withdrew the army to Gargaza; from whence he conveyed back the regal corpse to Pantikapæum.²

¹ This boundary is attested in another Inscription, No. 2104, of the same collection. Inscription No. 2103, seems to indicate Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Leukon: about the mercenaries, see Diodor. xx. 22.

Parisadês I. is said to have been worshipped as a god, after his death (Strabo, vii. p. 310).

² Diodor. xx. 24. The scene of these military operations (as far as we can pretend to make it out from the brief and superficial narrative of Diodorus) seems to have been on the European side of Bosporus; somewhere between the Borysthenes river and the Isthmus of Perekop, in the territory called by Herodotus *Hylæa*. This is Niebuhr's opinion, which I think more probable than that of Boeckh, who supposes the operations to have occurred on the Asiatic territory of Bosporus. So far I concur with Niebuhr; but his reasons for placing Dromichætês king of the Getæ (the victor over Lysimachus), east of the Borysthenes, are noway satisfactory.

Compare Niebuhr's *Untersuchungen über die Skythen*, &c. (in his *Kleine Schriften*, p. 380), with Boeckh's *Commentary on the Sarmatian Inscriptions*, Corp. Ins. Græc. part xi. p. 83-103.

The mention by Diodorus of a wooden fortress, surrounded by morass

Prytanis, the next brother, rejecting an offer of partition tendered by Eumelus, assumed the sceptre, and marched forth to continue the struggle. But the tide of fortune now turned in favour of Eumelus; who took Gargaza with several other places, worsted his brother in battle, and so blocked him up in the isthmus near the Palus Mæotis, that he was forced to capitulate and resign his pretensions. Eumelus entered Pantikapæum as conqueror. Nevertheless, the defeated Prytanis, in spite of his recent covenant, made a renewed attempt upon the crown; wherein he was again baffled, forced to escape to Kêpi, and there slain. To assure himself of the throne, Eumelus put to death the wives and children of both his two brothers, Satyrus and Prytanis—together with all their principal friends. One youth alone—Parisadês, son of Satyrus—escaped and found protection with the Scythian prince Agarus.

Eumelus had now put down all rivals; yet his recent cruelties had occasioned wrath and disgust among the Bosporian citizens. He convoked them in assembly, to excuse his past conduct, and promised good government for the future; at the same time guaranteeing to them their full civic constitution, with such privileges and immunities as they had before enjoyed, and freedom from direct taxation.¹ Such assurances, combined probably with an imposing mercenary force, appeased or at least silenced the prevailing disaffection. Eumelus kept his promises so far as to govern in a mild and popular spirit. While thus rendering himself acceptable at home, he maintained an energetic foreign policy, and made several conquests among the surrounding tribes. He constituted himself a sort of protector of the Euxine, repressing the piracies of the Heniochi and Achæi (among the Caucasian mountains to the east) as well as of the Tauri in the Chersonesus (Crimea); much to the satisfaction of the Byzantines, Sinopians, and other Pontic Greeks. He received a portion of the fugitives from Kallatis, when besieged by Lysimachus, and provided for them a settlement in his dominions. Having thus acquired great reputation, Eumelus was in the full career of conquest and aggrandisement, when an accident terminated his life, after a

and forest, is curious, and may be illustrated by the description in Herodotus (iv. 108) of the city of the Budini. This habit, of building towns and fortifications of wood, prevailed among the Slavonic population in Russia and Poland until far down in the middle ages. See Paul Joseph Schaffarik, *Slavische Alterthümer*, in the German translation of Wuttke, vol. i. ch. 10, p. 192; also K. Neumann, *Die Hellenen im Skythenlande*, p. 91.

¹ Diodor. xx. 24.

reign of rather more than five years. In returning from Scythia to Pantikapæum, in a four-wheeled carriage (or waggon) and four with a tent upon it, his horses took fright and ran away. Perceiving that they were carrying him towards a precipice, he tried to jump out; but his sword becoming entangled in the wheel, he was killed on the spot.¹ He was succeeded by his son Spartokus IV., who reigned twenty years (304-284 B.C.); afterwards came the son of Spartokus, Parisadês II.; with whose name our information breaks off.²

This dynasty, the Spartokidæ, though they ruled the Greeks of Bosphorus as despots by means of a foreign mercenary force—yet seem to have exercised power with equity and moderation.³ Had Eumelus lived, he might probably have established an extensive empire over the barbaric tribes on all sides of him. But empire over such subjects was seldom permanent; nor did his successors long maintain even as much as he left. We have no means of following their fortunes in detail; but we know that about a century B.C. the then reigning prince, Parisadês IV., found himself so pressed and squeezed by the Scythians,⁴ that he was forced (like Olbia and the Pentapolis) to forego his independence; and to call in, as auxiliary or master, the formidable Mithridatês Eupator of Pontus; from whom a new dynasty of Bosporanic kings began—subject however, after no long interval, to the dominion and interference of Rome.

These Mithridatic princes lie beyond our period; but the cities of Bosphorus under the Spartokid princes, in the fourth century B.C., deserve to be ranked among the conspicuous features of the living Hellenic world. They were not indeed purely Hellenic, but presented a considerable admixture of Scythian or Oriental manners; analogous to the mixture of the Hellenic and Libyan elements at Kyrênê with its Battiad princes. Among the facts attesting the wealth and power of these Spartokid princes, and of the Bosporanic community, we may number the imposing groups of mighty sepulchral tumuli

¹ Diodor. xx. 25.

² Diodor. xx. 100. Spartokus IV.—son of Eumelus—is recognised in one Attic Inscription (No. 107), and various Bosporanic (No. 2105, 2106, 2120) in Boeckh's Collection. Parisadês II.—son of Spartokus—is recognised in another Bosporanic Inscription, No. 2107—seemingly also in No. 2120 *b*.

³ Strabo, vii. p. 310. Deinarchus however calls Parisadês, Satyrus and Gorgippus, τοὺς ἐχθίστους τυράννους (adv. Demosth. s. 44).

⁴ Strabo, vii. p. 310. οὐχ ὁλός τε ὦν ἀντέχειν πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, φόρον πρᾶττομένους μείζω τοῦ πρότερον, &c.

near Kertch (Pantikapæum); some of which have been recently examined, while the greater part still remain unopened. These spacious chambers of stone—enclosed in vast hillocks (Kurgans), cyclopiian works piled up with prodigious labour and cost—have been found to contain not only a profusion of ornaments of the precious metals (gold, silver, and electron, or a mixture of four parts of gold to one of silver), but also numerous vases, implements, and works of art, illustrating the life and ideas of the Bosporanic population. “The contents of the tumuli already opened are so multifarious, that from the sepulchres of Pantikapæum alone, we might become acquainted with everything which served the Greeks either for necessary use, or for the decoration of domestic life.”¹ Statues, reliefs, and frescoes on the walls, have been found, on varied subjects both of war and peace, and often of very fine execution; besides these, numerous carvings in wood, and vessels of bronze or terra cotta; with necklaces, armlets, bracelets, rings, drinking cups, &c., of precious metal—several with coloured beads attached.² The costumes, equipment, and physiognomy

¹ Neumann, *Die Hellenen im Skythenlande*, p. 503.

² An account of the recent discoveries near Kertch or Pantikapæum, will be found in Dubois de Montpéroux, *Voyage dans le Caucase*, vol. v. p. 135 *seqq.*; and in Neumann, *Die Hellenen im Skythenlande*, p. 483–533. The last-mentioned work is peculiarly copious and instructive; relating what has been done since Dubois's travels, and containing abundant information derived from the recent memoirs of the St. Petersburg Literary Societies.

The local and special type, which shows itself so much on these works of art, justifies the inference that they were not brought from other Grecian cities, but executed by Grecian artists resident at Pantikapæum (p. 507). Two marble statues, a man and a woman, both larger than life, exhumed in 1850, are spoken of with peculiar admiration (p. 491). Coins of the third and fourth century B.C. have been found in several of the tumuli (p. 494–495). A great number of the so-called Etruscan vases have also been discovered, probably fabricated from a species of clay still existing in the neighbourhood: the figures on these vases are often excellent, with designs and scenes of every description, religious, festal, warlike, domestic (p. 522). Many of the sarcophagi are richly ornamented with carvings, in wood, ivory, &c.; some admirably executed (p. 521).

Unfortunately, the belief prevails, and has long prevailed, among the neighbouring population, that these tumuli contain hidden treasures. One of the most striking among them—called the Kul-Obo—was opened in 1830 by the Russian authorities. After great pains and trouble, the means of entrance were discovered, and the interior chamber was reached. It was the richest that had ever been opened; being found to contain some splendid golden ornaments, as well as many other relics. The Russian officers placed a guard to prevent any one from entering it; but the cupidity of the population of Kertch was so inflamed by the report of the expected treasure being discovered, that they forced the guard, broke into

represented, are indeed a mixture of Hellenic and barbaric ; moreover, even the profusion of gold chains and other precious ornaments, indicates a tone of sentiment partially orientalised, in those for whom they were destined. But the design as well as the execution comes clearly out of the Hellenic workshop ; and there is good ground for believing, that in the fourth century B.C., Pantikapæum was the seat, not only of enterprising and wealthy citizens, but also of strenuous and well-directed artistic genius. Such manifestations of the refinements of Hellenism, in this remote and little-noticed city, form an important addition to the picture of Hellas as a whole,—prior to its days of subjection,—which it has been the purpose of this History to present.

I have now brought down the History of Greece to the point of time marked out in the Preface to my First Volume—the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander—the epoch, from whence dates not only the extinction of Grecian political freedom and self-action, but also the decay of productive genius, and the debasement of that consummate literary and rhetorical excellence which the fourth century B.C. had seen exhibited in Plato and Demosthenês.¹ The contents of this last Volume indicate but too clearly that Greece as a separate subject of history no longer exists ; for one full half of it is employed in depicting Alexander and his conquests—

the interior, and pillaged most of the contents (p. 509). The Russian authorities have been generally anxious for the preservation and gradual excavation of these monuments, but have had to contend against repugnance and even rapacity on the part of the people near.

Dubois de Montpéreux gives an interesting description of the opening of these tumuli near Kertch—especially of the Kul-Obo, the richest of all, which he conceives to have belonged to one of the Spartokid kings, and the decorations of which were the product of Hellenic art :—

“ Si l'on a enterré (he observes) un roi entouré d'un luxe Scythique, ce sont des Grecs et des artistes de cette nation qui ont travaillé à ses funérailles ” (Voyage autour du Caucase, pp. 195, 213, 227). Pantikapæum and Phanagoria (he says) “ se reconnoissent de loin à la foule de leurs tumulus ” (p. 137).

¹ How marked that degradation was, may be seen attested by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, *De Antiquis Oratoribus*, pp. 445, 446, Reiske—*ἐν γὰρ δὴ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν χρόνοις ἡ μὲν ἀρχαία καὶ φιλόσοφος ῥητορικὴ προπηλακισμένη καὶ δεινὰς ὕβρεις ὑπομένουσα κατελύετο, ἀρξαμένη μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνης τελευτῆς ἐκπνεῖν καὶ μαραινέσθαι κατ' ὅλγον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἡλικίας μικροῦ δεήσασα εἰς τέλος ἠφανίσθαι*. Compare Dionys. *De Composit. Verbor.* pp. 29, 30, Reisk. ; and Westernmann, *Geschichte der Griechischen Beredtsamkeit*, s. 75-77.

*ἄγριον αἰχμητὴν κρατερὸν μήστωρα φόβοιο*¹—that non-Hellenic conqueror into whose vast possessions the Greeks are absorbed, with their intellectual brightness bedimmed, their spirit broken, and half their virtue taken away by Zeus—the melancholy emasculation inflicted (according to Homer) upon victims overtaken by the day of slavery.²

One branch of intellectual energy there was, and one alone, which continued to flourish, comparatively little impaired, under the preponderance of the Macedonian sword—the spirit of speculation and philosophy. During the century which we have just gone through, this spirit was embodied in several eminent persons, whose names have been scarcely adverted to in this History. Among these names, indeed, there are two, of peculiar grandeur, whom I have brought partially before the reader, because both of them belong to general history as well as to philosophy; Plato, as citizen of Athens, companion of Sokratēs at his trial, and counsellor of Dionysius in his glory—Aristotle, as the teacher of Alexander. I had at one time hoped to include in my present work a record of them as philosophers also, and an estimate of their speculative characteristics; but I find the subject far too vast to be compressed into such a space as this volume would afford. The exposition of the tenets of distinguished thinkers is not now numbered by historians, either ancient or modern, among the duties incumbent upon them, nor yet among the natural expectations of their readers; but is reserved for the special historian of philosophy. Accordingly, I have brought my History of Greece to a close, without attempting to do justice either to Plato or to Aristotle. I hope to contribute something towards supplying this defect, the magnitude of which I fully appreciate, in a separate work, devoted specially to an account of Greek speculative philosophy in the fourth century B.C.

¹ Hom. Iliad, vi. 97.

² Hom. Odys. xvii. 322—

*ἡμῖσι γάρ τ' ἀρετῆς ἀποαίνονται εὐρύσπα Ζεὺς
ἀνέρος, εὖτ' ἂν μιν κατὰ δούλιον ἦμαρ ἔλθῃσιν.*

APPENDIX

ON ISSUS AND ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD AS CONNECTED WITH THE BATTLE

The exact battle-field of Issus cannot be certainly assigned upon the evidence accessible to us. But it may be determined, within a few miles north or south; and what is even more important—the general features of the locality, as well as the preliminary movements of the contending armies, admit of being clearly conceived and represented. The annexed Plan, of the country round the Gulf of Issus, will enable the reader to follow easily what is certain, and to understand the debate about what is matter of hypothesis.

That the battle was fought in some portion of the narrow space intervening between the eastern coast of the Gulf of Issus and the western flank of Mount Amanus—that Alexander's left and Darius's right, rested on the sea, and their right and left respectively on the mountain—that Darius came upon Alexander unexpectedly from the rear, thus causing him to return back a day's march from Myriandrus, and to reoccupy a pass which he had already passed through and quitted—these points are clearly given, and appear to me not open to question. We know that the river Pinarus, on which the battle was fought, was at a certain distance *south* of Issus, the last town of Kilikia before entering Syria (Arrian, ii. 7, 2) —*ἐς τὴν ὑστεραίαν προῦχόμεναι* (Darius from Issus) *ἐπὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τὸν Πίναρον*—Ritter erroneously states that Issus was *upon* the river Pinarus, which he even calls *the Issus river* (Erdkunde, Theil iv. Abth. 2, p. 1797–1806). We know also that this river was at some distance *north* of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria, through which Alexander passed and repassed.

But when we proceed, beyond these data (the last of them only vague and relative), to fix the exact battle-field, we are reduced to conjecture. Dr. Thirlwall, in an appendix to the sixth volume of his History, has collected and discussed very ably the different opinions of various geographers.

To those whom he has cited, may be added—Mr. Ainsworth's Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates (in the Transactions of the Geographical Society for 1837)—Mützel's Topographical Notes on the third book of Quintus Curtius—and the last volume of Ritter's Erdkunde, published only this year (1855), ch. xxvii. p. 1778 *seqq.*

We know from Xenophon that Issus was a considerable town close to the sea—two days' march from the river Pyramus, and one day's march northward of the maritime pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria. That it was near the north-eastern corner of the Gulf, may also be collected from Strabo, who reckons the shortest line across Asia Minor, as stretching from Sinôpê or Amisus to Issus—and who also lays down the Egyptian sea as having its northern termination *at Issus* (Strabo, xiv. p. 677; xvi.

p. 749). The probable site of Issus has been differently determined by different authors ; Rennell (*Illustrations of the Geography of the Anabasis*, p. 42-48) places it near Oseler or Yusler ; as far as I can judge, this seems too far distant from the head of the Gulf, towards the south.

In respect to the maritime pass, called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, there is much discrepancy between Xenophon and Arrian. It is evident that, in Xenophon's time, this pass and the road of march through it lay between the mountains and the sea,—and that the obstructions (walls blocking up the passage), which he calls insurmountable by force, were mainly of artificial creation. But when Alexander passed no walls existed. The artificial obstructions had disappeared during the seventy years between Xenophon and Alexander ; and we can assign a probable reason why. In Xenophon's time, Kilikia was occupied by the native prince Syennesis, who, though tributary, maintained a certain degree of independence even in regard to the Great King, and therefore kept a wall guarded by his own soldiers on his boundary towards Syria. But in Alexander's time, Kilikia was occupied, like Syria, by a Persian satrap. Artificial boundary walls, between two conterminous satrapies under the same master, were unnecessary ; and must even have been found inconvenient, during the great collective military operations of the Persian satraps against the revolted Evagoras of Cyprus (principally carried on from Kilikia as a base, about 380 B.C., Diodor. xv. 2)—as well as in the subsequent operations against the Phenician towns (Diodor. xvi. 42). Hence we may discern a reason why all artificial obstructions may have been swept away before the time of Alexander ; leaving only the natural difficulties of the neighbouring ground, upon which Xenophon has not touched.

The spot still retained its old name—"The Gates of Kilikia and Syria"—even after walls and gates had been dispensed with. But that name, in Arrian's description, designates a difficult and narrow point of the road *over hills and rocks* ; a point which Major Rennell (*Illustrations*, p. 54) supposes to have been about a mile south of the river and walls described by Xenophon. However this may be, the precise spot designated by Xenophon seems probably to be sought about seven miles north of Scanderoon, near the ruins now known as Jonas's Pillars (or Sakal Tutan), and the Castle of Merkes, where a river called *Merkes*, *Mahersy*, or *Kara-su*, flows across from the mountain to the sea. That this river is the same with the Kersus of Xenophon, is the opinion of Rennell, Ainsworth, and Müttel ; as well as of Colonel Callier, who surveyed the country when accompanying the army of Ibrahim Pacha as engineer (cited by Ritter, *Erdk.* p. 1792). At the spot here mentioned, the gulf indents eastward, while the western flank of Amanus approaches very close to it, and drops with unusual steepness towards it. Hence the road now followed does not pass between the mountain and the sea, but ascends over a portion of the mountain, and descends again afterwards to the low ground skirting the sea. Northward of

Merkes, the space between the mountain and the sea gradually widens, towards Bayas. At some distance to the north of Bayas occurs the river now called Delle Tschai, which is considered, I think with probability, to be the Pinarus, where the battle between Alexander and Darius was fought. This opinion however is not unanimous; Kinneir identifies the *Merkes* with the Pinarus. Moreover, there are several different streams which cross the space between Mount Amanus and the sea. Des Monceaux notices six streams as having been crossed between the Castle of Merkes and Bayas; and five more streams between Bayas and Ayas (Mützel ad Curtium, p. 105). Which among these is the Pinarus, cannot be settled without more or less of doubt.

Besides the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, noted by Xenophon and Arrian in the above passages, there are also other Gates called the *Amanian Gates*, which are spoken of in a perplexing manner. Dr. Thirlwall insists with propriety on the necessity of distinguishing the *maritime* passes, between Mount Amanus and the sea—from the *inland* passes, which crossed over the ridge of Mount Amanus itself. But this distinction seems not uniformly observed by ancient authors, when we compare Strabo, Arrian and Kallisthenês. Strabo uses the phrase, *Amanian Gates*, twice (xiv. p. 676; xvi. p. 751); in both cases designating a *maritime pass*, and not a pass *over* the mountain—yet designating one maritime pass in the page first referred to, and another in the second. In xiv. p. 676 he means by αἱ Ἀμανίδες πύλαι, the spot called by modern travellers Demir Kapu, between Ægæ and Issus, or between Mopsuestia and Issus; while in xvi. 751—he means by the same words that which I have been explaining as the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, on the eastern side of the Gulf of Issus. In fact, Strabo seems to conceive as a whole the strip of land between Mount Amanus and the Gulf, beginning at Demir Kapu, and ending at the Gates of Kilikia and Syria—and to call both the beginning and the end of it by the same name—the Amanian Gates. But he does not use this last phrase to designate the passage over or across Mount Amanus; neither does Arrian; who in describing the march of Darius from Sochi into Kilikia, says (ii. 7, 1)—ὕπερβαλὼν δὴ τὸ ὕρος Δαρείος τὸ κατὰ τὰς πύλας τὰς Ἀμανικὰς καλουμένας, ὡς ἐπὶ Ἰσσοῦ προῆγε, καὶ ἐγένετο κατόπιν Ἀλεξάνδρου λαθὼν. Here, let it be observed, we do not read ὕπερβαλὼν τὰς πύλας—nor can I think that the words mean, as the translator gives them—“transiit Amanum, *eundo per Pylas Amanicas*.” The words rather signify, that Darius “crossed over the mountain where it adjoined the Amanian Gates”—*i. e.* where it adjoined the strip of land skirting the Gulf, and lying between those two extreme points which Strabo denominates *Amanian Gates*. Arrian employs this last phrase more loosely than Strabo, yet still with reference to the maritime strip, and not to a *col* over the mountain ridge.

On the other hand, Kallisthenês (if he is rightly represented by Polybius who recites his statement, not his words, xii. 17) uses the words *Amanian Gates* to signify the passage by which Darius

entered Kilikia—that is, the passage *over* the mountain. That which Xenophon and Arrian call the *Gates of Kilikia and Syria*—and which Strabo calls *Amanian Gates*—is described by Polybius as τὰ στενὰ, καὶ τὰς λεγομένας ἐν τῇ Κιλικίᾳ πύλας.

I have marked on the Plan the pass by which Darius crossed Mount Amanus, as it stands on Kiepert's Map, and on Chesney's Map; in the line from Aintab to the head of the Gulf, near the 37th parallel. It seems pretty certain that this must have been Darius's line of march, because he came down immediately upon Issus, and then marched forward to the river Pinarus. Had he entered Kilikia by the pass of Beylan, he must have passed the Pinarus *before* he reached Issus. The positive grounds for admitting a practicable pass near the 37th parallel, are indeed called in question by Müttel (ad Curtium, pp. 102, 103), and are not in themselves conclusive; still I hold them sufficient, when taken in conjunction with the probabilities of the case. This pass was, however, we may suppose, less frequented than the maritime line of road through the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, and the pass of Beylan; which, as the more usual, was preferred both by the Cyreians and by Alexander.

Respecting the march of Alexander, Dr. Thirlwall here starts a question, substantially to this effect: "Since Alexander intended to march through the pass of Beylan for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp at Sochi, what could have caused him to go to Myriandrus, which was more south than Beylan, and out of his road?" Dr. Thirlwall feels this difficulty so forcibly, that in order to eliminate it, he is inclined to accept the hypothesis of Mr. Williams, which places Myriandrus at Bayas, and the Kiliko-Syrian Gates at Demir-Kapu; an hypothesis which appears to me inadmissible on various grounds, and against which Mr. Ainsworth (in his Essay on the Cilician and Syrian Gates) has produced several very forcible objections.

I confess that I do not feel the difficulty on which Dr. Thirlwall insists. When we see that Cyrus and the Ten Thousand went to Myriandrus, in their way to the pass of Beylan, we may reasonably infer that, whether that town was in the direct line or not, it was at least in the *usual* road of march—which does not always coincide with the direct line. But to waive this supposition, however—let us assume that there existed another shorter road leading to Beylan without passing by Myriandrus—there would still be reason enough to induce Alexander to go somewhat out of his way, in order to visit Myriandrus. For it was an important object with him to secure the sea-ports in his rear, in case of a possible reverse. Suppose him repulsed and forced to retreat,—it would be a material assistance to his retreat, to have assured himself beforehand of Myriandrus as well as the other sea-ports.

In the approaching months, we shall find him just as careful to make sure of the Phenician cities on the coast, before he marches into the interior to attack Darius at Arbela.


Further, Alexander, marching to attack Darius, had nothing to

gain by haste, and nothing to lose by coming up to Sochi three days later. He knew that the enormous Persian host would not try to escape ; it would either await him at Sochi, or else advance into Kilikia to attack him there. The longer he tarried, the more likely they were to do the latter, which was what he desired. He had nothing to lose therefore in any way, and some chance of gain, by prolonging his march to Sochi for as long a time as was necessary to secure Myriandrus. There is no more difficulty, I think, in understanding why he went to Myriandrus than why he went westward from Tarsus (still more out of his line of advance) to Soli and Anchialus.


It seems probable (as Rennell (p. 56) and others think), that the site of Myriandrus is now some distance inland ; that there has been an accretion of new land and morass on the coast.

The modern town of Scanderoon occupies the site of *Ἀλεξανδρεῖα κατ' Ἰσσόον*, founded (probably by order of Alexander himself) in commemoration of the victory of Issus. According to Ritter (p. 1791), "Alexander had the great idea of establishing there an emporium for the traffic of the East with Europe, as at the other Alexandria for the trade of the East with Egypt." The importance of the site of Scanderoon, in antiquity, is here greatly exaggerated. I know no proof that Alexander had the idea which Ritter ascribes to him ; and it is certain that his successors had no such idea ; because they founded the great cities of Antioch and Seleukeia (in Pieria), both of them carrying the course of trade up the Orontes, and therefore diverting it away from Scanderoon. This latter town is only of importance as being the harbour of Aleppo ; a city (Berœa) of little consequence in antiquity, while Antioch became the first city in the East, and Seleukeia among the first : see Ritter, p. 1152.

PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE BATTLE OF ISSUS.



AFRICAN TERRITORY OF CARTHAGE



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